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Abstract
This doctoral study is situated within key debates relating to a recognised need to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. National governments have been subject to binding 
targets through the Kyoto Treaty and linked EU legislation, with many governments 
implementing their own climate change programmes. One consequence of this is that 
sub-national governing organisations are being confronted with a need to re-think their 
own governing logics. This includes new strategies for reducing emissions and perhaps 
different ways of viewing spaces within their jurisdiction. Research in this area requires 
more empirical and conceptual development (although see While, Jonas and Gibbs, 
2010). This study investigates carbon reduction policies in the English regions between 
2005 and 2009, with a focus on practices of re-imagining, calculating and connecting 
the region as a ‘carbon space’.
The PhD contributes to contemporary research on climate change policy in three key 
ways. First, although some scholars (for example, Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003) have 
explored the role of cities in climate change governance, few have engaged theoretically 
and empirically with debates around the spatial politics of carbon reduction. This thesis 
helps to fill this gap, and contributes to conceptual debates around low-carbon 
transitions and the political impacts of carbon management in Western states.
Second, the thesis draws from the work of John Allen (2003), Harriet Bulkeley and 
colleagues (cf. Bulkeley et al. 2005; 2007) and Multi-level Governance theories to 
develop a nuanced ‘multi-level power modalities’ account of governing practices. This 
particularly focuses on the mediations and translations between actors as governing 
technologies are deployed. This helps to highlight, third, an emerging ‘multi-scalar 
politics of carbon’ in particular relating to knowledge and evidence. This alludes to, first, 
the politics surrounding centralised regulation of spatial carbon emissions; and, second, 
a rising sub-national carbon ‘elite’ of policy professionals with greater access to carbon 
knowledges, thus able to better interpret and manipulate top-down imposition of carbon 
targets than others.
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1 Introduction
A century after Svante Arrhenius (1896) first presented his “hot house theory”, the creation of the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1997 was a landmark point in the recognition of climate 
change as a political concern. The Protocol included binding emissions reduction targets 
for 37 industrialised nations, which included the UK as part of an EU bloc of 15 
member states. This marked the point at which climate change first became a serious 
policy issue for nation states. It was a clear sign that a shift had taken place from policy 
interventions that focused on the science of climate change, to ‘science for policy’ 
(Agrawala, 1998). This shift signalled a deeper enmeshing of human political interests 
within climate change debates and from here the relatively simple mitigative solution in 
scientific terms -  reduce activities that produce greenhouse gases -  takes on all the 
characteristics of what might be termed a wicked issue (Rittel, 1969). That is, as a 
problem for humans, it is a symptom of -  and is complicated by -  other sets of human 
problems, while solutions are not easily defined and often sit within amorphous grey 
areas between ‘better’ and ‘worse’, rather than ‘right or ‘wrong’.
While the Kyoto Protocol was concerned with the umbrella terms of climate change 
mitigation1 and adaptation, it was distinctive in that it focused on emissions reductions, 
and specifically that it required signatory states to begin to effectively account for 
national emissions levels. - This in turn developed the need for effective ‘carbon 
management’ systems: the need for governing processes to both account for and then 
instigate action to reduce carbon emissions (or remove them from the books through 
other means).
1 Attempts to reduce, or mitigate for the extent o f  clim ate change resulting from human activity. This 
covers a range o f  actions, which may include different forms o f  non-em issions related geo-engineering as 
well as em issions reductions.
‘ The K yoto Protocol aimed to reduce em issions in ‘Annex T industrialised nations by 5 per cent by 
2008-2012  relative to a 1990 baseline. This built on the U N FC C C , drawn up at the 1992 R io ‘Earth 
Sum m it’, which com m itted signatories to action on clim ate change, but did not introduce binding  
com m itm ents.
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Yet, progress on carbon management policy at the national level post-1997 did not 
happen as quickly as was perhaps at first anticipated, or hoped for. Initial policy 
development in the United Kingdom -  for example -  was slow and piecemeal and did 
little to address the wide ranging structural issues associated with ‘de-carbonising’ the 
UK economy. The decision by the United States -  until recently the largest emitters of 
carbon dioxide -  not to ratify the treaty was a factor in this lack of action. Various 
‘serendipitous’ (Kerr, 2007) events, such as the de-industrialisation of economies and 
recessions of varying magnitude across Europe in the early 1990s also meant that 
countries like the UK were on course to meet their emissions quotas without having to 
implement major new policy instruments. But the lack of genuine progress was also 
partly to do with the fact that carbon management under the Kyoto Protocol required 
only that individual states’ carbon accounts be reduced: there were various means by 
which countries could effectively buy their way to meeting targets, for example through 
purchasing ‘hot air’ from nations that had achieved cuts beyond their own quotas.
In the mid-2000s this attitude towards action on carbon emissions began to change. 
After nearly a decade of relative inaction following the Kyoto summit in 1997, 
governments at all levels were seemingly beginning to take heed of the urgent need for 
action on carbon reduction -  and reduced oil dependence -  as well as adapting to the 
likely consequences of climate change. In 2007 the first national binding commitment to 
emissions budgeting was introduced in the UK Climate Change Bill, which 
accompanied political rhetoric regarding a new emphasis on spatial and individual 
carbon budgeting, emissions trading regimes and the search for a new international 
settlement on carbon reduction post-Kyoto.
Amongst this new-found seriousness about climate change a host of issues old and new 
were beginning to emerge or receive new levels of scrutiny. Many of these brought new 
dimensions to existing debates, such as re-invigorated tensions between state and 
market, or the organisation of responsibilities between individuals and collective or 
state bodies. It also brought added dimensions to discussions of how to effect changes in 
human behaviour, including the methods that governing actors could employ to do so 
and the time horizons within which such changes needed to take place.
These deliberations brought further questions regarding the best way of governmental 
and spatial organisation for such efforts. This included consideration of geographic 
scales at which policy would be best organised and implemented, the relationship 
between different scales of governing, and the role of different forms of network 
governance across and between cities, regions and nations. Amongst these issues are the 
scalar functions of different organisations and how this affects the types of actions they 
might become involved with. For instance, should certain organisations concern 
themselves purely with ‘steering’ action elsewhere, while others engage with direct 
emissions reductions? Alongside these quandaries of government came more 
fundamental questions about the ‘re-imagining’ of spaces as ‘carbon spaces’, including 
questions of how the idea of such spaces would fit with existing political spatial ‘fixes’. 
Within this, the question of how to effectively compartmentalise space for purposes of 
carbon accounting is a particularly interesting issue, as it throws human searches for 
order up against the fundamentally disordered ‘seething mass’ of nature.
To compound the list of concerns, these issues of political organisation sit alongside 
continuing uncertainty regarding aspects of the science of climate change and the 
measurement of carbon emissions. Tracing the multiple politics of these issues is 
fascinating in itself, but it is also crucially important to develop an understanding and 
assessment of emerging experiments that attempt to provide solutions to these problems.
The incorporation of climate change into more mainstream political agendas meant 
intervention at sub-national scales. Following initial understandings of the nation state 
as a ‘carbon space’ under the Kyoto protocol, the new emphasis on ‘carbon control’ 
(While, 2008) within the nation state requires a further stage of spatial re-imagining and 
calculation in order to draw sub-national actors into the logic of carbon management. As 
such, of particular interest here is the emerging role of sub-national governing 
organisations in the development of programmes for carbon management, including the 
ways in which international and national policy rhetoric is translated, replicated or 
produced by sub-national governing actors.
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A brief overview of the thesis
This research account is based on research carried out between 2007 and 2009 and 
provides an analysis of spatial practices of governing carbon management in the English 
regions between 2005 and 2009. The research takes as its starting point two moments of 
change in 2007: the emergence of climate change in the mainstream of political and 
popular discourse in the UK; and sub-national institutional reorganisation as a result of 
the 2007 ‘Sub-National Review’ (HM Treasury, 2007). Specifically, it focuses on 
groups of ‘first and second wave’ practices identified through the evolution of carbon 
management policy within specific regions, which follows a rough pre- and post-2007 
chronology. Yorkshire and the Humber provides the main focus of study on individual 
governing technologies, while the South West and North East regions are used to 
provide broader context as well as some specific comparator examples. The research 
began with an interest in the extent to which regional organisations were developing 
climate change policy, given an apparent gap in the literature to date on this issue. This 
then developed into the following four basic questions:
-  How is carbon management being governed in the English regions?
-  Specifically, how are practices of governing being used to re-imagine regions as 
‘carbon spaces’?
-  What are the specific spatial practices involved in doing so?
-  How have these practices changed over time?
This included an interest in exploring the ways that the multiple politics of space -  
particularly of scale -  were being played out within these emerging practices and 
translation between the steering, or ‘metagovernance’ activities of regional 
organisations affected ‘on the ground’ action.
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Scholarly attention
I began the research for this thesis in early 2007, the point at which climate change had 
just begun to filter through as a ‘serious’ national policy item, and more widely as a 
matter of concern within popular discourse. This new era of carbon calculation and 
control seemed to mark not only a change in the extent to which climate change was 
considered as a matter for concern, it also presented a potential shift in the type of 
governing practices used to achieve environmental goals. As Aidan While (2008 p8) 
notes: “a low-carbon polity is structured around a somewhat instrumental goal, 
especially in comparison with the integrated perspective of sustainable development”.
At the same time, while national and international climate policy had received a degree 
of attention in academic circles, emerging patterns of sub-national climate governance 
had been subjected to less examination. Some studies (e.g. Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; 
Hodson and Marvin, 2007) had explored local approaches to climate protection, but 
these had not been placed within the context of this new phase of ‘eco-state 
restructuring’ (While et al., 2010 via Meadowcroft, 2005). In particular, the role of 
meso-scales of governing -  federal, regional and sub-regional governing actors -  in 
governing climate change had received little attention. In 2010, despite growing interest 
in these issues these interstices remain largely unexplored within academic literature, 
with the extent and implications of the rise of ‘carbon control’ (While, 2008) yet to be 
empirically tested. This research therefore took as its starting point a commitment to 
bring empirical light to the role of sub-national actors -  specifically the English regions 
-  in governing carbon management and the ways in which these functions may be 
changing, with the aim that this would also lead to some conceptual and theoretical 
contributions to carbon control debates.
Concomitant to changing governmental climate change agendas was a seemingly more 
prosaic set of organisational changes taking place in the English regions. The failure of 
the 2004 referendum in the North East, and an element of general apathy towards the 
New Labour regional ‘project’ sparked off a period of existential flux for regional 
organisations, culminating first in the 2007 ‘Sub-national Review’, which resulted in the
'yabolition of Regional Assemblies. This provides a second ‘moment of change’ for the 
research, as regional actors struggled not only to position climate change as a point of 
action, but were subject to changing understandings of the role of the regions in the 
context of continuing institutional malaise and uncertainty about the future.
Following the election of the Coalition government in May 2010, the abolition of 
Regional Development Agencies and Government Offices for the Regions was 
announced. Disregarding the merits of these decisions,4 from a self-centred point of 
view this final rejection of the regions in England appeared at first to me as disastrous. 
Removal of the entire governing network that I had spent three and a bit years exploring 
seemed to me initially to reduce this thesis to a historical document. Notwithstanding 
the fact that these events serve as a useful reminder to other researchers about the merits 
of submitting research findings as soon as possible after conducting fieldwork, on 
reflection I believe that the research does retain empirical relevance and utility to others. 
This is in part because it focuses on a range of more general trends in carbon 
management and spatial regulation, but also as it provides an examination of continuing 
debates around scales and spaces of governing: not least the UK’s apparent addiction to 
the spatial reorganisation of administrative units. This is set within the context of what 
proved to be the death-throes of the Labour government and, in turn, the post-1997 form 
of institutional regionalism.
Theoretical background
A key area of interest, which runs through both climate change as a policy domain and 
the region as a political space, is the importance of legitimacy in achieving policy aims. 
In particular, the research explores the notions of spatial and governing legitimacy and 
aims to uncover the extent to which these have played a role in the acceptance or 
rejection of governmental programmes, and the effect that changing institutional and 
policy arrangements have had upon them. This includes analysis of attempts to develop
3 The regional project might perhaps be more accurately termed Prescottism given the main source o f  
enthusiasm for English devolution, the rise and fall in influence within governm ent o f  John Prescott 
perhaps also providing at least part o f  the explanation for the later political apathy for continuing  
regionalisation o f  government.
4 A lthough they are important, they are not the focus o f  this research.
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legitimacy through different sets of practices. For instance, central to changing attitudes 
and behaviour towards action on carbon emissions is a need to re-imagine governed 
spaces as ‘carbon spaces’, which requires legitimisation of climate change as a policy 
concern (termed here as thematic legitimacy); the space concerned as a place, territory, 
network or scale for dealing with that concern; and the governing actors as capable of 
acting upon it.
The carbon control thesis suggests that moves towards a change in perspective of 
environmental governance are being pushed by attempts to re-calculate space through 
carbon accounting. This is not an entirely new phenomenon: as I explore in an analysis 
of ‘pre-carbon control’ action in Yorkshire and the Humber (Chapters 9, 10 and 11) 
sub-national attempts had been made by governing actors to re-calculate regions as 
carbon spaces in the early 2000s. This was, however, limited to individual local and 
regional actors’ attempts to effect change, rather than as part of a wider instrumental 
programme of spatial regulation. In question therefore is the extent to which previous 
attempts were successful in bringing about change, but also how more recent attempts at 
re-calculating sub-national space differ in form and extent to these earlier programmes.
Calculative practices tend to be used to provide an illustration of instrumental 
approaches to carbon management. They may, however, be utilised as the focal point of 
associative programmes to build consensus on a particular issue, something which is 
perhaps under-emphasised in discussions of carbon accounting. Similarly, associative 
programmes such as partnerships, intelligence networks and enabling funding streams 
did not disappear with the emergence of new carbon rationalities. Instead it is important 
to uncover the ways in which these initially developed as programmes prior to the 
implementation of carbon control regimes and the effect that new governmental 
programmes then had upon these programmes. This has received less attention in the 
literature relating to ‘carbon control’ to date.
Exploring these events required grounding in three sets of theoretical debates. First, an
exploration of the production of spatial formations led to a general conceptualisation of
spatial relations that draws on Bob Jessop, Martin Jones and Neil Brenner’s (2008)
‘TSPN’ -  territory-scale-place-network -  approach. Second, an exploration of ‘eco-state
restructuring’, sustainability and emerging understandings of ‘carbon control’ framed
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the understanding of policy trends in the UK and ‘the West’ more widely. Third, an 
interest in attempts to legitimise political programmes and changing practices of 
governing required an understanding of the specificities of power as exercised by 
governing actors. Here, John Allen’s theorising on the lost ‘geographies of power’ is 
drawn upon to re-work Harriet Bulkeley’s (et al., 2005; with Kern, 2006; et al. 2007) 
modes of governing framework into an approach that is both sympathetic to the (multi­
level) ‘whereabouts’ as well specific ‘howabouts’ of power as governing actors act as 
producers, mediators, intermediaries and recipients of governmental technologies.
This leads to three broad aims for the thesis beyond the specific research questions 
outlined above. These are as follows:
-  To bring empirical light to the role of sub-national actors in governing carbon 
management and the ways in which these roles may be changing, leading to some 
conceptual contributions to carbon control debates
-  To utilise and develop a framework of understanding practices of ‘group formation’ 
and the development of ties between governing actors through understanding of the 
different ways in which power is exercised in governing processes.
-  To explore notions of spatial and governing legitimacy as a focus of governmental 
programmes but also as a framework for understanding the success or failure of 
different sets of governing practices.
There is also a broader concern, which sits behind the decision-making process, to 
recognise and draw attention to a ‘geography of practice’, with particular emphasis on 
the actors and objects that work ‘in between’ others to shape these practices. Even more 
broadly, there is an aim to continue the vein of thinking that should come naturally to 
those trained within geographical disciplines but which is not always apparent in their 
accounts: an approach to space which recognises human and non-human entities as 
intrinsically linked; ontologically the same; and entirely contingent.
Reference to Italo Calvino’s 1979 novel, I f  on a winter's night a traveler, draws a 
number of these themes out more clearly. In the novel, the protagonist “You” becomes
14
embroiled in a farcical journey through different books that are at first apparently 
identical. He begins one book, which he is then unable to finish, before starting another, 
apparently the same, book with virtually the same title. Except, of course it is an 
entirely different book. This is a continuing theme of the story, with no satisfactory 
answers elicited from his search for the ends to the books, and no final ‘closure’. This 
serves, in part, as an analogy for the research process, or even a history of the 
challenges of research. Endless dead ends and fruitless searching for further information, 
only to be interrupted by other, equally important avenues of research, which result in 
yet more dead ends and unanswered questions.
But it also serves to present two other sets of issues relating to the analysis of data. First, 
You’s engagement along the way with other people who provide him with books; 
passively watch; enable access to other people and places; who divert his attention; 
offer false information; threaten him; or simply refuse to co-operate with his search, 
highlights the role of the ‘in-between’ people: the mediators, intermediaries and other 
actors that can aid, hinder, or be passively neutral in both the practice of research and of 
governing. These are recurring themes in the empirical chapters in this, present work. 
As Bruno Latour (2005 p43) notes, “action is always overtaken”.
Second, two of the book titles in the novel draw attention to the subtleties of power, and 
the formation of ties: In a network o f lines that enlace and In a network o f lines that 
intersect. They sound almost the same, and apparently represent the same thing at first 
glance: a group of entities that coalesce at various points. But they do mean subtly 
different things. The former relates to ties that are bounded, and work to constrict 
something, or someone. The latter on the other hand denotes a coalition of entities, a 
coming together without imposition. Untangling these subtle differences is another 
recurring theme of this work: for instance the points at which seduction becomes 
induction becomes manipulation becomes coercion becomes domination...
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Thesis structure
The thesis is organised into three sections in a relatively conventional manner. The first 
four chapters are concerned with setting the research questions through engagement 
with the theoretical debates and empirical literature regarding the broad areas of the 
production of space and the practice of governing. Chapters 2-4 work with ideas about 
the construction of political spatial formations. This begins with some ‘initial 
propositions’ (Massey, 2005) of types of spatial formation and notions of spatial and 
governing ‘legitimacies’ (Chapter 2) and then leads into more specific discussions in 
relation to the ‘chaotic construction’ of the English regions (Chapter 3). The 
institutional arrangements are posited as being inherently unstable, caused in part by a 
degree of existential muddle as to the function and meaning of ‘the region’.
Chapter 4 shifts to look at the incorporation of non-human space into political 
decision-making. This is based around an exploration of the evolution of environmental 
policy discourses in the West in relation to sub-national governing actors and takes the 
idea of ‘eco-state restructuring’ (While et al., 2010) as its guiding theme. The analysis 
looks first at the literature on the incorporation of sustainable development agendas into 
policy, noting how its core aims have been first subverted and then substituted for 
narrower ‘smart growth’ and eco-modemisation projects, before being potentially 
subsumed by emerging ‘carbon control’ agendas. From this angle carbon control is 
distinct from sustainable development, but also can be seen as part of a longer process 
of ‘instrumentalisation’ in economising environmental goals. The core research agendas 
are set out in the conclusions, based around the need to empirically explore the 
purported shift in governing logics towards developing regimes of carbon control.
The final chapter in the first section of the thesis (Chapter 5) is concerned with
developing an analytical framework for exploring the agendas highlighted in the
preceding chapters, based on an identified need to uncover the specific practices
involved in developing governing programmes and the changes that may have taken
place to the form of these programmes over time. The chapter argues that such an
approach needs to be attentive to both the multi-site nature of governing as well as the
different power modalities that are exercised in attempting to effect behavioural change.
This requires combining and re-casting multi-level governance and ‘modes of
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governing’ (Bulkeley et al., 2005) frameworks towards developing a framework capable 
of exploring the way governmental technologies are developed, implemented, mediated 
and translated through space.
Having set up the study questions and the broad ‘angle of attack’, the second section of 
the thesis deals with the practical matter of carrying out the research. As such, it looks at 
developing a methodological framework, deploying methods to capture information, 
and then reflection on the challenges that these brought in carrying them out. Chapter 6 
sets out the case for using an in-depth case study approach to explore the research 
questions, including the rationale behind the choice of Yorkshire and the Humber, 
North East and South West regions as case studies. Chapter 7 reflects on the process of 
‘doing’ the research in terms of the methods of data collection, the experience of 
actually carrying out the data collection and methods of data analysis.
The final part of the research account focuses on research findings and analysis, with a 
study of both general and specific developments in governing carbon management in 
Yorkshire and the Humber alongside the two ‘comparator’ regions. Chapter 8 begins 
this section by outlining an initial ‘baseline’ of activity on carbon management in the 
regions ‘pre-2007’ by setting out an analysis of the modes of governing being utilised 
and some of the political issues surrounding these alongside a brief analysis of carbon 
emissions trends across the regions.
Chapters 9 and 10 open up the analysis of specific ‘first wave’ spatial practices of 
carbon management with an exploration of early attempts to re-calculate, re-imagine 
and -  in doing so -  ‘re-connect’ Yorkshire and the Humber through, first, a regional 
carbon reduction target and later a regional climate change partnership with an 
associated action plan. Both sets of practices sought to develop ‘carbon regionalisms’ 
through co-option to a shared regional agenda on carbon management and specific 
understanding of the region as legitimate space for governing carbon. Chapter 11 is a 
short discussion chapter, which sums up some of the key underlying issues threading 
through the previous three chapters in terms of governing and spatial legitimacy. In 
particular it focuses on the level of connection between scales of governing, different 
understandings of the region as a ‘carbon space’ and the extent to which different local
actors shared these understandings with regional policy-makers.
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Chapter 12 moves on to look at the development of ‘second wave’ practices in the 
regions, with particular emphasis on the centralisation of governing carbon through the 
development of instrumental practices for calculating carbon emissions. The main focus 
for this is the introduction of local area carbon reduction targets through Local Area 
Agreements in 2008, which brought a new carbon management role for Government 
Offices for the Regions as mediators between central and local government in the 
setting of targets. The final part of the chapter explores how introduction of 
instrumental programmes, an increase in wider engagement with carbon management as 
a policy agenda and changing institutional relationships in the regions led also to a 
second wave of associative spatial practices, which were more fractured across sectors 
and scales than previous ‘carbon regionalisms’. Finally, Chapter 13 provides a 
concluding discussion of broader themes and research agendas that emerge from the 
thesis.
18
2 Spatial Formations
Look. This is the idea: to study man as he really is. Not this metaphysical marionette they’ve 
made us believe he is, but the physiological human being, determined by his surroundings, 
motivated by the functioning of his organs ... What is thought, in God’s name, but the 
product of the entire body? Can they get a brain to think by itself? What happens to the 
“nobility” of the brain when its owner has belly-ache?
‘Sandoz’, in Emile Zola’s The Masterpiece, 1886/1993 p i54
Two sets of broad theoretical debates underpin this research. These relate respectively 
to the conceptualisation of spatial and governing processes. Chapter 5, which outlines 
the analytical framework for this project, will deal with the latter -  the issue of 
governing space -  while this chapter aims to introduce the literature surrounding 
conceptualisations of space. This will then lead on to a discussion of two specific sets of 
spatial concerns: the construction of political spaces -  in this case the English regions -  
and the incorporation of non-human space into (sub-national) political decision-making, 
in particular the challenges posed by climate change.
This initial discussion stems from the separate works of Doreen Massey and Bruno 
Latour to develop an understanding of space(-time) as relational, always contingent and 
without necessary conceptual distinctions between human and non-human elements.5 
From these starting points, the focus turns to exploring some of the terms used to 
describe different types of spatial formation. This takes recent debates relating to 
geographical scale as a starting point, before developing a more plural approach to the 
various types of spatial discourses that political actors may seek to generate through 
different practices of legitimisation. This then leads into an exploration of the English 
regions as ‘chaotic constructions’ (Chapter 3): the coalescence of various political
5 A s M assey explains, the full term ‘space-tim e’ helps to understand the concept as relational and 
contingent. I w ill m ostly stick with the shorthand o f  ‘space’ for the remainder o f  this account, how ever.
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strategies in the late 1990s and early 2000s represented a range of potentially conflicting 
spatial discourses, which led to an inherently unstable spatial fix.
A second set of debates surround the various phases of ‘eco-restructuring’ of the state -  
broadly defined -  identified by Aidan While, Andy Jonas and David Gibbs (2010). Of 
particular interest are recent trends towards incorporating physical and/or non-human 
space into policy, first through a dominant ‘sustainable development’ paradigm, and 
more recently through the emergence of a distinct ‘carbon control’ policy fix that 
focuses explicitly on the ecological crises threatened by anthropogenic climate change 
(Chapter 4). Here a number of trends are highlighted, including the co-option, 
subversion and substitution of environmental policy to legitimise short-termist 
economic policy. While the advent of carbon control presents a shift in the form and 
extent that states needs to ‘take the environment seriously’ (Meadowcroft, 2005), work 
in this area highlights a need to explore further the continuities with and shifts away 
from ‘old’ sustainable development logic, and the politics that arise from these.
Conceptualising space
To begin, a brief exposition of the general principles underpinning the approach to 
space taken in this account is necessary in order to develop some ontological and 
epistemological foundation for what follows. In doing so, Andrew Sayer’s (2000 p i06) 
warning relating to spatial theorisation is heeded. He notes that scholars often become 
tied up in attempting to theorise space, without ever moving beyond the point of high- 
level abstraction, which makes such discussions relatively meaningless:
There have been numerous attempts to develop spatial social theory which find it difficult to 
get beyond repeated mentions of space, without being able to say much about what social 
spaces are like in terms of their spatial form or configuration.
Emphasis in original
The intention here is that mentions of space are taken somewhat further, first through
conceptualisation and then later employing these conceptualisations in an analysis of
governing practices. This research is concerned with the construction of conceptions
and configurations of spatial formations, approaching socio-political processes as
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critical, but not all-encompassing in terms of understanding the world; that is, 
examining the politics of certain forms of spatial practice. In taking this approach to 
research, there is an obvious temptation to ‘fetishise’ space: to be clear, it is not argued 
that everything must be considered in terms of space -  although it cannot be entirely 
avoided -  but that many processes and events may be well served by a spatial approach. 
6 Others may not require an explicitly spatial approach to uncover the mechanisms and 
structures of their being, but may equally well be served in using spatial terminology to 
explain them.
This research account takes Doreen Massey’s ‘opening propositions’ (2005, p9) to her 
spatial treatise, fo r  space, as solid foundations for a conceptualisation of space. These 
propositions seek to understand space as being contingent, relational and essentially 
‘thrown together’. First, space should be conceived as being produced by interrelations.7 
In line with conventional physics, space can never be anything but relative; spaces are 
always evolving and changing, the universe ever-expanding, the Earth always moving
othrough space. This is something that has been approached in the lexicon of the social 
sciences through the contemporary ‘relational turn’ in geography (Yeung, 2005).9 This 
is outlined in earlier work with John Allen et al. (1998) on Rethinking the region. Here 
the argument is that spaces should, or can only be, defined in relation to other spaces; 
by what makes them different:
‘Regions’ only exist in relation to particular criteria. They are not ‘out there’ waiting to be 
discovered; they are our (and others’) constructions.
Ib id .  p2
Second, Massey outlines space as being the ‘realm of possibility’: it allows for “the 
existence of multiplicity in the sense of contemporaneous plurality” (p9) and space is
6 A s Sayer (2000  p 107) argues, “In som e respects, [space] is absolutely vital, in others it d oesn ’t make 
much difference”, but see, for exam ple, Bertram Zuindeau’s (2006) spatial approach to sustainable  
developm ent, which show s how  potential conflicts are more easily outlined and g ive  a clearer (more 
bleak) picture when view ed through a spatial lens. A lso  see Stcfanic Duhr (2005) on mapping and policy  
outcom es.
7 This is a concept long held within physics, but can be just as well explained in the lexicon o f  the social 
sciences.
8 Although there may be such thing as absolute motion  -  see Huggert and Hoel'er (2006).
9 Although Y eung is unconvinced as to the actual novelty o f  this “turn’, instead pointing to the array o f  
literature produced in the 1970s, ‘80s and early ‘90s exploring the production o f space as a function o f  
social and econom ic inequalities; that is o f  spalio-social relations.
seen as fundamentally plural. Later on in fo r  space, Massey talks of the 
‘throwntogethemess’ of place. This can be taken further to link in with the ideas of 
Bruno Latour, who points to the false boundaries that have been drawn up and 
maintained -  often without question -  between the human and non-human spheres. 
Instead, events and processes should be seen as taking shape through heterogeneous 
bundles of associations (Latour, 2005). Heterogeneous in that they are not made of 
‘political’ or ‘economic’ or ‘physical’ associations, but all of these and many more. This 
approach is particularly important in reasserting the importance of material processes 
that are in danger of being lost through approaches that reify the power of ‘the social’ or 
discursive practices: as Latour points out, only the most basic of human interactions can 
be said to be purely ‘social’ in the common understanding of the w ord.10 Increasingly 
few ‘social’ encounters involve direct ‘face-to-face’ verbal communication, and even 
then these encounters are reliant on myriad extra-social forces that, for example, make 
speech possible, or travelling to the point at which a person is within talking distance of 
somebody else.
Third, space is dynamic, in a constant state of emergence (Sayer, 1992). It should not be 
seen simply as ‘the crystallisation of time’ (Castells, 1998), a viewpoint which leads to 
a static understanding of space. This highlights important issues, not least that spatial 
formations -  such as regions -  should be recognised as (temporary) constructions in 
space:
Precisely because space on this reading is a product of relations-between, relations which are 
necessarily embedded material practices which have to be carried out, it is always in the 
process of being made. It is never finished; never closed. Perhaps we could imagine space as 
a simultaneity of stories-so-far.
Massey, 2005 p9
10 A s a relevant exam ple o f  this failure, in an initial review  o f  42 papers relating to the ‘new  regionalism ’ 
in Europe and North A m erica, not one made reference to the physical spatial properties, or o f  non-human  
relations, including those that sought to critique different spatial conceptualisations used by others.
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There is, therefore, “no coherent now” (p i58) to space. This is important to bear in 
mind in relation to any spatial exploration: research is always being carried out “in the 
middle of things, in media res” (Latour, 2005 p30). As Massey (2005, p l4 1 ) notes of 
her favourite peak in the Lake District:
.. .the rocks of Skiddaw are immigrant rocks, just passing through here, like my sister and me 
only rather more slowly, and changing all the while. Places as heterogeneous associations. If 
we can’t go ‘back’ home, in the sense that it will have moved on from where we left it, then 
no more, and in the same sense, can we, on a weekend in the country, go back to nature. It 
too is moving on ... [I]n the end there is no ground, in the sense of a stable position.
Having said that, understanding space as a relative, dynamic concept should not be seen 
as ‘absolute’ relativity in the practical sense. In recent years the trends of technology-led 
globalisation (or ‘glocalisation’; Swyngedouw, 1997) have led to notions such as the 
‘space of flows’ (Castells, 1998), and space-time compression (Harvey, 2000). These 
understand relational space as becoming less fixed, and capable of being easily 
transgressed through leaps in communication technologies, for example. As Castells 
points out, however, the outcomes of these processes are not even; the result is 
‘switched on’ and ‘switched off’ spaces. In essence then, the result of globalised 
communications is not space-time compression, but space-time distortion (Massey, 
2005). For Latour (2005), like Massey, space-times are not linear. They instead are 
characterised by ‘nearness and rifts’, of points of connection and of disconnection: as in 
Castells’ ‘switched on’ and ‘switched o ff  spaces that may be neighbours in 
cartographic space, but are otherwise entirely disconnected from one another.
Instead, it is worth highlighting the nature of time within the more comprehensive 
notion of space-time. A key point here is that different points in space move, or flow, at 
different rates; thus those that are more historically fixed, or moving at something akin 
to ‘glacial time’ (Castells, 1998) in many ways may as well be absolutely fixed to a 
human living for his/her allotted ‘three score and ten’. Like the most recent (neoliberal) 
guise of globalisation, climate change destabilises space-time in that it may cause 
‘glacial’ processes to speed-up11 -  perhaps exponentially -  or others to slow down or 
even stop; such as the gulf stream. Grasping the impermanence of everything indeed is a 
continual issue for all humans in an existential sense, but more prosaically speaking,
11 Quite literally in this instance
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current ecological crises make recognition of the relativity, impermanence and plurality 
of space a critical challenge for policy actors.
In this vein, Gottfried Leibniz (1989) suggests that the notion of absolute space should 
be seen as ideal space: a hypothetical situation where spatial-temporal relations reach a 
point of ‘balance’. The notion of sustainable development shows an earthly attempt to 
achieve this balance, but raises significant questions surrounding the ‘value’ of non­
human space, as exemplified in the principle of inter-species equity. These themes are 
traced out more comprehensively in exploring the literature on governing the 
environment (Chapter 4), but first it is useful to turn to the problems faced when 
attempting to describe different types of spatial formation, focusing particularly on the
I ^sensitive " issue of scale, and how -  predominantly -  political theorists and economic 
geographers have investigated the political ordering of space. First, the idea of spatial 
relations as formed through practice is explored through a discussion of the recent ‘scale 
debates’. This is followed by consideration of the ‘spatial polymorphy’ of Bob Jessop, 
Martin Jones and Neil Brenner (2008), before settling on a slightly more nuanced 
version of this approach which recognises the different ontological ‘layers’ of relations.
Categorising formations
Site, arena, area, space, place, territory, domain, point, network, scale, level, 
assemblage... An array of different terms are used to describe particular types of spatial 
formation meaning sometimes similar, sometimes very different things. Often these are 
used as short hand -  a common term -  for something generally, if vaguely, understood. 
If a scholar talks of this place or that, it is generally understood that they mean a point in 
space, which -  generally -  has been given a specific spatial moniker: Rotherham; the 
Picos de Europa; Clapham. If they talk of an arena, it is understood as a bordered space 
within which an event happened: a house; a football stadium; ‘politics’. This is largely 
unproblematic, because there is a widely understood general meaning for these terms 
which does not need to be any more sharply delineated than to give a broad feel for a 
situation, or study focus. If, however, the focus of a study is of particular types of
12 At least, it has been a sensitive issue for som e human geographers
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relations -  and this is what these spatial labels essentially refer to -  then they do become 
more problematic, especially when seemingly different meanings are applied to the 
same or similar terms: a critique that has been applied by various geographers to others’ 
works (cf. Brenner, 1999; Herod and Wright, 2002; Jessop et al., 2008). Most academic 
investigations also tend to focus on a particular spatial concept largely in isolation from 
others, which can compound this issue: if we only consider one option, it is hard to see 
how it is different in relation to other options. These problems are well highlighted by 
the recent ‘scale debates’ in human geography. An initial focus on conceptualising scale 
would therefore seem appropriate, and will lay the foundations for covering three other 
“dominant” spatial concepts (Jessop et al., 2008): network, territory and place.
The vexed issue of scale
The 1990s and early-mid 2000s witnessed a rise to prominence of the region, both in 
academic and policy circles. This was broadly co-temporal with -  and in many cases 
explicitly linked to -  a number of debates concerning conceptualisation of geographic 
scale. These debates coincided to the extent that there was an emerging emphasis on the 
social construction (cf. Smith, 1992; Marston, 2000) of relational scale in the works of 
a number of scholars (cf. Jones, 1998; Brenner, 1999; Swyngedouw, 2004; Jessop, 
2002a and 2002b; Herod and Wright, 2002), which brought about scrutiny of scale as a 
concept from those within and outside debates around ‘territorial re-scaling’; most 
notably from Sallie Marston and Neil Smith (2004; Marston et al., 2005). Yet there is 
divergence as to where this should lead; including a questioning of the relevance of 
scalar concepts in the age of networks and relations.
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In approaching the limits to scale, Neil Brenner (2001) sparked off a debate on the 
application of scalar concepts, arguing that the proliferation of works based on the 
social and political production of scale have resulted in a degree of “analytical blunting” 
(p591), or theoretical “slippage” (ibid.) of the concept in relation to other geographical 
concepts such as place, territory, locality, arena, et cetera. He warned that:
...if the notion of geographical scale is extended unreflexively to demarcate any aspect of 
sociospatial processes, then much of the analytical power and theoretical potential of recent 
methodological innovations may ultimately be lost, causing scale to collapse into an 
overgeneralized ‘chaotic conception’.
p593
Brenner cites Sallie Marston’s (2000) study of the social construction of scale in 
relation to the household as a case in point, arguing that she pays scant attention to the 
scalar dimension of the household: a focus on transformations within the household is 
really a discussion of territory, locale, or place. As such, Marston has seemingly 
overstretched the concept of scale until it is no longer distinguishable as a distinct 
concept.
To further this argument, Brenner turns to the ‘politics of scale’ (Smith, 1992), 
pertaining to geographical scales as frameworks for a broad range of social processes; 
arguing that scale should be studied as an epistemological construct rather than an 
ontological reality. He begins this debate by suggesting that the politics of scale are best 
studied in terms of scalar relationships, contests and positionality, as opposed to politics 
within a scale, which should be analysed using an “alternative geographical lexicon” 
(p600). This approach may appear to suggest that scalar relationships can only be 
between the scale of study and a ‘higher’ scale. For instance, this logic might 
understand a house only as an ‘arena’ when internal events are explored, but may be a 
scale if discussed in relation to things that contain it: the street, locale, region and so on. 
As Mark Purcell (2003) states, however, there is a valid point here:
One cannot understand a scale without analysing its relationship to other scales, since the 
meaning and importance of each scale is unavoidably embedded in interscalar relationships.
p318
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In response, Marston and Smith (2001) argue that there is a degree of arbitrariness in 
determining which spaces are granted ‘scale status’, though, in fairness Brenner did not 
suggest that the household cannot be analysed as a scalar category, rather that Marston’s 
analysis did not do this. Marston and Smith do agree, however, that the popularity of 
scalar discourse has led to ‘analytical blunting’. This has been taken further by Marston 
et al. (2005, p416) to suggest a new, ‘flat’ ontology of space. They begin by stating that 
“there is today no consensus on what is meant by [scale] or how it should be 
operationalized” and compare ‘vertical’ hierarchical models (cf. Agnew, 1993; Smith, 
2000; Brenner, 2005) with arguments that scales are simply “intuitive fictions” (cf. 
Thrift, 1995; Jones, 1998) to suggest that there is a problem beyond even the issues of 
scale as a ‘chaotic’ or ‘fuzzy’ concept (Hudson, 2003; Markusen, 1999; Harrison, 
2006a). In short, their argument is that vertical hierarchical conceptions of scale cannot 
be successfully integrated with network theories: instead they offer a “flat alternative, 
one that does not rely on the concept of scale” (Marston et al. p417), which instead 
focuses on interrelationships between specific sites. This viewpoint is also in part borne 
out of a frustration with particular scales being a priori assumptions and their 
unreflexive utilisation in denoting generalised processes: for example the idea of 
ephemeral ‘global’ forces or globalisation being responsible for certain actions, rather 
than the forces of particular firms, states or individuals. This is an important point, and 
underlines the need for more robust theoretical and conceptual tools to enable research 
to move from the particular to the general.
Similarly there is an argument against the power hierarchies that scalar conceptions 
ultimately imply: the individual (or particular urbis) being in the shadow of higher and 
greater powers. As Andrew Jonas (2006) points out, however:
Upon close inspection, many so-called ‘scalists’ are not writing about ‘scales-as-fixed- 
structures’; nor are they treating scalar territories as ‘vertical structures’ or ‘rational 
abstractions’ in the realist sense. Instead they are responding to the challenge of narrative 
and deploying scalar categories in ways that attempt to show how particular material 
structures and processes have become fixed at or around certain sites and scales, are in the 
process of becoming unfixed at a specific scale, or combine to differentiate the world in 
complex scalar and site-specific dimensions.
p404
A more subtle critique of the work of ‘scalists’ may therefore be more enlightening. 
This is something that has been attempted by Adam Moore (2008).
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Practices of formation
Moore (2008) outlines similar concerns to Marston et al. (2005), but takes a more 
conciliatory - and progressive - approach. For Moore, like Marston, scale as a concept 
has become “unwieldy” and “laden with multiple, contradictory and problematic 
meanings” (p203). This is in part through a lack of distinction between scale as a 
‘category of practice’ and scale as a ‘category of analysis’. Latour (2005) sets this issue 
within wider problems related to ‘mainstream’ social science, whereby categories are 
developed through a priori assumptions rather than as a result of enquiry:
The problem is that social scientists use scale as one of the many variables they need to set 
up before doing the study, whereas scale is what actors achieve by scaling, spacing and 
contextualizing each other through the transportation in some specific vehicles of some 
specific traces.
Latour, 2005 p i84. Emphasis in original
The suggestion is that treating scale as an analytical category -  of presupposing semi­
fixed scales of enquiry -  there is often a reification of scale as a “fundamental 
ontological entity” (Moore, 2008 p203). Instead, Moore suggests an alternative 
conceptualisation, with a particular scale seen as a category of practice', for instance, as 
a discursive tool of spatial politics.
Moore argues that the trend towards viewing scalar categories as socially constructed 
through fluid and contingent processes has tended to “obscure, rather than illuminate, 
different theoretical approaches to scales” (p204). In attempting to clarify where these 
differences do lie, two general theoretical schools of thought within scalar work are 
highlighted. The work of many of those referenced above, including Neil Smith (2004) 
and Erik Swyngedouw (2004), is characterised by Moore as viewing scales as material 
sociospatial entities, corresponding “to real material processes, events and spatial 
formations” (p204). This is contrasted with the work of Katherine Jones (1998) and 
Hilda Kurtz (2003), amongst others, who view scale as an epistemological construct, 
whereby there is no necessary relationship between scalar representations and material 
conditions; although deployment and contestation of representations can have material 
effects. This is then taken to suggest that materialist theorisations run the risk of ‘spatial 
fetishism’ whereby inert space is charged with causal powers. Drawing on Rogers
Brubaker’s work {cf. Brubaker, 1996; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Brubraker et al.,
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2004) on the discursive construction of identity categories, Moore suggests that the 
ideas of, for example, national, local and global scales are:
...deeply ingrained, ‘intuitive fictions’ ... that inform our folk understandings of the spatial 
organisation of the world. And, like the political fiction of nations, the notion that scales are 
actually existing sociospatial levels, platforms or arenas is often taken for granted in social 
scientists’ research.
Moore, 2008 p208
There is much to be said for Moore’s argument. While there is no avoiding that 
processes are scaled in that there are limits to their sphere of influence or engagement, 
beyond certain physical boundaries they tend not to be necessarily fixed at particular 
categorised, or discrete, scales. Where they are partially or temporarily fixed at 
particular categorised scales this is through a discursive engagement with, or ‘belief in’ 
that scalar category; for example -  as I will turn to shortly -  the institutionalisation of 
the English regions. Similarly, a categorised scale is defined by its engagement with 
other scalar categories, but there is no necessary scalar engagement between, for 
example, local, regional and national governing entities, just as a ‘regional’ organisation 
does not necessarily operate at the regional scale simply by dint of its ambition to do so: 
this is based on recognition from at least one of the parties involved as the other 
constituting a scale in relation to themselves. Julie Cidell’s work on the individual and 
the politics o f scale (2006) amply demonstrates this issue. In her study of the politics of 
a proposed airport development she notes how individuals who do not abide by the 
expectations associated with scalar hierarchies and delineations are able to have a 
degree of success in ‘jumping’ scales and to some extent negating constructed scalar 
boundaries.
In this sense exploring the practices of developing and deploying scalar discourses -  as 
well as those relating to other spatial concepts or formations -  becomes a key research 
programme. This approach requires some caveats, however. Firstly, the implied 
suggestion that those who focus on ‘presupposed’ categories of scale are automatically 
‘reifying’ categories as ontological ‘givens’ is misguided: a more sensitive 
understanding would be to view such works as focusing on a relatively fixed scalar 
category of practice -  for instance those spaces that have been legitimised politically 
through the construction of tiers of governing -  and exploring the ongoing political
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discourses and power relations between the actors involved that serve to produce, 
reproduce or dissolve scalar discourses.
Second, and more fundamentally, it is important to note again that, while actions are not 
necessarily fixed at particular categorised scales, there may be functional 
approximations to the limits of different spheres of activity; most importantly a 
recognition that spatial engagement is intrinsically bound, and scaled, by physical space, 
which cannot be reduced to discursive arrangements. Although in physics space is no 
longer seen as having absolute qualities (Hugget and Hoefer, 2006), for humans the 
environmental differences between the Earth and the space that surrounds it, large 
stretches of water or mountains and human creations such as transportive technologies, 
houses or boundary walls work to limit the scale at which we operate. Finally, although 
Moore calls for an understanding not of what scale should be understood as meaning, 
but of how it is (discursively) deployed, he does not offer a suggestion as to what such a 
deployment might consist of: how one might differentiate between a scalar practice and 
a network practice, for example. This final issue is a point of exploration within this 
thesis, with an ongoing concern for analysing the different ways in which governing 
organisations interact with the space they seek to govern.
Towards a plural conception of space
The debates outlined above highlight some of the issues raised by Markusen’s (1999;
discussed in further depth in Chapter 6) ‘fuzzy’ concepts, and this is perhaps something
that is unavoidable when discussing interrelated terms such as space, scale, territory,
networks and place. There is an inevitable degree of crossover and even confusion
between meanings. The works outlined above helped bring about a greater sensitivity to
understanding scale as process rather than fixed relations; helping to create conceptions
of ‘scale-time’, as well as pointing out the multiplicitous and messy nature of ‘lived’
scales. Nonetheless, in the initial ‘Brenner-Marston’ debate, the later ‘scale or nothing’
debate and the category-practice delineations of Moore, there have been a consistent
creation of unhelpful, and at times false, dualisms. Mark Purcell’s (2003) entreaty
following the first scalar spat argues for a bridging of ‘islands of practice’ -  which act in
effect as professional silos -  to allow for more holistic theoretical engagement with
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spatial theory. This is taken on board more broadly here in approaching the project as 
necessarily engaging with plural schools of thought, conceptualisations and 
methodological disciplines. In the case of the debates above there is therefore a 
commitment to overcoming a number of the constructed dualisms and circular 
arguments presented.
With regard to Moore’s argument for scales of practice, as opposed to scales of analysis, 
I have already outlined a brief case for tempering some of the claims made, but have 
sympathy with the general projects involved. In all, there is a need for ‘porous’ 
understanding of spatial formations -  and more specifically here, regions -  based on the 
confluence of political discourses, functional practice and theoretical analytics. I would 
also argue that despite Marston and colleagues’ contention that networks and scales 
cannot be reconciled -  and that scale is now an unhelpful, chaotic, concept -  scale 
remains an essential ingredient in understanding spatial interactions, but only as one 
component amongst others: whilst the distinctions may often be blurred and overlapping, 
regions may be viewed as, for instance, places, spaces, territories, sites, networks, 
arenas and scales of action. It should be made clear that I would not be alone in this 
project: in this regard, some recent attempts have been made to achieve a more reflexive, 
plural, approach to more comprehensively theorising the ‘mille-feuille’ (Lefebvre, 1991 
[1974]) of socio-spatial relations. For instance, Bulkeley (2005) attempted a dual 
theorisation of networks and scales, arguing that:
...insights on the politics of scale can provide a means through which to reconfigure notions 
of ... governance to create an approach which can be sensitive to processes of scaling and 
rescaling the objects and agents of governance, and the consequent political, social and 
environmental implications, whilst at the same time engaging with the politics of networks.
p897
In essence, Bulkeley argues that a straw man of hierarchical scalar theories is often 
drawn by network theorists and points to the ongoing importance of understanding the 
construction of scalar identities and related governing institutions: Moore’s ‘scalar 
practices’. This includes the political bounding of space, as well as the fact that 
networks are effectively scaled in both their spatial extent and the ways in which they 
are discursively framed. Although acknowledging differences between the ways in 
which network, territorial and scalar approaches to research are conceptualised,
Bulkeley states that “any polarisation of the debate into ‘scalar’ and ‘non-scalar’ 
perspectives should be avoided” (p888).
Plural spatial relations
Arguably somewhat belatedly but nonetheless offering a welcome contribution, Bob 
Jessop, Neil Brenner and Martin Jones (2008) have recently joined in explicitly 
outlining a plural, or polymorphous, approach to space, which they call TSPN (Territory, 
Scale, Place and Networks):
...we now question the privileging, in any form, of a single dimension of sociospatial 
processes, scalar or otherwise ... [instead] we argue for a more systematic recognition of 
polymorphy — the organisation of sociospatial relations in multiple forms and dimensions — 
in sociospatial theory.
p389
Antecedents of this may be seen in Brenner’s (2001) initial comments on the limits to 
scale, although these were more focused on precisely delineating scale as a useful 
analytical concept rather than developing a spatial ‘polymorphy’. This contains an 
important reminder of the role of analytical concepts in research:
Some readers may object that this methodological procedure imposes an arbitrary separation 
of distinct ‘dimensions’ of social spatiality that are in practice dialectically intertwined. 
Although this danger is admittedly a real one, I believe that it stems from certain 
unavoidable methodological dilemmas that accompany any exercise in theory construction. 
All forms of social theory, even the most avowedly poststructuralist approaches, necessarily 
involve the introduction and deployment of conceptual distinctions.
p593
A mere acknowledgement of the role of different spatial dimensions is not sufficient, 
however. Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) argue that there is a need to explicitly 
engage with each of the four outlined dimensions in order to effectively come to grips 
with the sociospatial relations in a particular context: sometimes the deployment of 
scalar hierarchies may prevail as key factors in a process; sometimes territorial 
competition and bordering processes; at other times network flows and interconnections; 
at others ‘place-making’ activities. More likely, each dimension will be involved; and a
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rigorous understanding is only possible by engaging with each. The key is to avoid 
spatial ‘one-, or two-dimensionalism’. Costas Hadjimichalis (2006, p698), for instance, 
argues that the conceptualisation of space within ‘institutional’ new regionalist texts is 
overly territorial, invoking the notion of regions as analogous to firms. At the same time 
there is a tendency to understand a ‘flatter’ space, with networks and flows -  of capital, 
knowledge, social relations and so on -  as the more predominant lexicon, which can 
distance the role of scalar political processes such as hierarchical modes of state 
governing from economic action. Similarly, works on the ‘politics of scale’ and ‘re­
scaling’ may exclude more complex network relations and/or the continuing importance 
of territorial discourses. Erik Swyngedouw (2004) characterises scalar configurations as 
either ‘regulatory orders’ or as network-based: in a more plural spatial lexicon these 
could be fleshed out discursively in various spatial ‘directions’ to understand, for 
example, that networks operate within and across different scales, different territories 
and are sited in various places.
The TSPN framework offers a seemingly common-sense way to view processes of 
spatialisation, taking as it does the four most prevalent conceptions of spatiality and 
attempting to combine them to give a more holistic overview. We are left then with a 
sense of different forms of -  often overlapping -  spatial practices, with different sets of 
political discourses helping to shape both the form and outcome, to which I will return 
in more detail in later chapters.
Levels of spatial relation
This approach is not without its critics, however. Edward Casey (2008) and Margrit
Mayer (2008) both question the ‘limits to plurality’ as laid down by Jessop, Brenner and
Jones (2008): in other words, “Is it necessarily the case there are just four leading
dimensions of sociospatial relations?” (Casey, 2008 p403). Casey also asks questions of
the supposed co-equal status of the different dimensions. Although Jessop et al. assert
that some dimensions will be more important at different times than others, he argues,
might not some be more important in general? Casey contends that place is the most
important, and it “does so by virtue of being itself ingredient in the other three
dimensions, structuring them from within” (p403). Although I disagree with Casey’s
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specific point on place, in general these are valid sets of points, and worthy of 
exploration. I will return briefly to the issue of ‘the limits to plurality’ in Chapter 4 in 
exploring material spatial relations.
The issue of the status of different relations might also be framed through a more 
fundamental re-casting of this approach through exploration of the ‘level’ at which these 
four types of relation might be conceptualised. That is, not only are they different types 
of relation in themselves, but they are also composed of different forms of associations. 
At base, we might say that only networks -  as conceived by Latour (1999; 2005) -  may 
be said to unambiguously operate in the realm of ontological ‘existence’: in fact 
networks are a necessary factor of existence. Scale as a geographic concept is purely 
about relative distance, or size. In other words it is about the ordering of networks. 
Scales as categories are entirely constructed through practice, of relations between 
actors or networks (or actor-networks) that operate -  by dint of different levels of 
resources -  at a certain geographic scope, which often include discursive production of 
the notion of acting at a particular scale. Territory might be conceived similarly to 
scales as categories, in that it is about the practices of bordering and control over a 
particular network. Places, on the other hand, cannot be said to exist in the same way. 
They exist only in their naming and in essence are simply arbitrarily labelled networks, 
confluences of networks, scaled or bordered networks. The idea of place, therefore, is 
one of network relations discursively framed as something imbued with cultural 
meaning and one might therefore argue as a result that the framework would be better 
labelled TSN, although I will keep the P for reasons detailed below.
In this sense, networks provide the ‘base’ category of spatial formation and relations, 
with territorial and scalar processes sitting -  figuratively speaking -  ‘above’ this. They 
relate to processes involving networks, rather than separate from them; that is, the 
bordering and ordering of networks. The idea of place sits a further step removed from 
the ‘real’, as it is produced discursively through the bordering, ordering and confluence 
of networks.
In the analysis sections of this thesis, this framework is utilised in two ways. First, it is
used as a way of analysing relationships between actors, and second, to analyse
practices that attempt to discursively frame space, and work towards building particular
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types of relationships between actors. In the former, the emphasis is on relations within 
a provisionally bordered network (regional governing actors and organisations) and 
scalar practices between national, regional and local actors; territorial processes may be 
important, but were not foremost in the range of issues presented through the research. 
In the latter, the full TSPN model is used to highlight sets of discursive practices and it 
is in this understanding that place retains importance; it is in fact perhaps the category 
that is most discursively imbued with meaning of the four. I will turn briefly now to the 
latter, before following this up in further depth in the following chapter, relating 
specifically to the practices of ‘region building’ in England.
Region-building
In attempting to construct a new political space, the issue of spatial conceptions moves 
towards building a shared discourse around a ‘logical’ space of governing: that is, 
legitimising the introduction of governing actors by building a spatial narrative 
supporting the pertinence of, say, ‘the region’. In this process, the TSPN model can be 
‘flattened’ once more: the key is to be discursively accepted; other conceptualisations 
become only important in deconstructing these discourses and in analysing the outcome 
of the narrative process. Keeping with the same four ‘core’ spatial concepts, the 
theoretical ‘model’ region might therefore be understood as requiring successful 
legitimisation of the following forms of spatial relationship:
(a) A cohesive place, a discursive belief in shared -  and in some way unique -  community 
values and heritage, or a ‘critical mass’ of network connections or confluences.
(b) The region as territory: this could be reducible simply to economic competition; or to 
more basic issues relating to land ‘ownership’ including statutory and legal definitions.
(c) A natural, or functional, scale of relations that also relates to other scales of relations.
(d) Possessing strong internal networks bound by (a), (b) and (c).
This, however, requires a second form of legitimisation in order to make the leap to 
constructing a political institutional fix. At this point spatial concepts are no longer
sufficient and a need to engage in the discourse of governance and power becomes clear. 
This will be explored in further depth later, but it is worth noting now that in order for 
political space to become successfully ‘legitimate’ there is a concomitant desired aim of 
creating an understanding that new political institutions provide:
(e) Adequate representation of the values/needs of the cohesive space outlined above, as 
well as of governing institutions with influence over wider spatial scales.
(f) Sufficient resource autonomy to potentially carry out (a) into specific actions
Crucially though, in addition, there should be an understanding that regionally oriented 
institutions also provide:
(g) Accountability to the actors and institutions represented by a governing organisation.
Regional fixes are inserted to a multi-level governing framework in which the region 
acts at a spatial level between not just local political institutions, but also -  most 
importantly -  national government, as well as supra-national governing institutions, 
who possess the resources to influence the creation and actions of regional institutions.
The above represent routes to discursive ‘input’ legitimacy for regional institutions. 
Output legitimacy is also desirable for the model region; that is there needs to be:
(h) Competent translation of (e), (f) and (g) into specific actions
Whilst desirable, the confluence of these inputs and outputs is not necessary for the 
institutionalisation of regions, and neither should the spatial inputs be seen as 
necessarily preceding the creation of institutions. Indeed, the presence of new 
institutions with an arbitrarily defined spatial influence may precede the existence of 
spatial conditions, and may be involved in their development. As such, attempting to 
discursively frame regions and their institutions as being representative of these ideals is 
a continuing project for political actors, as is explored in more detail in the later 
analytical chapters.
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Conclusion
This opening theoretical chapter set out an exploration of some underlying 
understandings of space in itself, with an exposition of space as fundamentally 
relational, plural and ever-changing. This should be tempered with notions of relative 
fixity, however, and remembering spatial and temporal constraints that, for example, 
humans are faced with, which effectively work to fix and scale certain aspects of space. 
These ideas were then applied in outlining conceptions of different types of spatial 
formation, or relations. The TSPN framework offers a starting point in exploring spatial 
relations, but needs further fleshing out to reveal the multi-layered nature of these 
conceptions: in doing so, networks become understood as the ‘bedrock’ of spatial 
formations, with other conceptions layering -  and interlinking -  upon this base. This is 
important only in so far as analysing relationships between actors and networks, 
however. In analysing discursive strategies through a TSPN lens the layering becomes 
flat once more.
In the following chapters it should be clear that there is a continuation of others’ 
concern for spatial institutional relations in the governing process: a second set of issues 
also come to light here, with the dominant neoliberal economic ‘imperative’ and the 
politics of scale also strongly shaping the ways in which regional organisations develop 
alternative policies. A spatial lexicon of governing will continue to be used in what 
follows, but it is important to note that this should not be confused with a reification of 
space as a way of explaining society. Instead then, terminologies of spatial relations are 
used to identify discursive constructions of power; the ways in which power is exercised 
by governing institutions; and as referents to particular forms of institutional relations. 
The spatiality of these relations does not in itself mean anything; more precisely it is the 
concentration and mobilisation of resources at certain points in the process of spatial 
governing that matter.
In theorising the discursive process of ‘region building’ it is important to make explicit
reference to the role that governing legitimacies -  for instance, accountability,
autonomy, representation and competency -  can play in strengthening, or building, ties.
Chapter 5 returns to these issues and develops a more comprehensive framework for
theorising and analysing governing practices, but Chapter 3, next, begins to draw out
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some of the themes discussed here in reviewing the process of constructing regional 
institutional arrangements in England. This explores the rise of a Western European 
and North American academic and political ‘discourse hegemony’ (Lagendijk, 2007) 
around the region as an important point of spatial organisation and the construction of 
regional governing organisations in line with this. In doing so, this also serves to shed 
further light on the issues explored in this chapter, as well as develop the context for the 
ensuing account of the empirical research.
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3 The chaotic construction of the English regions
The previous chapter was concerned with regions as conceptual entities; leading towards a view of regions as particular forms of temporal-spatial fixes, constituted 
through a number of heterogeneous spatial practices. The key concern of this research, 
however, is of regions as political spaces within a framework of spatial governing. In 
this form, regions are first and foremost political -  often arbitrary -  constructions which 
may not, initially at least, be based on existing spatial ‘legitimacies’. In this case it 
becomes the role of political actors to build a ‘regional discourse’ through governing 
practices.
The ‘model’ region at the end of the previous chapter framed governing and spatial 
legitimacy largely in terms of how relations between actors within a region might be 
constituted. In this chapter, the discussion moves to an account of the English regions in 
terms of attempts by various actors to seek to achieve these forms of legitimacy through 
different spatial practices, with an emphasis on the discursive developments that led to 
the (re-)emergence of ‘institutionalised’ regions in the 1990s.
Amoud Lagendijk’s (2007) ‘production of discourse hegemony’ approach is employed 
here to explore the roots, rise and re-opening of the region as a ‘hegemonic discourse’ in 
England. This included the coalescence of various different political discourses to 
develop a potentially ‘uneasy coalition’ of rationales. The last major staging point in 
this process came in the move towards re-constructing the regions following the 2007 
Review o f Sub-national Economic Development and Regeneration (Sub-National 
Review, SNR; HM Treasury, 2007). The election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition government in June 2010 brought an end to the ‘regional project’. The 
layering of particular policy doctrines based around “vulgar” ‘new regionalist’ 
economic theories (Lovering, 1999), on to regional divisions that initially were largely 
developed from a pragmatic desire to co-ordinate planning and modernise the delivery 
of sub-national governmental programmes, leads to a notion of the English regions as
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‘chaotic constructs’, which have suffered from a lack of discursive spatial or governing 
legitimacy.
Constructing the Region
The creation of a new regional space of governing involves a process of ‘region- 
building’: in other words employing strategies with the aim of ensuring that regions are 
discursively accepted as a legitimate governing space. With this in mind, turning to 
Arnoud Lagendijk’s (2007) work on the rise of regions in academic and political 
thinking is helpful; not least in emphasising the role of discourse hegemony and 
political power relationships in determining the construction of regions as institutional 
spaces. In doing so, Lagendijk builds on the work of Ngai-Ling Sum (2004) on the 
‘production of hegemony’: in this case used to demonstrate the rise of the 
institutionalised region in Europe. This focuses on moments at which periods of gradual 
change, characterised by path-dependency, “are punctuated by moments at which paths 
may change”, where “ ‘counter-hegemonic’ discourses and practices might cause new 
imaginaries to take priority, power relations to be overturned, and new forms to emerge” 
(Lagendijk, 2007 pi 197). Lagendijk uses Sum’s five stages of the production of 
hegemony, as reproduced in Figure 1, below:
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Figure 1: The Production of Hegemony
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Source: Lagendijk (2007), adapted from Sum (2004)
A number of ‘windows of change’ in the 1980s and ‘90s are outlined by Lagendijk, 
which began the process of region building in Western Europe and North America. 
These include, firstly, the emergence of the post- or after-fordist economy and new 
regulatory approaches based around institutional and re-scaling debates centred on ‘the 
new regionalism’. These approaches generally espoused different variants of the spatial 
inputs outlined above, and aimed to develop ways of harnessing these forces through 
securing governing legitimacies. A second ‘window’ is identified in changes to 
governmental practices: in particular in seeking ‘modernising’ responses to problems of 
coordination and control in light of a greatly expanded state since the Second World 
War. This includes the alignment of European funding regimes at regional levels and 
the ‘Europeanisation’ (c f  Benz and Eberlein, 1999; Gualini, 2006) of governance. 
Finally, Lagendijk points to the cultural-political development of various regional 
movements based on territorial identity and difference, representing longer running ‘old 
regionalisms’ and ‘regional nationalisms’ (cf Mackintosh, 1968).
Each of the 15 pre-2005 EU States had some form of regional governing settlement, 
ranging from the long-standing federal arrangements of Germany and (dysfunctional)
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Belgium, to the regionalised states of Spain, Italy and France, and the two arbitrary 
administrative boundaries of the Republic of Ireland. The UK moved from operating as 
a unitary state in 1994 to one with mixed-level or asymmetric devolution between 
‘nations’ and regions by the end of the decade. Each of these structures reflects different 
internal economic, cultural and political arguments surrounding territorial identities, the 
role of the nation-state and economic development rationalities.
This gives an idea of how regions developed as discursive policy solutions in Western 
Europe, and some of the outcomes, but in order to follow these processes through to the 
construction of specific regional institutional arrangements -  that is, examining what 
Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) might term the concrete-complex issues -  I will now 
turn to the case of the English regions. What emerges is a slightly more complicated 
situation; in particular showing that discursive constructions are not necessarily 
successful and do not often follow a straight-forward path to hegemonic status, nor are 
they necessarily consolidated in stable institutional fixes. Essentially, if these fixes are 
contested in their conception, they will equally be contested in their implementation and 
consequent development.
In order to explore the specifics of the construction of the English regions, it is 
important first to devote some time to exploring the development of dominant trends in 
academic and political regional discourses: in particular those of ‘new’ and ‘old’ 
regionalism against the ‘pragmatic’ regionalist tendencies of central government in the 
UK. As will become clear below, the majority of recent empirical, theoretical and 
normative work has focused on regions as economic spaces, most notably through the 
loosely connected body of work collectively comprising the ‘new regionalism’.
The region as a territorial place: ‘old’ regionalisms
Arguments for devolution and regionally based governing institutions in the UK are by
no means a new phenomenon. In fact, regionalism has been present in varying forms
and varying degrees of prominence since the end of World War II and the inception of
the welfare state. Regionalist texts of the 1960s focused on the UK as a semi-planned
economy, in particular focusing on the re-scaling of service management. For instance,
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Mackintosh (1968) debated devolving planning of utilities and certain functions of the 
NHS and education to a regional level, transport and planning at the city-region level, 
with local authorities retaining control of municipal planning and management. The 
1970s saw a re-emergence of secessionist movements from the peripheral UK nations 
and/or regions (Scotland, Wales, Cornwall), which formed the basis for many of the 
cultural and democratic devolution movements of the last 30 years. The heavily 
centralised governmental policy of the 1980s meant that the regions were off the agenda 
from a policy perspective in the UK, but the ‘two-nation’ politics brought increasing 
concern from commentators, particular with regard to the UK’s peripheral regions and 
the ‘north-south divide’ (c f  Martin, 1988). That said, uneven economic development 
between regions has long led to arguments for intervention through both redistribution 
of state function and funding (see Massey, 1984; Amin, Massey and Thrift, 2003) and 
also provided the basis for regional interventions since the dawn of the welfare state. 
Alongside these arguments, a political movement towards European integration during 
this period brought the notion of the “Europe of regions” to the fore, before the early to 
mid-1990s returned issues of devolution to policy. These sets of arguments may be said 
to have been instrumental in the devolution of resources (although not necessarily in 
terms of finances) to Scotland and Wales in the UK in 1998, following referenda.
The region as a competitive territory: new regionalism
The late 1990s saw the birth of this renewed interest in regions as economic and 
political spaces, based primarily around shifts in economic thinking towards a more 
spatially orientated, institutional, approach, and a concern for the future of the nation­
state in the face of the apparently relentless forces of globalisation. A range of 
commentators in the late 1990s, including Michael Keating (1998), Ash Amin (1999), 
Martin Jones and Gordon MacLeod (1999), Phillip Allmendinger and Mark Tewdwr- 
Jones (2000), Ian Deas and Kevin Ward (2000), and John Tomaney (2002) heralded a 
new regionalism in academic inquiry and political discourse. 13 The new regionalism 
thus rapidly gained currency as shorthand for describing the work of various scholars, 
mainly based in North America and Western Europe, who highlighted the significance
13 The earliest found citing o f  the term ‘new regionalism ’ is that o $ Robin M urray  (1992 , “E urope an d  the 
new  regionalism ”)
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of the region as an effective arena for situating the institutions of after-Fordist economic 
governance (MacLeod, 2001).
Taken as a whole, this trend in academic and political thought is described succinctly by 
John Harrison (2006a p25) as “the trial and error search for the best socio-spatial fix for 
advanced capitalism”. It is, nonetheless, important to note that those labelled as sitting 
within the new regionalist canon are many and varied in their contributions.14 As a 
starting point, however, the literature can be split into categories that follow two 
dominant trends: that which focuses on the importance of institutions and ‘non­
economic economics’; and that which focuses on ideas of ‘territorial re-scaling’.
Institutions and non-economic economics
The first new regionalist strand revolves around the evolution of ‘new institutionalism’ 
(cf. Amin, 1999), drawing particularly on work around agglomeration economies, 
flexible specialization, cooperative competition and the knowledge econom y.15 This is 
described by Lagendijk (1997, p i) as “a new orthodoxy built around an emphasis on the 
region, networking and resource-orientation”, in particular that “knowledge is the most 
strategic resource and learning the most important process” (ibid.). These drew heavily 
on the work of Michael Porter (1998) on economic clustering, Robert Putnam (1993) on 
social capital, Richard Florida (1995) on learning regions and Michael Storper’s (1995) 
accounts of the “wealth of regions” (with Scott, 1995) and regional competitiveness. 
Such works are typified by statements such as that of MacLeod (2001):
Amid the protracted struggle to configure an after-Fordist regime, many of the advanced 
industrial countries are experiencing a renaissance of cities and regions ... a range of high- 
profile regional economies and urban metropoles appear to be surging ahead in the race to be 
leading motors of wealth creation.
Ibid., p808
14 Taking in as it does debates from econom ic, cultural and social geography, as well as political science; 
covering concepts such as cluster theory, learning regions, institutional thickness, globalisation, territorial 
re-scaling; including perspectives from both the political ‘left’ and ‘right’, as well as a range o f  differing  
spatial conceptions o f  the region.
13 Each o f  which are critiqued as, or constituting part of, ‘fuzzy concepts’ by Ann M arkusen (1999 )
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From a governing perspective the focus is on “existing skills, industries and, above all, 
relationships; endogenous growth and development instead of inward investm ent... and 
boosting supply-side economic measures” (Sandford, 2005 p26). Central to these 
theories is the importance of non-economic factors in economic success, particularly 
knowledge and practices that are not fully codifiable; of ‘untraded interdependencies’ 
(Storper, 1995) within a new, reflexive capitalism where sharing and networking of 
information is replacing market-based competition.
Despite the attempts in these works to bring about a more nuanced economic geography, 
a number of relatively wide-ranging critiques have arisen. A line of attack focusing on 
the conceptual foundations of the ‘knowledge cluster’ approach has provided a rich vein 
of material for even those ‘sympathetic’ to the cause (cf. MacLeod, 2001; Harrison, 
2006a; Hadjimichalis, 2006) as well as those seemingly not (cf. Lovering, 1999; 
Markusen, 1999). These include a belief that the importance of non-economic factors 
has been embraced to the extent that the primary economic motors of capitalism are 
marginalised (Hadjimichalis, 2006), with critical concepts de-politicised and ‘de­
economised’. Understandings of social capital, trust and reciprocity are also heavily 
critiqued, including a failure to take into account path-dependency and historical factors 
in achieving success (Harrison, 2006a; Cooke, 1997; Morgan, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 
1998) and even an attack on Putnam’s original conceptualisation of social capital 
(Hadjimichalis, 2006); in particular that it is approached as a benign, apolitical concept, 
with a consequent conflation of correlation and causation in making an a priori 
assumption that community solidarity tends to lead to economic growth. A further 
criticism centres on a selective use of empirical evidence -  for instance, the Emilia- 
Romagna region of Italy is often cited as a replicable new regionalist success story, 
while less successful regions are ignored -  which also highlights the paradox of 
replicating seemingly space-dependent non-codifiable processes elsewhere.
Territorial Re-scaling
An allied body of work is that based around an analysis of ‘territorial re-scaling’ and a
concern for changing spatial forms of governance. This is perhaps most easily
understood through the contention by scholars (cf Brenner, 1999; 2001; Jessop, 1997;
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2005) that changes in the organisation of capital have brought about significant 
transformations of scale, territory and governance; in particular re-examining the role of 
the nation state amid claims that “scholars and politicians began to suggest that it was 
now too small to solve the world’s big problems and too big to solve its little ones” 
(Jessop, 2005 p i3), or as Enrico Gualini (2006) puts it:
Changes in the world order have challenged regional integration and inter-governmental 
theories based on the centrality of the nation state as primary unit of analysis. Debate on 
“globalization” of the economy has highlighted new relationships between sociospatial and 
economic phenomena and pointed to the challenges of governance “beyond the nation state”.
Ibid., p882
There were concerns regarding the ability of the nation state to effectively manage and 
regulate its territory, particularly in terms of the economy, with global forces eroding 
space in one direction and re-forming as localised constellations at a (city-) regional 
level. Andrew Herod and Melissa Wright (2002) cite the re-scaling of territories as a 
method for dealing with this problem, by situating governance closer to the actual sites 
of production. In relation to this Allen Scott et a l  (2001) state that:
There are many institutional experiments now under way that are leading in the direction of a 
new social and political organization of space. This new organization consists above all of a 
hierarchy of interpenetrating territorial scales of economic activity and governance relations, 
ranging from the global to the local.
Pi
Both institutional and re-scaling literatures identify with a changing economic system 
brought about by the intensification of globalisation. However, while institutional 
variants of the new regionalism focus on a seemingly neoliberal system of economy, 
literatures based around re-scaling take an approach that focuses on the regulation of the 
economy, seeing the region as a new spatial fix to control and shape societal processes.
A particular point of debate surrounding re-scaling approaches is the lack of 
consideration to the way in which the region relates to other scales of governing, in 
particular its relation to the nation state. John Harrison (2006a) argues that the demise of 
the state has been overplayed in political analyses, with Bob Jessop’s ‘hollowing-out’ 
thesis (see, for example, 1998) being a case in point, although Erik Swyngedouw’s
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(2004) more overtly political notion of ‘glocalisation’ may be similarly accused. He 
points to MacLeod’s (2001) assertion that we are instead seeing a process of 
geographical ‘filling-in’ with the state enhancing its capacity -  rather than its size -  by 
creating different scales of intervention. Similarly, Barry Goodchild and Paul Hickman 
(2006) talk of ‘de-concentration’ of state apparatus. In fairness, Jessop’s more recent 
work (for example, 2005) has included a number of caveats to the hollowing-out 
concept, emphasising the fact that resources remain in the control of a centralised state 
and that welfare-state institutions are still largely centrally controlled. Similarly, Kevin 
Cox (2002) suggests that the separation of state from capital evident in re-scaling 
approaches ignores the role of states in constructing globalisation and even exaggerating 
its effects for their own purposes; the assumption has been that the nation-state has been 
undermined by oppositional capital, rather than as a player in its own ‘downfall’. 16
On a related issue, Harrison (2006a) suggests that the new regionalism in general is 
characterised by a degree of conceptual fuzziness - in particular in approaches to scale - 
and MacLeod (2001 p435) highlights “the perennial enigma surrounding any definition 
of ‘the region’”. This criticism can be aimed at both institutional and re-scaling strands, 
and is particularly problematic when combining the two to consider the new
regionalism as a ‘movement’. Perhaps the main problem here is the variety of research 
questions being posed in relation to the region. For example, the region might be seen as 
a sub-national administrative unit; urban-metropolitan agglomeration formed out of 
political economic independence; or culturally defined ‘old’ regions such as Cornwall, 
the Basque Country or Sardinia: MacLeod {ibid.) asserts that researchers must be
unambiguous in defining the scale and context of their inquiry.
Policy outcomes: pragmatic regionalism?
Taking a step further to look at the actualisation of these discourses in the
institutionalisation of the English regions, we can see how the three identified 
regionalisms have played a part in the process, but in particular the -  often under­
16 See also Andrew Gam ble (2002) on the ‘politics o f  fate’.
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acknowledged -  role of pragmatic ‘modernising’ policies. As Sandford (2005, pp34-35) 
argues, moves towards regional governance structures were initially:
...justified and defended on grounds of efficiency and administration grounds ... not on the 
basis of any territorial identity ... Regions came into being not as part of a drive towards 
decentralised decision-making or political involvement at the sub-national level, but through a 
desire for a more efficient structure of central administration.
In 2007 there were three statutory regional bodies operating in each of the eight 
administrative regions in England: a regional Government Office, a Regional
I 7Development Agency and a Regional Assembly, as shown in Table 1.
17 London is excluded here as it is geographically and adm inistratively different from the eight other 
regions. It is a city or city-region in itself, and administratively had different resources and structures, 
including an elected mayor.
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Table 1: Statutory Regional Actors in England (excluding London)
Agency Created Core Functions Average Annual Expenditure
Government Offices 
for Regions 
(‘Whitehall in the 
regions’)
1994 Management of EU Structural 
Funds
Management of SRB funds (up to 
1999)
Efficiency and modernisation in 
local government
£805m (2003/4)18
Regional 
Development 
Agencies (Quangos)
1998/9 Management of SRB, later ‘Single 
Pot’ funds (1999 onwards)
Delivery of ‘strategic’ economic 
development and regeneration 
(inc. European programmes)
Co-ordination of inward investment
£239m (2007/8)’9
Regional Assemblies 
(LA elected members 
and ‘SEEPs’20)
1998/9 Regional Planning body 
Scrutiny of RDAs
Development of regional 
‘partnership-working’
3.6m (2004/5)21
The introduction of Government Offices for the Regions (GORs) by the Major 
Government in 1994 was a largely pragmatic reaction to a small range of key pressures. 
Insistence from the EU on co-ordinated regional strategic planning for allocation of 
European Structural Funds provided a major catalyst, alongside the launch of the Single 
Regeneration Budget (SRB) as a means of co-ordinating a number of previously 
separate programmes (Mawson and Spencer, 1997; Bache and Jones, 2000).22 Similarly, 
there were perceived efficiency gains from more effectively co-ordinating the sub­
national activities of governmental departments. Initially this encompassed the then 
departments for Trade and Industry; Employment; Transport; and Environment. This
18 Source: Pearce, M awson and Ayres (2008). Includes management ol'E U  structural funds: falls to 
£676m  when this is excluded.
19 Source: Pearce and Ayres (2009)
20 Social, E conom ic and Environmental Partners
-l Source: Pearce and Ayres (2007)
■" Structural Funds are are made up o f  three funding streams: the European R egional D evelopm ent Fund 
(ER DF), European Social Fund (ESF) and European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF).
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was followed by the inclusion of the department for Education when it merged with 
Employment (DfEE) in 1995.
Moving ahead three years, by which time the New Labour Government had swept to 
power, the regional agenda had moved on. The 1997 New Labour manifesto included a 
commitment to the inception of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). This was 
formalised in the 1997 White Paper Building Partnerships fo r  Prosperity, which set out 
the Government’s intentions in this regard. While the pragmatic emphasis on 
modernising governance continued, a different approach to that of the previous 
government is clear. In particular, new regionalist economic agendas were prominent, 
and indeed can be seen to be already embedded within policy discourse: ‘regional 
economies’ are referred to throughout the 1997 White Paper, assuming no need for 
explanation, which relates to new institutionalist thinking in implicitly suggesting that 
business-led public institutions at the administrative regional level will enhance and 
develop institutionally thick learning regions. This is compounded with continued 
emphasis on regional competitiveness, in particular the role of RDAs in marketing the 
regions and encouraging inward investment.
Up to 2007, the new regionalism had been most influential in the subsequent regional 
policy prescriptions rather than in the impetus towards institutionalised regions 
(Sandford, 2005): RDAs uniformly adopted ‘cluster’ policies, advanced the idea of 
‘learning regions’ in their mission statements and attempted to brand regions as 
competitive territorial units. These discourses even comprehensively enveloped day-to- 
day practice: whilst working for a sub-regional regeneration agency, it was routine for 
my colleagues to refer to “[The Region] PLC”. An essential problem here is that the 
normative and prescriptive approaches that thread through institutional and re-scaling 
literature were simply dropped into a pre-existing administrative ‘fix’: quite against the 
‘ideal’ approach to the model region that these approaches would prescribe.
Proponents of ‘old’ regionalisms were a persistent, if marginal, voice throughout the 
20th century -  and up to the present day -  but had little political exposure, and only a 
modicum of influence on government policy: there has been no increase in fiscal
50
redistribution across the country and relatively little decentralisation of resources. “ 
Even the 1997 RDA White Paper, signed off by then Deputy Prime Minister John 
Prescott -  a key proponent of regionalisation -  is relatively quiet on these issues. The 
White Paper and the subsequent Regional Development Agencies Act (1998) emphasise 
that no additional fiscal transfer to the regions would in fact take place.
The development of formalised Regional Chambers -  incorporated in 1999 -  as 
representative bodies for local authorities and representatives of other sectors could be 
seen as a concession towards these pressures. However, these may be more accurately 
understood as part of wider governmental programmes. These included a programme of 
modernisation and ‘partnership’ governance. At the same time, the government were 
attempting to find a solution to the ‘English Question’ exacerbated by the creation of 
devolved administrations for Wales and Scotland alongside the eventual re-opening of 
Stormont in Northern Ireland. These Chambers, later renamed Assemblies, were 
designed to inject a degree of democratic accountability into the institutionalised 
regions, starting with local authority and regional ‘stakeholder’ engagement, with plans 
for directly elected members at a later date. While Regional Assemblies’ ambit included 
scrutiny of RDAs’ operations, their other core function was to oversee regional planning: 
again a distinctly pragmatic, strategic role.
In cases where there were genuine identity-based calls for regional autonomy, these 
were either spatially different to the administrative regions - for example, Cornwall in 
the South West region - or have proved to be less cohesive than imagined by academic 
and political elites: as was arguably the case in the North East in light of the failed 
referendum on an elected regional assembly in 2004. On the other hand, one form of 
‘organic’ regionalism may be seen in the tendency in English regions for local 
authorities to form their own regional chambers and policy organisation (Tomaney, 
2000), even during the 1980s, when central government’s interest in the regions was 
ambivalent at best. These have not always been involved in the regionalisation of 
centra] government, however, and in various regions - for example, Yorkshire and 
Humber and the North East - regional local government networks to some extent opted 
out of the Regional Assemblies designed to give them a voice.
23 In fact, between 1999 and 2008, the only region to receive an relative increase in public expenditure 
was London (National Statistics /  HM Treasury, 2004 and 2008)
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In contrast to the model region outlined in Chapter 2, the English regions were given 
input legitimacy through centralised rationales. Beyond a largely unreflexive notion of 
regions as scalar links between local and national government, spatial inputs were 
largely absent; the bordering of English regions has been largely arbitrarily based on 
administrative divisions created in the Second World War following the Barlow report 
(1940): “Like watermarks on paper, throughout the twentieth century a pattern of eight 
to twelve regions have been used again and again as an off-the-shelf solution” 
(Sandford, 2005 p i4). This is referred to by Harrison (2008) as “centrally orchestrated 
regionalism”, which has “resulted in a noose being placed around the neck of successive 
attempts to address England’s longstanding regional ‘problem’” (p3). This reflects the 
fact that regions have been constituted by central governments reluctant to accede any 
substantive powers to regional institutions, and also, given that the core problem has 
been framed around uneven development, the insistence on treating each region the 
same. In returning to debates on territorial re-scaling, this process may be more 
accurately described as a process of ‘deconcentration’ or ‘filling-in’ of the state, than by 
the hollowing-out thesis; although the influence of EU funding structures in this process 
act as a reminder of multi-level governing processes. This arguably has ramifications 
for regions’ abilities to successfully pursue their own agendas and develop unique 
‘policy regionalisms’:
[R]egional strategy-making and project development only represents a fragment in a much 
wider ‘policy space’ ... which subjects them to additional sets of constraints and 
interdependencies.
Lagendijk, 2007 p i203
In this sense the pre-2007 regional settlement represented pragmatic regionalisation, 
overlaid with various confused and potentially conflicting policy prescriptions based on 
various forms of new regionalist thinking, with an exaggerated sense of the existence of 
‘old’ cultural regionalisms within the regions.
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Changes in Material Conditions
As noted, the introduction of a regional tier of governing was in part designed to reduce 
inter-regional inequalities in the UK through ‘bottom-up’ growth and more targeted 
redistributive spending. Indeed, government Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets 
for RDAs included the following:
[1] Make sustainable improvements in the economic performance of all English regions by 
2008, and [2] over the long term reduce the persistent gap in growth rates between the 
regions, demonstrating progress by 2006.
BERR, 2004
The two elements are vaguely paradoxical when taken together, reflective once more of 
the confused political thinking behind the English regions. Nonetheless, as an indication 
of the impact of regional structures, Tables 2 and 3 are helpful in displaying progress on 
these two targets in turn. The data has been split to cover three periods: 1989-1994, 
prior to the introduction of regional structures; 1994-1998, following the introduction of 
Government Offices; and 1998-2008, following the introduction of RDAs and Regional 
Assemblies.
Table 2, overleaf, shows the mean yearly growth for each of the English regions. They 
can be seen to have all achieved a mean growth level of above one per cent over the 
period in which RDAs operated. However, growth between 1998 and 2008 was not 
markedly higher than across the whole period, with Yorkshire and the Humber, West 
Midlands and the South East all achieving a lower rate of growth than in the period 
1989-98. In relation to the second element of the PSA target -  to reduce inter-regional 
inequalities -  the difference in the rates of growth for the ‘Greater South East’ (2.3%) 
and the ‘North, Midlands and West’ (1.5%) suggest a failure to do so.
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Table 2: Inflation Adjusted Mean Yearly Growth for English Regions
„ . Inflation Adjusted Mean Yearly Growth (%)Region 1989-94 1994-98 1998-08 1989-08
North East 1.0% 1.7% 1.7% 1.5%
North West 0.9% 2.3% 1.6% 1.6%
Yorkshire & the Humber 0.8% 2.9% 1.4% 1.5%
East Midlands 0.7% 2.5% 1.5% 1.5%
West Midlands 1.1% 2.8% 1.2% 1.5%
East of England 1.1% 2.8% 2.0% 1.9%
London 0.8% 3.6% 2.6% 2.4%
South East 1.5% 3.8% 2.0% 2.2%
South West 1.0% 3.1% 1.9% 1.9%
Greater South East 7.7% 3.5% 2.3% 2.2%
North, Midlands & West 0.9% 2.6% 1.5% 1.6%
England 1.0% 3.1% 1.9% 1.9%
Nb. Growth based on Growth Value Added (GVA) per capita
Source: BIS (2010)
Table 3 explores inter-regional inequalities further, in showing relative changes in 
Gross Value Added (GVA) per capita by region against a UK baseline. Relative GVA 
for all six of the regions in the North, Midlands and West (NMW) fell over this period, 
while the East of England, South East and London all rose. GVA for each of the NMW 
regions had also fallen relative to the rest of the UK in the period 1989-1998, but for 
Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands and South West, this decline 
accelerated in the latter period.
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Table 3: Relative change in workplace GVA per capita 1989-2008
Region Baseline 1989-94
Relative Change 
1994-98 1998-2008 1989-2008
North East 83.5 -0.30 -4.05 -1.69 -6.04
North West 91.3 -0.84 -2.21 -2.72 -5.76
Yorkshire & the Humber 89.5 -1.15 -0.10 -4.95 -6.20
East Midlands 94.9 -1.84 -1.49 -3.66 -6.99
West Midlands 91.8 0.19 -0.51 -6.36 -6.68
East of England 95.3 -0.17 -0.66 0.41 -0.42
London 156.9 -2.31 4.06 10.85 12.60
South East 100.2 1.96 3.43 0.13 5.52
South West 91.9 -0.39 0.49 -0.47 -0.37
England 102.3 -0.41 0.59 0.00 0.17
Wales 84.5 -1.39 -4.59 -4.22 -10.20
Scotland 96.0 3.14 -3.47 2.22 1.89
Northern Ireland 72.9 4.99 1.35 -0.33 6.01
United Kingdom 100.0 0 0 0 0
Note: change calculated based on an indexed baseline (1989), where UK mean = 100 
Source: BIS (2010)
While these tables take no account of added value or additionality, they do suggest that 
ultimately the regional structures did not bring about the core change that they were 
charged with achieving. Attempts have been made to carry out a more nuanced analysis 
of regional impacts, but -  as noted by Grahame Pearce and Sarah Ayres (2009) -  
deficiencies in the data available have made this difficult. They cite the English RDAs:
The overall contribution of RDAs to regional economic performance and their influence on 
the macro-economy requires further quantification and is hard to assess at this stage ... The 
evaluation evidence which would assist this quantification is currently scarce
England’s RDAs, 2006 pi cited in Pearce and Ayres, 2009 p545
Similarly, BERR’s 2009 report Impact o f RDA Spending was unable to quantify the
additional benefits of RDAs; instead measuring only the crude benefits accrued by their
spending. On the other hand, the point of having regional structures -  from the
‘endogenous growth’ perspective -  was not simply to spend money. In fact, combined
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RDA expenditure was just £2.3 billion in 2006/7, compared to £402.2 billion central 
governmental expenditure for the same year. RDAs were also designed to develop 
‘institutionally thick’ agglomerations, the effects of which are harder to pin down. 
Although not related specifically to economic growth, the analysis in Chapters 9 and 10 
touch upon this issue.
Re-constructing the regions
The initial chaotic construction of the regions was partially borne out in the continual 
‘fiddling’ with regional structures right from their conception. Aside from the major 
institutional developments, regional structures were subject to a number of centrally-led 
reforms between 1998 and 2007, culminating in the Review o f Sub-national Economic 
Development and Regeneration (2007). Government Offices underwent various reviews 
and reforms (Pearce, Mawson and Ayres, 2008; c f  Cabinet Office, 2000; HM Treasury 
and Cabinet Office, 2004); the last being the 2006 Review o f Government Offices. 
RDAs were not completely overhauled, but did undergo ongoing organisational and 
functional tweaks, and when considered in conjunction with Regional Assemblies a 
range of policy documents were released by a number of government departments (cf 
DETR, 2001; Cabinet Office and DETR, 2002; ODPM, 2004a). In 2004 a referendum 
was held in the North East to determine whether an elected Regional Assembly would 
be created in the region. The resulting ‘No’ vote sent the whole ‘regional agenda’ into 
crisis and brought into stark focus the lack of spatial and governing ‘input’ legitimacy in 
regional governance; and perhaps also, a lack of public belief in the ‘output’ legitimacy 
of regional organisations.24 This lack of internal legitimacy may also be seen as a driver 
for the continuing debates over a regional settlement for England in between 
institutional changes over the period 1999-2009; although, as with the creation of 
regional institutions it is important to stress the importance of a pragmatic ‘co­
ordination’ agenda in the continuing review and reform.
24 The unpopularity o f  the N ew  Labour governm ent at the tim e also hindered the debate for regional 
dem ocracy. A ction within a shorter period o f  the election in 1997 when there was widespread goodw ill 
towards the new governm ent may have swayed the argument in the other direction: for instance when  
France underwent regionalisation in 1982, this was taken forward within a year o f  the election  o f  Francois 
Mitterrand, who view ed this as a key political project. B y way o f  contrast, N ew  Labour’s hesitancy on the 
issue also reflected a degree o f  uncertainty or am bivalence towards ‘the regional project’.
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The 2004 referendum also arguably led to the opening of a new ‘window of change’ in 
English regional policy, to which I will now briefly turn. The proposed ‘institutionally 
thick’ ‘knowledge’ or ‘learning’ regions discussed in much of the foundational new 
regionalist literatures were becoming more linked with the city-region approach to 
regions rather than the larger administrative regions previously in place in England. One 
might argue that some academics had been applying these arguments to established 
administrative regions without considering the various spatial factors that might 
determine a ideal-type region and that the shift to city-regionalisms was simply another
9 Sattempt to make these arguments ‘fit’ geographically." John Harrison (2006a) argues 
that this was a key stumbling block for the new-regionalism; in particular that those 
working from an economic geography perspective have taken regions as particular 
urban economic agglomerations, while the more regulation-based accounts tend to 
characterise regions as sub-national territorial ‘units’. Economic geographical accounts 
have tended further towards an analysis of the city-region in recent years, with a 
concomitant turn towards policy networks based on city-regions -  for example, the Core 
Cities and Eurocities networks -  which have also filtered through to policy approaches.
The Core Cities group -  established in 1994 -  was particularly strident in its claims for 
greater focus on England’s major cities in sub-national economic policy.26 This was also 
reflected in a range of reports produced by ODPM, later CLG, including Competitive 
European Cities (Parkinson et al., 2004); Our cities are back (2004); State o f the 
English cities report (Parkinson et al., 2006); and finally A framework fo r  city regions 
(Robson et a l, 2006). These essentially worked to continue the development of a 
narrower focus on “cities that do well” (Gonzalez, 2006 plO). The Northern Way 
Strategy (2004) took these discourses a step further. The strategy was a collaboration 
between the North East, North West and Yorkshire and the Humber, aimed at 
promoting the north of England as a potential growth engine. This involved the 
identification of eight city-regions to act as the focal point for growth strategies, 
followed by the construction of some ‘soft’ governing infrastructure within these areas.
25 Or even more likely, the role o f  academic prescriptions was not the core driver o f  regional policy.
26 The group is made up o f  England’s eight largest cities outside London: Birmingham, B ristol, L eeds, 
Liverpool, M anchester, N ew castle, Nottingham and Sheffield.
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The institutional crisis following the 2004 referendum thus brought about an 
opportunity to assert the discourse of city-regions in more concrete policy terms, with 
the potential to address the inherent conflicts in the coalescence of divergent policy 
discourses at the regional level. HM Treasury’s 2007 ‘Sub-national Review’ (SNR) was 
a key staging-post in this regard. It suggested two sets of policy formulae for sub­
regional entities; which leads to some ambiguity as to the future of the city-region 
concept in policy terms. First, there was a call for greater devolution of policy delivery 
to the sub-regional tiers of the established English regions, with RDAs expected to 
delegate more economic development responsibilities to sub-regional partnerships and 
local authorities. This suggested a fairly straight-forward hierarchical relationship based 
on existing governing structures, and was a continuation from sub-regional investment 
planning approaches that some regions already had in operation. At the same time, 
however, the SNR built on the city-regions rhetoric of the Northern Way, and proposed 
the development of ‘soft’ institutional partnerships that were not necessarily bound by 
regional, or sub-regional, boundaries: for example the Sheffield city-region contained 
Chesterfield in the East Midlands, and Barnsley, which was also part of the Leeds city- 
region.
These city-regions were to be developed by local authorities as opposed to the more 
arbitrary, top-down, sub-regional approach. Following publication of the SNR, Multi- 
Area Agreements (MAAs) were introduced. These consisted of a group of shared 
priorities for local authorities within a city-region in agreement with central government 
through Government Offices for the Regions. As of February 2009, 10 MAAs were in 
place. Potentially, two sets of institutional structures would operate within the same 
governed space, with similar modus operandi. As with the regional tier, it seemed that 
the government had taken a relatively reactive approach to a ‘regional crisis’ without a 
deeply coherent understanding of what this would mean in the long-term.27
The SNR also had a number of implications for the remaining regional organisations. 
With the delegation of delivery duties to sub-regions, RDAs moved towards a more 
‘strategic’ role centred on their core roles of setting the regional ‘agenda’ through
27 The Coalition governm ent continued in the tradition o f  a d  hoc  regional restructuring in 20 1 0  with the 
abolishment o f  R D A s and GORs, and the incorporation o f  voluntary city-regional Local Enterprise 
Partnerships for those areas that put forward proposals. At time o f  writing this left a ‘patchw ork’ o f  
arrangements, with many parts o f  the country not covered.
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regional economic strategies (RESs), attracting inward investment and business support. 
They were also going to take on the planning function of regional assemblies, which 
were abolished: most assemblies ceased operations in 2009. Government Offices were 
to continue more or less unchanged, subject to minor tweaks to their internal operations. 
Harrison (2008 p3) argues that “the post-referendum years have been noteworthy for the 
surprising lack of critical debate” (although see Jonas and Ward, 2007a; 2007b; and 
Harding, 2007), either politically or theoretically. Throughout the period of this research 
a high level of uncertainty prevailed with regard to the way in which the changing roles 
for regional agencies and the strengthening of sub- or city-regional structures would 
affect the delivery of sub-national policy, or how in fact how the institutional landscape 
would look in the near future: this is something that will be touched upon throughout 
the analysis in chapters 8-11.
Conclusion: Positing (English) regions as ‘chaotic constructs’
Bruno Latour (1999) argues that facts are constructed through the interlinking of five 
facets: links and knots (that is, concepts), instruments to mobilise the concept (for 
instance, statistical tools or the written word), autonomisation through bringing 
colleagues on board, alliances with new groups (for example, between academics and 
politicians) and finally through public representation. It may that the English regions 
failed through their basis on ill-defined and ill-matched conceptions, followed by a mis­
translation of different sets of ideas through alliances with politicians, and then failure 
to mobilise these facets to achieve effective public representation. Crucially, the bonds 
between the conceptions and politicians were always relatively weak, even amongst the 
strongest protagonists, such as John Prescott. So, while -  for example -  redistributive 
approaches are not necessarily incompatible with approaches that aim for greater 
internal competitiveness, neither were pushed through to the extent that they had 
significant impact, nor was the political will strong enough to engage with the wider 
debates about the ‘purpose of the region’ or to build a discourse around an underlying 
spatial regionalism: the latter was either ignored or simply assumed.
Regional governing structures in England were particularly characterised by two sets of
problematising issues. Firstly, there was a lack of spatial legitimacy. John Lovering
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(1999), Ray Hudson (2003), Ann Markusen (1999) and John Harrison (2006a) refer 
variously to the ‘woolly’, ‘fuzzy’ or ‘chaotic’ conceptualisation of economic and spatial 
processes that have come to characterise contemporary regional studies (and policy). 
Markusen defines fuzzy concepts as “characterizations lacking conceptual clarity and 
difficult to operationalize” (p870); with underdeveloped methodologies, lack of 
empirical rigour and a level of abstraction which distances them from ‘real world’ 
policy (that is, the agent is removed from the analysis).
It is possible to see how regional governance arrangements were built on fuzzy 
conceptualisation and utilisation of the notion of the region: for instance as a functional, 
social, economic or cultural unit; as a site for redistributive economics or for 
encouraging endogenous, market-led growth; as a city-region or larger administrative 
region; as a site for national government to extend its tentacles, a site for the EU to by­
pass national government, a site for the organisation of local government, or as a site for 
direct engagement with individual businesses and actors; and relatively unsuccessful 
discursive ‘region-building’, either as places, territory, scales or networks. This might 
therefore go some way to explaining the continuing flux, upheaval and uncertainty 
within regional governance. In other words, it is not simply that there was ‘institutional 
muddle’ (Stoker, 2002); there was also existential muddle, with the administrative 
regions acting to some extent as self-perpetuating chaotic constructs.
Markusen (1999) also goes into some depth in arguing that flexible accumulation, 
agglomeration economies, social capital, ‘cooperative competition’ and world or global 
cities should be regarded as fuzzy concepts; all concepts that had become part of the 
accepted lexicon of economic geography. Although these concepts may be apparently 
distanced from ‘real world’ policy, they have in fact been taken on by policy-makers, 
particularly with regard to regional policy, resulting in a form of what Lovering has 
described as “vulgar” new regionalism (1999, p7): these concepts can be seen 
repeatedly in the language of regional governance. With regard to the prevalent ‘new 
regionalist’ policy prescriptions, Amoud Lagendijk (2007 p i203) argues that “a major 
handicap ... is the spurious nature of many regional knowledges, and their 
incompatibilities once they are put into practice”. This is backed by the wider critiques 
of institutional new regionalist discourses outlined above, and points towards a lack of
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‘output’ legitimacy in regional activities. The problem of legitimacy for regional 
constructions is encapsulated by Lagendijk (ibid. p i205):
...with the exception of regions where coherence is institutionally induced (such as in federal 
systems), these fragments are themselves torn in many directions. Regions are continuously 
subjected to multiple spatial and scalar selectivities of state and other dominant organizations. 
It comes down to organizations such as Regional Development Agencies to cope with such 
centrifugal forces and instabilities. Accordingly, together with local business, state and 
community organization, they have to weave an image of coherence, functionality and 
identity through a myriad of programmatic activities.
Pertinently for this present research, Lagendijk notes that regional bodies had to work 
hard to develop their own legitimacies through various programmes of action; and as 
will be seen in Chapters 9 to 12, this had to be continually re-negotiated with each new 
policy paradigm. As I will investigate in these later chapters, these issues may become 
particularly important when regional bodies attempt to develop stand-alone policy on 
issues that are not based primarily on (crude understandings of) economic growth. This 
may become especially evident when working ‘in partnership’ on ‘cross-cutting’, or 
non-statutory, policies such as those relating to carbon management; and especially 
when working on an emergent policy area with little overt guidance from national 
government or the EU. The effects of the ‘chaotic’ construction and the continual re­
construction of the regions on these issues will form an important part of the analysis 
here: see in particular, Chapters 9 and 10.
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4 Eco-state restructuring and the regions
The previous chapter focused on the construction of the English regions as governed spaces, in particular their political production as spaces of, primarily, 
economic governing. It gave little attention to the non-human (or ‘real’, Lefebvre, 
1974/1991) dimension of space. This focus is mirrored in the academic literature on 
regions; as Graham Haughton and Kevin Morgan (2008 p i219) note, while there have 
been attempts to explore regions as spaces for sustainable development or 
environmental management:
... it is dwarfed by the literature devoted to the role of the regions in economic development. 
Indeed, given the large amounts written about local and national approaches to sustainable 
development, one could easily be forgiven for thinking that the regions are the weakest link 
in the governance landscape when it comes to sustainability.
Ibid.
Similarly, policy and academic literature relating specifically to environmental 
governing has often taken a dualist ‘local-global’ approach. As a result, the ‘meso- 
spaces’ of governing have been under-researched. This chapter therefore moves to re­
introduce consideration for non-human space to the debate, briefly from a theoretical 
point of view -  in line with the discussion in Chapter 2 -  and then in more depth to look 
at how non-human space has been incorporated into policy, particularly at sub-national 
levels of governing.
The search for achieving balance between human actions and the effect they have on 
non-humans is, to borrow Iris Murdoch’s (1959, p51) definition of love, chiefly about 
“...the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real” . That is, 
real in the sense that not only do human actions matter to the stability of ecosystems, 
but also that these ecosystems matter to human actions. The allied threats of 
anthropogenic climate change and resource depletion -  amongst the many other 
environmental challenges -  offer devastating evidence that humanity has failed to 
understand the world it inhabits as being constituted of ‘real’ things.
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That said, attempts have been made to incorporate non-human space into political 
thought, something which has been long debated by environmentalists, political 
theorists and now in an emerging avenue of geographical political economy. In terms of 
the latter, there is a growing concern for the uneven distributional consequences of 
neoliberal economic growth strategies, with increasing attention being paid to different 
understandings of the environment, including different notions of ‘sustainability’ and 
‘sustainable development’ (Jonas and While, 2007). The main area of interest here lies 
in analysing responses made by sub-national organisations to perceived environmental 
pressures; in particular, the ways in which these pressures are framed, the approaches 
taken to overcome them and the interactions between organisations working at different 
spatial scales. This may be framed also through the notion of ‘thematic’ legitimacy: 
environmental issues as seeking a legitimate role within governing networks and 
programmes. Work by Aidan While (2008) with David Gibbs and Andy Jonas (2004; 
2010), as well as a similar analysis by Roger Hayter (2008), provides an analysis of 
trends in ‘eco-state restructuring’ in Western nations. This is used here as a template to 
visit key developments in ‘sustainability’ literature at the (city-)regional level. I will 
then move on to look at emergent work on governing carbon reduction through the gaze 
of While’s ‘carbon control’ thesis, which hints at a new era of eco-state restructuring. 
Specifically, he calls for:
...the urgent need for an approach that focuses on the realpolitik of what is happening rather 
than add to the growing normative wishlist of what might be done; to focus on ‘actually 
existing; low-carbon politics and regulation ... and to place environmental governance 
within the complexities and contradictions of state territorial management.
2008, p2
This move towards an era of carbon control may be framed as an extension and partial 
re-imagining of trends in ‘ecological modernisation’ that have been observed in recent 
local and regional approaches to sustainable development. Questions remain, however, 
as to how this shift is being played out in emerging policy prescriptions: for instance, 
relating to the breaks and continuities with previous eco-management paradigms; and 
where shifts are taking place, the causes behind them, and the effects of their 
implementation. This provides an important basis for developing the research agenda 
for this thesis.
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Non-human Space
Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]), laments the privileging of ‘abstract’ space in theoretical 
discourse, stating that “the modem theory of inquiry known as epistemology has 
inherited and adopted the notion that the status of space is that of a ‘mental thing’ or 
‘mental place’ and that notions of ‘man’ and space itself are conspicuously absent from 
debate” (p28). Our knowledge is based in abstractions of reality; metaphor and signs are 
used to describe ‘fuzzy’ concepts such as geographical scale (c f  Herod and Wright, 
2002; Moore, 2008). Our conceptions of boundaries are discursively produced through 
socio-political practices. But they still refer to and are shaped by connections to ‘real’ 
space. As Sayer (2000 p i29) states “[physical] space is a necessary dimension of all 
material phenomena, social ones included”, for example we are influenced by physical 
processes extra-discursively when we catch a virus. “We are involved in the world, as 
one of its forces” {ibid. p37) and we should therefore be attentive to the “socially 
constructed yet biophysical character of nature” (Gibbs, Jonas and While, 2002 p i26). 
More fundamentally, Latour (2005) argues that human and non-human space should not 
be categorically distinguished from one another.
The de-materialisation of space can be seen clearly in the development of Western 
societies. For instance, the prevailing modernist or post-modernist architecture and 
infrastructure of cities has aimed to dominate nature, and remove any sense of limits to 
human endeavour: Erik Swyngedouw and Maria Kaika (2000) warn that nature is being 
subsumed by an “increasingly managed clarity of the urban environment”. In an 
increasingly urbanised world, nature is being literally taken further and further from 
view. For instance, Swyngedouw and Kaika talk of urban water networks being buried 
underground, thus removing the ‘production’ of water from its consumption: a familiar 
story of high-capitalism. This in turn creates a world which is seemingly entirely 
distanced from nature, where social forces are the only ‘visible’ forces and the 
abstraction of simulations and simulacra (Baudrillard, 1994 [1981]) can appear to be the 
only reality. For Ulrich Beck (1998), Western society fostered this ‘metabolic rift’ 
(Marx 1992 [1867]) to the extent that there is now an inability to act on ecological 
crises. We are trapped within a vicious cycle of risk, whereby “nobody knows” the 
impact of their actions (Beck, 1998 p590), the conclusion being that, “We have to
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rediscover this crazy, mad-cow diseased world sociologically, and the script of 
modernity has to be rewritten, redefined, reinvented” {ibid. p587).
The Ecological State
In order to counteract the marginalisation of non-human space in contemporary society 
a number of ‘grand’ theories of governmental re-structuring have been posited. These 
often take current forms of liberal democracy as the problematising factor {cf. Beck, 
1998; Dryzek 1990; 1992; 1995; 2000; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). Other approaches 
have attempted to work from within current modes of liberal democracy {cf. Paehlke, 
1988; Wissenburg, 2001; Fabre, 2000). Along these lines, James Meadowcroft (2005) 
takes a less prescriptive, more pragmatic theoretical approach in exploring the idea of an 
‘ecological state’. This approach looks to a shift, more or less within the framework of 
current liberal democracies, towards a state that “takes the management of 
environmental burdens seriously” {ibid. p3), without environmental values necessarily 
forming the primary basis of politics and policy. In other words, towards environmental 
concerns becoming a legitimate theme for political action. For Meadowcroft, the 
ecological state would be concerned with ensuring that societal development did not 
take place at the expense of the environmental conditions necessary to allow future 
development. With this in mind, the ecological state is required to have the capacity to:
Monitor the state of the environment, map patterns of socioecological interaction, and 
anticipate future developments;
Take decisions relating to the assessment of risk, the definition of preferred 
environmental outcomes, the reconciliation of objectives with other individual and 
societal goals, and the distribution of social costs;
Deploy effective steering strategies and policy instruments;
Finance and legitimate its activities; [and]
Act in both the domestic and international realms.
Meadowcroft, 2005 p5
Meadowcroft goes on to place these requirements within the context of the welfare state, 
marking out a number of parallels between the two forms of state organisation. Like the 
welfare state, he argues, the ecological state involves an extension of state authority into
new areas of life, “or at least a systematisation and intensification of pre-existing 
interventions” (p6). This extension of authority is borne out of political desire to 
respond to market failures, which have not been addressed by other social institutions: 
in the case of the ecological state it has been recognised that environmental 
sustainability cannot be achieved without active state intervention. As a result, both sets 
of programmes will inevitably “alter patterns of ‘normal’ economic interaction” (p7), 
but at the same time will be faced with high levels of economic and political constraints. 
A key issue here is the relationship between the ecological state and the economy. In 
Meadowcroft’s eyes it is not necessary for sustainable development to equate to a 
reduction, or end to, economic growth: it is the quality of growth that needs to change. 
Although, unlike the welfare state, the ecological state is expressly related to patterns of 
production and consumption, the challenge for the state is to achieve ecological aims 
without interfering unduly with freedom to pursue other policy aims, such as economic 
growth.
Unlike the work of Dryzek and others cited above, Meadowcroft’s ecological state is 
based on analysis of trends in environmental governance and how policies are actually 
being developed in response to environmental crises from within capitalist liberal 
democracies. Nonetheless this remains a normative theoretical observance, rather than 
explicitly dealing with uncovering the ways in which environmental issues and policies 
have manifested themselves in practice, either spatially or institutionally. It is especially 
vague on the practice of governing the eco-state and in exploring the specific forms of 
governing required to achieve ecological aims. This represents a wider lacuna within 
environmental literature; and Rob Krueger and David Gibbs (2007, p4) argue that, 
“engaging the politics of sustainability represents a gap in the current sustainability 
literature”. I interpret this as being about a lack of engagement with the practice of 
sustainability as it is discursively framed, implemented, distorted and displaced -  
including processes of co-operation, co-ordination and co-option -  as opposed to 
concerns with ‘grand’ political theory. There are, unavoidably, normative elements to 
this, but it is essentially about analysing a policy area that has not been thoroughly 
scrutinised in terms of the ‘politics of practice’.
As noted, Meadowcroft’s approach is based in observation of trends in environmental
policy over the last two to three decades and it is from this analysis that While, Jonas
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and Gibbs (2010) take their exploration of processes of ‘eco-state restructuring’, 
involving the selective incorporation of environmental discourses into policy in recent 
years. This approach forms the framework for the following outline of trends in 
environmental discourse, policy and analysis. In doing so, the discussion will turn to a 
number of other normative discourses that have been taken on in some form by policy 
makers; in particular the concepts of sustainable development, ecological modernisation 
and ‘smart growth’, before moving on to the idea of a new political paradigm in the 
guise of ‘carbon control’.
Eco-state restructuring
Despite the recent profusion of apocalyptic discourses that envisage human-induced 
ecological breakdown (Swyngedouw, 2007), concern for the effects of human activity 
on the environment is by no means a new phenomenon. Concern for public health as a 
result of environmental degradation, for example, may be traced at least as far back as 
the sixth century BC, with the provision of rudimentary sewerage systems in Rome. 
More recently, policy interventions in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries began to 
show concern for issues of preservation and conservation (Robinson, 2004). It is not 
until the last few decades, however, that a gradual ‘globalisation’ of environmental 
issues has begun to take place, with a slowly growing recognition of the global 
consequences of human environmental consumption. This period has seen policy actors 
begin to understand non-human space as ‘part of’ the ‘social’, rather than an external 
resource to be managed separately. Most pertinently for this discussion, the specific 
threats of climate change and peak oil have reached a relatively global level of 
consciousness, but issues such as ozone layer depletion, acid rain and other forms of 
pollution have also gained prominence at one time or another. There has also been 
recognition that these ‘global’ issues have spatial manifestations, affect different points 
in space in different ways and that individual or localised actions can have global 
ramifications (Barry and Eckersley, 2005).
While, Jonas and Gibbs (2010) frame these policy debates within the notion of eco-state 
restructuring:
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...defined here as the reorganisation of state powers, capacities, regulations and territorial 
structures around institutional pathways and strategic projects, which are (at least from the 
vantage of state interests at a given moment in time) viewed as less environmentally 
damaging than previous trajectories.
While, Jonas and Gibbs, 2010 p80
That is, the process of potentially moving towards a situation approaching 
Meadowcroft’s (2005) ecological state. This framework identifies distinct phases of 
eco-state restructuring, and from this work and that of Hayter (2008), we might thus 
develop a chronology of environmental policy (see Table 4, below) with eco-state 
restructuring identified by both Meadowcroft and While, Jonas and Gibbs as beginning 
to really take shape in the ‘sustainable development years’. While, Jonas and Gibbs then 
outline a new restructuring phase in the guise of ‘carbon control’, which forms a core 
concern of this research. As such, this review will concentrate on these two policy 
discourses. The work of While, Jonas and Gibbs (While, 2008; While et al., 2010; 
While, forthcoming 2011) focuses particularly on the development of different practices 
of governing, or what Meadowcroft (2005 p5) calls “steering strategies and policy 
instruments”. It also touches on discursive arrangements that may help the eco-state to 
“legitimate its activities” (ibid. p4). As these aspects of governing provide a key 
theoretical focus of this research, the following discussion is based around 
developments in these areas of eco-state restructuring.
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Table 4: Eras of eco-state restructuring
Years of Ascendency Policy Discourse Dominant Policy Practices
600BC -  1900s Public Health Development of physical infrastructure
1895- 1940s Preservation/Conservation Urban/Rural planning
1950s-1980s Pollution Control Direct regulation at source
1980s-2000s
Sustainable Development 
(or ecological 
modernisation)
Partnerships, networks and strategic 
selectivity
2000s - Carbon Control? (Market based) Instrumental rationalities: 
targets/budgets (spatial and sectoral); 
direct regulation; taxation; potentially 
internalised within the ‘capitalist state’
Sources: Robinson (2004), Hayter (2008), and While et al. (2010)
Sustainable Development
The notion of sustainable development, as popularised by the Brundtland report (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, WCED, 1987), is in essence a principle 
of equity between social, economic and environmental goals. In a sense, it may be seen 
as a search for time-space balance; to create an ideal or absolute space, where medium 
to long-term space-time processes are balanced out so as to be relatively unchanging: a 
fundamental holistic re-imagining of space. It is, however, largely an anthropocentric 
approach, both in the sense that it creates distinctions between human and non-human 
concerns, but also that it is concerned with achieving the conditions for perpetual 
economic development. That is, an approach that “meets the needs of current 
generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (ibid. p23), whilst still aiming for a “5-10 fold” increase in world GDP over the 
following century (ibid., cited in Robinson, 2004 p372). One might in fact argue that 
the inclusion of an economic dimension automatically skews the aims of sustainable 
development: it is not really a dimension in its own right, but a label given to a
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particular form of social organisation aimed at achieving individual or collective social 
goals. As such, ‘the environment’ is weighted against from the outset.
Sustainable development -  or at least the WCED conceptualisation -  is chiefly 
concerned with institutional responses to social and environmental problems; with what 
Robinson (2004) terms a utilitarian ‘technical fix’ as opposed to ‘value changes’ in 
society. Nonetheless, the Brundtland Report represented the beginnings of an apparent 
willingness in policy circles to take seriously the idea of the Earth as a potentially 
vulnerable ecological system. Following publication of the Report, the concept of 
sustainable development became increasingly popular in policy realms. The 1992 Rio 
‘Earth’ Summit provided the stimulus for an explosion of activity, most significantly the 
implementation of UN Agenda 21 within many signatory countries. The EU (at the time 
the European Community) enshrined a commitment towards environmental policy 
within the Single European Act and its fifth Environmental Action Programme was 
initiated in 1992, with strong reference to the concept of sustainable development. This 
also became instrumental in the development of Agenda 21 in Europe (McCormick, 
2001). By 2006, 23 of the 30 OECD member states had prepared at least one formal 
national sustainable development strategy (OECD, 2006). The UK became the first 
country to develop a national strategy in 1994 -  revised in 1999 and 2006 -  and as part 
of this programme all English local authorities developed Local Agenda 21 strategies at 
some point during the following decade. By 2003 all of the English regions had 
produced sustainable development strategies, and by 2006, six of the eight 
administrative regions -  plus London -  had published a second iteration of their strategy. 
In more general terms, sustainable development became a near-ubiquitous policy 
discourse, as acerbically noted by Erik Swyngedouw (2007 p20):
I have not been able to find a single source that is against “sustainability”. Greenpeace is in 
favor, George Bush Jr. and Sr. are, the World Bank and its chairman (a prime warmonger on 
Iraq) are, the Pope is, my son Arno is, the rubber tappers in the Brazilian Amazon forest are, 
Bill Gates is, the labor unions are.
The fact that this disparate collection of individuals were apparently committed to 
sustainable development may suggest that it had become successfully integrated within 
the practice of governments and other actors across the (Western) world. In turn this 
could suggest that a successful process of eco-restructuring had taken place, and that
humans were on the road to an ecologically-balanced future. Equally, however, it could 
suggest that the ideal had become weakened in its implementation, through subversion 
of its principles, or substitution for other ideas whilst retaining the sustainable 
development moniker. Explorations of sustainable development in practice have 
increasingly come to draw the latter set of conclusions.
Sustainable Development Subverted
Meadowcroft (1999) talks of sustainable development as being adopted as a meta­
narrative for governing strategies. For Meadowcroft, however, its adoption is not to do 
with the ‘quality’ of the concept and the ability for the implementation of sustainable 
development principles to forge a path to social, ecological and economic balance. It is 
instead, he argues, largely a reflection of its fluidity and context dependency as a 
concept: it can be used to justify any number of policy agendas. Sustainability -  defined 
as the ultimate ‘fuzzy’ concept by Ann Markusen (1999) -  can therefore be reshaped 
and appropriated for a range of different ends. Most frequently, commentators have 
pointed to the co-option of sustainable development principles into dominant modes of 
economic policy discourse. Roger Keil (2007), for instance, finds that instead of a new 
era of anti-capitalism and ecological rationality, proponents of neoliberal growth 
policies subverted sustainability principles so as not to deviate economic trends from 
current paths. Put more simply, Swyngedouw (2007 p20) follows his list of pro­
sustainability actors with the observation that “All are presumably concerned about the 
long-term survival of (parts of) humanity; most just keep on doing business as usual”.
This has been observed across different levels of governing, including local and 
regional policy. Drawing attention to the ‘politics of scope’ operating in sustainable 
development policy, in their exploration of regional planning David Counsell and 
Graham Haughton (2006) examine the ways in which different sectors, groups or ‘silos’ 
within and across institutions engage in bargaining and manipulation over the scope and 
prominence of policy domains. In doing so, they analyse the UK government’s 
approach to sustainable development and attempts to overcome silo mentalities:
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The government has adopted an ‘integrative’ definition of sustainable development, which 
emphasises that it should not be seen as an environment-led agenda, but rather an agenda for 
integrating economic, social and environmental issues.
Ibid. p i08
Counsell and Haughton later note, however, that this kind of policy integration -  
characterised as a search for ‘win-win-win’ solutions -  can simply weaken the position 
of environmental agendas. Similarly, environmental and conservation groups such as 
the Campaign for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) have been critical of the 
preference for sustainability appraisal as opposed to strategic environmental assessment; 
Ann Hamblin (2004 p i3) states that, “traditionally, this has meant the environment 
almost always loses out”. As Jonas and While (2007 p i30) contend, “[t]he idea that all 
cities can be competitive, liveable and good for the environment seems to us to involve 
a leap of faith”.
Sustainable Development Substituted
More recently, while sustainable development has remained the catch-all term for 
integrating environmental and economic goals, the goals and underlying rationales have 
been substituted for narrower agendas. David Gibbs (2000) contends that in order to 
escape the “vague and all-encompassing” (p9) terms of sustainable development, an 
exploration instead of ‘ecological modernisation’ in both theory and practice offers a 
more rigorous approach to focusing on the tensions between economy and environment. 
This is particularly apposite given that ecological modernisation is more directly 
amenable to the pressures of the ‘growth imperative’:
Ecological modernisation specifically argues that economic development and ecological 
crisis can be reconciled to form a new model of development for capitalist economies.
Ibid. plO
The concept of ecological modernisation was developed in the early 1980s by Huber
(1982) and Janicke (1985), who argued for an ecological switchover; a move towards an
ecologically rational organisation of production, which envisages a progressive
modernisation of the institutions of modern society as opposed to their destruction or
dismantling. Therefore it aims to work within, rather than against, the capitalist market
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economy and current governmental configurations. Gibbs (2000; 2006) suggests that 
this pragmatic political programme can also be used theoretically to analyse changes in 
institutions that are redirecting environmental policy making. The three main ‘projects’ 
of the switchover are as follows:
Restructuring production and consumption through development of clean 
technologies and reducing or removing dependence on non-renewable resources.
Economising ecology by placing economic value on nature (e.g. through tax reform). 
Integrating environmental policy goals into other policy areas.
These are closely linked to three programmes that characterise the political approach:
Compensation for environmental damage and the use of new technology to minimise 
the effects of growing production and consumption.
Focus on altering the processes of production and consumption.
Dismantling and deindustrialisation of economies and a transformation towards small- 
scale units and a closer link between production and consumption.
A basic tenet is that businesses will support these programmes because they respond to 
environmental issues through notions of profitable enterprise: for instance, greater 
efficiency, avoidance of future costs such as clearing up contaminated land, the sale of 
environmentally friendly products or services and the sale of eco-technologies. New 
technologies are a key part of ecological modernisation and changes are predominantly 
a task for state-business partnership through negotiated agreements: consumers are 
essentially passive elements. Unlike the original conception of sustainable development, 
issues of democratic participation and equality are not present in (narrow) 
interpretations of ecological modernisation.
The early ‘sustainable development’ policies of -  for example -  RDAs in England, 
Gibbs (2000) suggests, in fact implicitly drew on ecological modernisation as a guide
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for policy implementation. Weaker variants of ecological modernisation can be seen in 
fact to have a number of similarities with various ‘new regionalist’ discourses and so 
this is perhaps not surprising: for example, there is a fatalist belief in globalisation as an 
unstoppable force; that part of the answer lies in moving towards de-industrialised 
vertically and horizontally integrated economic clusters; and the idea of a politically 
smooth process whereby cooperative competition leads to ecological switchover.
Viewing certain state practices as weak ecological modernisation also works well to 
frame the degree of apparent ‘fracturing’ of sustainability agendas at both national and 
sub-national levels of governing. For instance, Batchelor and Patterson (2007) point to 
‘smart growth’ as the latest incarnation of sustainable development in the South East. 
This, they argue, is a weaker variant of ecological modernisation, which allows a 
neoliberal ‘business as usual’ approach to development. Rob Krueger and David Gibbs 
(2008; Gibbs and Krueger, 2007) have explored smart growth policies in the USA as 
variants on sustainable development policy -  although firmly couched within the remits 
of eco-modemisation discourses -  with smart growth posited as a ‘third wave’ 
sustainability discourse based around market solutions to sustainability issues. They 
note that sustainability is essentially about a change in the world’s relationship with the 
environment and social justice: in contrast to this,
...smart growth may indeed just be a result of a fetishized urban lifestyle, not a change of 
course ... Smart growth provides an alternative for the consumption of open space. It does 
not address the larger issue of consumption itself
Krueger and Gibbs, 2008 pi 272
From another perspective, Mike Raco (2005; 2007) explores the ‘Sustainable 
Communities’ (SC) agenda in the UK, which was couched in more holistic sustainable 
development terms. Yet, in reality there are striking similarities between the two 
agendas. The SC programme represented a binding of New Labour modernisation 
agendas -  centred on partnership-based local governance -  with sustainable 
development discourses. Raco argues that the agenda was “anything but a coherent and 
logical spatial development programme” (p215); and while Raco (2005) originally 
argued that the SC programme should be seen as lying somewhere on a continuum 
between neoliberalism and sustainability -  however that might be interpreted -  more
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recently (2007) he finds that this over-estimates the coherence of the programme. In 
particular, there is a continuing difficulty in marrying economic objectives with 
sustainability agendas: the SC agenda is a form of hybrid between the -  seemingly 
antithetical -  principles of sustainable development and a pro-growth strategy 
emphasising economic competitiveness. There is also a clear ‘new regionalist’ emphasis 
to SC plans: they are keenly focused on regional competitiveness within a discourse of 
globalisation and global markets, leading towards a notion of the SC programme as 
again being more in line with a narrower ecological modernisation approach to 
development.
Taking an ecological modernisation approach to sustainability politics brings into sharp 
focus the apparent degree of subversion from the original political ideology of 
sustainable development to a point at which it can often appear to be a meaningless 
discourse. As an analytical theory ecological modernisation -  in its weakest guises -  
seems to quite aptly describe the rhetoric surrounding ‘ecological switchover’ coming 
from political elites at different scales of governing across the world. This 
understanding sees environmental issues as ‘negative externalities’ of the capitalist 
economy that can be dealt with within existing arrangements, rather than the current 
form of global capitalism as being fundamentally flawed. Roger Keil argues that these 
weak variants of ecological modernisation -  couched within the rhetoric of sustainable 
development -  have become the “new master discourse” (2007, p46):
The Brundtland and Club of Rome proposals were subsequently re-cast from a critical set of 
potentially anticapitalist warnings to a recipe for the survival of capitalism through a 
concrete set of measures involving ecological modernization. Instead of throwing a wrench 
into the capitalist machine, sustainability subsequently gets redefined as one of the possible 
routes for a neoliberal renewal of the capitalist accumulation process.
Keil, 2007 p46
As such, the discourse of sustainability shifts from being one of protecting nature from 
the impacts of the economy, to protecting the economy from the impacts of nature: a 
determination to continue the capitalist, neoliberal, or modernist project, with a 
continued emphasis on the environment (the effect) as the problem to solve rather than 
current economic configurations (the cause).
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Placing regions in sustainability politics
As sustainable development policies have been implemented across the (Western) world, 
they have apparently been subverted to incorporate neoliberal growth oriented 
approaches to development, which has in practice led to an adoption of weak ecological 
modernisation agendas. As noted, this discursive shift highlights the ‘politics of scope’, 
and the ideological concerns of national and sub-national governing institutions. No 
matter the weakness of the approaches, local authorities and regional governing 
institutions in Europe and North America have nonetheless been involved in developing 
environmental policies and strategies. Focusing on the ‘politics of scope’ -  or 
‘horizontal’ policy networks -  is useful to highlight conflicts of interest between 
environment, social and economic goals. An exploration of specific forms of governing 
strategies and the ‘politics of scale’ involved would, however, shed greater light on the 
reasons behind the ways in which policy has been framed and implemented sub- 
nationally.
The emphasis in initial sustainable development policy was on the nation state 
transferring powers upwards to supra-national governing institutions -  for example, the 
EU and UN -  with a strong emphasis on delivery at the local level (Gibbs, 2000); in 
many ways following the environmentalist ethos think global, act local. There is, 
however, no mention of meso -  federal state, regional, or city-regional -  tiers of 
governance in the original UN Agenda 21 (1992) document and The Johannesburg Plan 
of Implementation (2002) refers only to regions as supra-national spatial units. That is 
not to say that regions were entirely excluded from sustainable development agendas. In 
the UK, the 1998 Regional Development Agencies Act states that RDAs are expected to 
“contribute to the achievement of sustainable development where it is relevant to do so” 
(p2), while Regional Assemblies were charged with developing a sustainable 
development strategy for their region. Government Offices have also had some impact 
through influence from central government.
At the same time it would be fair to say that a degree of confusion remained regarding
the role of regional governing organisations, and indeed the region as a space more
generally, in developing sustainable development policy. This is on top of the ‘chaotic’
construction of the regions as a political entity discussed in the previous chapter, which
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potentially creates a further problematic. By way of explanation, work relating to 
English RDAs by Paul Benneworth, Leanne Conroy and Peter Roberts (2002) shows 
how a lack of governmental steering led to overriding economic imperatives winning 
out within regional policy implementation. They argue that, although the national 
government included a commitment to sustainable development in the founding statutes 
of RDAs, the meaning of this was developed insufficiently. This allowed RDAs to 
subvert the concept to the extent that economic policies almost always took centre stage. 
As noted by an interviewee (in Whitehead, 2003 p253):
... how anyone will ever take them to court on negligence of that duty is difficult to imagine 
because there is no legal definition of sustainable development and I don’t think that there 
possibly could be ...
Similarly, Anna Batchelor and Alan Patterson (2007) note that the fact that each of the 
statutory regional organisations had some sustainable development responsibilities 
regarding sustainable development, it in fact made it policy “diffuse” {ibid. p205) and 
thus weak in practice. Because the three regional institutions have differing roles and 
responsibilities with regard to sustainable development, “it is hard to ascertain where 
the lead is and on which ideology it is based ... [T]he institutional muddle ensures that 
the regional scale lacks leadership” {ibid. p212). So, while rhetoric on sustainable 
development is strong, the structures within which policy is framed and implemented 
make it difficult for anything other than the status quo of neoliberal or ‘vulgar’ new 
regionalist economic development to continue, while sustainable development policy is 
weak and ‘muddled’. Based on Gerry Stoker’s (2002) notion of ‘purposeful muddle’, 
Batchelor and Patterson argue that this approach allows the Government to see “what 
works and what effects SD [sustainable development] policies have at a regional scale 
before committing to institutional reform” (p208). There is an alternative, but linked 
argument that successive UK governments deferred decisions to avoid making difficult 
choices, and that it reflects a general lack of concern for sustainable development.
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Sustainable ‘regionalisms’
Despite the lack of a binding framework for sustainable policy-making at the regional 
level in England, Mark Whitehead (2003 p236) notes “a concerted effort to recast 
regions as important spaces through which to develop a more sustainable society” in the 
1990s and early 2000s, specifically that:
... the contemporary political construction of the region as a site of social and ecological 
regeneration is (re)creating a moral geography of regional space in the UK. This moral 
geography combines traditional concerns for social and economic justice with an emerging 
brand of environmental ethics ... Close analysis reveals that encrypted within the rhetoric of 
the sustainable region is a valorisation of the region as a particular scale of socio-ecological 
activity.
These strategies were therefore in part aimed at developing new forms of legitimacies 
for regional governing arrangements in attempting to overcome some of the issues 
discussed in Chapter 3: they aimed to act as ‘meta-technologies’ in re-framing 
understandings of the region as a space of sustainability. Whitehead explores the West 
Midlands sustainable development strategy as an example of this process, showing the 
way in which it draws on a particular moral argument: that people in the West Midlands 
have rights and responsibilities with regard to quality of life, which can be met through 
acting in a ‘sustainable’ manner. This is taken to include stakeholders in the region 
beyond the regional planning bodies, or regional institutions more broadly, in 
developing a framework of ‘good’ citizenry. This framework also attempts to develop a 
vision for a sea-change in the practice of governing in the region and draw local 
authorities into a regional spatial logic:
... this change sees local government not just as a legalistic regulator or guardian of 
sustainable development, but as a crucial actor in the complex web of socio-economic and 
ecological relations which make up regional space
Ibid. 2003 p239
For Whitehead, though, this is more than a framework for internal spatial morality. The 
construction of institutionalised ‘standard’ regions in the UK represented a ‘new scalar 
rationality’ towards regional space, which helped to engender space as “politically 
legible and technically manageable, through which the UK state can read its territory 
and orchestrate different forms of spatial policy” (ibid. 2003, p250, emphasis in
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original). As shown in Chapter 3, the regions in England did not develop as natural ‘bio­
regions’; they are political constructs which initially developed from pragmatic 
concerns for spatial management. As a result, the region may be seen as bound within 
moral discourses at the national level more than any internal spatial legitimacy.28 
Attempts to develop new spatial ‘imaginaries’ within the region then become an 
important project for actors seeking to build policy goals around non-statutory aims.
The development of scalar constraints and prescriptions are played out in further 
writings on sustainable development strategies in the English regions. In England, each 
of the regions had either a Regional Sustainable Development Framework (RSDF), or 
an Integrated Regional Strategy (IRS) that incorporated sustainable development 
principles. Graham Haughton, Dave Counsell and Geoff Vigar (2008) also found a 
distinct lack of variation between the sustainable development policies and approaches 
of the English regions. They contend that prescriptive guidance on strategy from central 
government made it difficult for regions -  with the possible exception of London -  to 
develop innovative approaches. Sustainable development strategies “lacked coherence 
and ownership, in spite of the apparent progress in producing paper strategies” (p i233), 
although they argue that these strategies did act as a form of metagovemance (Jessop, 
1995) in establishing ‘the rules of the game’ for governing and policy processes. Taking 
these findings alongside those of Batchelor and Patterson (2007), it may be argued that 
the government offered strong guidance on strategy content -  where it was not 
necessarily beneficial -  and weak guidance in terms of responsibilities and structures, 
where it was seemingly required.
Other experiments in creating sustainable (city-) regionalisms have taken place across 
the UK and elsewhere. Unlike Whitehead’s ‘morality’ discourse, however, these have 
often shown clear links with wider ‘new regionalist’ economic policy discourses, and in 
fact serve to highlight the issues around politics of both scale and scope discussed above. 
These ‘sustainable regionalisms’ have often operated as outward facing ‘branding’ 
exercises as much as they have been about inward facing attempts to foster societal 
engagement with sustainability issues. In common with the discussion above, Jonas and 
While (2007) found that “[cjentral to the urban regime’s strategy is the mobilization of
28 Although attempts to meet policy  goals might attempt to draw on, or develop, particular internal 
regional spatial charactersistics: see Chapter 9
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environmental assets for material goals” (p i38), while David Gibbs and Rob Krueger’s 
(2007; Krueger and Gibbs, 2008) exploration of ‘smart growth’ policies in the Austin 
and Boston city-regions drew similar conclusions, arguing that ‘new economy spaces’ 
attempt to develop sustainable strategies only when the material conditions that 
underpin them are compromised by rapid growth, and that these conditions are more 
about branding than deeper ecological concerns. Gibbs and Krueger’s work (2007; 
Krueger and Gibbs, 2008) does, however, pick up on attempts to develop internal 
partnerships and action following the failure of initial strategies: in Austin, one response 
was to develop a business-led sustainability network (started by CEOs in the city), as 
well as a chamber of commerce-led economic strategy that included environmental 
issues as a central part of its development plans. This included the funding of a Clean 
Energy and Development Council.
Sustainable Development Subsumed?
The above discussion of regional policy in relation to environmental issues has on the 
whole looked at a generalised notion of ‘environment’ within the wider realms of 
sustainable development and ecological modernisation. The more specific issue of 
climate change has, however, recently been subject to a growth in attention from 
academic and policy spheres. At the same time, while publications from policy-makers 
and academics concerned with normative and practical solutions have abounded, 
perspectives from political geography -  and the social sciences more widely -  still 
remain relatively thin on the ground. In particular, there remains a lack of material 
exploring the political and spatial ramifications of emerging carbon reduction politics 
(Bailey and Compston, 2008; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008), especially beyond 
discussions of national policy programmes. This is understandable, due to the relatively 
recent appearance of climate change as a serious issue in the political realm, and the fact 
that sub-national carbon regulation is only just beginning to take shape, if at all, in most 
countries. As Neil Adger (2001 p921) points out, however, “global climate change is a 
significant challenge to structures of governance at all temporal and spatial scales” and 
so it is vital that attention is paid to the way in which carbon reduction policy is played 
out across and between different spaces.
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Aidan While (2008; 2010) and colleagues (While, Jonas and Gibbs, 2010) have begun 
to open up debates relating to the spatio-political implications of a perceived shift from 
the fuzzily defined and implemented discourse of sustainable development to a specific 
concern with ‘carbon control’. While explores the rise of a ‘low carbon polity’ as an 
emerging, and increasingly dominant discourse within regulatory governance; so much 
so that “the management of carbon flows, and especially carbon emissions, could be 
said to be rapidly supplanting ‘sustainable development’ as the central goal of ongoing 
processes of eco-state restructuring” (2008 p i). This sees a concern for carbon 
reduction not just as the key issue within sustainable development discourses (Bulkeley,
2006), but as marking a new era of eco-state restructuring.
Potentially the most significant element of this turn is that of spatial carbon targets -
and possibly carbon budgets in the future -  which mark a first in terms of governmental
regulation of spaces in terms of monitoring economic circulations through an extra-
economic lens. This therefore moves to a much narrower, instrumental form of
environmental management; one focused on direct outputs. Alongside this are efforts to
create carbon markets, through carbon offsetting and trading schemes, leading to a
commodification of carbon. In similar veins, a number of commentators have pointed to
‘neoliberalisation’ of the environment (Castree, 2008). Adam Bumpus and Diana
Liverman (2008; see also Liverman, 2004), for example, discuss the role of carbon-
offset schemes in providing opportunities for ‘accumulation by decarbonisation’. This
focus on carbon reduction, While (2008) argues, is “linked to, but abstracted from a
sense of natural limits”: in other words the wider issues of ecological crisis and the
complex science surrounding climate change are -  like in Whitehead’s (2003)
discussion of the region -  restructured so as to be politically legible and technically
manageable. This could also be couched in terms of the debate around critiques of
liberal democracy and non-human space. Climate change forces recognition of the
physical limits of space, but because of liberal democracy’s entanglement with the
capitalist market logic, it is abstracted to the point that it can fit in with existing
economic discourses. A number thus becomes reified as a way of bringing about action;
somehow as more effective than the central fear that the biosphere -  a meta-network
that we cannot live without -  is likely to alter to the point that lives are at risk if no
action on carbon emissions is taken. This rationalisation of complex processes then
allows for the development of distinct spatial moralities:
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Perhaps all the morality of mankind has its origin in the tremendous inner excitement which 
seized on primeval men when they discovered measure and measuring, scales and 
weighing ... With these conceptions they climbed into realms that are quite unmeasurable 
and unweighable but originally did not seem to be.
Nietzsche, 1880 in Elden, 2006 pi
‘Carbon control’ may therefore be seen as a continuation, extension, and partial re- 
imagining of weak ecological modernisation logic. For example, it sees a potential turn 
away from loose, incentive-based ‘smart growth’ policies based on partnership and 
consensus, to more authoritarian, target-based modes of governing, but still bound 
within a wider sense that businesses will perform an ecological switchover if it is seen 
to be a profitable enterprise: hence the popularity of market-based cap and trading 
systems.
National and Supranational Carbon Control
Key staging posts in the early shifts towards carbon regulation took place through 
supranational agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, with related emissions 
targets for the EU and its member states, the launch of the European Climate Change 
Programme in 2000 and in 2003 the birth of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which 
extended beyond state bodies to all ‘large emitters’. These mechanisms in reality made 
very little headway in global carbon reduction, particularly owing to the amount of ‘hot 
air’ in the system following the collapse of former Eastern Bloc economies, the general 
‘loose and baggy’ nature of the targets (see Barrett, 1998; Brabiker et al., 2002; Kerr,
2007), and the system of ‘grandfathering’ carbon credits in emissions trading (see 
Tickell, 2008). However, they did represent a gradual move towards taking carbon 
reduction ‘seriously’ as an issue to be dealt with internationally and most national 
governments signed up to Kyoto have since designed and implemented their own 
climate change strategies, as well as the infamous non-signatory, the United States.
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In the UK a number of policy developments and related instruments were implemented 
between 2000 and 2007, including those outlined in Table 5, below.29 For While, Jonas 
and Gibbs (2010) 2006 represented a ‘tipping point’ in the shift towards the new 
political paradigm of carbon control, with 2007 pinpointed as the year that carbon 
control began to be ‘mainstreamed’ within political decision-making in the UK. This 
culminated in the passing of the Climate Change Act in November 2008, which 
committed the UK to a minimum 80 per cent reduction in CCL emissions by 2050.
Table 5: Policy Developments in the UK 2000-8
Year Policy instrument
2001 Climate Change Levy (CCL): business energy use tax
2001 Climate Change Agreements: CCL discounts for businesses in vulnerable sectors
2002 Energy Efficiency Commitment: mandatory targets for gas an electricity suppliers 
with more than 15,000 customers to assist customers with domestic energy efficiency
2002 UK emissions trading scheme: voluntary emissions trading for businesses
2002 Renewables obligation: electricity suppliers obliged to supply proportion of energy 
from renewable sources
2003 Energy White Paper: emphasis on increasing renewable energy production and 
supply
2004 PPS22 on Planning for Renewable Energy: includes introduction of regional 
renewable energy targets
2006 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
2006 Draft PPS on ‘Planning and Climate Change’ (CLG)
2007 Energy White Paper: commits UK to 60% C 02e reductions by 2050
2007 Carbon Reduction Commitment: mandatory emissions trading for non-energy 
intensive commercial and public organisations
2008 Creation of Department of Energy and Climate Change
2008 Climate Change Act receives Royal Assent: commits UK to C 02e emissions 
reductions of at least 80 per cent by 2050
Sources: Lorenzoni, O’Riorden and Pidgeon, 2008 and While, Jonas and Gibbs, 2010.
29 See Chapter 12 for further detail on the Clim ate Change A ct and the im plications for sub-national 
governing arrangements
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The UK was the first nation to adopt a “legally binding” (HM Government, 2008) 
emissions target in 2008, but in some respects lagged behind other EU nations, 
particularly in terms of energy production. Although a shift from coal and oil fuelled 
power to gas in the 1990s resulted in some reductions in energy production-related 
emissions, the UK struggled to make progress on renewable energy targets and price 
rises in the 2000s led to some shifts back to coal power (National Statistics, 2005). As a 
whole, electricity generation in the mid-2000s accounted for around a quarter of the 
UK’s greenhouse gas emissions, compared to eight per cent in France (Szarka, 2008). 
Irene Lorenzoni, Tim O’Riordan and Nick Pidgeon (2008) outline a number of failures 
in the national level policy implementation of the Labour government in the 2000s. First, 
they argue that the government focused on incremental change through market 
mechanisms in deference to business-led lobbying and electoral preferences (in that 
order); investment in technology and infrastructure was hampered by a lack of 
regulatory mechanisms that reflect the “true price” of carbon {ibid. pi 19); and targets 
were undermined by “ineffective policy measures, poor reporting, auditing reviews 
which are persistently ignored, and repeated upward revisions in carbon emissions 
scenarios” {ibid.). Second, they argue that departmental ‘silos’ and conflicting interests 
led to a lack of consistency in policy articulation and implementation. Lorenzoni, 
O’Riorden and Pidgeon conclude that there is a need to build a more effective 
programme of government that utilises a range of governing strategies to change public 
attitudes through a fundamental re-imagining of the goals and ordering of governing: 
“there needs to be a new vision of what a low-carbon sustainable society and economy 
should look like and a clearer view of the changes in policy and institutional design 
necessary to get there” {ibid. p i21).
Carbon ‘Regionalisms’
In analysing trends in carbon reduction policy, While (2008; 2010; While, Jonas and 
Gibbs, 2010) focuses on the socio-economic impacts of potential future outcomes: for 
instance the growth of alternative forms of economic development, or even ‘non­
development’ pursued by different localities or regions in order to make best use of 
their carbon budget; or more draconian, regressive measures that may favour certain
spaces or scales over others. Whilst sustainable development policy has generally been
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led through light-touch approaches to policy implementation at sub-national level, this 
argument suggests that ‘carbon control’ is perhaps more likely to see stronger policy 
interference from above. As such, direct regulation through targets and budgets are seen 
as likely to come to the fore in policy.
As with national and supra-national carbon reduction programmes, taking climate 
change seriously requires a change in the spatial imaginations of sub-national governing 
actors, with a need for locales and regions seen as spaces of carbon flows (While, 2010). 
This includes a shift in the logic of calculation towards the calculus of carbon spaces. 
Such calculative strategies may take a range of forms, from outward-facing 
regionalisms or urbanisms as part of a spatial branding strategy, to inward-facing 
approaches of reimagining and recalculating spaces.
While there has been a recent profusion of popular and academic research that focuses 
on these issues at international and national levels (see, for example, Leggett, 2005; 
2006; 2009, Dessler and Parson, 2006; Monbiot, 2006; Kerr, 2007; Porritt, 2008; 
Tickell, 2008; Giddens, 2009), beyond While and colleagues’ tentative exploration there 
have been very few specific explorations of sub-national climate change politics, 
particularly those focused on either (a) strategies of ‘re-imagining’ political spaces as 
carbon spaces (rather than sectoral policies); (b) regions as spaces of governing carbon; 
or (c) the scalar politics of (a) and (b).
In terms of outward facing strategies, Mike Hodson and Simon Marvin (2007) have 
carried out some work relating to climate change governing in London, focusing on the 
development of a process of ‘strategic glurbanisation’, through which London’s 
governing elites attempt to brand the city as a ‘national exemplar’ in terms of 
developing a low carbon economy based on hydrogen fuel. This has clear links to the 
literature on ‘sustainable regionalisms’ discussed above, but hints at the potential for a 
more aggressive economic focus in low-carbon strategies. There has been little, if any, 
emphasis on more comprehensive practices of re-viewing sub-national space however, 
particularly in terms of the politics of re-imagining and re-calculating sub-national 
spaces within the aegis of multi-level or multi-scalar governing arrangements.
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More widely, some work has begun to explore the scalar politics of governing carbon. 
These publications are, however, largely centred on developing research questions for 
future exploration. For instance, a short essay from Mike Hulme (2007) and an even 
shorter ‘complement’ to this from Ian Bailey (2008) both introduce the role of cultural 
specificities in the politics of scale involved in climate change governing, and call for 
greater scrutiny of the scaled processes of the techno-political processes involved in 
measuring and controlling carbon levels. In line with the carbon control thesis, Hulme 
contends that the idea of climate has been de-humanised and divorced from the 
variegations of space to develop a ‘homogenous climate’ discourse: Bailey takes this on 
to discuss ways in which knowledge is controlled at different scales of governing. The 
politics of knowledge is highly important in the development of a new policy domain, 
particularly one with the complexity of climate change, and is something that is 
explored in more depth in Chapter 12, on the deployment of local carbon reduction 
targets. More generally, Bailey calls for “greater exploration of how climate politics 
operates within, and transcends, international, regional, national and local governance 
scales” (p420).
The region has remained largely absent from these debates, however, leaving a number 
of unanswered questions. For instance, where do (or did) regions fit in strategically 
within global, national and local carbon ‘regimes’? Was there a role for the regions 
beyond simply ensuring that their internal operations meet with (supra-)national 
regulations? If regional organisations did have a role, was it chiefly as mediators 
between the national and local -  and what were the politics involved in these processes 
-  or were there wider mechanisms available by which they could influence climate 
change mitigation? And, finally, what overlaps, continuities and differences were 
taking place in the purported transition from ‘sustainable development’ to ‘carbon 
control’ as the leitmotif of environmental policy at the regional level?
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P.S. Remembering Practices of Governing
Three sets of critiques may be aimed at the literature emanating from political and 
economic geography circles outlined above. Firstly, theories of governing are largely 
absent, or engaged with only implicitly. Much of the work is based within forms of neo- 
Marxist and neo-Gramscian thought, with Bob Jessop’s theories of meta-governance 
and strategic selectivity (Jessop, 2003) often invoked, but are not developed in depth to 
explore processes of governing more explicitly. Harriet Bulkeley and Michele Betsill 
(2005 p58) highlight a key weakness in current understandings of the implementation of 
‘sustainability’ policies, however they might be defined:
...the lack of engagement between those concerned with the analysis of urban governance 
and those whose focus is on sustainable cities has ... led to a relatively impoverished 
conception of the governance context in many accounts of urban sustainability.
There is therefore a weakness in understandings of governance and power. In this vein, 
the most interesting and potentially fruitful avenues of exploration are those that have 
attempted to conceptualise the different types of strategies being taken to achieve 
carbon reduction within different spatial boundaries. Harriet Bulkeley and Kristine Kern 
(2006), for instance, traced the different ‘modes of governing’ used by local authorities 
in the UK and Germany to achieve climate change goals. This work provided insights in 
attempting to conceptualise and trace the specific forms in which power can be 
exercised, as will be discussed in the next chapter. These explorations did not, however, 
explicitly trace out the exercise of power as it translates through different actors in the 
development and implementation of policy, although Bulkeley and Kern (2009) do 
make a start with this in viewing the ways in which transnational climate change 
networks work to influence national and international governing processes. More 
recently, Bulkeley (2010) also attempts to tie this body of work with multi-level 
governing theories, but does not go beyond simply modelling the relation of local 
governing actors to others acting ‘from above’.
Second, and related to the above, there is a tendency to focus only on the relationship 
between national government and a particular sub-national entity, rather than 
relationships between sub-national actors. It is worth also noting the role of the EU in
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attempting to embed environmental agendas into regional policy. Jenny Fairbrass and 
Andrew Jordon (2004) assert that the EU has:
... created some of the strongest and most progressive environmental policies of any polity 
in the world. This remarkable achievement has been accomplished with the involvement of a 
variety of state and non-state actors at different levels of governance, ranging from the local 
to the global.
pi 47
The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, for example, gave legal status to prioritising 
environmental issues within European policy (Cohen, 2008). While much European 
policy feeds through national government before reaching sub-national institutions, 
literature on policy integration has highlighted attempts to implement sustainable 
development agendas as part of ‘cross-cutting’ or ‘horizontal’ themes in EU regional 
structural funds programmes (c f  Taylor, Polverari and Raines, 2001; Wells et al., 2004; 
Gore, 2005; Cohen, 2008). Findings from this body of work have not been radically 
different to those discussed above, but are still important to recognise. Continuing a 
familiar theme, Tony Gore (2005, p i), for example, suggests that policy co-ordination 
“may reflect a neoliberal concern to obtain control over complex or ‘wicked’ issues by 
attempting to insert connective strands into an institutional structure that remains 
fundamentally unchanged”. In a similar study, Sarah Cohen (2008) also found that 
“incremental changes to achieve the integration of environmental concerns within 
structural fund programmes are likely to be unsuccessful” (p i2) for the same reasons.
Finally, while there has been some emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ forms of governing, 
including studies of particular local climate movements -  such as the Transition Towns 
movement -  (see North, 2009), there has been less emphasis on ‘formal’ governing 
actors working to by-pass traditional state hierarchies by joining policy networks, 
increasingly operating across boundaries. This has included signing up to international 
agreements -  for example, LA21 -  or various sustainability and climate change 
networks -  for example the Nottingham Declaration and the C40 Climate Leadership 
Network -  even if the take up for some of these initiatives has been “patchy” (Jonas 
and While, 2007 p i29). A range of transnational local authority climate change 
networks operate, and have been explored by Harriet Bulkeley and Michele Betsill 
(2005; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2008), including the ways in which these networks
influence their members, but also aim to influence policy at different hierarchical scales 
of governing. This opens up two areas of interest, first in exploring partnership-based 
regionalisms as being one of many potential policy networks for local and regional 
actors to participate with. Here, attempts at legitimising regional governing 
organisations come to the fore. Second, some analysis of the different strategies that can 
be taken by governing organisations and networks to influence the policy process is 
important to show spatial governing as not simply a top-down process of cascading 
authority, but as a more complex process involving a range of actors at different scales 
and across different networks. These critiques -  particularly in terms of asserting 
theories of governing within geographical perspectives -  come to prominence in the 
following chapter, and are explored further in the empirical analysis later on.
Conclusion
The physicality of space was not explicitly considered in the political construction of 
the English regions; in particular human interaction with non-humans. Nonetheless, 
environmental issues have slowly gained currency as legitimate policy themes and as a 
result sub-national governing organisations in England are increasingly implicated in 
struggles around recognising and dealing with the linkages between economic 
development, welfare issues and environmental concerns (Gibbs and Jonas, 2001). 
Engagement with the ‘politics of scale’ at regional and local levels of governing point to 
two intertwined issue that stifle attempts at developing sustainable pathways even where 
there is will to do so. Firstly, there has been a distinct lack of steering from national, and 
supra-national, levels of governing, whilst economic agendas are often closely 
monitored from above, particularly in the UK. This points to a second major problem 
faced by sub-national policy makers: a lack of autonomy to develop their own 
distinctive policy agendas. In response, governing institutions operating at regional and 
city-regional levels attempted to develop alternative forms of governing based on 
‘network steering’ and discursive (city-) regionalisms to foster action on sustainability; 
although these inclusive approaches almost inevitably became couched in, and 
potentially subsumed by, economic imperatives.
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If, as Gibbs and Jonas (2001), as well as Whitehead (2003), contend, local governing 
arrangements are “crucial” in implementing sustainable development policies, then 
there is also a question of tensions or partnerships between regional and local scales: 
attempts to deal with ‘wicked’ issues such as environmental sustainability “involve a 
series of interactions between actors in different policy frames, a sequence that has to be 
repeated at each level as the package feeds down the policy chain” (Gore, 2005 p i). 
Aidan While (2008, 2010; et al., 2010) contends that increasing concern for carbon 
reduction policies will potentially result in greater spatial and scalar tensions than seen 
in previous incarnations of eco-state restructuring. Investigation of the politics of space 
and scale in this emerging policy area thus becomes a key research agenda: not only 
between national and regional or local scales of governing -  as has been the dominant 
focus to date -  but also between the different sub-national scales of governing.
A key research agenda emerges then in empirically analysing the extent and forms of 
shifts to an era of ‘carbon control’, in particular in attempts to re-imagine the region as a 
carbon space. This potential new phase of eco-state restructuring brings forward a new 
set of questions concerning scalar politics and governing strategies. For example, how is 
the governing of carbon management being scaled: that is, which institutions and levels 
of governing are being privileged in new governing arrangements, and how do these 
arrangements differ from previous modes of governing sustainability? Similarly, to 
what extent and in what ways do emerging trends in governing climate change differ 
from practices and policies for meeting sustainable development agendas? And in what 
ways are the multiple politics of space and scale being played out within these emerging 
practices?
In terms of analysing these questions, stronger linkage to theories of governing would 
help to give depth to the existing literature in this area. It is to this issue that the next 
chapter turns. In particular, there is a need to focus on the specificities of scalar politics 
and the exercise of power: that is, a need to understand how resources are mobilised to 
attain political outcomes and the strategies that are employed beyond ‘broad brush’ 
theorisations of neoliberalism; scalar hierarchies versus network collaborations; and 
‘metagovemance’.
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5 Multi-level power modalities and translations
This account has so far explored debates around ‘the region’ and non-human space, bringing forth a set of research questions focused on the ways that governing 
actors work to ‘construct’ political spaces and how actors have attempted -  or might 
attempt -  to develop new spatial imaginaries around notions of ‘the environment’, 
sustainable development, or -  more recently -  carbon ‘flows’. In developing new spatial 
boundaries -  either in terms of territory or scale, or including and excluding certain 
constituent elements from that space -  the ‘practice’ of space was outlined as crucial in 
Chapter 2. Essentially, this means focusing on the specifics of how and where actors 
seek to build spatial formations. This has to some extent been underplayed in literature 
concerning both the governing of sub-national space and of ‘the environment’. The 
previous chapter thus concluded with a critique that suggested a need for greater 
emphasis on theories of governing and the ways in which power is exercised in order to 
more comprehensively analyse the ways in which policy -  and space -  is produced and 
enacted.
In order to effectively explore these practices, a framework that is specifically 
concerned with conceptualising and tracing power is required: this chapter explores the 
work of John Allen and Harriet Bulkeley in an attempt to adopt and develop a 
framework that effectively meets these requirements. Harriet Bulkeley’s ‘modes of 
governing’ (MoG) approach attempts to engage with critiques of contemporary 
discourses of both power and governing. In terms of power, it attempts to draw attention 
to the particularities of power as it is exercised; in particular the heterogeneity of its 
manifestations. Viewed in terms of theories of governing this approach may be seen as 
attempting to develop the work of Bob Jessop and others into an approach more 
sensitive to calls from neo-Foucauldian scholars for a greater emphasis on the 
specificities of power. A more specific critique of governing theories relates to the 
theoretical lexicon used. In particular, the term governance is critiqued as being 
ambiguous and, in certain interpretations, a teleological misrepresentation of a trend as 
an endpoint.
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Here, I outline a framework that takes Bulkeley’s approach as a starting point for 
developing a more theoretically consistent, analytically flexible and spatially sensitive 
approach to analysing governing practices. In terms of the ‘howabouts’ of power I take 
Bulkeley’s MoG framework and re-work it through Allen’s work regarding the analysis 
of specific power modalities. I suggest a focus on the technologies of governing in order 
to highlight the ‘horizontal’ fluidities between governing modes. In determining the 
‘whereabouts’ of power a turn towards theories of multi-level governance (MLG) is 
useful, although I briefly note that this model would perhaps be better termed multi-s/te 
governance to more clearly capture the heterogeneity of actors and relations involved, 
and their spatial natures. While Bulkeley’s concern has been for analysing the multi­
level practices of governing as well as the specific forms of governing, these approaches 
have not been explicitly combined in her work.30 The MoG framework is therefore re­
worked and expanded to develop a more flexible ‘general-theoretic’ approach for 
analysis. Crucially, while Bulkeley and colleagues’ work has been quite static in its 
analysis of governing ‘constellations’ this expanded approach is concerned with 
highlighting the ways in which power is translated, mediated and potentially subverted 
across scales of governing. This aspect of governing practices is given too little 
emphasis in governance or governmental literature as a whole. Similarly, the MoG 
approach has tended to focus on analysing top-down governing strategies, although 
elements of it have been drawn from in work by Bulkeley with Kristine Kern on 
transnational governing networks: I briefly offer ways in which ‘governing from below’ 
might be analysed more fully using the re-worked ‘multi-site power modalities’ 
framework.
Lost Geographies of Power
Any discussion of governing processes invariably requires a discussion of power. 
Indeed, power is everywhere, and embodied in everything (Foucault, 1975). This can be 
problematic in itself. As Murray Low (2005 p83) notes, “[power] is both one of the 
most readily digested concepts in the world ... yet curiously difficult to specify when
30 Although B ulkeley (2010) does work with both fram eworks, the analysis does not go  so far as to 
effectively  entw ine the two.
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we actually focus on it”. Without an understanding of what power is, or of what it is 
constituted, it may be argued that any understanding of its effects will be ultimately 
lacking. And yet, as noted in the previous chapters, it is an issue that has not been 
sufficiently ‘de-constructed’ in much contemporary work regarding the region, or on 
political processes more generally. John Allen (2003; 2004; 2006) has gone further, 
arguing that geographical study as a whole has drifted away from exploration of power 
in itself as an object of enquiry. Specifically, he argues that,
I think that we have lost sight of the particularities of power, the diverse and specific 
modalities of power that make a difference to how we are put in our place, how we 
experience power ... I want to bring such differences and distinctions back to the fore, not 
only to underline the kinds of confrontation that power can and does take, but also to weave 
them into a more geographically curious dialogue of power.
Ibid. p2
In order to ‘reclaim’ the concept, Allen depicts a reinvigorated approach to power. This 
can be distilled to three core points. Firstly, there is a need to alter the lexicon of power. 
Most significantly, power should not be seen as something that may be ‘held’ or 
‘stored’; power is something that is exercised. So, although we might agree with Michel 
Foucault that power is ever-present, and (potentially) coming from everywhere, power 
is not a ‘thing’, but a “relational effect of social interaction” {ibid. p5). In using this 
definition, we then need also to be more aware of the distinction between resources -  or 
capacities -  and power. Resources may determine the level, and form, of power we are 
able to exert in a particular circumstance; that is, they affect our ability to act. They do 
not, however, determine whether or not power is exercised. A lump of coal is a resource, 
but it does not possess the power that it produces when combusted. Similarly, it would 
be wrong to say that individuals or institutions ‘hold’ powers. This may seem a largely 
semantic issue, but for Allen this is central to the ensuing discussion: if we can move 
away from power as a nebulous phenomenon - “a shadowy force lurking in the murky 
recesses” (2003 p9) - held by certain individuals and organisations, we can begin to also 
look at the specificities of power. We move towards exploring power more clearly as 
something heterogeneously applied and mediated through relationships and material 
encounters in particular contexts.
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This brings the second key point into focus. Drawing on the work of Max Weber and 
Hannah Arendt, Allen criticises Foucauldian works of often theorising power through a 
dualist domination-resistance dialectic. Instead, he points out the manifold ways - or 
modalities - in which power can be exercised:
... power is never power in general, but always power of a particular kind, I take such acts as 
domination, authority, seduction, manipulation, coercion and the like to possess their own 
relational peculiarities ... A world of difference separates dominant relationships which 
restrict choice and close down possibilities from those which, for instance, secure assent, 
manipulate outcomes, impute threats or seduce through suggestion and enticement.
2003, p5
It would be easy to take a leap from here to take a stance where there are seen to be “as 
many forms of power as there are types of relationships” (Sheridan, 1980 in Allen, 2003 
p99). To do so, Allen warns, would be to drift back into a position where power is again 
seen as a singular, nebulous force; to lose sight of the ‘particularities’ of power once 
more. Although Allen does not say so outright, it is therefore implicitly deemed 
necessary to have some level of abstraction, or theorisation, of the various modalities of 
power. In other words, there is a need to walk a careful line between power as a singular 
thing because all power is the same, and power as a singular thing because power is 
exercised in so many different ways that it is seen as an all pervasive force separated 
from specific relationships. Allen thus speaks of a number of different general modes of 
power. First, he talks of two general forms of relational ties through which power exerts 
itself. These are instrumental ties, which are held over you and used to gain leverage; 
and associational ties, which are “more like a collective medium enabling things to get 
done or facilitate some common aim” (p5). Instrumental ties are always at someone 
else’s expense, while associational ties are enabling for the benefit of all those taking 
part: “power is exercised either over, or with others” {ibid. emphasis in original). From 
this starting point, Allen refers at various points to six modes of power: domination, 
coercion, seduction, inducement, manipulation and authority. Allen does not at any 
point argue that these comprise a comprehensive typology of power; although they do 
appear to form a strong basis from which to begin.
The two preceding discussions lead to Allen’s final -  and overarching -  concern: the
‘lost geographies’ of power. That is to say, Allen wishes to assert that power is “always
already spatial” (p i02). This may be seen as something as a truism, in the same sense
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that one might point out that everything is spatial, just like everything is temporal, but 
this would do an injustice to his argument. Like Doreen Massey (2005) and others (see 
Chapter 2), Allen’s concern is not just that space is ‘always there’, but that 
contemporary notions of networks and flows (c f  Castells, 1998; Latour, 2005), 
reification of ‘global’ forces, and the above discussed arguments regarding ‘all- 
pervasive’ power have resulted in scant attention being paid to the effect that space has 
on the ways in which power is exercised and experienced:
People are placed by power, but they experience it at first hand through the rhythms and 
relationships of particular places, not as some pre-packaged force from afar and not as a 
ubiquitous presence.
Allen, 2003 p2
As an example of this, Allen (2006) explores the place-specific manifestations of 
seductive power in the Sony Centre, Berlin. Here, the production of ‘ambient’ space is 
used to develop an apparently open environment that in fact represents a seductive 
presence that closes options, depicting this expression of power as less reliant on 
continual small scale interactions than conventional practices of domination might. At 
the same time, however, this localised seduction may also be seen as a translation of 
other forms of power as they move across scales of practice: the fact that the Sony 
Centre is placed in a culturally highly significant public place31 may be seen as a 
manifestation of the domination of certain multi-national firms over policy-makers and 
wider discursive logics in society. Similarly, as Murray Low (2005, p83) points out, 
“Different modalities of power have different spatial characteristics or ‘reach’, and thus 
different degrees of effectiveness over wider scales”. Low suggests that domination is 
most effective when there is minimal spatial distanciation, involving frequent 
interactions, while seduction may be less so.
Allen’s framework is certainly “compelling” (Low, 2005 p84) and draws out a range of 
research questions pertinent to this research project. His call for renewed emphasis on 
the particularities of power has resonance with the aim here to view the different 
strategies and practices of governing. It also provides a potential lexicon through which 
to analyse these processes and the overarching aim of rediscovering lost geographies o f
31 The Sony Centre is on Potsdamer Platz, previously the cultural and com m ercial heart o f  Berlin, which  
was decim ated by the construction o f lh e  Berlin W all in 1961.
95
power is something central to both the understanding of space outlined in Chapter 2, 
and the ‘politics of scale’ discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. What Allen does not do, 
however, is link his ideas to specific theories of governing: while it is useful to develop 
a wider understanding of power, this can only be utilised as an analytical framework if 
incorporated within a framework that takes into account the governing process. 
Serendipitously, Harriet Bulkeley (2010; et al., 2005; with Kern, 2006 and 2009; with 
Watson and Hudson, 2007; with Betsill, 2008) has made a start at developing a 
framework that does attempt to do such a thing, to which I will shortly turn.
First, however, it would be useful to take a look at two dominant sets of approaches to 
analysing governing processes: institutional governance theories, particularly those of 
Jessop; and neo-Foucauldian govemmentality: for Bulkeley et al. (2007, p2734) 
“neither account adequately addresses the complexities of how authority is attained, 
maintained and exercised, with the practice of governing”. Instead they develop a 
‘modes of governing’ approach, which takes on elements of both sets of approaches; in 
particular Jessop’s regulation approach and recent ‘moderate’ interpretations of 
Foucault (c f  MacKinnon, 2000; Murdoch, 2000).
Governance
In the eyes of many scholars, recent years have seen a fundamental shift in the forms,
structures, processes and spaces of governing. This is largely owing to a sense that
previous ideas of hierarchical, state-centric, government are no longer sufficient to
describe the processes by which institutions exercise power in light of changing scalar
patterns of governing (see Chapter 3), including a less clear sense of scale - as practice
and category - and hierarchy being intrinsically linked, and increased involvement of
non-state institutions in governing activities. As a result, there has been a concurrent
rise in the use of the term governance to refer to governing actors, institutions and
practices. At the same time, one might argue that recent notions of governance also
show recognition of the fact that governing practices were never reducible to set
hierarchical relationships between specific state institutions and society. This avenue of
work has branched into various fields -  of which, three areas of most relevance to this
research are discussed below -  and has often been fruitful in providing a better
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understanding of the way state actors interact with others. Specifically, in developing 
their ‘modes of governing’ framework, Bulkeley et al. acknowledge that:
...recent debates on the changing nature of the state and the emergence of new forms of 
governance provide a useful starting point for the development of a framework for 
analysis ... [of] a heterogeneous policy milieu.
Bulkeley et al., 2005 p i5
Furthermore, these debates suggest that it is no longer possible to take for granted the 
context within which policy making is taking shape and being implemented. In fact 
their approach attempts to supplement rather than supplant governance approaches by 
developing a more plural approach, which fills in some of the gaps identified in their 
reading of governance literature to date. The work of Jessop on governance and 
institutions (cf. Jessop, 1990; 1997; 2003; 2005) has been particularly influential.
Jessop, SRA and Institutional Turns
Situated within a broader ‘regulation’ school of thought, Bob Jessop’s Strategic 
Relational Approach (SRA) to theorising society, institutions and governance has 
proved popular for those attempting to research sub-national governing practices. 
Indeed, the preceding two chapters have been shot through with references to those who 
explicitly use Jessop’s approaches (cf. Lagendijk, 1997; Sum, 2004), others who draw 
selectively on his ideas (cf. Haughton, Counsell and Vigar 2008), and yet more who 
implicitly engage with some of the wider understandings of the world he espouses (cf. 
While, Jonas and Gibbs, 2010; Gibbs, 2006). Jessop describes his approach thus:
The SRA is a general theoretical framework for addressing structure and strategy at various 
scales of social life from its micro-foundations to its most general macrostructural 
dynamics ... It regards the state neither as a unitary political subject nor as a passive 
instrumentalizable thing but as a complex social relation ... It treats the state as a relatively 
unified ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularized, and strategically selective 
institutions, organizations, social forces, and activities organized around (or at least involved 
in) making collectively binding decisions for an imagined political community .
2005 p50. Emphasis in original.
Jessop takes a critical realist approach in developing this theory. Critical realism is a
philosophy of science primarily based on a particular understanding of ontology. This is
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based on the existence three stages of ‘reality’. For critical realists the ‘empirical’ level 
of reality makes up only those things that can be readily observed. In order to 
understand these observations, one must delve to the level of the ‘real’, which is the 
realm of potentiality: the structures and powers of objects. In between the real and the 
empirical domains lies the realm of the ‘actual’ (Sayer, 2000). This refers to what 
happens if and when those powers are activated. In a wider sense Jessop is concerned 
with the role that analysis of institutions can play in understandings of structure and 
agency.32 Jessop argues that, rather then taking a dualist structure-agency dichotomy, a 
more fruitful avenue is to examine structure in relation to agency and agency in relation 
to structure. That is, he takes a dialectical approach to their relations.
Jessop draws from Nicos Poulantzas in considering the state as “a system of strategic 
selectivity and the nature of political struggle as a field of competing strategies for 
hegemony” (Jessop, 1990 p221, original emphasis in Uitermark, 2005 pi 39). This, for 
example, allows a view of the different ways in which the state can work for different 
purposes, and develop different forms of ‘selectivity’. Antonio Gramsci has also been a 
key influence in Jessop’s SRA, which attempts to look at the strategy-structure dialectic 
in decision-making (Uitermark, 2005). The SRA argues that it is impossible to draw an 
ontological line between the two: they are co-constitutive.
There are many strengths to this approach. The focus on ‘strategic selectivity’ is 
particularly interesting. In simple terms, this concept posits that, “some actors and 
institutions have the ability to formulate, secure and implement specific policies, while 
others do not” (Gibbs, 2006 p203). The strategic selectivities of structures thus “reward 
actions that are compatible with the recursive reproduction of the structure(s) in 
question” (Jessop, 2001 p i225). For Jessop then, institutions only matter in terms of 
their “structurally inscribed strategic selectivity: institutions select behaviours” {ibid. 
p i226, emphasis in original). At the same time, however, individuals may - through 
skilful or reflexive action - reconstitute institutions. The SRA thus attempts to situate 
institutions within a broader, and richer, social world: they should be analysed as
32 The term institution is used here to be consistent with Jessop’s term inology. The m eaning o f  the word 
institution is vague, and often represented in different ways by different writers, particularly when 
scholars talk o f  institutions being inscribed with particular forms o f  cultural logics. Therefore, when 
carrying out my own analysis, the term institution has been used sparingly, and when it is used, is to be 
understood as a direct synonym  for organisation, or -  loosely  speaking -  a particular network.
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“complex emergent phenomena, whose reproduction is incomplete, provisional and 
unstable, and which coevolve with a range of other complex emergent phenomena” 
{ibid. p i230). They are always in formation and always exist in relation to any number 
of other heterogeneous formations.
An especially cogent analysis relates to Jessop’s contention that “every mode of 
governance fails” (2003, p i6). That is, the strategies taken by governing organisations 
will always in some way, at some point, not achieve the desired outcomes. Jessop thus 
highlights three strategies that are used to mitigate for this:
Developing a flexible repertoire of response: effective governance often requires a 
combination of mechanisms oriented to different scales and temporal horizons. “In 
this way strategies and tactics can be combined to reduce the likelihood of failure” 
(pi6): “Because of the infinite variety of perturbations that could affect a system in a 
complex world, one should try to maximize its internal variety (or diversity) so that 
the system is well prepared for any contingencies” (pi7).
A reflexive orientation about what would be an acceptable level of failure.
Self-reflexive ‘irony’ in that participants in governance recognise the likely failure of 
their actions, but proceed as if success were possible (pi 6).
Jessop, 2003 pp 16-17
The first of these points can be easily related to Allen’s preoccupation with the multiple 
modalities of power: Jessop offers an explanation as to why multiple modalities are 
required in order to effect changes in others’ behaviour. Governing institutions need to 
use a range of strategies in order to minimise the risk of failure. Jessop’s extensive 
discussions of institutions of governance thus promise to provide a potentially rich 
analytical approach. As noted above, his work has been influential on much recent work 
investigating sub-national environmental policy (c f  Whitehead, Jones and Jones, 2006; 
Haughton, Counsell and Vigar, 2008). Much of this work has not, however, taken much 
time to engage with these theories in depth, beyond employing certain elements of the 
theoretical lexicon used in the SRA.
One notable exception to this is in David Gibbs’ (2006) attempt to outline a framework 
for ‘Environmental Economic Geography’ based around linking ecological 
modernisation approaches -  which he accuses of lacking a “theory of power relations”
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{ibid. p200) -  with those taking a regulationist starting point. Gibbs argues that 
approaching the governance of environment-economy relations through Jessop’s SRA 
helps place emphasis on the discursive and material processes involved in developing 
and implementing environment policy, including the interplay of structural and strategic 
elements within those processes. This in turn allows the researcher to reconceptualise 
ecological modernisation to understand that the “focus upon ways of integrating 
economic and environmental aims in some developed states suggests a process of 
strategic selectivity at work” {ibid. p203). These principles have been also taken on in 
his work with Aidan While and Andy Jonas (While, Jonas and Gibbs, 2010) on eco- 
state restructuring.
There are, however, a number of critiques of Jessop’s work. Justus Uitermark (2005), 
for example, outlines a number of key problems with both SRA and its application in 
concrete analysis. First, he argues, despite a concern for the interrelationships between 
institutions, Jessop has not taken this further to explore relationships between different 
actors working at different scales of governing. Second, Uitermark picks on Jessop’s 
“notorious hesitancy” in translating his theoretical ideas into empirical research: “in fact 
there is a large discrepancy between the formal methods of SRA and Jessop’s actual 
analysis” {ibid. pl41). In particular, Jessop has not focused on how institutions may 
have come into being through trial and error processes rather than through a simplified 
process of ‘strategic selectivity’. Similarly, one might wonder where the unintentional -  
that is, ‘non-strategic’ -  exercise of power might come into these analyses. These issues 
highlight the difficulty of operationalising Jessop’s approach, which may in themselves 
point to a need for either adaptation of the SRA, or finding an alternative, 
complementary, approach. Two further critiques are potentially of more fundamental 
importance, however.
One critique relates to Jessop’s approach to structure and agency: despite his attempts to 
overcome the problems taken in other structure-agency approaches, there are still 
grounds to take issue. The problem is that Jessop continues to work with the notions of 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’ as somehow necessarily interrelated. ”  As with the spatial
33 This is not an attempt to wade in and ‘so lv e ’ the ongoing and seem ingly intractable debates around 
structure and agency -  and structure-agency issues are essentially  dependent on the research subject -b u t  
instead to highlight a small number o f  specific issues relating to som e conceptualisations o f  the terms.
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polymorphy approach he developed with Neil Brenner and Martin Jones (2008), Jessop 
fails to take into account the non-human element of all (social) relations: everything is a 
‘structure’ (or network) and is entirely determined by structure; we are only ever talking 
about the ways in which different structures relate to each other, and the ties that hold 
them together.
Structure is a necessary factor, while agency is contingent. Sometimes it is there, at 
other times it is not. In some accounts, Jessop prefers to talk of a structure-strategy 
dialectic, which would be a marginally preferential account: this allows a more 
acceptable understanding of actions taken within particular spatio-temporal constraints 
rather than grander notions of individual humans as remaining somehow separate, and 
fundamentally different, to the other types of networks that shape them. This also 
highlights a danger when talking about ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, or even ‘structuration’ 
that the terms can be taken to mean two different things: a scale of activity -  for 
example, the ‘individual’ against the ‘organisation’ -and the ability of actors to act. The 
two should not really be conflated, but often seemingly are. As the recent focus on the 
‘social construction’ of space has shown, scale -  in terms of size, or even position in a 
chain of geographic hierarchies -  does not necessarily equal an increased ability to 
ensure that others do what you want them to.
A final critique, which is perhaps of most direct relevance to this research, is that “the 
microphysics of power has remained well out of the orbit of not only Jessop’s work but 
the body of regulationist writings as a whole” (Uitermark, 2005 p i42): it tends to 
underplay, or ignore, “the places where power makes itself actually felt”. That is, “the 
body and the institutional setting that surrounds it” {ibid.). This is acknowledged by 
Gordon MacLeod, who in propounding Jessop’s approach, adds:
Not that this is in any way to deny the persistence of serious gaps and unexplored lacunae in 
the regulation approach. For instance, thus far it has yet to successfully bring into play a 
whole series of questions relating to consumption ... the micro-physics of 
governmentality ... the discursive construction and performativity of political-economic 
regimes, or the ways in which they take on gendered sets of power relations ... and questions 
around subjectivity.
MacLeod, 2001 footnote 22
It tells of generic governing strategies -  or technologies -  and of the organisation of
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institutions, but not of the forms of power exercised. Jessop is keen to develop a 
nuanced understanding of institutions, and notes a preference for understanding “powers 
in the plural” (2004 p5), yet continues to talk of power as ‘domination’ (cf. Jessop, 
2001). Here lies the crux of the issue. Institutional approaches to governance -  
including Jessop’s SRA -  often appear to either take a singular notion of power or 
conflate it with the use of particular technologies (see Modes of Governance, below). 
So, for instance, Jessop talks of ‘strategic selectivity’, but does not show how this 
operates in practice, or how this might operate in different ways through different 
mobilisations of resources.
As a result, although Jessop’s work is extremely useful, it is difficult to operationalise 
as an analytical framework, being as it does not focus -  or has not focused -  on what he 
might term the ‘concrete-complex’ issues of power. The SRA, including Jessop’s 
institutional approach to governance, remains pertinent to the research reported in this 
thesis and provides much by way of considering the role of state and non-state 
institutions, as well as different spaces of governing. It is felt, however -  in line with 
Bulkeley et al. -  that in order to more thoroughly engage with the specificities of power, 
a different approach is required.
Multi-level Governance
One potential option is a closely related approach: that of Multi-level Governance 
(MLG). This model attempts to account for shifts in the spaces and scales of governing 
as well as the actors involved (Bache and Flinders, 2004). Jessop (for instance, 2005) 
has in fact contributed to this field, in emphasising the ‘placing’ and ‘scaling’ of 
(governing) institutions. As well as understanding institutions as being relational 
artefacts in a broad sense, they also need to be ‘put in their place’. First, an institution 
needs to be defined, located, and thematised; then its operation and reproduction 
through routine actions must be understood. Within this, Jessop is overtly concerned 
with the position of institutions in time and space, and the effects that they have on 
institutional operations: power relations between institutions set in different spatio- 
temporal contexts are crucially important to the functioning of individual institutions. In
other words, the whereabouts o f power is an important agenda.
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MLG (coined by Marks, 1993) as a model or theory of governance arose chiefly out of a 
recognition of these issues. Although not explicitly concerned with issues of geography, 
a need to acknowledge the fact that governing institutions are increasingly embedded 
within wider institutional systems is a core focus. MLG is chiefly concerned with the 
idea of a move towards governance as opposed to government (Rhodes, 2000), the 
simultaneous understanding of fragmentation, whilst at the same time increased 
interconnectivity in society (Gamble, Kelly and Kelly, 1996) and a critique of the “false 
dichotomy” (Bache and Flinders, 2004 p3) caused by the traditional academic 
separation of domestic and international politics. These suppositions have appeared 
particularly salient in relation to the EU and as such MLG has become popular in 
disciplines analysing governance in Western Europe; especially, as befits this discussion, 
at the local and regional levels.
Bulkeley et a l  (2007), however, suggest that there remains contention about whether 
MLG ought to be called multi-level government instead. In part this is because, for 
Andrew Jordan (2001 p i93 cited in Bulkeley et a l , 2007), “it remains unclear whether 
multi-level governance is a general feature of the EU or a phenomenon confined to 
particular sectors and/or levels”. Similarly, while there is evidence suggesting that, in 
the case of environmental governance, forms of multi-level governance are increasingly 
significant and that this governance -  at least at the local level -  involves new 
partnerships and networks between state and non-state actors, elsewhere govern ment 
retains dominance: Richard Cowell and Jonathan Murdoch (1999 p663) found that 
planning for housing and for minerals retain strong governmental characteristics, with 
strong national-to-local ‘chains of command’ “which ensure that a ‘dominant line’ ... is 
disseminated to a multitude of local decision-making bodies”. In line with this it is 
important to remember that policy domains are not bounded units: environmental 
governing is also intertwined with other areas, such as housing, or economic policy, and 
so if govern ment is still found in these areas then it is still important to recognise this.
Bulkeley’s critique is based on a particular understanding of governance, however, and
Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2004) partly overcome this issue by outlining two
models of MLG. Type I MLG continues in line with ‘nested’ approaches to scale,
whereby governance institutions take a hierarchical lineage: “a system of continuous
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negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers” (Marks, 1993 p392 in 
Bache and Flinders, 2004). This model sees general-purpose jurisdictions operating at a 
limited number of levels. This form of governing aims to cover whole systems, with 
‘non-intersecting’ memberships (that is, strictly hierarchical). Type II MLG, however, 
emphasises the mixture of instrumental, hierarchical approaches and network-based; 
partnership working, as well as forms of market governance. For example, David 
Counsell and Graham Houghton (2006) discuss the planning system in England, noting 
how rigid hierarchical systems of formal planning have been reshaped, but still provide 
the skeleton of the formal planning system. They are now overlain with a range of other 
informal and formal ways of working, involving links to other policy sectors and to new 
scales of planning with less rigidly defined statutory roles; this they term “mutant 
planning”.
Despite the focus on ‘multi-level’ practices, MLG approaches still tend towards viewing 
issues relatively ‘statically’, without explicit focus on how the MLG process brings 
about translations and fluidities as governing programmes move across levels or even 
forms of governing. To take the discussion back to the initial points made by John Allen, 
another key issue is that while MLG approaches help to bring an added understanding 
of where, or by whom, power is exercised, they do not bring about understanding of the 
different forms of powers, or strategies, that are being exercised. The approach acts as a 
way of modelling institutional patterns rather than developing a ‘theory of relations’. In 
this sense the ‘modes of governance’ approach may offer some insights (see below).
A second critique might be that the notion of ‘levels’ in governing presupposes fixed 
‘scales as categories’ in governing. While in practice this may often seem the case, an 
approach in line with the spatial propositions put forward in Chapter 2 would want to 
emphasise the contingency of relations, as well as the heterogeneity of actors. Indeed 
Type II multi-level governance places emphasis on the blurring of distinctions between 
traditional hierarchies between actors. As such, multi-level governance would perhaps 
be better labelled with a moniker that more properly signals these factors. Multi-s/te 
governance might be a good starting point, although I will retain the term ‘multi-level’ 
for the remainder of this thesis to avoid confusion.
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Modes of Governance
Bulkeley and Kern (2006) suggest work on modes of governance has been a useful 
starting point in engaging in the plural means of governing in the EU. Jonas and Gibbs 
(2003) and Treib, Bahr and Falkner (2007) each take a modes of governance approach 
to their respective studies. Jonas and Gibbs write of modes of governance in relation to 
economic and environmental governance at the local level in England. This approach 
takes regime theory as its starting point and focuses on interaction between economic 
and environmental discourses and the role of different institutions at various levels 
within this process. Rationales, the location of power and the implementation of specific 
policy instruments were explored only implicitly.
Treib, Bahr and Falkner take a more formalised approach in developing a typology for 
governance modes based on synthesis of research carried out by governance scholars 
across the EU. They begin by segmenting governance into policy, politics and polity; 
and concern themselves with developing a typology for the policy dimension based on 
those previously attempted by NewGov (2005) and Knill and Lenschow (2003), arguing 
in particular that:
It seems wise ... to begin by looking at (changing) modes of governance in terms of policy 
instruments without simultaneously taking into account what kind of actors were involved in, 
and what kind of institutional conditions structured, the production of these policy 
instruments
Treib, Bahr and Falkner, 2007 p20
From this starting point, Treib, Bahr and Falkner develop a typology for the policy 
domain based around four modes of governance organised on axes of ‘implementation’ 
and ‘legal instrument’: coercion (rigid implementation, legally binding); targeting (rigid 
implementation, non-binding); framework regulation (flexible but binding); and 
voluntarism (flexible and non-binding).
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Table 6: Modes of governance framework
Implementation Binding
Legal Instrument
Non-binding
Rigid Coercion Targeting
Flexible Framework regulation Voluntarism
Source: Treib, Bahr and Falkner (2007)
As stated, however, this approach specifically limits examination to one particular 
aspect of the policy process: in this instance approaching policy instruments as modes 
of governance. This does not help to develop sufficiently plural understandings of 
governing practices or a thorough understanding of the ways that particular policies 
actually take shape.
From governance and government to ‘governing’
The issues raised as to whether certain relationships should be labelled government or 
governance, or Type I or Type II multi-level governance, opens up a separate critique of 
the concept of governance. For Bulkeley et al. (2007), there remains an issue of 
lexicological confusion with all approaches that refer to governance. First, and most 
commonly, governance is used in contrast to government. This is seen as the dominant 
approach by Bulkeley et al., with governance used to label only interactions that involve 
non-state actors either through self-governing networks or in conjunction with state 
bodies: it is argued that there is a shift from government to governance in progress (cf. 
Stoker, 2004; Wilson, 2003). Governance in this way signifies “a change in the meaning 
of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of 
ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed” (Rhodes, 1996 pp652-3 
in Stoker, 1998 pi). For instance, Rod Rhodes (1996) posited the notion of a move from 
a state apparatus characterised by govern ment, to one better described as govern ance. 
Rhodes (2000 p6, in Newman, 2001 p 11) argues that this shift has now resulted in 
governance becoming “the defining narrative of British government at the start of the
106
new century, challenging the commonplace notion of Britain as a unitary state with a 
strong executive”. As discussed in Chapter 3, this purported shift incorporates the 
various ideas about ‘territorial re-scaling’ and the idea of the ‘hollowing-out’ (Jessop, 
1997), ‘filling-in’ (Jones and McLeod, 1999), or ‘de-concentration’ (Goodchild and 
Hickman, 2006) of the nation state. This includes the involvement of new quasi- and 
non-state actors in steering society and the development of new steering strategies: in 
particular the rise of network governance.
Second, and related, the term is used in reference to multi-level governance, as 
discussed above. Finally, it can be seen broadly as the ‘instituted’ process of steering 
society, which can involve diverse collections of (institutional) actors not necessarily 
limited to state institutions. Gerry Stoker (1998) points to this as the traditional use of 
governance; “a synonym for government” (pi). This interpretation would allow for the 
form of analysis that Bulkeley et al. aim for. This recognises (a) the plurality of 
governing relations and arrangements, which vary within and across particular contexts 
(as highlighted by Jessop, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2000); and (b) the multiple ways in 
which states govern, which may include multiple modes simultaneously, both in 
organising the conditions for network governance ( ‘metaheterarchy’; Jessop, 2002) and 
in (re-)developing different modes of governance (meta-governance; ibid.).
In contrast to the third interpretation, Jessop (2003) attempts to develop some 
conceptual clarification in delineating government, governance, the state and the market 
as particular concepts meaning different things. This is brought about partly from an 
acute awareness of the issues that the different applications of governance theory bring 
about: “It is being deployed for quite contrary, if not plain contradictory, purposes and 
its meaning often varies markedly by context” and “the very popularity of the term 
increases the likelihood that those who use it will talk past each other, leading to ill- 
founded misunderstandings and pointless disagreements” (ibid. p4). Instead, Jessop 
attempts to pin down governance as something akin to governance versus government. 
Here societal co-ordination is separated into three key modes: the ‘anarchy’ of the 
market; hierarchical govern ment', and heterarchic govern ance (ibid.). Similarly, the state 
might be seen as “government + governance” (2004, p52).
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Each of these interpretations are of particular relevance to the above discussion of the 
particularities of power; the governance thesis suggests that there is a need to move 
beyond analysing traditional governmental hierarchies of authority towards exploring 
plural governing modalities, through plural methods, with different spatial 
manifestations. However, for Bulkeley et al. (2007) the term governance is now so 
bound up with multiple meanings that it is no longer a helpful term in itself. Instead, 
they choose the term ‘governing’ as a catch-all term, similar to the second definition of 
governance outlined above:
[Considering the modes of governing which shape and orchestrate ... policies and practice 
provides a basis for an analysis of the role of authority and other modalities of power as well 
as the institutional arrangements and networks through which governing takes place.
ibid. p 17
This can throw light on the underlying dynamics of policy making, as well as the 
specifics, and on the ways in which problems are defined and policy is made through 
discourse, networks and coalitions that traverse traditional state-society boundaries. 
Bulkeley et al. argue that taking on board recent neo-Foucauldian notions of 
govemmentality may offer a route to a more holistic and robust analytical framework: it 
is in this sense that the theoretical grounding to the approach moves beyond semantic 
clarification of the meaning of governance.
Govemmentality
Danny Mackinnon (2000) states that the recent purported shift to governance is a 
product of wider strategies of social regulation and control, as outlined by Jessop as 
well as, for example, Gordon MacLeod, Martin Jones (cf. MacLeod and Jones, 2006) 
and Neil Brenner (cf. 1999, 2004). However, Mackinnon draws on neo-Foucauldian 
writings on ‘govemmentality’ -  as opposed to the prevalent neo-Gramscian state theory 
-  arguing that local state restructuring is a “product of the ascendency of neo-liberalism 
as a distinct political rationality” (ibid. p395). This approach focuses on sets of specific 
practices and technologies which allow actors to introduce, enact and legitimise 
strategies of reform:
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Notions of govemmentality support a focus on the how of government, on the specific 
mechanisms, techniques and procedures which political authorities deploy to realise and 
enact their programmes.
Ibid. p295
This, for Foucault, should be interpreted as ‘the conduct of conduct’, through which 
political programmes are defined by the underlying ‘rationalities’ that shape their 
development. This in turn also draws attention to the specific techniques employed by 
the state in the way it both represents and intervenes within different domains. 
Mackinnon, along with Bulkeley et al. (2007), sees this neo-Foucauldian emphasis on 
specific mechanisms, procedures and tactics in contrast to a preoccupation with abstract 
principles of rule found in ‘traditional’ political theory. This also contrasts with 
analytical and empirical accounts of governance, which have tended to focus more on 
(changing) institutional arrangements as opposed to the production of policy or 
knowledge.
Indeed, there is an emphasis specifically on the importance of knowledge and expertise 
in providing an “intellectual machinery” (Mackinnon, 2000 p296) of ordering 
procedures and explanations that “construct and frame reality in ways that allow 
government to act upon it” (ibid. p296); analysis of govemmentalities requires attention 
on the ways in which knowledge and technologies are employed as well as the governed 
entity and the way it is perceived (Bulkeley et al., 2007). Analyses of govemmentality 
therefore concentrate on two aspects of government: governmental rationalities and 
governmental technologies. Governmental rationalities define both the objects and the 
nature of government: “in effect, rendering reality governable through the collecting and 
framing of knowledge” (ibid. p2736). Governmental technologies are the visible 
outcomes of rationalities, permitting “their extension through time and space” (Murdoch, 
2000 p505). Technologies tend to be “mobile, stable, and capable of aggregation, so that 
they allow governing to take place ‘at a distance’ from governing agencies” (Bulkeley 
et al., p2737).
Thus, while the concept of ‘modes of steering’, or modes of governance, is often
expressed in general and abstract terms around policy instruments -  as evidenced in the
work by Treib, Bahr and Falkner -  governmental technologies encompass both policy
instruments (regulation, market mechanisms, benchmarking and so on) and material
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infrastructures (for example, particular instruments or forms of service delivery). 
Nonetheless, these approaches are not without their -  in some ways fatal(ist) -  
shortcomings. David Kerr (1999) offers summary of a key problem with 
govemmentality-based approaches:
....while this work addresses important issues, it does so in a way that limits its critical and 
emancipatory potential. Govemmentality is seen to be based on a top-down and dualist 
conception of power, one that externalizes and marginalizes contradiction and struggle to 
become a theory of social reproduction rather than of transcendence. Govemmentality 
therefore has to be subject to critique and reconceptualized as a social form of struggle; that 
is, in terms of negative dialectic of movement and transcendence grounded in the 
subjectivity of labor.
Ibid. p i73
This -  in simpler terms -  suggests that although these approaches intend to focus on the 
individual spaces and struggles of power, they in fact often reduce the actor to conduits, 
or recipients of top-down imposition of authority. This also extends to a neglect of 
‘government from below’; geographical variation in government and the roles of 
institutions and networks in mediating regimes of practice; and little consideration of 
the multi-scalar nature of govemmentalities and of the possibilities of multiple centres 
of authority and calculation (Bulkeley et a l,  2007).
Modes of Governing
In short then, for Bulkeley (et al. 2005; 2007; with Kern, 2006) the shift to governance 
remains incomplete, or is over-exaggerated:
Rather than subscribe to an analysis which posits a wholesale shift from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’ ... we consider the multiple modes through which the local state has sought to 
govern.
Bulkeley and Kem, 2006 p2237
Governance-based approaches -  broadly defined -  would therefore benefit from more 
plural understandings of governing; in this respect Bulkeley’s {et al.) approach draws 
strongly on Jessop’s regulation approach, combined with elements of Treib and others' 
work on ‘modes of governance’. There is also an issue of lexicon: the multiple
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meanings of governance as a term allow too much potential for confusion between its 
different understandings. Similarly, many forms of governing are grey areas of 
hierarchical govern ment and heterarchic govern ance (and mixtures of the two), as 
Jessop has highlighted in the past.
A second main sticking point for Bulkeley et al. is that, although a focus on changing 
institutional relations -  including those of re-scaling -  is valuable,
...it is important to recognize that institutional change does not necessarily suggest a change 
in authority ... and hence that authority is not the only mode of power deployed in governing. 
Rather than seeing ‘government’ and ‘governance’ as necessarily fixed or exclusive entities, 
it is therefore necessary to unpack the means through which governing power is exercised 
and orchestrated in particular contexts.
Bulkeley et al., 2005, p i7
In this respect then, approaches that use governance theories would benefit from 
sensitivity to the neo-Foucauldian govemmentality approaches outlined above. By 
introducing a focus on specific rationales and technologies, as well as institutional 
relations, a ‘modes of governing’ approach would therefore -  for example -  help to 
highlight politics of scale or space and points at which rationalities (etcetera) are 
conceptualised and mobilised more clearly than broader governance-based approaches. 
In other words this approach would on the surface seem to be potentially capable of 
highlighting both the whereabouts and ‘howabouts’ of power involved in governing 
society.
The modes of governing (MoG) approach is thus highlighted as a way of integrating 
approaches of regulation (including those that specifically relate to metagovemance), 
modes of governance and govemmentality to develop a plural understanding of
governing, which focuses on a mode of governing as:
... a set of governmental technologies deployed through particular institutional relations 
through which agents seek to act on the world/other people in order to attain distinctive
objectives in line with particular kinds of governmental rationality.
Bulkeley et al., 2007 p2739
A mode is defined by its objectives, with a set of components that include:
A governmental rationality, and associated objectives and programmes 
Governing agencies
Institutional relations between the agencies involved
Technologies of governing
Governed entities (human and non-human)
Notions of rationalities and technologies thus draw on neo-Foucauldian governmental 
approaches, while the continued interest in institutional relations -  and the lexicon used 
-  draws on Jessop’s approach to the state. Having made these distinctions, there is, 
however, acknowledgement that modes do not necessarily exist as discrete entities. This 
is an analytical tool in order to find a way of constructively engaging with different 
components of governing that give a particular mode a degree of internal logic. 
Similarly a mode of governing is a dynamic ‘constellation’: rationalities are configured 
through sets of relations, which in turn provide the means through which technologies 
are deployed. Governmental technologies may also act to reshape rationalities.
By maintaining the importance of institutional and individual roles in the policy process 
beyond those at the head of traditional chains of hierarchy the modes of governing 
approach also retains the sense that policy may be reshaped by institutional 
‘interference’. Similarly, in the subsequent analyses of modes of governing -  on 
municipal waste, and local climate change protection -  there is recognition of multi­
level governing processes through identification of the institutions and agents involved.
Although this approach appears to offer a starting point for developing plural theories of 
governance there are a few areas that deserve further thought. Some of these are fairly 
minor: there are, for example, grounds for concern that the notion of ‘governing’ as 
opposed to ‘governance’ is perhaps overly-semantic in its defining differences to 
approaches that do use this terminology. While there is a need to ensure that this
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approach is seen as properly distinct from the Modes of Governance framework there is 
also a need to bear in mind Ann Markusen (2003) and Arnoud Lagendijk’s (2003b) call 
for ‘subtle’ as opposed to grand critique of theories/paradigms and a need to engage 
from within ‘islands of discourse’ (Purcell, 2002). The question here is whether 
Bulkeley et a l  do remain within this realm, or whether they should engage more 
constructively from within the ‘governance’ paradigm instead of partially removing 
themselves from it.
There is a second issue here in that Bulkeley et a l  (2005; 2007) do not explicitly spell 
out what they mean by govern ment: governance is explored as an alternative and 
presumably government is used to mean hierarchical ‘chain-of-command’ governing via 
use of ‘strong’ power -  that is, legally/statutorily binding with little leeway for agencies 
to adapt/negotiate these -  which is not necessarily excluded from most ‘governance’ 
analyses: more that they are seen to be achieved in a more complex manner than 
perhaps previously conceived. For Bulkeley (and Kern 2006 p2237), governing is 
understood through Gerry Stoker’s (2004 p22) description as: “the processes that create 
the conditions for ordered rule and collective action within the political realm”, again 
something described in theories of metagovemance by Jessop. I would argue that the 
stress on processes of ‘governing’ could have the effect of distracting from the central 
tenets of MoG, and potentially closing it off from certain audiences. I will, however, 
continue with the terms used by Bulkeley and colleagues for purposes of consistency.
A third question asked of the MoG framework -  put forward by readers of early drafts 
of this chapter -  was whether it allows for ‘critical’ analysis of governing practices and 
relationships. In other words, it can be used to map the process of governing, but can it 
uncover the ‘real’ structures and politics involved? Some sympathy may be had with 
this criticism: the framework is not explicitly a ‘critical’ approach. It does not start with 
a particular stance on what it aims to uncover. But that should not be seen as a failing of 
the framework; it is a strength. The MoG approach is concerned with uncovering 
precisely how governing rationalities are conceived and implemented and via which 
actors they are mobilised. A thorough exploration of these processes will inevitably then 
expose the power relationships, disjunctions, contradictions and ‘politics’ of the 
governing process.
There are two more fundamental issues, however. The first of these relates to the extent 
that the framework is actually concerned with capturing the ‘dynamism’ of governing 
constellations. Applications of MoG to date have actually been quite static in their 
analysis of governing practices. As such, the framework would benefit from 
reconfiguration towards a focus on technologies, with an emphasis on the ways in 
which specific power modalities -  conceived within a re-worked set of governing 
modes -  are operationalised, as well as the fluidity between different modalities. Second, 
and linked, the application of MoG can be said to have not fully delivered on its aims to 
explore the particularities of power within a multi-level context, both through its 
conception of governing modes and its utilisation in practice. In sum, the approach 
offers a good starting point for analysis, but requires a reasonable amount of further 
development in order to gain sufficient utility for application as a robust theoretical and 
analytical framework.
Unpacking modalities
Re-working MoG requires first that the initial conceptions of governing modes are 
unpacked, simplified and then expanded. As an analytical approach MoG has been used 
in two studies from which work has been published, both of environmental governing at 
the local level: an exploration of municipal waste management (Bulkeley et al., 2005; 
2007) and also of local climate change protection (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). In both 
cases four MoGs were found, but different typologies resulted. In the case of municipal 
waste, the governing modes found were sector-specific: disposal, diversion, eco- 
efficiency and ‘waste-as-resource’. These would be likely to alter from case to case, 
which potentially makes wider application of MoG beyond particular spheres of 
governing difficult. In the case of climate protection, however, the modes are less 
context-specific, relating instead to broad governing strategies, and as such provide a 
better starting point for other work on MoG.
As noted, four key modes of governing are found to be utilised by local authorities in 
both the UK and Germany. These are as follows:
Self-governing: the capacity of local government to govern its own activities. Relies 
on processes of organisational management.
Governing by provision: the shaping of practice through the delivery of particular 
forms of service and resource. Accomplished through practical, material and 
infrastructural means.
Governing by authority: the use of traditional forms of authority such as regulation 
and direction which persist despite reforms. Takes place through use of sanction.
Governing through enabling: facilitating, co-ordinating and encouraging action 
through partnership with private- and voluntary-sector agencies, and various forms of 
community engagement. This works through persuasion, argument and incentive.
These seem like a promising starting point for work on the process of governing; and 
sufficiently broad to be potentially transferable to other governing sectors and spaces. It 
is worth, however, unpacking the four modes used in Bulkeley and Kern’s study in 
order to potentially develop a more general-theoretical understanding of different ways 
in which governing actors might interact with others to achieve a desired outcome. This 
approach takes the initial typology and transforms it through reference to Allen’s more 
general theory of power. Specifically this requires re-working modes so that they more 
accurately reflect expressions of power.
First, to develop a more theoretically consistent approach, the ‘self-governing’ mode is 
removed. Governing the self in this typology has been used to mean governing an 
organisation ‘from within’. This still requires a range of different strategies and tactics, 
including elements of governing by enabling, authority and provision. As such, self- 
governing is an issue of who is governed -  the governed entity -  rather than how they
are governed. Similarly, governing by provision should be seen more as a form of 
enabling rather than as a governing mode in its own right.34
Next, I suggest expanding governing by authority to a wider notion of ‘governing by 
constraining’ in order to take in wider forms of power: governing by authority is only 
one form of power that involves direct intervention to achieve change. There is, for 
example, a difference between ‘authority’ and ‘domination’, outlined by Allen (2004). 
Authority requires an understanding, and some agreement from both sides that one is 
subordinate to the other; domination, on the other hand, is based around an imposition 
of a particular form of conduct so that submission is the only possible action. Governed 
entities may also be coerced into action -  involving threats of force, or other sanctions 
to exact compliance -  which is again different from authority. Finally, working from 
Allen’s power modalities, I have added a new governing mode: that of governing by co­
option. By this I mean methods by which governing agencies attempt to enlist other 
entities to a particular cause through various methods of persuasion that are neither 
directly authoritarian, nor straight-forwardly ‘enabling’. This leaves three broad modes 
of governing -  enabling, constraining and co-opting -  under which John Allen’s six key 
power modalities fall, plus Bulkeley and Kern’s ‘provision’ element. I have also added 
an eighth power modality not explicitly outlined by Allen or Bulkeley: facilitation. By 
this I mean the ways in which governing entities may enable others to achieve goals by, 
for example, bringing groups of people or institutions together to share materials or 
information. Table 7, below, shows the revised categorisation of governing modes, 
which run broadly speaking from instrumental ties at the top end, down to purely 
associative ties at the bottom. Rationalities, technologies and institutional relations are 
not affixed to particular modalities here: these remain contingent on the way in which 
they are mobilised (although some technologies will lend themselves more towards 
particular modalities than others).
34 Although this could be contested in the sense that provision o f  specific services can act to reduce the 
range o f  options available, provision is taken here to mean provision o f  information or services that w ould  
not otherwise be made available (although, see modal fluidity, below ).
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Table 7: Initial revision of modes of governing framework35
Governing
Mode
Power
Modality Rationality Technology
Institutional 
Relations (e.g.)
Constraining Domination
Coercion
Authority e.g. reduce
regional
carbon
Targets Hierarchy
Partnerships Heterarchy
Co-opting Manipulation Discursive strategies Network
Seduction emissions Financial incentives Market
Induction Infrastructure provision 
Knowledge sharing
Metagovernance
Enabling Provision
Facilitation
workshops etc.
Modal Fluidities and Translations
Although a single rationality is given in the table above, in reality a range of different 
rationalities will thread through the different modes and specific technologies, which in 
turn will rely on a whole other set of rationalities, assumptions and knowledges: as 
discussed in Chapter 3 -  albeit in a different lexicon -  the way in which these are 
developed and deployed in the governing process thread through each of the other 
components and as such are crucial in understanding the way in which regional actors 
develop and implement modes of governing.
This also draws attention to other issues relating to the fluidity of governing modes. In 
focusing primarily on general modes of governing, the MoG approach could be accused 
of not going far enough in uncovering the specificities and complexities of power. This 
can be overcome to some extent by re-thinking the potential modalities used by 
governing entities, as detailed above. A second way of re-framing the approach is 
through re-ordering the focus of the framework. I propose that a focus on the 
specificities of governing should instead begin its focus on the technologies of 
governing, from which analysis can then identify the particular forms of power being 
exercised. This therefore moves away from being strictly a ‘modes of governing’
35 In this and the fo llow ing table governing agencies and governed entities are omitted, partly for reasons 
o f  space, but also because sim ply presenting a list o f  potential actors docs not really add anything to the 
discussion at this point.
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framework towards an approach that is more expressly interested in the exercise of 
power modalities in governing practices. This revised typology is shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Technology Centred Power Modalities
Governmental technologies Power modalities (examples) Institutional relations
Targets Coercion, authority, induction Hierarchy, heterarchy,
Partnerships Seduction, facilitation network, marketDiscursive strategies Seduction, manipulation (anarchy),
Financial incentives / taxes Induction, coercion metagovernance etc.
Infrastructure provision Provision
Knowledge sharing networks Facilitation, seduction
Regulation / legislation Authority, coercion
Behavioural 'nudges' Manipulation, induction
This framework more clearly highlights the different ‘fluidities’ between modes and 
potential conflicts that might arise within the governing process. As an example of 
internal fluidity, the same technology might be used to different ends: for instance, 
depending on the entity it is aimed at, it might be more constraining, co-opting or 
enabling. There are also definite ambiguities in identifying technologies as specifically 
‘enabling’ or ‘constraining’. Technologies may be presented as enabling or empowering, 
but also contain elements of authority. For example, funding for projects may be tied to 
meeting specific targets. In the same way a technology often cannot be described as 
belonging to just one mode of governing; it can require different forms of power in 
order to make the technology work. For instance, a combination of associative enabling 
approaches and instrumental authoritarian or coercive approaches might be required. 
Similarly, the effect of the technology may transform across modes. For instance, its 
‘use’ in an enabling mode might be as technology, but when translated across to focus 
on a different governed entity it becomes a rationale for action. As I show from Chapter 
8 onwards, a target might work as a technology when the focus is on other institutions, 
but when the focus is on the self, it may become a rationale for action.
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Translation through mediation: analysing multi-site power modalities
Utilising this approach for research on regional actors’ roles in governing carbon 
management relies in particular on the adaptability of the approach for use beyond 
simply analysing the different modes used in governing a locale in relatively static 
manner, including the increased need for awareness of governing from ‘above’, ‘below’, 
and across networks that this entails. However, rather than pose additional problems, 
this instead brings some added routes of exploration; for example, tracking the way in 
which technologies and rationalities translate across networks. Moving the study to a 
scale of governing that was more overtly involved in multi-site processes also highlights 
some theoretical issues that Bulkeley and colleagues have not dealt with in depth as yet.
Viewed within a multi-level (or multi-site) framework, institutional arrangements give 
some indication of the ‘types’ of governance, as outlined by Hooghe and Marks (2005). 
In such arrangements, regional governing institutions potentially act as recipients and 
mediators of governing processes, as well as exercisers of power in their own right. As 
such, Bulkeley's approach may be seen as overly static in its initial form, focusing as it 
does on the ways in which power is exercised within individual organisations and 
networks. More recent articles by Bulkeley, (2010; with Kristine Kern, 2009), do look 
at multi-level governance and draw on elements of this framework, but do not 
successfully entwine the two models together, or thoroughly engage with the multiple 
manifestations of the 'politics of scale' involved in governing across different networks.
36
In taking a general focus on governing bodies as the ‘source’ of power and other actors 
simply as recipients, MoG studies have yet to explore in any depth the 'whereabouts of 
power': that is, where power lies within governing processes; where the initiation of 
new rationalities and technologies of governing takes place; and how governing 
processes affect the implementation of new rationalities and technologies across 
different scales. In particular, the ‘fluidities’ of power may be highlighted as 
technologies translate across different institutions and scales: they may be transformed, 
or subverted, by mediating or recipient entities. Similarly, a particular technology -
36 B ulkeley has also focused on m ulti-level governance in the past, but not relating it to m odes o f  
governing: see B ulkeley and B etsill, 2005
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however implemented -  may work to catalyse the development of new institutional 
frameworks, norms and arrangements; in turn becoming a rationale for action and the 
development of new governmental technologies. A fourth area worth discussing briefly 
is the prospect of analysing bottom-up governing through the MoG approach: although I 
do not dwell on this in too much detail in my analysis, it is still worth mentioning as a 
potential way of utilising the approach.
Modal translations
Building on the issues of modal translations discussed above, the first area to pick up on 
is that of the ‘vertical’ fluidity of modes. As technologies move between different 
governing networks they may be transformed, or subverted, by intermediary or recipient 
entities. For instance a technology may be initiated nationally, or supra-nationally, and 
then potentially watered-down or ‘souped-up’, or its guiding aims subverted as it travels 
between governing entities. Similarly, the role of different governing institutions with 
regard to a particular technology may differ across scales. For example, regional 
institutions may act as mediators in the implementation of an authoritarian technology, 
whereby their role is to act more as enablers through processes of facilitation of 
meetings between different parties or provision of the materials, skills and knowledge to 
help achieve governmental aims. They may also act as ‘co-opters’ in attempting to get 
other entities to sign up to particular technologies or rationalities, including ‘seduction’ 
through discursive persuasion; manipulation of facts, discourses and people; and 
potentially inducement, through offering other incentives to comply. At the same time, 
regional institutions may use the resources available to them through statutory 
governmental technologies to meet their own agendas.
Component fluidity
A particular technology, however implemented, may work to catalyse the development
of new institutional frameworks, norms and arrangements; in turn becoming a
rationality for action and the development of new governmental technologies. Indeed,
when a technology is implemented across scales, or institutions, the intention is that it
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becomes a rationale for action in the institution or individual(s) previously labelled as 
the governed entity. Successful governing -  that is, a mode that translates a particular 
rationality into the desired action -  would result in a cycle of governing as it is mediated 
through different institutions as it travels from, for example, a supra-national 
organisation to the individual.
Figure 2: Transformation of modes across governing and governed entities
Institutional Institutional Institutional
Mediation Mediation Mediation
* 1 1 ►Rationality------------------ ►Technology -------------- ► Governed Entity  ►
Significantly, however, the process will rarely simply cascade through the different 
scales or sites of governing: there are likely to be dead-ends, diversions and subversions 
along the route. Furthermore, as in the case of carbon management, political factors 
within institutions and individuals at each point in the process play an important part.
Bottom-up Governing
Finally, up to now the MoG framework has been mostly applied in viewing top-down 
processes of governing. It may, however, be possible to use the framework for viewing 
attempts by entities to achieve bottom-up governing; or at least for acknowledging the 
fact that power can flow in more than one direction. This is particularly pertinent in the 
case of regional institutions: for example, regional assemblies were partly dependent on 
the ‘buy-in’ of local authorities to achieve their aims. The types of power they are able 
to exercise may be fewer than those with greater levels of resources, but bottom-up 
governing might attempt to impose particular rationalities, shape or introduce 
governmental technologies through a range of ‘modes’. For instance, local authorities 
often lack the direct authority of national government, but they may be able to constrain 
governmental action through coercion -  by threatening to refuse to recognise 
governmental authority, for instance -  or through manipulating information and people
121
to achieve their own aims. They may also employ more associative measures, such as 
attempting to seduce governing agencies through powers of persuasion, as identified by 
Bulkeley and Kern (2009) in their study of trans-national local authority networks, 
where they noted the influence of these networks on European governing networks.
Conclusion
The two key issues here relate to the effect of emergent ‘carbon control’ discourses on 
the rationalities and technologies of governing; and to the emerging role of regional 
governing organisations within emerging patterns of spatially governing carbon 
management. In this context, the Modes of Governing framework opens up -  or helps to 
clarify -  these issues somewhat, by helping to focus on the specific ways in which new 
carbon management policies and strategies are being developed and implemented; and 
how governing institutions may attempt to draw others into their own set of logics and 
practices. The approach retains some flaws, however, and in particular requires greater 
consistency in terms of conceptualising modes; emphasis on the fluidity of power 
modalities; and emphasis on the importance of exploring ways in which governing 
programmes or technologies translate across different actors. In other words, the 
‘dynamic constellations’ that form modes of governing need re-working in order to be 
seen as such. By re-framing the approach through taking on more of John Allen’s thesis 
on the ‘lost geographies of power’ the subtleties of power can be opened up further to 
give a potentially richer understanding of governing processes; especially when 
combined with a more flexible approach that takes into account the multi-level and 
multi-directional exertion of power. More minor quibbles relating to the use of language 
of the Modes of Governing approach remain, but they do not ultimately affect the utility 
of the approach, more its reach to other audiences. A similar point may be made of 
Multi-level Governance. The term Multi-level is problematic in both its geographic 
insensitivity and its lack of focus on different types of power. The latter is overcome by 
combining it with a re-worked MoG approach, while the former is perhaps more of a 
semantic issue that one relating to the merits of the model itself.
Although many of those exploring the theory and practice of governance, government,
or governing do touch upon spatial concepts, in particular -  as noted in Chapter 3 -
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scalar debates (cf. Brenner, 1999; Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008), the relationship 
between the two has not perhaps been fully explored. Simply put, governing practices 
should not be seen as synonymous with spatial practices. It is tempting -  instinctive 
perhaps -  to view scalar practices or relationships as authoritative practices or 
relationships, for example. This is not necessarily the case. At the same time, however, 
authoritative relationships can be built upon -  and can also shape -  scalar relationships. 
But scales may also be ‘practiced’ through other means: for instance, a regional body 
acting as a conduit for forms of provision; local authorities working together ‘as a 
region’ to influence and interact with central government; or local authorities working 
together as a ‘scale-based’ trans-national network. In other words, governing practices 
are also always spatial.
In direct relation to this research, the re-worked MoG framework allows a focus on the 
development of new spatial rationalities for governing carbon emissions, the specific 
ways in which this takes place and the effect of multi-level institutional relations in this 
process. It will also aid a focus on the implementation of particular spatial technologies, 
including the effect of recent instrumental techniques in the form of emissions targets. 
This approach also opens up a number of methodological questions about how best to 
explore power and governing processes ‘in action’, which the next chapter aims to 
address.
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6 Spatial clamps: researching governing practices in the regions
In the process of carrying out any investigation a variety of ‘clamps’ must be put in place to delineate what the study is and is not, and what it aims to achieve. The first 
five chapters have outlined some of the theoretical clamps put in place for the study: for 
instance in outlining a specific area of academic interest for the study, specific research 
questions, and a framework for investigating these questions. There has also been some 
spatial delineation: it is a study that focuses on sub-national governing, specifically in 
the English regions. This chapter moves on to outline the methodological approach for 
the research, culminating in a final insertion of the spatial and temporal clamps that 
determine the specific sites for the study.
In bridging the theoretical exploration and empirical analysis, this chapter outlines the 
rationale behind and practicalities of a case study approach for the study of climate 
change policy in the English regions. In doing so, I will take a look at recent debates 
within human geography, in particular regional studies, around theory development and 
issues of methodological ‘rigour’. The main focus of this part of the discussion will 
relate to the debate on ‘fuzzy concepts’ initiated by Ann Markusen (1999) and 
subsequently critiqued to varying degrees by Ray Hudson (2003), Amoud Lagendijk 
(2003) and Jamie Peck (2003). This also links into wider debates about the ‘relational 
approach’ (c f  Yeung, 2003) to social scientific enquiry.
Taking these issues on board, a ‘methodologically sensitive’ case study approach is 
outlined, including discussion of the rationale behind the choice of case studies. An 
approach is taken using comparative case studies to account for some of the concerns 
about the transferability and rigour of data taken from a single case study. Case studies 
were chosen through a degree of purposive sampling, whilst acknowledging that cases 
should not necessarily be chosen on the basis of their apparent ‘results potential’.
Underlying Assumptions
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The philosophy of critical realism has been a popular underlying approach to critical 
regional and governance studies in recent years, not least because Bob Jessop’s SRA 
builds from a realist framework. I will not engage in too much depth on this issue here, 
but the previous chapters outline an approach to relational interactins that both sit 
alongside and also implicitly criticise realist or critical realist approaches to research. 
Most problematic is the fact that realists have worked from an assumption that the non­
human realm (however conceived) is somehow intrinsically separate from ‘social’ 
activity, and must therefore be studied differently. As Latour (1999; 2005) ably 
demonstrates, the non-human and human, the material and social, cannot be effectively 
separated.
Nonetheless -  and perhaps ironically, given the claims by some that there is no well- 
defined realist methodology (see Pratt, 1995; Yeung, 1997) -  methodological lessons 
can be drawn from realist research approaches, particularly in terms of offering practical 
and pragmatic solutions to difficult methodological issues. Given also that theorists 
taking a realist standpoint -  including Jessop (2002a) and Anthony Giddens (1995) -  
have been influential in regional studies in recent years it seems also pragmatic to begin 
with the realist standpoint as the norm from which to deviate.
This research, like many realist research projects, is based around a case study approach 
and answers questions of the ‘middle range’. These two sets of issues are worthy of 
unpacking in order to both explore the potential pitfalls and achieve an approach that 
acknowledges -  and, where possible, overcomes -  these potential problems.
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Research Questions
The methodology and methods used in research should be those appropriate to the 
study (Sayer, 1992). As such, a return to the original research questions is helpful here. 
The research began with a quite straightforward question:
How is carbon management being governed in the English regions?
Then, an interest in the political construction of regions led to a second question:
Specifically, how are practices of governing being used to re-imagine regions as ‘carbon 
spaces’?
In order to analyse this it was necessary to delve into the specific ways in which 
governing practices were utilised to do so:
What are the specific spatial practices involved in doing so?
Finally, the ‘carbon control’ thesis suggests that, as states become ‘serious’ about 
climate change, the methods to govern carbon will take on ‘mainstream’ governing 
logics, including more instrumental carbon reduction measures. This leads to the final 
question:
How have these practices changed over time?
Approaching these issues requires a relatively intense study of relationships between 
actors, and the techniques employed to develop these relationships.
Case study methodologies
In deliberating about how best to begin to explore the questions outlined above, the 
recurring themes were of the complexity and heterogeneity of actors, data and events. 
This led to the conclusion that, to quote Flyvbjerg (2006 p219), “[i]t was clear to me
that to understand a complex issue such as this, in-depth case-study research was 
necessary”. More simply, this research essentially follows the doctrine of Kenneth 
Burke (1945) in that it aims to explore ‘scene, agent, agency, purpose, and act’: this 
requires that a ‘scene’ must first be constructed in order to then explore the other four 
components.
The basic idea behind a case study approach is that one, or a small number, of cases are 
studied in detail, using whichever methods are deemed appropriate for the study. As 
Keith Punch (1998 p i50) states, a case study “ ... has a holistic focus, aiming to 
preserve and understand the wholeness and unity of the case”, while a case is defined as 
“a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context” {ibid. p i52).
This project involves carrying out one in-depth study alongside two comparator studies, 
and as such on the surface most closely matches what Robert Stake (1995) calls a 
collective case study, although in reality this is only one element of the study: it is also 
instrumental in that it attempts to give insight to a particular set of pre-identified issues, 
and intrinsic in that it attempts to bring a better understanding of the case(s) in itself. 
The rationale behind the choice of the specific cases will be discussed further on in this 
chapter. It is first useful to discuss some of the potential problems associated with a 
qualitative case study approach, particularly in relation to recent debates concerning 
methodology in critical regional studies and policy research.
The main strength of a case study is, as Punch (1998) points out above, that it allows for 
a deep investigation of a particular issue in a particular context. So, detailed 
understanding of the processes, mechanisms and actors involved is possible through use 
of a range of intensive research methods. Criticisms have been directed at the 
application of case studies, however: not necessarily of the validity of methods of 
investigation used within case studies -  although these have been explored -  but of the 
validity of case studies in abstraction and theory development.
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Fuzzy concepts and methodological rigour
Ann Markusen’s (1999) debate piece critiquing the ‘sloppiness’ of much research 
within what may be loosely described as critical regional studies highlights a number of 
methodological concerns, in particular relating to case study analysis, which have been 
a fixture of a number of subsequent direct and indirect responses (cf. Hudson, 2003; 
Peck, 2003; Lagendijk, 2003; Yeung, 2003; Markusen, 2003). The core arguments 
revolve around lack of ‘empirical rigour’ within contemporary research. In making 
these points, Markusen draws the reader to think more deeply about their 
epistemological positioning as much as more specific methodological issues: 
particularly the potential ambiguity of realist approaches to ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’, 
with attendant methodological issues; and the temptation for agency to be lost in theory 
development.
Before exploring these methodological challenges it is useful to dwell for a moment on
the issues of epistemology. One criticism of Markusen, as highlighted by Ray Hudson
(2003), is that her approach to defining non-‘fuzzy’ concepts -  those that are precise
and empirically testable -  relies on the replicability and empirical testing of theories. In
response, Hudson suggests that Markusen is bound in part by an unreflexive positivist
standpoint: as Jamie Peck (2003 p729) states, it is a “fuzzy old world”. But perhaps part
of the ‘problem’ with the conceptualisation of theory can be attributed to the fact that
much contemporary regional research does share roots in realist philosophy, or at least
some vague Kantian conceptions of truth and knowledge. From this viewpoint, neither
purely Humean-empirical, nor Cartesian-rationalist approaches to knowledge or truth
are deemed sufficient on their own. At the same time, there is a belief in some form of
objective truth -  the realm of the ‘real’ -  and a resistance to proclaiming all concepts to
be inherently chaotic. Methodologically, wide-ranging, extensive approaches to
research are deemed incapable of uncovering causal mechanisms, while deep study of
the minutiae of particular phenomena are often seen as conducive to overly descriptive
outcomes, insufficient to develop robust theoretical outcomes. Researchers are thus
trapped between a desire to explain on the one hand and recognition of complexity,
uncertainty and contingency in the ‘real-world’ on the other. This makes the process of
abstraction difficult, and is perhaps one reason why regional research has often led to
broad-brush descriptions of middle-range processes at the meso-level, with the case
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study often being a default research strategy. This is a challenge for all realist scholars 
and I will not -  nor could I -  attempt to solve it here: instead I argue for methodological 
realism on pragmatic grounds of time, resources and research scope. Challenges more 
specific to case study approaches then flow from these wider concerns, in particular 
those of empirical rigour; agency; ‘generalisability’; routes to abstraction or theory 
development; and replication of studies.
Empirical rigour
Although this chapter is mostly concerned with the use of case studies in a wider sense, 
it is important to touch on the issue of ‘empirical rigour’ within a case study: that of 
ensuring that the data collected and analysed is representative and rich enough to allow 
a thorough and deep understanding of the case itself. Whilst one cannot always account 
for the researcher’s ability to extract the right information, strategies can be employed to 
create the best possible environment for this to happen. As a case study approach is 
based around the thorough examination of one, or a small number, of cases, the key to 
achieving this lies in as much immersion within the case as is practically possible. In 
particular, this requires triangulation of various data collection techniques using a wide 
variety of sources. Analytical ‘tools’ are also important in making sense of the data: 
again it is useful to use a range of approaches where possible and appropriate.37
37 See Chapter 7 for a discussion o f  the data collection and analytical methods deployed during the 
research process and the problem s encountered along the way.
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Agency
Markusen (1999) argues that a further problem with much contemporary theorising is 
that theory is divorced from agency, in particular those that combine fuzziness with an 
emphasis on process. Ray Hudson (2003) counteracts this with a suggestion that the 
notion of process requires:
...a specification of the links between actors, agents and structures, [and so] I have difficulty 
in conceptualizing process as an alternative to the specification of these links.
Ibid. p744, emphasis in original
Methodologically this requires the researcher to follow lines of enquiry that recognise 
individuals as producers, and shapers, of formations as well as being produced and 
shaped through them. As noted previously, it can be unhelpful to distinguish individuals 
as somehow separate from the notion of structures' : a better way might be to consider 
the fixedness, size and resources of different networks -  including individual humans -  
in assessing their ability to effect change. It is important to treat the relationship 
between actors and networks, or conduct and context, as questions in themselves, 
contingent on the gaze of the study and -  depending on the way in which they are 
conceptualised -  not always entirely interdependent.
In theory development this requires deliberation over who or what the ‘generators’ are 
and how they may shape others: in the case of this research this might be about 
understanding who or what determines an organisation’s approach to governing carbon 
management, in particular in terms of relationships between different governing 
organisations.
Generalisation
The ability and relative importance of being able to generalise from case studies is 
perhaps the most visited concern relating to case study research. A number of scholars 
of political and economic geography have attributed certain perceived failings of the
38 And where theorists such as Jessop and Giddens have attempted to overcom e this, they have failed to 
do so.
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‘new regionalism’ (see Lovering, 1999; Harding, 2007) and regional studies in general 
(Markusen, 1999; 2003) to an over-reliance on single-case studies and a lack of 
attention given to contextual factors in determining the course of events. In other words, 
“ ...authors of qualitative accounts often fail to make the case that a particular case study 
is representative and that the findings from it are generalizable” (Markusen, 1999 p872 
in Peck, 2003).
This fits with a wider conception of case-studies as “unable to provide reliable 
information about the broader class” (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1984 cited in 
Flyvbjerg, 2006 p220). For Bent Flyvbjerg (ibid.), this interpretation, “if not directly 
wrong, is so oversimplified as to be grossly misleading”. In support of this rebuttal, 
Jamie Peck (2003) presents Clyde Mitchell’s (1983 p207) argument that while case 
studies may not invoke statistical inference, instead:
...the inferential process turns exclusively on the theoretically necessary linkages among the 
features in the case study. The validity of extrapolation depends not on the typicality or 
representativeness of the case but of the cogency of theoretical reasoning.
Similarly, as Flyvbjerg (2006) points out, all knowledge is context-dependent: any 
theorisation is defined within a particular context. Nonetheless, there remains some 
doubt about the ability to infer from a singular case to a theory applicable for the 
population; for example, Mitchell’s statement may for some infer too much reliance on 
rationalist ‘reasoning’ as opposed to interrogation of empirically observable events.
One of the key strengths of the case study approach is the ability to focus on the
richness and uniqueness of individual cases, but there is a danger on the other hand of
becoming overly concerned, for example, with the peculiarities of place in a
geographical enquiry as opposed to the causative mechanisms that may be more fully
developed by a comparative study of more than one case. Indeed, without study of other
cases how can one deduce which facts are peculiar to a particular place and which are
not? Alan Harding (2007) highlights this issue in a critique of recent debates on city-
regions, arguing that they have often been hampered by reliance on independent case
studies, which has led to studies making simplistic, singular conclusions to processes
that are being shaped in different ways in different places. In doing so Harding draws
attention to works by Eugene McCann (2007) and Pauline McGuirk (2007) of Austin
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(Texas, USA) and Sydney (Australia) respectively which show quite different ways in 
which city-regional agendas are developed, including the involvement of different 
actors and rationales.
While Markusen and Harding both appear to argue for a shift to more positivist 
informed approaches to research39 there is a clear issue to be confronted in terms of 
theory development and the ‘generalisability’ of research findings as well as, therefore, 
theory testing. An initial point to make is that any case study-based research has to be 
clear about its limitations: as with all research strategies there are some sacrifices to be 
made. Similarly, any research has to take into account the context within which the data 
is collected and the type of research questions being asked. In the context of this 
research, the in-depth case-study method offers the overriding advantage of facilitating 
the development of an in-depth understanding of practices, interactions and the 
mobilisation of interests that, it is felt, outweigh any potential disadvantages in terms of 
widely applicable theory development: the important point is that methods should be 
appropriate to the research question(s).
There has also been some exaggeration of the issue of generalisation or theory 
development, partly as a result of a largely false distinction between inductive and 
deductive approaches -  as Markusen herself remarks (2003) -  which is linked to an 
apparent misinterpretation of processes of abstraction: this may be overcome by 
viewing research as a retroductive process (see Lawson, 1998; Sayer, 2000; and 
Downward and Learman, 2007), which I will now outline.
Retroduction
It is true that certain studies may incline towards induction or deduction, but in reality 
no research is a pure example of one or the other. In simplistic terms, nobody conducts 
their research in a theoretical vacuum, whether intentionally or otherwise. Nor is a 
purely deductive approach generally possible, because both the hypotheses or theories 
to be tested and the cases chosen to test them will on the whole have been chosen with
39‘ A lthough Markusen (2003) does refute this in her response to Peck
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some degree of prior examination of the cases involved so as to determine the 
appropriateness of the study. It is in fact important to recognise the relationship between 
theory or ‘the general’ and the concrete-complex issues on ‘the ground’. Failure to do so 
inevitably leads to research findings that are partial and incomplete. In other words, the 
process of lazy abstraction bemoaned by Markusen and others is not one found in ‘good’ 
research, ‘critical’ or otherwise. As Peck (2003) states:
In theoretically informed intensive research, conceptualisation occurs through abstraction 
and through continuous dialogue with concrete cases, selected on the basis of their potential 
elucidation of the relationships in question, not according to the frequency of their 
occurrence or their statistical representativeness.
Ibid. p730
The process of abstraction -  isolating in thought some necessary aspect of an object that 
contributes to the world of experience -  is perhaps more constructively set within a 
wider method of retroduction. Retroduction involves moving a discussion “from a 
description of some phenomenon to a description of something which produces it or is a 
condition of it” (Bhaskar, 1986 pi 1). The process of doing so is set out by Balihar 
Sanghera (2008) in the following steps:
1. In order to explain observable phenomena, social scientists must attempt to discover 
appropriate ‘mechanisms’: links or causal factors.
2. Since these causal factors will typically be unavailable to immediate or prior 
observation, we first construct a model of them, often drawing upon familiar sources 
(academic or otherwise).
3. The model is such that, were it to represent correctly the link between an event and an 
outcome, the phenomena would then be causally explained.
4. The model, as a hypothetical description of actually existing entities and their relations, 
is tested by examining its further consequences.
This demonstrates a clear dialogical relationship between empirical data and theory
informed abstraction, or comparison to other sources of evidence. This method of
theory generation, according to John Roberts (2001), dispels many misleading
conceptual dualisms in geography; for example the ability to jump from the concrete to
the abstract, the empirical to the theoretical, or the local to the global. Movement
between concrete findings and abstractions involves degrees of concreteness. In many
ways this sums up the realist approach to social science: truth, knowledge, abstractions,
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or spaces cannot be easily classified; all answers are approximations and belong 
somewhere on a sliding scale from ‘probably’ to ‘probably not’.
Replicability
The issue of replicability of case studies highlighted by Markusen (1999, 2003) is 
perhaps not one that is immediately applicable to a stand-alone piece of research. 
However, an important part of carrying out ‘good’ research is being clear about the 
methods and approaches being used and the way in which they might affect or shape the 
research findings. This allows for critical evaluation by others, but also if desired, the 
use of similar methods in other studies to test or develop the findings. This is not such a 
straightforward process as through a standardised model of data collection and analysis, 
particularly as interpretation of data in qualitative studies can sometimes come down to 
the interpretation of minor nuances in texts as opposed to large scale standardised 
testing. However, it is important to at least attempt clarity and regularity of approach, 
while bearing in mind that contextual factors, including access to information mean that 
each case may need variations on the approach taken.
Selecting Cases
The Yorkshire and Humber region was chosen as a central case study for this research, 
with the North East and South West selected as comparator studies. This section 
outlines the rationale behind these choices.
For a single piece of research the case study approach is too intensive to allow for 
replication on a large scale by one researcher. However, the use of a comparative case 
study approach may ameliorate some of the potential concerns over the ‘generalisability’ 
or theory-development potential of a single case study. While research would ideally be 
based on intensive exploration of all members of a population, in reality this is rarely 
possible. In the case of this study, the population -  English regions -  stretches to just
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eight cases (plus London).40 But the complex nature of the cases; the number of actors 
and organisations involved as well as the relationships with other actors and 
organisations; the methodological approach taken within the case study; and the time 
and resource constraints with the research mean that it is only practical to study one 
case in real depth, with selective use of comparator data to fix this within a wider 
context. The approach taken here, therefore, took a sample of three English regions -  
one in-depth study, and two comparator studies -  selected based on a survey of the 
population to identify some basic characteristics of the governing of carbon 
management in the English regions. Using comparators also allows for a broader base 
for discussion of ‘national’ policy developments.
While it is important to spend time thinking about choosing case studies to ensure some 
level of representativeness, it is impossible to pick an ideal case; and indeed there is an 
argument to suggest that cases could be picked on an entirely random basis. Yin (2003) 
argues that case study selection should be based on extensive screening of cases, 
including pilot studies. Others are more relaxed, however: Stake (1995) argues for 
making choices based on those which seemingly offer the best “opportunity for learning” 
and Mitchell (1983) similarly argues for choice based on the ‘explanatory power’ of the 
selection. In the end I chose a core case study region as an “exemplary case” (Yin, 
2003 p i3), with comparators chosen to reflect different political and spatial contexts 
across the regions. I was, however, keen not to be overly prescriptive in selecting cases: 
deliberately selecting cases just because they meet the criteria you want carries a clear 
danger of skewing the research to meet a certain agenda. As such, just a small range of 
criteria were used in determining case study choices.
Firstly, as my interest was in governing carbon management I felt it would be useful if 
at least one of the case studies had some existing specific institutional infrastructure and 
a strategy for governing climate change. As it happened, all eight regions fulfilled this 
to some degree. Yorkshire and the Humber, however, had the longest history of specific 
institutional arrangements and strategies -  including a regional carbon emissions target 
-  relating to climate change (see Table 23 in Annex 1). Furthermore, the Regional
40 London has been omitted as a standard case for various reasons; most importantly because o f  its 
different governing structures and resources, and the fact that it may be more accurately represented as 
more o f  a city-region or even city-state than a region in the sense that the other eight G overnm ent O ffice  
regions do.
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Climate Change Partnership in that region was about to begin writing a second iteration 
of its climate change action plan at the time that my fieldwork was due to begin. This 
seemed to offer a point of entry where stakeholders were likely to already be in a 
reflective mood regarding regional efforts to govern carbon emissions, thus allowing 
research “while the dust is still flying” (Latour, 2005 p23). As such, Yorkshire and the 
Humber seemed a good choice for the main study.
To a large extent any other region would have sufficed to serve the purpose of providing 
comparative evidence. In the end, some criteria were placed on the selection of two 
comparators, but these were deliberately fairly loose in order to retain a sense of 
‘randomness’. In using the North East, I have chosen a region with a similar geographic, 
political and economic context to Yorkshire and the Humber -  including a shared 
Environment Agency ‘region’ -  but with a more recent turn towards carbon 
management issues at the regional level. These two regions share an industrial past, 
with economies built on ‘carboniferous capitalism’ in the form of coal mining as well as 
energy intensive secondary industries in iron, steel and ship manufacturing, engineering 
and energy production. Unsurprisingly these regions have the two highest per capita 
emissions in England.
The North West could equally have provided a useful comparator in many of these 
respects, and after the selection of the case studies the region took a lead through the 
RDA network on developing a low-carbon economy. Despite the deliberately loose 
criteria, the choice of the North East can be justified in several respects. First, at the 
time of choosing the case studies the North East was in the process of developing its 
first climate change action plan; as with Yorkshire and the Humber, this proved to be a 
useful point at which to engage with policy actors. Second, the selection of the North 
East helped to reflect a ‘non-exceptional’ case against the Yorkshire and the Humber’s 
relatively early adoption of technologies aimed at the spatial governing of carbon. Third, 
it was felt that a shared Environment Agency region would provide extra scope for 
comparison.41
41 A s it turned out, how ever, the Environment A gency proved to have little involvem ent with governing  
carbon managem ent at the regional (N U T S I) level.
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The South West provided the final case study, offering a contrasting position to that of 
the North East, with a history of political interest in environmental issues, a more 
politically contested regional history and a much less carbon-intensive economy, 
reflecting both the greater proportion of rural land in the region and its less intensively 
industrial past. It produced the second lowest per capita emissions of the English 
regions in 2007. Table 9 compares the three regions’ emissions levels and sources.
Table 9: Population, GVA and CO2 Emissions in Case Study Regions, 2007
Pop,
(000s)
GVA P er  
C apita  
(£)
Industry & 
C om m ercial 
(kT)
D om estic R oadTransport Total
E m issions 
P e r  C apita  
(0
North East 2 ,565 15,460 21,143 6,021 5,098 32 ,183 12.6
Yorkshire
and the 
Humber
5,177 16,670 27 ,060 12,302 11,585 51 ,273 9.9
South
W est 5,178 18,235 15,360 12,238 12,116 40 ,766 7.9
Source: National Statistics (2009) and BIS (2010)
Note: This table omits emissions from LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry), 
which means that the total cannot be derived from the three sets of emissions shown.
Yorkshire and the Humber
Yorkshire and the Humber is perhaps the oldest of the administrative regions in England, 
having been -  as the three Yorkshire Ridings -  a distinct territory since the Eighth 
Century (Gore and Jones, 2006). Geographically, it was historically bounded by the 
North Sea to the East, the Pennines to the West; Tees estuary to the North and -  broadly 
speaking - the Humber Estuary to the South. The current incarnation also includes 
North and North East Lincolnshire, which lie just to the South of the Humber, but not 
Middlesbrough, south of the Tees.
Administratively, the region was divided into four sub-regions: North Yorkshire; West 
Yorkshire (Leeds city-region); South Yorkshire (Sheffield city-region); and the Humber
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(Hull city-region). The populations of each of these sub-regions have historically drawn 
on their natural resources for economic purposes: fishing and port industries in the 
Humber estuary; coal mining and steel production in South Yorkshire; agriculture in 
North Yorkshire; and textiles in West Yorkshire. In addition to these traditional 
industries the region is home to a number of large power stations, including Drax, the 
largest coal-fuelled power station in the UK. In 2007, Yorkshire and the Humber was 
responsible for the production of around 18 per cent of the UK’s electricity (YHRA, 
2007). A period of economic restructuring took place over the thirty years up to 2007, 
with the main industries of the three core cities and their hinterlands being largely 
decimated in the 1970s and 80s, preceded by years of gradual decline. In 2008, 
Yorkshire and the Humber had the second lowest GVA of the English regions, with 
GVA per capita 17 per cent lower than the English average (BIS, 2010).
Despite the period of restructuring, emissions levels in the region reflected its industrial 
heritage: per capita carbon emissions for the region were the second highest in England 
for the years covered by the research, and industry and commerce represented a higher 
proportion (46 per cent) of emissions than any region except the North East. At the 
same time, recycling of household waste was the lowest of all regions in 2007/8 
(National Statistics, 2010).
The institutional development of Yorkshire and the Humber broadly followed that of 
each of the English regions, with statutory bodies formed through national initiatives: 
Government Office Yorkshire and the Humber in 1994; Yorkshire Forward (the RDA) 
and the statutory Regional Chamber (later Assembly) in 1998. Aidan While (2000 p334) 
describes the regional arrangements as “fairly weak” during the 1980s, then taking 
greater prominence in the 1990s as the regional agenda became more visible in EU and 
national politics:
Although a regional local government association, planning conference and public-private 
body (the Yorkshire and Humberside Partnership) had been formed in the 1980s, these 
partnership organisations largely failed to secure consistent high-level support across the 
region — not least because of the diversity of interests and rivalry between sub-regional 
areas.
ibid. p334
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The region then “emerged in the mid-1990s as one of the most active English regions” 
(While, 2000 p330). In 1996 a new regional local government association was formed, 
calling itself the Regional Assembly for Yorkshire and The Humber, and in March 1998 
became the first to establish a regional chamber. A plethora of other regional 
organisations arose alongside the statutory bodies, including the Yorkshire and Humber 
Regional Forum, a body constituted by members of the voluntary and community sector; 
the Regional Environment Network; and the Yorkshire and Humber Faiths Forum (Gore 
and Jones, 2006). By the end of the research period, the region had produced its second 
Regional Economic Strategy (RES, Yorkshire Forward 2005); a second Regional 
Spatial Strategy (RSS, YHRA, 2008); and three sustainable development strategies 
(YHRA, 2000 and 2003; Yorkshire Forward, 2008).
A number of research studies have noted regional actors in Yorkshire and the Humber 
(Y&H) as being relatively progressive on sustainable development agendas. Paul 
Benneworth, Conroy and Roberts (2002) - in a review of sustainable development in the 
regions - noted Yorkshire and the Humber’s Regional Sustainable Development 
Framework (RSDF) as being clearer, more focused and exhibiting a greater level of 
regional sensitivity than other regions’ strategies. Similarly, Steven Smith and William 
Sheate (2001) found that Y&H had been more thorough in the sustainability appraisal of 
Regional Planning Guidance than other regions.
Yorkshire and the Humber region also has the longest documented history of climate 
change policy and was the only region to have a specific ‘aspirational’ target for GHG 
emissions reduction in 2007. This target was first iterated in the 2003 RES and provided 
an area of particular interest for the research, as it represented an early attempt to 
reconfigure, or re-calculate a region as a ‘carbon space’. A Regional Climate Change 
Executive Group was formed in 2004, which included the employment of a regional 
climate change co-ordinator for two years from 2004-6 - and again from 2008 onwards - 
and a Regional Climate Change Action Plan (RCCAP) was published in 2005. In 2009 
the Executive Group was renamed as a ‘Regional Climate Change Partnership’, and the 
second iteration of the RCCAP was published.
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North East
The North East provides a useful comparator to Yorkshire and the Humber for various 
reasons. First, like Yorkshire and the Humber it is stereotypic ally seen to have a strong 
regional identity. Nonetheless, Dave Byrne and Paul Benneworth (2006) note that the 
North East region may in some ways be seen as both the birthplace and graveyard of 
regionalism in England. The Campaign for a North East Assembly was formed in 1992 
(Tomaney, 2002), but although popularly understood as a uniquely culturally defined 
region, when given the opportunity to vote for elected regional government in 2004 78 
per cent voted against. The reasons for this are manifold (as discussed in Chapter 3), 
and include the unpopularity of the Labour government at the time, and wider distrust of 
‘politicians’ (Shaw et al., 2006) but as Byrne and Benneworth (2006) note:
Part of the problem is that although regional identity is strong in the North East of England, 
identity is complex, and simple narratives of ‘Geordie pride’ inevitably fail to catch the 
complexity42
pl08
The two regions also share a relatively similar path of industrial development and 
decline, with the North East economy historically based around coal mining, iron and 
steel production, shipbuilding, heavy engineering, chemicals and port-related activities. 
In 1931, just over 10 per cent of the region’s population worked in either coal mining, 
iron and steel production or shipbuilding. In 1971 these industries still represented six 
per cent of the population, but by 1991 this figure had fallen to just one in every 
hundred residents {ibid.). In 2008, the North East had the lowest GVA per capita of the 
English regions (BIS, 2010).
Reflecting the nationally-led regional agenda, the North East had more or less the same 
organisational make-up at the regional level as Yorkshire and the Humber. This
42 L iving in N ew castle at the time o f  the referendum w hile carrying out research on regional econom ic  
developm ent in the North East I spoke informally with academ ics and policy makers as w ell as friends 
and fam ily in the region about their feelings towards the referendum. T w o sets o f  problem s seem ed  
prevalent amongst both policy  and ‘lay’ com m unities which hampered the argument for an elected  
assem bly. These were: (1) internal opposition to the hegem ony o f  N ew castle as representative o f  the 
North East, with a concom itant concern that an elected assem bly based in N ew castle w ould increase this 
hegem ony; and (2) policy actors and academ ics felt that the argument for elected assem blies w ere too 
couched in econom ic developm ent debates -  which were overplayed by proponents -  and not enough in 
cultural and democratic terms that ‘ordinary people’ could relate to.
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included a shared institutional boundary in the shape of a joint Environment Agency 
region: the North East Environment Agency region covers Yorkshire and the Humber 
and the North East. This provided a shared context for discussions with actors from the 
Environment Agency, as well as national policy actors. Although it does not feature 
much in terms of carbon management policy the North East is also a constituent region 
of the Northern Way strategy, along with Yorkshire and the Humber and the North 
West.
By virtue of the two regions’ similar economic paths, the North East also had a record 
on carbon emissions similar to that of the Yorkshire and Humber. It had the highest per 
capita carbon emissions of the English regions across the study period as well as the 
highest proportion of emissions from industry and commerce. In contrast to Yorkshire 
and the Humber, however, the North East was one of the last regions to set up a regional 
climate change partnership and develop a related action plan. The North East employed 
a nominally independent ‘climate change co-ordinator’ to head the North East Climate 
Change Partnership, who stayed in post for the length of the research period. An 
RCCAP was developed in 2007 and published in autumn 2008.
On the broader subject of sustainable development, the North East was seen to be 
‘doing its bit’, but was relatively slow in implementing its principles in practice. For 
instance, Benneworth, Conroy and Roberts (2002) found that:
In the North East, the UK Sustainable Development Roundtable had inspired the 
establishment of a regional round table, although this achieved little beyond assembling 
those with some interest in the topic ... [and] early RDA working documents largely 
overlooked sustainable development, but in the later stages of the process, One North East 
(ONE) co-opted experts into its strategy team to ensure the subject received appropriate 
coverage.
p207
This builds on the notion of governing actors in the North East being comparatively late 
adopters of carbon management principles, and as such, the North East offered a 
potentially contrasting approach to Yorkshire and the Humber within a similar 
geographical, political and economic context.
South West
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The South West was chosen as a region with different environmental pressures as well 
as economic and political context. The region as a whole has been a disputed territory 
by its inhabitants, with separate territorially based environment groups such as the 
Cornwall Alliance. Indeed, for Amer Hirmis (2006 p204), the region lacks spatial 
legitimacy: “As a coherent regional entity ... it appears to lack a unity of purpose and 
appears to fall into John Lovering’s (1999) category of ‘unfortunate regionalism’”. This 
follows analysis by Bernard Deacon (2004) of the construction of a ‘regional agenda’ in 
the South West, which noted a marked divide between the political-economic project of 
those working to ‘construct’ the region and the South West’s cultural identities:
In the regional discourse of peak institutions of the new regionalization the image of the 
South-West as rural, maritime and diverse, cohering around a politically and economically 
driven project or regional construction, is seen as separate from cultural identity, the self- 
identification of inhabitants. When identity is found, it is found at a different scale.
Ibid. p219
Identity based politics were evidenced in the Cornish Constitutional Convention -  a 
body that argues for Cornish devolution -  and Mebyon Kernow, a political party 
standing for Cornish autonomy. Cornwall is also recognised as a member of the League 
of Celtic Nations.43
In essence, the South West “lacks a strong sense of common identity or effective 
regional institutions” (GOSW, 1997 in Deacon, 2004). For some, however, this 
diversity was a positive attribute, and regional strategies, briefings and respondents to 
this research often made play on this: the idea being that the diversity was a regional 
strength, and also led to a more pragmatic and functional regional approach. The region 
also has a different political make-up in terms of its elected representatives. For instance, 
while the North East (93%) and Yorkshire and the Humber (77%) featured 
predominantly Labour MPs, the South West had much more even split of 16 Labour, 21 
Conservative and nine Liberal Democrat MPs in 2007. The South West therefore 
offered an opportunity to approach the issues from a slightly different perspective to the 
other two regions and thus, hopefully, allow richer exploration of the issues involved in 
the research.
43 This includes W ales, Scotland and Ireland (including Northern Ireland), as well as the less w idely  
recognised territories o f  Cornwall, Brittany and the Isle o f  Man.
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In terms of the environment and sustainable development, the South West’s regional 
bodies have tended to be seen as more holistic and integrative in their approach, which 
perhaps reflects a deeper political commitment to environmental issues within the 
region: for instance, as a stronghold of the Transition Towns movement. Benneworth, 
Conroy and Roberts (2002) found that the South West RDA was the only RDA to fully 
address the conflicts brought about in trying to effectively integrate environmental, 
social and economic aims into the RES, but also acknowledging that “the South West 
lacked the institutional mechanisms to ensure that all three were core concerns” {ibid. 
p207). Like the other two regions, the South West was in the process of developing an 
RCCAP at the start of the research period.
Regional organisations
Each of the three regions had the same four ‘core’ regional bodies in operation -  plus 
the Environment Agency -  as shown in Table 10, below.
Table 10: Core regional bodies and year of incorporation in the three regions
R D A R e g io n a l A s s e m b ly R e g io n a l L o c a l  
G o v e rn m e n t A s s o c ia tio n
G o v e rn m e n t O ffic e
Yorkshire Yorkshire and Local Government Government Office
Forward (1999) Humber Assembly Yorkshire and Humber Yorkshire and the
(1998) (LGYH, 200644) Humber (1994)
ONE North East North East Regional Association of North East Government Office
(1999) Assembly (1999) Councils (199945) North East (1994)
South West RDA South West Regional SW Councils (200846) Government Office
(1999) Assembly (1999) South West (1994)
The only real difference between the three was the relationship between the Regional
Assemblies and the corresponding regional local government association. In Yorkshire
44 Previously Yorkshire and Humber A ssociation o f  Local Authorities (1999-2006) and Yorkshire and 
Humber R egional A ssem bly (1996-99)
45 Previously (pre-1999) North o f  England A ssem bly o f  Local Authorities
46 Previously (pre-2008) South W est LGA
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and the Humber, the Regional Assembly incorporated the Yorkshire and Humber 
Association of Local Authorities (YHALA; previously known as the Yorkshire and 
Humber Regional Assembly), but in 2006 YHALA opted to split from the Assembly 
and form Local Government Yorkshire and Humber (LGYH) in a bid to develop an 
“independent voice for the region’s councils” (Barnsley MBC, 2005). A similar story is 
found in the North East. Between 1999 and 2004 the Association of North East 
Councils (ANEC) and the North East Assembly (NEA), although formally separate 
bodies, worked as one. Following the referendum in 2004, however, ANEC officially 
severed ties with the NEA and there was evidence of attempts by ANEC to marginalise 
the NEA between then and the dismantling of the Assembly in 2009 (Linford, 2005). 
Similarly, the referendum result also led to ONE North East (the RDA) taking on a 
more aggressive ‘leadership’ strategy in the region, which also led to marginalisation of 
the Assembly (Shaw et al., 2006).
Temporal clamps
Analysing policy in action also requires the setting of temporal boundaries. This is 
pragmatic in terms of keeping a research project manageable, but in this instance also 
allows focus on a particular ‘moment of change’; identified here as a shift in 
governmental behaviour in relation to both carbon management and regional governing 
structures around 2007. The research period also covered the final term of the New 
Labour government. The research account in the following chapters focuses on two 
‘waves’ of carbon management practices, which roughly follow a chronology of pre- 
2007 and post-2007 actions. The research largely covers the years 2005-09. 47 
Pertinently for this research, 2005 marked the publication of the first regional climate 
change action plan in England, in Yorkshire and the Humber.
47 The regional target for Yorkshire and the Humber was introduced in 2003 , but most o f  the analysis 
concerns 2005 onwards.
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Specific events and practices
Even after the application of temporal and spatial clamps a large, amorphous area of 
potential exploration still remains, especially in researching such a broad realm as 
carbon reduction policy. The investigation is partly exploratory, and the research 
account in Chapter 8 begins with an overview of the various policy practices being 
employed at the regional level up to 2007. Some further narrowing of focus helps to put 
the spotlight on specific sets of issues. Returning to the research questions, the key 
interest was in the way in which regional actors attempted to ‘re-imagine’ the region, 
especially through re-calculating it as a carbon space. This leads to interest in practices 
that attempt to build a view of the region as a space in itself as opposed to sector 
specific approaches. Each region had attempted to do this to some degree through the 
use of climate change partnerships and either had or were in the process of developing a 
climate change action plan for their region. Yorkshire and the Humber also had an 
aspirational target for the region, which had been in place since 2002. In 2007 and 2008 
all the Government Offices for the Regions were involved in agreeing Local Area 
Agreements with Local Strategic Partnerships, including for many a spatial carbon 
emissions target: this showed a third set of spatial practices that regional actors were 
involved in relating to the calculus of ‘carbon spaces’.
In order to more thoroughly get to grips with the mobilisation of strategies and practices 
of governing it is necessary to focus on relationships between various sets of actors. 
These need to be capable of shedding light on each of the stages of governing traced 
through the MoG framework: development of governing rationalities; development and 
implementation of technologies; relationships between actors; and the effect on the 
governed entity. In particular, there was an interest in scalar practices and relationships 
between ‘scaled’ actors. Four sets of relationships tend to be at the forefront of regional 
activity: statutory regional actors with other statutory regional actors; statutory regional 
actors with non-statutory regional actors; regional actors with local authorities; and 
regional actors and national governmental actors. Analysing these specific sets of
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relationships gives a rounded picture of the politics involved in governing regional 
policy from ‘above’, ‘within’ and ‘below’. 48
The nature of governing at the regional level often required that regional actors acted in 
partnership, in particular where statutory roles were shared amongst different actors 
within different organisations, as was the case with sustainable development and carbon 
management. This is particularly important in trying to develop a shared regional 
‘imaginary’ on a particular issue. The analysis in Chapter 9 -  of ‘first wave’ practices -  
partly focuses on the development of broad-based climate change partnerships, which 
attempted to gain ‘buy-in’ from each of the core regional organisations. Here it was 
important therefore to identify actors at the regional level that were involved in carbon 
management policy.
Statutory regional bodies also interacted with non-statutory regional constellations, 
which pre-2007 included regional local government associations, as well as regional 
environment forums and regional representatives of environmental charities such as 
Friends of the Earth. Analysing these relationships is important in establishing the 
extent to which governing networks extended beyond the regional ‘troika’, and also 
give important ‘outsider’ insights on the workings of regional governing.
The relationship between regional and local authority actors receives much of the 
emphasis in Chapters 8-12. In terms of ‘first wave’ practices, the emphasis is on the 
extent to which local authorities engaged with regional actors in policy formation and 
implementation as well as the way in which regional technologies ‘translate’ across 
scales. Local authority actors are seen as important indicators of the success of the 
broad-based ‘regionalisms’ developed by regional actors. The analysis of ‘second wave’ 
practices focuses on the forms of engagement and the politics that arise as regional 
actors become involved as a mediating force between local and national government. 
Finally, the relationship between regional actors and national government is an 
important step in developing a ‘multi-level’ perspective on the research, and especially 
in exploring the context for the development of regional governing technologies.
48 A full list o f  respondents and data sources can be found in Annex 2 and the process o f  carrying out the 
research is discussed in depth in the follow ing chapter.
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Conclusion
This chapter has tackled two sets of methodological issues. First, it set out the 
theoretical basis for a comparative case study approach. The aim here has not been to 
set out a specific and immutable philosophical ‘standpoint’. Most clearly however, it 
might be said to sit somewhere in the realm of ‘methodological realism’: one that does 
not necessarily share all of the ontological or epistemological standpoints of Bhaskar, 
Sayer et al., but which nonetheless sees merit in the pragmatic approach to research 
methodologies that have developed from within this tradition.
I have outlined the rationale for a case study approach, in particular by addressing some 
of the concerns raised in recent years regarding their use in regional studies. While 
some of the concerns have been rejected, they have highlighted other issues worthy of 
discussion. For example, while generalisability is not necessarily the aim of case study- 
based research, some degree of corroboration and investigation of issues in other 
contexts is a useful strategy to adopt.
For the second task, I set out the basis for the specific case study choices, including a 
brief description of some of the characteristics of the chosen regions; the organisational 
structures; the specific governing technologies of interest; and the relationships to be 
studied. This work is at least partly an exploratory piece of research, as little research 
has been published at the time of writing which focuses specifically on English regions 
and carbon management policy. As such, this chapter gave only contextual information: 
the overview of regional carbon management policy was a research task in itself and is 
outlined in Chapter 8. Yorkshire and the Humber offered insight to two sets of 
governing technologies that other regions either had not, or were only just beginning to 
offer. The South West and North East offered some ballast to this selection, giving an 
insight into experience of regions where carbon management policy was still ‘in the 
making’ -  including different approaches to policy -  and to give wider context to the 
situation in Yorkshire and the Humber, the English regions as a whole, and the national 
policy picture.
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7 Exploring actors and their accounts
Having determined the case study approach, the next research task was to deploy a set of methods to effectively explore the research questions: embarking on the 
process of ‘real world’ research and all the potential for excitement, frustration and 
general messiness that this entails. This chapter therefore follows on from the previous 
methodological chapter in exploring the ‘reality’ of the research process. This 
concentrates on the deployment of specific research methods and reflection on the 
process of gathering evidence. In terms of methods, some time is taken to discuss the 
theoretical and practical considerations in making strategic choices, as well as the tools 
then used to analyse the data. This includes a short discussion of discourse analysis and 
Bruno Latour’s (1999) notions of ‘programmes’ and ‘anti-programmes’. Particular 
attention is given to the most ‘open’ point of research gathering: carrying out semi­
structured in depth qualitative interviews. As part of this I engage with the particular 
issues faced when attempting to access and interview policy ‘elites’, strategies taken to 
ameliorate any problems, and reflection on the success of these strategies.
Setting up the Study
Yin (2003) outlines six sources of evidence for a case study: documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation and physical artefacts. 
Each of the six sources of evidence were utilised at some point in the study, but in-depth 
semi-structured interviews and documentary evidence were the most used sources of 
data. This was in part pragmatic: for example, it was easier to get people to agree to an 
interview than to set up a more embedded method of study. Documentary evidence -  
although not always easy to get hold of -  is a useful source for analysing the 
‘programmes’ (Latour, 1999; 2005) and discourses that actors present to others, as well 
as some indication of historical decision-making processes.
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Documentary evidence was important to the study in that regional action plans provided 
the basis of a large section of the study, while archived material also acted as a useful 
data source. The majority of these were sourced through the internet, but on occasion 
they were provided by or requested from individuals or organisations: on the whole they 
were co-operative with these requests, although some information did appear to have a 
habit of going ‘missing’. 49 Published versions of strategies also count as physical 
artefacts, as did the buildings that house the different organisations I visited: these were 
useful indicators of particular organisational cultures and even, in part, the extent to 
which ecological considerations were embedded within the organisation.
It was initially hoped that interviews and documentary evidence would be augmented 
by at least one period of ‘embedded’ observation of a regional governing organisation’s 
climate change activities. This was to allow for ‘submerged’ empirical analysis to gain 
access to the deeper levels of decision-making and organisational cultures. Although 
there are any number of different problems that may arise relating to ethics and 
positionality as a result of taking such an approach, it would have allowed an 
opportunity to essentially get ‘under the skin’ of the issues I was hoping to explore. 
Martyn Hammersley (1992 p241-42), notes that:
...there are independent and unknown realities that can come to be known to the researcher 
getting into direct contact with them, for example through participant observation.
Unfortunately, I was unable to persuade any individuals or organisations to agree to this 
form of observation. By way of compromise, I was invited along to a number of board 
meetings, workshops and policy groups, of which I made full use. A list of the events I 
participated in or observed can be found in Annex 3
In-depth interviews
Observation proved to be a useful means of getting a sense of prevailing power 
relationships, underlying organisational politics and particular policy issues. Attendance 
at workshop and consultation events also provided a means of viewing discussions of
49 See the discussion o f  regional targets in Chapter 9.
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policy from outside the ‘inner circle’ of governing actors. These events were 
particularly useful for informal discussions with various people to probe around some of 
the research questions I was dealing with. They were not, however, ideal for directing 
the shape of discussions to specifically deal with the issues I was interesting in 
exploring. Focus groups provide a useful means for doing this in a group setting, and 
two of these were carried out, but it proved difficult to get groups of people together in 
one place at one time. Similarly, the dynamics of focus groups mean that the leader has, 
to some extent, to take a back seat: shaping, but not directly forcing the issues. There is 
also potential for certain opinions and issues to be skirted over in a group environment 
to avoid conflict, or for people ‘outside’ mainstream groups or viewpoints not to attend.
Many of the events at the heart of this research are quite specific and require more direct 
questioning to uncover the decision-making processes involved as well as some of the 
nuances around regional practices. In order to get a deeper understanding of political 
issues it was also important to speak to people individually to get their own perspective 
on events. As such, in-depth semi-structured interviews provided the means for 
generating the bulk of primary data. In total, interviews were carried out with 62 people 
working within national government, regional organisations, local authorities and other 
‘social, economic and environmental partners’ (SEEPs) across the three case study 
regions, with people based in Yorkshire and the Humber comprising roughly half of the 
sample. An anonymised list of interviewees can be found in Annex 2.
A purposive sampling approach was taken and potential research participants were 
initially identified through taking the names of people attending board or partnership 
meetings; listed on organisational websites; and through speculative emails to 
organisations. Interviews were then used to generate further contacts through 
identification of ‘key players’ and people with ‘something to say’ by respondents. 
Identifying potential research participants was relatively straightforward, especially 
once a few interviews had taken place. There was an element of stratification to the 
sampling: it was important to ensure that certain key organisations, people and places 
were represented within the study. Beyond this, there was a potential population of 
hundreds who could have informed the study, but in the end a pragmatic response was 
taken on grounds of time, and perhaps more importantly, the law of diminishing returns.
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This is neatly summed up by the character ‘Engleby’ in Sebastian Faulks’ novel of the 
same title:
By noon the story had fallen into place. You can tell when this has happened because you 
stop writing. The first person you interview, you can’t move the pen fast enough, because 
it’s all new to you. Gradually returns diminish. When your pen is still, and you can pause to 
help the interviewee out with the names of his own colleagues he’s momentarily forgotten, 
you’re there. The blank page is the story done.
‘Engleby’ in Faulks, 2008 p i37
While I never reached the point in interviews of having nothing new to write, there did 
come a point at which themes were repeated often enough within interviews for clear 
patterns to emerge and facts to be, if not one hundred per cent verified, then at least 
established to a reasonable degree of certainty.
Accessing, engaging and recording respondents
Carrying out an in-depth interview is a sociological experience in itself, with potential 
repercussions for the quality and validity of research findings. This is reflected in the 
wealth of academic literature that has been dedicated to the process of accessing, 
engaging with and recording interviewees. Of particular relevance in this research is the 
work that covers researching ‘elite’ actors.50
The rise of semi-autonomous regional governing structures and the allied ‘democratic 
deficit’ (Tomaney, 2000) led to the rise of a regional policy elite that was also often 
untouched by democratic or popular scrutiny. This should not necessarily be taken as a 
normative statement; nonetheless the last decade witnessed a growing body of powerful 
and influential people with little outside understanding as to their roles, strategic 
decision-making or motivational forces. A range of issues have been identified as being 
associated with interviewing elite actors. In particular, the themes of access, power, 
openness and feedback -  as identified by Welch et al. (2002) -  are worthy of discussion,
50 Broadly defined as “an informant . . .  who occupies a senior or middle management position; has 
functional responsibility . . .  has considerable industry experience and . . .  possesses a broad network o f  
personal [and professional] relationships” (W elch et a l., 2002  p 6 14).
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alongside ever-pre valent concerns surrounding positionality, situatedness and 
reflexivity.
Qualitative Interviewing With Elites
Beverley Mullings (1999) argues that very few geographers have recognised the way in 
which in-depth interviews can be too highly affected by issues of power, positionality 
and subjectivity to be sufficiently rigorous or ethical to be valid: as Mullings (1999 
p339) states, using this method “requires a recognition of the relationships of power 
played out during the interview process and the effect that researchers have on the final 
outcomes”. Kevin Ward and Martin Jones (1999) offer an alternative approach in 
suggesting that, while an interview between a junior researcher and a member of a 
policy elite may suggest a fairly clear and fixed locus of control, this ignores the 
subtleties of research, control being also related to issues such as questionnaire design 
and the use of mechanical scenarios to illustrate outcomes. They argue for a more ‘fluid’ 
reading, as control fluctuates around a “constellation of potential positions” {ibid. p304). 
In a similar vein, Welch et al. (2002) contend that there is a dominant view that those 
with higher status are more likely to give accurate and powerful data, but that a number 
of concerns remain regarding the validity and reliability of data from elite sources. One 
of the key issues at stake is the importance of the relationship between researcher and 
researched. To be simplistic, it is an unavoidable fact that the way in which the 
interviewee responds to questions will influence the outcome of the research (Woods, 
1998). As Allan Cochrane (1998 p287) states:
The acknowledgement of difficulties entangled in the process of studying local elites is 
important, particularly those associated with the dangers of ‘surrendering’ to the agendas of 
the elites in the process of gaining cooperation.
I am aware, for example, that sometimes during previous research projects, I have
allowed myself -  sub-consciously -  to be swayed by the agendas of some interviewees.
For instance those with more forceful views perhaps found greater prominence within
my work, especially those who were capable of speaking in succinct ‘sound-bites’
convenient for use in written outcomes. It may not be possible to entirely eliminate such
issues, but it is useful to explore the strategies that may be available to minimise them.
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Access and Positionality
The first hurdle in carrying out elite research is negotiating access. Without access to 
information, no research can be carried out: this draws immediate attention to the 
relative lack of power that the researcher can exercise. Access, or lack of, can cause a 
fatal stumbling block to any proposed research, but can be particularly problematic 
when dealing with elite groups. Luck, connections and particular circumstances at the 
time often play large parts in determining access (McDowell, 1998; Parry, 1998) and 
access to elites is regarded as particularly difficult because they “establish barriers that 
set their members apart from the rest of society” (Hertz and Imber, 1993 p3). 
Furthermore, the threat of access being withdrawn will remain, which may also have an 
effect on the way that questions and responses are shaped (Rubin and Rubin, 1981).
Accessing respondents for this project was -  on the whole -  not too difficult. Once a 
contact name had been established, an initial email was sent to the potential interviewee. 
More often than not no response was received, so the email would be followed up with 
reminder emails and phone calls after a suitable period of time had passed: usually 
about a week after the first email. Few people outright refused to take part in the study, 
although a number did engage in various diversionary tactics -  for instance, cancelling 
meetings at short notice, arguing that they would not be of much help to the study, or 
suggesting alternative contacts -  which in one or two instances meant that it was not 
possible to carry out interviews. This problem was most acute with employees of RDAs. 
These organisations were the only source of refusals and also of people continually 
cancelling and asking to re-organise meetings. This was mentioned to other respondents, 
who suggested -  for instance -  that “you have to understand that these people are very 
busy, and don’t always have time for this sort of thing”. This is understandable, but at 
the same time reflects a sense of a ‘closed shop’ given off by some representatives of 
RDAs in all three regions and feeds into to some of the issues of accountability 
discussed throughout the rest of this research account. On a couple of occasions I was 
able to circumvent these problems by corralling evasive respondents at meetings that I 
attended: here I was at least able to engage in a few minutes of informal discussion on 
particular issues. Similarly, I had no problems with respondents granting access on the
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basis that certain conditions relating to the use of the research would be met, except at 
moments when specific comments were stressed as ‘off the record’. 51
Once the issue of access has been negotiated, most concerns within elite interviewing 
literature continue to relate to issues of power and control. Qualitative research is 
dependent on developing successful working relationships between researcher and 
respondent, which can prove problematic if there is a significant power imbalance 
involved (Welch et al., 2002). In many cases, the main problem lies in the researcher 
being in control, with attendant fears of ‘leading the witness’ (Schoenberger, 1991; 
Hertz and Imber, 1993; Woods, 1998). Elite interviews are, however, likely to favour 
the researched in terms of control (McDowell, 1998; Mullings, 1999; Hughes and 
Cormode, 1998; 1999). As such, the negotiation of trust is equally important, but a 
different approach must be taken: the researcher may be forced to change their outward 
persona in order to appear respectable and perhaps sympathetic to the respondent. As 
part of this process there is the risk of “surrendering to the object of study” (Woods, 
1998 p2114): elite interviewees are often “professional communicators” (Fiuz and 
Halpin, 1995 p68), highly capable of putting across nuanced and persuasive arguments.
Another problem associated with the loss of power is that the interviewer may find 
themself as a ‘supplicant’ (McDowell, 1992; Welch et al., 2002), “requesting time and 
expertise from the powerful, with little to offer in return” (McDowell, 1992 p214). As 
such, the researcher may find it hard to ask critical or demanding questions. At the same 
time, elite interviewees are likely to have a more honed ability in dealing with questions, 
as well as being bound to organisational politics (Welch et al. 2002). Albert Hunter 
(1995 p i53, cited in Sabot 1999 p335) neatly sums this problem up in warning “[njever 
underestimate the elite’s capacity for secrecy”. Added to this question of honesty is the 
fact that in many situations, the information being sought may be sensitive or valuable 
and thus not readily divulged (McDowell, 1998).
It is important, therefore, to recognise that many of the problems and issues are a result 
of the positionality of the interacting parties. In fact it may be said that all research 
depends on the positionality of the researcher and his or her informants (McDowell,
51 ‘O ff the record’ com m ents, frustratingly, were often the source o f  the most interesting and contentious 
responses.
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1998); something which Pam Shurmer-Smith (1998) engages with in discussing how 
the experience of research continuously evolves through specific encounters and is 
shaped by matters such as dress, the researcher’s past, gender, age, ethnicity and 
temporal and spatial locations. Interviews also rely on the participants’ interpretation of 
processes, which the researcher must then comprehend for themselves, thus resulting in 
a ‘filtering’ of knowledge (Schoenberger, 1991; Mullings, 1999).
Much of the debate surrounding situation and positionality refers to the merits of being 
an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’. For example, researchers studying a group to which they have 
a prior connection may have an advantage in that they are able to comprehend and 
empathise more easily with respondents. Equally, however, ‘outsiders’ may have the 
advantage of being seen as unbiased or naive, thus being more likely to gain access to 
more sensitive information (Ward and Jones, 1999). The irony to this is that arguably it 
is the ‘inside’ researcher who can make more use of the information, being more 
capable of drawing insights from data. Thus, as Sabot (1999 p344) states, “those who 
could best understand are given least, and those who can understand least are given 
most!” Nonetheless, it should be recognised that no individual is likely to consistently 
retain insider status, nor hold on to the notion of being a complete outsider (Cochrane, 
1998), instead this status will fluctuate according to a range of circumstances and 
positionalities.
A look at gender continues this theme. Herod (1993) argues that gender of the 
researcher and researched can have an immediate bearing on results; for instance, 
Schoenberger (1991 p217) believes that her position as a woman made her appear less 
threatening to the elites she was dealing with, “or presumed to be a better audience for 
the recounting of exploits”. However, she also states that “on the other hand ... my male 
colleague probably does not have to deal with paternalism, flirting or skepticism about 
his ability to grasp technical subjects”. Some researchers have also suggested that when 
women are interviewing women, a shared empathy makes the procedure both pleasant 
and easy. However, McDowell is keen to disabuse the researcher of this notion, having 
found in her own work that many of the women interviewed were extremely forceful 
and had neither the time nor inclination to share sisterly values. Others have argued that, 
while gender matters are important, they are perhaps secondary to other positional
factors (Sabot, 1999; Mullings, 1999; Oinas, 1999).
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Within my own work, when I have been in the situation -  as a young(ish) male 
researcher -  of interviewing older women, I have often found them to be more frank 
about their opinions and also occasionally adopting a matemalistic attitude, with offers 
of assistance and guidance. Age is also a factor here. Welch et a l (2002) believe that 
this can be an ambiguous matter, with different reactions from different respondents. 
For example, they cite cases where there is a large gap between the ages of the elite and 
the interviewer. In such circumstances some elites have exploited the age difference, by 
expressing impatience at having to deal with ‘irrelevant’ issues, while in other cases 
elites adopt a maternal or paternal attitude, as I have experienced myself.
It is worth briefly mentioning feedback as a particular way in which researching elites 
may differ from other subject groups. While many texts suggest caution when sending 
reports to non-elites, as there is the potential to cause alienation, Thomas (1993) argues 
that follow-up work with elite informants can be particularly useful, as they may be 
willing to engage directly with verifying findings. It may be necessary, however, to 
present the findings in a different manner than traditional academic styles, with perhaps 
some censorship of details (Welch et al. 2002). I have presented provisional findings to 
groups of respondents -  and people ‘outside’ the study -  on three occasions, which 
provided very useful feedback, had informal discussions with various participants on a 
number of occasions and used the second round of interviews to verify some of my 
initial thoughts arising from the first set of interviews.
Interviewing Strategies and Reflections
The goal in interviewing should be collaborative dialogue that engages the respondent
in working through the research problem. In this way the respondent contributes to
shaping the context without controlling it. Having acknowledged the various problems
that are associated with elite interviewing, I will now outline some of the ‘strategies’
taken in carrying out the research to overcome these challenges. Schoenberger (1991)
identifies the key to a productive interview as strong preparation and this is perhaps the
most fundamental interview strategy. I ensured that I was well informed about the
organisation prior to the interview, the idea being that I would be able to engage fully in
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discussion with the interviewee, but also so that the respondent will be reassured to 
know that I had at least some understanding of the issues under discussion and would 
also appear able to assess the validity and accuracy of the information being offered.
There are a number of other, fairly basic, strategies that can be adopted. For instance 
Richards (1996 p202) suggests altering dress to appear respectable, but unthreatening:
As a male interviewing a top civil servant, I wore corduroys, a white shirt, tie and a black 
blazer, and carried a battered old briefcase with me. If I had turned up in a pin-striped suit 
and a filofax under one arm, it may not have created the right impression!
My wardrobe is relatively low on pin-striped suits, and my desk bereft of filofaxes, so 
the latter option was never really available to me. Nonetheless, I did feel that dressing in 
a particular way tended not only to create an image to other people, but also to make me 
feel more, or less, at ease in carrying out the interview. Usually this meant smart 
trousers and an open-necked shirt: somewhere between the corporate attire of regional 
governing organisations and the slovenly day-to-day wear of a PhD candidate.
A further set of strategies relate to representation (Shaffir, 1991). Research involves 
playing games to gain and maintain access, and even if we retain separateness there is 
still the possibility of betraying the trust of the researched. As such, elite interviews, as 
with all qualitative work, raise the question of how much to reveal about the purpose of 
the research, one’s values and beliefs as well as how to present oneself to the 
interviewee. McDowell (1998) claims that it is often best to maintain as much honesty 
as possible about research aims. Covert observation may sometimes be appropriate, but 
there is a danger of collecting sensitive information that interviewees may not otherwise 
have wished to reveal.
In dealing with interviewees I tried to be open about my research aims and to openly
discuss any thoughts or initial findings I had. This seemed as much a practical way to
approach the research as an ethical issue: openly discussing my research seemed a
useful way of eliciting opinions from respondents. This tended to work well and in fact
led to some of the more interesting discussions that I had with respondents. This kind of
approach is, however, perhaps best suited to research where -  like mine -  the issues
under examination are not particularly contentious and all concerned are to some extent
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removed from the subject matter: interviews did not generally include detailed 
questioning of individuals’ personal lives, for example, and the subject matter was not 
of immediate ‘life or death’ concern for interviewees. This also perhaps says something 
in advance of the analysis in later chapters about the level of profile and scrutiny 
attached to carbon management policy in the regions at the time of the research.
Experiencing interviewees
Each person I interviewed approached me with different aims and different reservations 
about the research. It was not always spoken, but these fears and ambitions underlay the 
discussions that we had. In carrying out the interviews, I seemed to come across four 
general categories of respondent: ‘pragmatists’, ‘collaborators’, ‘agenda-pushers’ and 
‘defensive strategists’. Each of these presented different sorts of challenges to myself as 
the researcher, but also played important roles -  beyond the direct ‘data’ that they 
provided -  in the research process.
The Pragmatist
The first of these ‘archetypes’ I have labelled ‘the pragmatist’. Respondents within this 
category would often describe themselves initially as someone “who likes to get things 
done”, and often point to a scientific or engineering background as a grounding element 
of their approach to policy: “I come from an engineering background. We identify the 
problem and we find the solution” (Former Policy Director, Y&H).
These respondents were not confined to any particular type of organisation, but tended 
to present themselves as an outsider to the policy ‘world’: interlopers who expressed 
frustration at “the stuffy, dithering, meeting after meeting way of doing things” (Policy 
Manager, North East). In actual fact, these people represented a perhaps a third of the 
interviewees, across various levels of responsibility within organisations, so were not 
really as ‘outside’ the policy process as they intimated.
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A key challenge with respondents identified as pragmatists was to convince them of the 
validity of my research -  in some cases just to gain access -  in order to gain their trust 
and elicit in-depth responses to my questions. On several occasions I was asked 
questions by Pragmatists similar to the following: “but, what exactly is the point of your 
research? What we need is something that will help us pinpoint specific actions on 
specific issues” (Policy Executive, Y&H). In several cases this included challenging 
several of the basic premises behind the research. While this presented a challenge, it 
also prompted several periods of reflection on the relevance of my research to the 
people it aimed to study and helped me think more carefully about the research 
questions and indeed the intended outcomes.
The Collaborator
A second group of respondents were ‘collaborators’. These respondents approached the 
research with some enthusiasm, and would often suggest conducting the interview in a 
more informal setting: “let’s meet for coffee, somewhere away from the office so we 
can have a proper chat”. “ Again, this group of people were not confined to one type of 
organisation, although more respondents from ‘SEEPs’ did exhibit the traits of this 
category.
Collaborators were, on the surface, open with their opinions and were keen to question 
‘mainstream’ views on particular issues. In particular, they were keen to assist in 
research in other ways where possible; for instance: “You should definitely speak to 
xxxxxx; he’ll be able to tell you just what you need” (Local Authority Officer, South 
West). This made collaborators an important source beyond their ability to contribute 
directly to research findings. On the other hand, the danger in interviewing this type of 
person is that the researcher may be taken ‘off guard’, and may become unduly 
influenced by the collaborator’s points of view. In many ways, the collaborator works 
much more effectively as a manipulator: they can seduce you down different avenues;
52 On one occasion, a collaborator drank several bottles o f  strong B elgian lager in the time it took to 
conduct our interview, which potentially opens a number o f  questions about ethics and the validity o f  
findings! Just to set any concerns aside 1 also interviewed the respondent again on another occasion  -  
where alcohol was not imbibed -  when 1 was able to check that the interview ee was happy with previous 
com m ents they made.
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and induce with promises of access to data, events, and people. I hope that I managed to 
avoid this in presenting my findings, but this does draw out another issue in terms of 
selecting quotations. Collaborators, in being open in their discussions, often provided 
‘good copy’ in that statements that they made would give a genuine opinion backed up 
by wider context: ideal for quoting within the findings. It therefore becomes important 
to reflect on whether analysis is being swayed by the availability of well-phrased 
soundbites, something which there can be a -  conscious or otherwise -  temptation to do. 
Again, I have tried to avoid this as far as possible, except where such quotations are 
illustrative of a wider body of evidence.
The Agenda-pusher
‘Agenda-pushers’ made up the third category of respondents. I came across a number of 
these -  although perhaps fewer than I anticipated -  and they tended to either sit within 
areas of relatively high responsibility within governing organisations, local politicians, 
or representatives of external pressure groups. In some ways these interviews were the 
most interesting, as they elicited some of the more contentious statements and also a 
more stark glimpse at the “politics large P” (as many respondents referred to organised 
political machinations) within the policy process. These respondents were clear from 
the outset about their strong views on a particular set of issues, which would then be 
pushed forward throughout the interview. Interestingly -  to me, at least -  these 
respondents almost without fail adopted a maternal or paternal attitude towards me as 
the researcher in expressing kindly interest in the research -  and on two occasions my 
overall wellbeing -  and then attempting to ‘enlighten’ me as to the realities of policy 
making: “this is perhaps something you have yet to experience, but let me tell you ...” 
(Policy Director, Y&H).
These interviews were often interspersed with comments that set the respondent apart
from other actors and interest groups -  “what they don’t understand is ...” ; “of course,
they will tell you... [But they are lying]” -  and on countless occasions the phrase “off
the record...” being used before making a damning statement about people working for
other organisations (never an admission of personal failings), despite knowing full well
that what they were about to say would unavoidably influence my research. These
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interviews were particularly interesting in terms of analysing the way in which 
particular ‘facts’ were constructed and deployed during the interviews, but presented a 
number of difficult challenges. These respondents were, on the whole, the most ‘elite’ 
of the people I spoke to in the course of the research, and as such posed a number of the 
challenges discussed above. First, there was a clear understanding -  on their part -  that 
they were in control of the interview process. Interviews almost always took place 
within the respondents’ own office (as opposed to a separate meeting room), and I was 
often subject to a reasonably lengthy wait in the reception area beforehand. Interviews 
were then often repeatedly interrupted by telephone calls and requests from colleagues, 
which could disrupt the flow of discussions. More challenging was the ability of 
agenda-pushers to manipulate conversation and simply deliver a monologue on a 
particular issue for ten or fifteen minutes at a time without allowing space for 
questioning, clarification or steering the conversation in different directions. I’m not 
sure that I was always successful in overcoming this obstacle, although on some 
occasions this led to collecting some interesting material that would not have been 
covered had I been able to shape the interview more directly.
The Defensive Strategist
I have labelled the final category of respondents ‘defensive strategists’. This group of 
respondents were most common amongst -  but not exclusive to -  people working for 
RDAs and were by far the most difficult group of people to engage with. These 
respondents posed problems for the research both in terms of access and in conducting 
interviews. The two most common characteristics of this group of respondents were fear 
and distrust: ‘what is it you want from me? What are you aiming to do with what I tell 
you? What’s that you’re writing down? Can I see your list of questions?’ There were, 
perhaps, legitimate reasons for these concerns. I was there ostensibly to ‘get to the 
bottom of things’ in relation to work that they may have been closely involved in and 
had a sense of ownership over. On a small number of occasions potential respondents 
simply refused to take part in the research, while some others agreed to meet but then 
failed to respond to requests to arrange a specific time or date to carry out the interview. 
On each of these occasions the people in question had first requested a detailed
breakdown of my research aims and questions.
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When defensive strategists did agree to meet, they were very cautious in their responses 
to my questions, and seemed careful to stick to the official ‘party line’ on most issues. 
This provided some difficulties in attempting to elicit more thought out responses, or 
discussion of ideas or challenges beyond issues that directly related to the respondents’ 
job. The phrase “above my pay grade” was used on a number of occasions, even by 
quite senior members of organisations. In order to get round some of these issues, I did 
find myself -  not entirely consciously at first -  drawing on my previous employment 
within a regional governing organisation to present myself as more of an ‘insider’: this 
included mentioning previous work and people that I had worked with, as well as some 
of the problems I had faced in my previous role, in order to create some level of trust 
between the respondent and myself. This strategy appeared to work reasonably well 
with people in Yorkshire and the Humber, which is where I had previously worked, but 
less so in the other two regions. In the South West, I was more able to draw on the role 
of ‘ignorant outsider’, whilst also effectively ‘swapping’ information about Yorkshire 
and the Humber and the North East in return for a more open discussion on the South 
West.
Other Ethical Considerations
It is important to briefly note a few of the more ‘standard’ ethical considerations that 
were taken before embarking on the research process. The research proposal had to be 
approved by the research ethics committee at Sheffield Hallam University, which 
included agreement that the research would not raise significant ethical problems, and 
met ethical requirements of the University’s research ethics policy.
In advance of carrying out interviews, respondents were contacted in writing to make 
sure that they were happy for their interview to be recorded and for materials to be used 
in my thesis and any later publications. This included agreement that all names and 
specific job titles would be anonymised. Specific organisations have been referred to 
where necessary to provide context to statements, but this has been avoided where 
possible. Respondents were given the opportunity to view interview transcripts,
although in practice only a very small number took up this offer.
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Analysing the data
Analysis of data began from the start of data collection. Documentary evidence was 
essentially analysed from the moment an initial scan of the text was made as decisions 
were made about the relevance and significance of material. Interview material took a 
slightly more drawn-out process. Before a more formal analytical process was carried 
out, interviews had been analysed a number of times: responses were analysed during 
interviews -  this is necessary in order to shape further questioning -  then from notes 
immediately after interviews to consider any particularly noticeable points or themes, 
then again during transcription.
Coding and Separating
Once interviews had been transcribed they were read through as a whole and further 
comments noted. A further level of analysis came through the use of NVivo qualitative 
data software. This involved thematic coding of data -  including documentary and 
interview materials -  across a number of themes that had been identified in the previous 
readings, plus new themes that were identified through the process of re-reading the 
texts. This was a useful process in testing out the initial theories and themes I had 
developed from reading through the text by quite simply seeing how much data there 
was to support the different arguments. This led to some reorganisation of my thoughts 
and changing some of the focal points of the research.
A final form of coding was carried out in terms of identifying the types of data being 
presented across the different themes. This was essentially a heuristic exercise to work 
through processes of legitimisation on the one hand, and the more prosaic ‘non-strategic’ 
politics of governing on the other. Fairclough (2005 p7) talks of the “partly discursive” 
nature of texts, which leads potentially to separating texts into ‘discourse’ and ‘events’ 
or ‘facts’. I have taken a slightly different route, which recognises that all facts as 
essentially constructed, in the sense that all facts have to be ‘legitimised’ before they are 
accepted as such -  as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 -  so instead separated information 
into ‘opinions’ and ‘programmes or anti-programmes’, as outlined by Bruno Latour 
(1999; 2005).
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Programmes and anti-programmes were particularly important in the analysis of 
discursive attempts to legitimise particular governing rationalities and technologies. For 
Latour, programmes and anti-programmes (or, in older texts, ‘modalities’) concern the 
way in which ‘stories’ are built that take us away from, or bury, the original claims or 
evidence: “the claim is decoupled from the scientist; i.e. the claim gets to look more and 
more like a fact” (Valkenburg, Achterhuif and Nijhof, 2003 p466). For instance, in 
Pandora's Hope (1999 p93), Latour approaches the acceptance of the possibilities for 
energy from nuclear fission, moving from through the following points:
(1) “Joliot [the pioneering French scientist] claims that each neuron liberates 3 to 4 neutrons, 
but that’s impossible; he has no proof...
(2) “The Joliot team seems to have proved that every neutron liberates three neutrons, that’s 
very interesting”
(3) “Numerous experiments have proven that each neutron liberates between 2 and 3 
neutrons”
(4) [As a general statement of fact] “Each neutron liberates 2.5 neutrons”
Frederic Joliot, the scientist, engaged with both human and nonhuman elements to 
create acceptance for his initial theory. This was modified along the way as it came into 
contact with ‘anti-programmes’, that is, actors and actants that worked against his initial 
hypothesis. Building such programmes is inherent in all attempts to build a consensus 
view.
In this research, documentary evidence and interviews were analysed for attempts to 
build ‘programmes’ and ‘anti-programmes’ surrounding imaginations of the region as a 
carbon space, and the attempted legitimisation of regional organisations as actors to 
govern this space. This is explored in most depth in Chapter 9 and 10, but elements of 
this are seen in Chapter 12, as extra-regional governing practices worked to shift the 
terms of the discursive programmes that actors had previously attempted to build.
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Writing as an anaiyticai process
A final point to make relates to the role of writing as an important part of the analytical 
process. I found that attempting to draw together the empirical research and matching it 
to elements of the theoretical framework at different points within the research process 
was the best way for me to effectively deal with the research material and think properly 
about how to present empirical findings. Working papers were written at various stages 
of the research, developing thoughts on themes and analysis, which included 
presentation at conferences and papers prepared for publication (see, for example, 
Eadson, 2008). These papers also proved a useful way of eliciting feedback from people 
not directly involved in the research -  for instance, peers, conference delegates and 
referees -  which proved invaluable in working towards the final analysis in chapters 8- 
12 .
Final Reflections
This chapter outlined the process of carrying out the research, with particular attention 
given to generating primary data. Although there is a clear temptation to engage in a 
post-hoc rationalisation of decisions made in the research process -  and this project was 
certainly not an entirely linear process -  in reality the development of a methodological 
framework, choosing methods and carrying out the research proved to be relatively 
straightforward: for example, I did not experience any major access problems or 
encounter any serious ethical dilemmas. This is perhaps reflective of the relatively 
‘mainstream’ methodological approach taken to the research, and the research subjects, 
but these choices were not made purely for convenience. They were in part made for 
pragmatic reasons, with regard to time and resources, but also in part through necessity 
-  as was the case in not experimenting with ethnographic approaches -  and in part 
because the methodology and methods chosen just seemed to be the most appropriate 
approaches to take. I have justified these choices over this and the preceding chapter.
The next chapter moves on from the process of ‘setting up’ the study and turns to
analysis of the evidence gathered through the different techniques discussed above. This
first empirical chapter focuses on regional organisations’ attempts at governing carbon
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management up to 2007. This overview uses the broad power modalities framework 
adapted in Chapter 5, in order to set a baseline context for the ensuing analysis in 
Chapters 9 onwards.
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8 Governing carbon in the English regions
The following four chapters are concerned with empirically exploring the ways in which regional governing actors were involved in governing carbon management. 
This first chapter gives a broad overview of the different sets of power modalities being 
employed by regional actors around 2007. I then move on in Chapters 9-12 to discuss 
more specific spatial practices, aimed at re-imagining, re-calculating and re-connecting 
the region as a carbon space through associative and instrumental ‘meta-technologies’.
Despite recent political and academic attention, climate change is still very much an 
emerging policy domain. This was reflected in both the form and extent of power 
exercised by regional organisations. Over the research period, carbon management 
moved from a marginal issue tied in with sustainable development discourses to 
becoming -  rhetorically, at least -  an issue discussed across all policy realms; and one 
that was potentially supplanting sustainable development as the ‘cross-cutting’ policy 
theme. This was not simply a sectoral issue; each scale or level of governing was 
awakening to the task ahead. Significantly, there was some awareness of a need to re- 
imagine governed territories as carbon spaces. At the same time, however, there 
remained a high degree of uncertainty as to the means through which the spatial 
governing of carbon should be achieved.
What makes it a particularly interesting topic of investigation is precisely this 
uncertainty about who should be doing what in terms of governing action on climate 
change. This draws out questions about carbon management as a ‘wicked issue’ in itself, 
but also around the extent to which dealing with carbon emissions challenges the 
interests of dominant networks and discourses. This uncertainty was no more 
pronounced than at the regional level, where governing organisations were in the midst 
of a period of institutional -  and existential -  flux between 2005 and 2009.
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This chapter will first provide an overview of governing carbon management at the 
regional level in 2007. This includes an initial comparative overview of quantitative 
trends in carbon emissions in the three regions, which is followed by a broad overview 
of the different types of power being exercised in the governing process and the types of 
institutional interactions that took place within this. The following chapter (Chapter 9) 
will then continue to look at ‘first wave’ actions in the regions, utilising the more 
broadly conceived framework of multi-level power modalities. First wave actions were 
not strictly chronological, in that they took place at different times across the regions: 
more accurately they reflect a certain set of technologies, power modalities and 
institutional relations that were utilised as regional actors took early steps in developing 
an understanding of the region as a carbon space. Nonetheless, these actions broadly sit 
within a wider pre-2007 framework when considering the rationales behind 
technologies and when set within the context of national government action. Chapter 11 
discusses the issues raised in the analysis of first wave actions within the framework of 
spatial and governing legitimacies outlined in Chapter 2. Chapter 12 will then move on 
to explore a second wave of developments in spatialising carbon emissions, with the 
introduction of more formalised roles for some regional actors, greater levels of spatial 
monitoring -  including spatial targets -  and a concurrent splintering of regionalist 
activity on carbon management.
In exploring these processes, a number of issues come to light. The initial overview 
notes that up to 2007 activity was confined to a small number of high profile ‘enabling’ 
schemes through provision of funding and limited authoritative action, alongside more 
prosaic activities such as provision of knowledge or evidence and facilitation of good 
practice sharing. Further themes emerge in exploring the more ideologically ambitious 
approaches to re-imagining and re-calculating the region as a ‘carbon space’. Most 
evident in first wave actions were questions surrounding governing and spatial 
legitimacy of regional actors, which were in part both a cause of and caused by a lack of 
co-ordination of climate change action at the regional level. In the second wave of 
activities some co-ordination took place, with a shift in the role of regional 
organisations with regard to governing carbon management as they became more 
strongly bound to centralised instrumental programmes. As a result the region took on 
an increased role as a mediating force between local and national government; either
through direct negotiations on Local Area Agreements, or through various enabling and
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facilitating measures to aid local actors to meet national requirements. At the same time, 
however, a degree of splintering and fragmentation of regional carbon management 
activities around specific themes and interests took place as regional actors envisaged 
the ‘carbon region’ through a range of different lenses.
Carbon Emissions in the Regions
Using Defra statistics on carbon emissions -  these are the only emissions figures 
available for all of the regions -  it is possible to make a rough comparison of Yorkshire 
and Humber’s progress against the other English NUTS 1 output areas. The first set of 
available figures are from 2003, with the most up to date being 2008. Admittedly this 
short time period does not allow for a comparison of recent changes against historic 
trends. To compound this, owing to changes in methodology only the figures for 2005 
to 2008 are directly comparable (see Table 11, below). Although this section is 
concerned with action up to 2007 it is worth including 2008, partly owing to the small 
data set, and partly to highlight trends in emissions across the time period considered for 
this analysis as a whole.
Table 11: Per capita CO2 emissions (tonnes) 2005-2008
Region 2005 2006 2007 2008 Change
London 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.0 -0.2
East of England 8.2 8.1 7.9 7.6 -0.6
South East 8.2 8.1 7.9 7.6 -0.6
West Midlands 8.3 8.3 8.2 7.9 -0.4
South West 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.8 -0.5
North West 00 00 8.6 8.5 8.3 -0.5
East Midlands 9.4 9.2 8.9 8.6 -0.8
Yorkshire and the Humber 10.3 10.2 10.0 9.6 -0.7
North East 12.9 12.6 12.4 12.2 -0.7
Mean 9.0 0000 8.7 8.4 -0.6
Source: National Statistics (2010)
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To place these figures in some perspective, it would be useful to first compare them to 
other NUTS 1 level emissions across the EU. Unfortunately such data is not available as 
yet. However, brief comparison to the per capita carbon emissions of other EU States’ 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reporting -  
with the caveat that the methodologies are not directly comparable -  gives some 
indication of where individual regions are placed within a wider context. For example, 
Yorkshire and Humber’s emissions level of 10.2 tonnes per capita in 2006 was broadly 
comparable to that of the Slovenia (10.3) and the total for the EU (10.4). At 12.6 tonnes 
per capita in 2006, the North East’s emissions were broadly comparable to the 
Netherlands (12.7) and the South West to Portugal (7.9) or Hungary (7.8, all figures 
from European Environment Agency, 2009).
Across this period, aggregated UK local authority emissions fell by 6.4%, although 
almost half of this reduction -  3.0% -  came in 2008 when the UK recession was 
beginning to take hold, thus generating a ‘default’ fall in energy usage (DECC, 2010). 
Each of the regions experienced a reduction in per capita emissions over four years, 
with East Midlands, Yorkshire and the Humber and the North East experiencing the 
highest reductions. The West Midlands and London achieved the lowest level of 
reductions. As with England as a whole, the majority of emissions reductions in 
Yorkshire and the Humber took place in 2008. This reflected a marked reduction in 
industrial and commercial emissions, most likely linked to a fall in GVA for the region 
for that period. The South West and North East took a steadier path in terms of 
emissions reductions. Nonetheless, none of the regions experienced a relative change in 
carbon emissions that was sufficient to dramatically alter their position compared to 
other regions and -  London withstanding -  there was not a great deal of variation in 
reductions over the four years.
Another way to look at this is through indexing regional per capita emissions to the 
national average (Table 12, overleaf). Here, data for 2004 is included as the 
methodological changes make less difference to comparative data than to raw data.
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Table 12: Indexed per capita C02 emissions by region, 2004-2008
Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
London 143 69.2 71.2 70.5 71.4
East of England 92.1 91.6 91.6 91.3 90.5
South East 91 91.6 91.6 91.3 90.5
West Midlands 93.1 92.7 93.8 94.7 94.0
South West 95.2 92.7 92.7 92.4 92.9
North West 95.2 98.3 97.2 98.2 98.8
East Midlands 107.8 105.0 104.0 102.8 102.4
Yorkshire and the Humber 114.1 115.0 115.3 115.5 114.3
North East 137.1 144.0 142.5 143.3 145.2
England (mean) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Nb. Regional figures measured against the mean for England (London included so that figures 
can be seen to add up).
Sources: AEA Environment (2005) and National Statistics (2010)
In Table 12, above, a very slight increase in Yorkshire and the Humber’s emissions 
relative to the rest of England can be seen across the five years, but on the whole, 
relative performance barely altered. The South West’s performance has remained more 
or less static for the four directly comparable years, and the North East marginally 
improved in 2006 before rising again between 2006 and 2008.
Of course, this is a very crude analysis. It does not allow for structural pressures that 
different regions might face at different rates: for instance, a change in fuel usage for a 
particular industry, or different levels of economic growth more generally. It does 
suggest at the outset, however, that the three study regions, and Yorkshire and the 
Humber more specifically have not achieved emissions reductions that go beyond 
national trends or cannot be at least in part accounted for by changes in economic output 
levels. This is important to note as the analysis turns to the general types of policies 
introduced by the three regions: as is shown in the overview below, there are some 
general themes of governing that spread across Yorkshire and the Humber, North East 
and South West.
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Modes of Governing Carbon Management in the Regions
Prior to embarking on analysis of spatial ‘meta-technologies’ in the following chapters, 
it is helpful to set the scene with a brief overview of the various ‘lower level’ 
technologies employed by regional organisations at the point of embarking on the 
research in 2007. As outlined in Chapter 5, Bob Jessop (2003), in his writings on 
governance failure , suggests that individuals and organisations aim to mitigate for the 
inevitable failure of each governing strategy by employing a range of different 
approaches: in effect, they attempt to spread risk. This was the case with regional 
organisations’ strategies for governing carbon; on the surface, at least. In practice, the 
strategies employed were heavily skewed towards those that represent a lower political 
risk and require less organisational upheaval. In particular, they tended to shy away 
from utilising their statutory resources to exercise authority over others, and instead 
tended towards more associative enabling and co-optive strategies. On the whole, 
regional action on climate change was largely piecemeal, uncoordinated and lacking a 
guiding approach to action. It was also inconsistently applied, even where statutory 
resources were in place. Table 13 gives an overview of the types of activities 
undertaken by statutory regional organisations as of 2007.
Table 13: modes of governing carbon management in the regions in 2007
Mode of governing RDA Regional Assembly Government Office
Constraining Funding
restrictions
Planning guidance 
Scrutiny of RDA
Scrutiny of RDA and 
RA
Co-opting Funding allocation 
Regional Strategies
Regional Strategies 
Regional Networks
Enabling Funding allocation Knowledge/evidence
provision
Facilitation of networks
Knowledge/evidence
provision
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Constraining
Uncovering ways in which regional institutions governed by constraining is not 
particularly straightforward. Nonetheless, regional organisations did in theory possess 
some statutory resources that could be used to bring about carbon action through 
authoritative means.
In 2007, Regional Assemblies were responsible for regional planning guidance through 
the RSS, which provided some loose authority over local authorities and other delivery 
agencies, depending on the consistency in which they were applied. As stated by the
Regional Yorkshire and Humber Assembly (2008a):
The Assembly is being asked to comment on those developments that would be of “major 
importance” or would “impinge on” the implementation of the Regional Spatial Strategy 
(RSS) or a ‘relevant regional policy’ ... The Assembly is also expected to respond to
requests for pre-application discussions for any such developments.
By way of example the draft RSS for the South West (2007) proposed using planning 
controls to concentrate growth in cities and towns, while ‘Policy G ’ includes the 
following requirements:
...That all new and refurbished buildings achieve the requirements of BREEAM and Eco- 
homes, very good standard, or at least Level 3 above minimum building standards in the 
emerging ‘Code for Sustainable Homes’ ...
...That all larger scale developments and, in particular, urban extensions, are designed and 
constructed to meet the top Level 5 of the emerging ‘Code for Sustainable Homes’, 
including carbon neutrality.
p45
Under the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act (2004), Regional Assemblies were
required to provide an opinion on the “general conformity” of local Development
Planning Documents (DPDs). Of the three study regions, this was most prevalent in
Yorkshire and the Humber. DPD revisions there included submissions from
Scarborough and Craven, where greater detail on renewable energy was requested, and
Doncaster, where the whole approach to sustainability was brought into question. On
the whole though, these interventions were limited, and minor. Regional Assemblies
also held a statutory role to scrutinise the work of RDAs; this can include scrutiny of
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RDAs’ performance on climate change, as was later the case in Yorkshire and the 
Humber, when an inquiry on Meeting the Climate Change Challenge was held. 
Stemming from this, a report was published in 2008 (YHA, 2008b) detailing a range of 
recommendations for Yorkshire Forward’s activity on climate change.
Governing through constraint at the regional level tended to take more ambiguous forms 
than through direct control or intervention. For instance, conditions placed on funding 
can turn what is in an enabling action in one policy domain into a constraining action in 
terms of carbon management. Nonetheless, RDAs had limited control over the 
constraints that they placed on funding, particularly through ERDF, which is largely 
determined through EU and national programme guidelines. Internally, RDAs could use 
sustainability or environmental appraisal of projects, which included some analysis of 
carbon impacts. This was not regularly taken up by RDAs: in Yorkshire and the 
Humber, for example, only one of 88 approved projects underwent a sustainability 
appraisal in 2007 (this rose to eight in 2008). Even with their own Single Pot funding 
RDAs sometimes found it difficult to attach additional carbon reduction-related 
conditions:
The barriers to you doing it are partly political, because RDAs are still under pressure to be 
business-level organisations, and if you get a bunch of businesses saying that ‘look, they’re 
just being too tough on this stuff, there is a risk about whether you’re perceived to not be 
having a business-run agenda. And then ... as you know in Yorkshire we used to be eight out 
of nine regions for economic performance, and so it’s not in a strong base position ... So 
there’s a background of ‘if we’re too stringent, might we lose some investment that we might 
have gained, that might go elsewhere instead’. So some of that holds it back.
Yorkshire Forward Executive
Here, the limits to the integration of carbon management into dominant economic 
rationales are clearly outlined, with pressure from both national and local actors to 
ensure that the economy comes first. At the same time, it is clear that -  in terms of 
constraining actions, at least -  carbon management as a distinct policy paradigm was 
not being fully taken on by regional actors: it had not become a sufficiently legitimate 
policy theme for concerted authoritative action to take place.
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Enabling
Contrastingly, governing through enabling was perceived as the most prevalent mode of 
governing found at the regional level, and respondents emphasised this as the primary 
role for regional institutions:
It’s facilitative; providing a policy framework role. And ... you might be able to invest in 
some of the enabling things, like Yorkshire Forward, the Regional Development Agency 
here is investing a significant sum in research to understand the potential for carbon capture 
and storage.
Former regional policy director, Y&H
This is not necessarily because enabling measures were seen as the best strategies for 
achieving objectives. A key issue related to the resources available to regional actors; 
and to the extent to which they performed a particular function with regard to other 
scales of governing. In other words, there was an understanding that regional action was 
limited by the existence of a form of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972), which was tacitly 
agreed rather than necessarily based on formal agreement.
It comes down to what is relevant and what is possible through regional activity ... [the 
received wisdom is] essentially regional activity should be invisible; its purpose should be to 
enable, facilitate and lobby to help other organisations deliver rather than interfere.
Regional policy officer, SW
This may have been the case across a range of policy sectors and not confined to carbon 
management.
Direct monetary provision for carbon management was on a much smaller scale than, 
for instance, economic development. Instead, dissemination of knowledge and the 
development of partnerships to share and develop carbon reduction strategies were the 
most evident technologies in use. That is not to say that monetary provision was entirely 
absent, although the amounts were relatively small. Through Single Pot and EU 
Structural Funds, as well as specific Research and Design grants, such as the national 
Grants for Research and Development and the EU Framework Programme 7, RDAs 
worked to develop climate-related agendas around which a case for economic 
development could be built. In particular, this has meant funding for a limited number
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of projects that developed new or embryonic technologies for renewable energy and 
emission sequestration. Figures for specific levels of funding for carbon reduction 
activities across programmes and projects were not available: none of the three RDAs in 
the study had published details of ‘environmental’ or low carbon investments and 
indeed this may be an agenda for future research in itself.
Funding for projects was available through various streams, although few of these were 
dedicated to carbon reduction initiatives. Some funding was available under the banner 
of the Defra BREW (Business Resource Efficiency and Waste) initiative through the 
RDAs -  amongst a host of other organizations, including the Carbon Trust and 
Environment Agency -  which came to an end in 2008. The RDAs received just below 
nine per cent of the £122 million funding in the last funding round (2007/8), and 
received no ring-fenced funding in addition to the £53 million that Defra contributed to 
the Single Pot in 2008/9. A number of predominantly renewable energy and 
microgeneration-related projects in the North East, South West and Yorkshire and the 
Humber received support through ERDF and Single Pot funding in between 2005 and 
2007. Each of the three regions had one ‘flagship’ low-carbon energy scheme. In the 
South West, the RDA designated approximately £10.75 million ERDF funding towards 
developing ‘Wave Hub’, the world’s first large-scale wave energy farm (SWRDA, 
2007). This project aimed to develop an offshore laboratory for testing and developing 
new wave-power electricity generators. This scheme threw up some issues relating to 
allocation of funding; and provided a first point for analysis of the ‘carbon politics of 
scale’. In interviews with local authority officers and councillors in the South West, 
there were suggestions from a number of respondents that RegenSW, the dedicated 
renewable energy funding arm of the South West RDA, had inconsistently applied 
funding rationales, meaning that relationships between Local Authorities and RDAs 
became frayed in places:
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It’s not good at the moment to be perfectly honest. I’ll give you an example: we’ve recently 
been approached by the South West UK Brussels office about our work on biofuels; they 
asked if we’d be interested in developing any other projects. We said yes -  we’re looking at 
further work with xxxxxx [university] on gasification technology from renewables, which 
we regard as a key issue -  and Brussels were keen. We got a load of other partners on board 
and Brussels advised us to go to the RDA who deal with Structural Funds ... But we drew a 
complete blank with the RDA, they weren’t interested. Said they’d only consider funding 
something if it was cross-regional. Yet it is funding the Wave Hub project, which is only 
beneficial to Cornwall.
County Council Officer, South West
The respondent was unable to provide a reason as to the reasoning applied to the 
decision not to fund their project, other than that the RDA wanted to go with “their own 
baby” {ibid.). In other words, as controller of funding streams, the RDA was able to 
ensure that its own project received backing ahead of those led by other organisations or 
networks. In this sense, the fluidities between different forms of power are highlighted: 
what for one interest group was an enabling technology, the lack of funding for another 
group made it an issue of constraint, with the RDA using their resources to close down 
options and exert domination. Similar concerns were raised in the North East, where the 
flagship project was the £30 million NaREC project (New and Renewable Energy 
Centre). In this instance, a local authority officer complained that NaREC was a “vanity 
project” for the RDA, when money could have been spent more effectively on large 
scale implementation of micro-generation facilities, retrofitting buildings and energy 
efficiency drives. One reason that these decisions were made may lie in the political risk 
involved. That is, while technological fixes in terms of developing new forms of large 
scale production facilities do not have immediate or guaranteed successful outcomes, 
nor do they threaten the dominant mode of centralised power production or the interest 
groups that benefit from this arrangement; indeed they help to strengthen this 
dominance on the back of public funds. This issue does also highlight some of the 
constraints faced by RDAs in allocating funding -  something which the local authority 
officer in the North East did go on to concede -  and which was raised by a Yorkshire 
Forward executive:
At the end of the day, we’re about economic growth, and we’re about a business-led agenda. 
It’s not a question of wishing it were different; that’s our statutory role. So, when we think 
about funding particular low-carbon projects... we have to be careful that it still meets our... 
our overall raison d ’etre.
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In sum then, direct provision was limited at the regional level: regional institutions were 
not charged with delivering particular services, and where funding was provided it was 
apparently reserved for high-profile projects that offered a chance for ‘regional 
branding’.
A less direct form of provision was that of providing carbon management knowledge 
and evidence to stakeholders and policy-makers. Here, the work of RDAs became less 
prominent, with greater involvement from regional assemblies and regional intelligence 
observatories and networks, which were funded by RDAs in each of the case study 
regions. In each of the regions, the regional assemblies commissioned studies to provide 
information to local authorities relating to carbon management. Between 2006 and 
spring 2009 -  when it ceased to exist -  the North East Assembly (NEA) produced four 
reports, including a ‘microrenewables toolkit’ to assist local authorities to meet the ten 
per cent ‘Merton rule’ (NaREC and CPEnergy, 2006) within the North East’s RSS and 
wind farm development and landscape studies (Arup, 2008; 2009) for four areas of the 
region.53 The Yorkshire and Humber Assembly (YHA) produced fewer studies, but did 
commission a study of low-carbon transport actions for the region (SEI and JMP 
Consultants, 2008). The South West Regional Assembly (SWRA), on the other hand, 
was not responsible for commissioning any research reports: this fits in with a wider 
sense that “the [South West] Assembly are kind of involved tokenistically, but they’re 
not a proactive assembly” (Sustainable Development Commission Regional Advisor). 
The regional intelligence observatories and networks also played a role in the provision 
of knowledge and evidence. Their role, as outlined by a policy manager in Yorkshire 
and the Humber was as follows:
It’s very much about collating work that other people have done, making sense of it, and 
maybe communicating it better ... I think what we can do is integrate issues more than 
anyone else really, because we’re very well placed to work across economic, environmental 
and social issues, er... On the climate change one, then probably our role is spotting gaps in 
information, helping to inform thinking and communicating issues and raising them.
And, while the South West and North East observatories hosted a range of data on 
climate change mitigation issues, Yorkshire Futures were more proactive in that they
53 This rule com m its comm ercial buildings with a size o f  more than 1,000 square metres to source at least
10 per cent o f  their energy from onsite renewable sources. This was introduced in the London Borough o f  
Merton in 2003 , and was included as a national policy  in Planning P olicy  Statement I (P P S1, Planning  
and Clim ate Change). PPS Planning and Clim ate Change is discussed in Chapter 12.
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commissioned their own research reports: a study of the region’s low carbon energy 
capacity (Arup, 2007a), and a carbon assessment of the ERDF 2007-2013 programme 
(Arup, 2007b). As with monetary provision, though, direct provision of knowledge and 
evidence tended to be piecemeal and sporadic.
More commonly, the three statutory regional organisations acted as ‘facilitators’ of 
activity. This worked in two similar ways. One method was to provide links to other 
people and organisations that could assist with emissions reductions. For example, 
Yorkshire Forward had an online “funding for going greener” tool, a matrix that 
allowed businesses to see what funding may be available from other organisations. Key 
-  all non-statutory -  partnerships in the regions included those concerned with 
sustainable development, climate change, energy and transport plus a range of more 
specific partnerships developed around sub-themes of the above. Knowledge was 
disseminated either through reports commissioned and published by regional bodies -  
most commonly Regional Assemblies -  or through regional bodies hosting workshops 
on climate change issues facing the region; again, this was usually undertaken by 
Regional Assemblies. The latter sometimes included briefing sessions on research 
developments from outside the region and also on central government policy. Despite 
disseminating information regarding governmental development ostensibly being the 
natural ground for regional Government Offices, their move to a more ‘strategic’ role 
within the regions following the 2006 Review o f Government Offices (HM Treasury and 
ODPM, 2006), meant they were generally involved in a supporting role to the Regional 
Assembly or RDA as opposed to facilitating enabling action themselves.
Co-option
As with direct means of authority and provision, co-option through direct forms of
induction was also limited. For instance, funding with strings attached might be used to
induct actors into a particular course of action, but was not used to great effect in early
governing of carbon management. Regional actors did, however, work to build regional
‘coalitions’ on carbon management action, which were characterised by more subtle co-
optive approaches: the main focus of the analysis of First Wave carbon management
practices in Chapters 9 and 10 concerns attempts to co-opt local, regional and supra-
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regional actors through seduction and forms of moral induction, alongside some 
facilitative practices. Of particular interest were attempts through the use of regional 
partnerships, knowledge dissemination, and the development of climate change action 
plans, to develop a ‘climate change regionalism’ amongst stakeholders. This was most 
clearly the case in Yorkshire and the Humber, but elements of this could be seen in the 
North East and South West. This involved enlisting stakeholders to the collective cause 
of tackling climate change, but also developing a sense of climate change as specifically 
a regional problem. The Yorkshire and Humber CCAP (2005) encapsulated this in 
threading a narrative throughout the Plan that develops an argument whereby Yorkshire 
and the Humber is portrayed as a unique place in itself -  including its climate -  with the 
regional governing institutions depicted as autonomous and competent bodies capable 
of driving action in the region. Reference to aspirational GHG targets for the region 
plays a role in developing this ‘programme’ (Latour, 1999), as will be discussed in 
Chapter 10.
Conclusion
Up to 2007, emissions across the regions followed a very clear trend of ‘no significant 
change’; if anything, those that were performing better in terms of emissions were 
diverging further from ‘lagging’ regions such as Yorkshire and the Humber and the 
North East. This reflected a lack of policy emphasis across scales of governing, 
including at the regional level; but also shows that efforts by individual regions to 
reverse these trends were not taking effect. Yet, this reflects a lack of resources at the 
regional level to effect large-scale change, but also a lack of willingness to use those 
resources where available. Attempts to mainstream carbon management as a ‘cross- 
cutting’ theme through, for example, conditions on funding arrangements appeared to 
be limited, and generally ineffective in terms of reducing emissions. Similarly, 
governing carbon management as a distinct policy goal suffered from a lack of direction 
from the EU and central government. More generally, it may be argued that this led to 
regional actors failing to take account of inevitable governing failure, by not exercising 
a range of different forms of power to achieve their goals, perhaps through pragmatism 
with regard to which areas they were able to act upon and also have an effect.
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This initial analysis also begins to hint at some of the recurring themes that will come 
through more strongly in the following chapters. Firstly, in theoretical terms it is clear 
that a typology of power does not prevent a great deal of fluidity between governing 
modes; in fact it serves to highlight these, especially in Chapter 12, where a move 
towards more multi-scalar governing processes served to highlight shifts in modes as 
they are translated across space. Second, in the absence of co-ordinated EU, national or 
internal programmes, regional agencies shied away from using direct provision, 
financial induction or authoritative actions to effect change. Thus we instead see in the 
first wave of regional action a preponderance of non-monetary techniques of facilitation 
and seduction to engage regional stakeholders. Some of these co-optive practices have 
attempted an ideologically -  if not actively -  ambitious programme to re-imagine the 
region as a ‘carbon space’ through developing a form of ‘carbon regionalism’: this will 
be the subject of the following chapter, where some of the wider legitimacy concerns 
with regional governing organisations are explored.
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9 First wave spatial practices: co-optive calculation
The previous section noted an absence of resources (broadly defined) to allow the 
exertion of more instrumental practices, and inconsistent use of those that were 
available. In the case of authoritative power, for example, regional actors were wont to 
claim that they had access to a paucity of resources; but where they were available, say 
through statutory planning responsibilities, there was an absence of internal will to use 
them. Nor were RDAs seen to be diverting large sums of money towards developing 
low carbon economies, with the exception of provision for a small number of flagship 
energy projects, which it may be argued did not challenge the status quo in terms of the 
energy supply. Instead, regions tended towards employing a range of associative 
practices using softer co-optive and facilitative governing techniques. Nevertheless, to 
each of these techniques there was a ‘harder’ side. Where seduction was used, it was in 
conjunction with moral inductive discourses and where facilitation was used, this came 
with an exclusionary side, too.
For the majority of respondents, regional action was largely concerned with “setting the 
agenda” (regional policy executive, Y&H), or more simply “providing a leadership 
message” (regional policy manager, SW). Most prominently, this included the 
development of regional climate change partnerships and associated climate change 
action plans. This chapter looks at the development of the Yorkshire and Humber 
Climate Change Action Plan -  Your Climate (2005) -  as an example of ‘first wave’ 
initiative on governing regional carbon management. Of the case study regions, 
Yorkshire and Humber had the longest standing partnership, and published the second 
iteration of its action plan in 2009, while both the South West and North East published 
the first iteration of their own action plans in 2008 (SWRA, 2008 and Sustaine, 2008). 
These partnerships, along with related activities and documents, represented the 
stirrings of ‘carbon regionalisms’ in the different regions: by which is meant a 
discursive and practice-based programme to foster a sense of regional initiative and 
identity relating to carbon management. These have played out in quite different ways
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across the three regions. Throughout the research process there was a strong sense of a 
continuing regionalist agenda within the Yorkshire and Humber Climate Change 
Partnership. The North East and South West, on the other hand, were later in developing 
their partnership and action plan. A combination of changes to the national regional 
agenda post-Sub-National Review (SNR; 2007) and internal historical context led to a 
more muted and pragmatic outlook to regionalist agendas in these two regions.
The idea of a carbon regionalism can be viewed as relatively straightforward attempts to 
engage different actors in activity on carbon management through associative means. It 
may also, however, be seen as an attempt to re-imagine the region as a legitimate space 
for governing carbon; and the perceived legitimacy of the region may be integral to the 
success of any regional carbon management programmes that do not rely on direct 
intervention through authority or provision. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
regionalism might be conceptualised through two sets of interlinked legitimisation 
discourses: spatial and governing legitimacy. Spatial legitimacy relates to acceptance of 
the region as a territory, a networked space, a cohesive place, and a functional scale of 
action. Governing legitimacy refers to acceptance of regional agencies as autonomous, 
competent, progressive and representative organisations.
Before delving into the development of action plans, however, this chapter will take a 
look at the development of a regional emissions target in Yorkshire and the Humber. 
Prior to the development of a regional partnership and action plan, Yorkshire and the 
Humber introduced an aspirational regional emissions target in the 2003 RES. This 
represented an initial attempt at ‘re-calculating’ the region as a carbon space, and 
presents a number of interesting avenues of discussion in itself, as well as providing 
evidence of wider spatial and governing issues evident elsewhere.
As stated, these initial regionalist developments are denoted here as first wave practices,
as they appear to represent the first coordinated attempts by regions to develop semi-
cohesive strategies for climate change. The development of second wave practices -
discussed in Chapter 12 -  took place as first wave practices were still emerging in some
regions, but these developments represent a move in a different direction for the role of
the regions in governing climate change and bring forth a host of different issues.
Focusing on the way that these technologies ‘translate’ through and across governing
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networks draws attention to the processes of mediation that take place in the governing 
process; the extent to which carbon regionalisms have been successful as ‘meta­
technologies’; and, where they have not been successful, hints at some of the possible 
reasons why.
Re-calculating the region: co-option through a regional target
In the 2003 Yorkshire and the Humber RES, ‘the region’ committed to “Cut greenhouse 
gases by over a fifth” by 2010 (Tier 1 Target, Objective 6). The North East and South 
West did not set specific targets during the research period, although they did both 
include commitments to meeting, or helping to meet, national emissions targets in their 
respective RSSs (2008, and -  draft -  2006). Table 14 shows the regional target in 
Yorkshire and the Humber as a governing technology within the modes of governing 
framework.
Table 14: Regional target as governmental technology
Technology Rationality Mode(s) GoverningAgencies
Institutional
Relations
Regional Encourage action on Co-option RDA, RA, GOR Heterarchy /
Target GHG emissions (moral induction Network
reduction and manipulation)
Rationality: the region as a legitimate carbon space
To begin with the programme rationality, the core rationale of the target was to effect 
action on carbon emissions by governed entities. This was largely to be achieved 
through co-option to a shared regional agenda amongst stakeholders. As such, the aim 
was for the regional target to act as a meta-technology and encourage behavioural 
change by drawing regional actors and organisations together to achieve a shared goal: 
to build a regional ‘heterarchy’ (Jessop, 1998) acting on carbon management and 
encouraging others to act in doing so.
184
This co-optive agenda worked in two directions. Most prominently, it aimed to make 
carbon management a legitimate and important policy goal for actors within the region. 
But this move towards calculating and monitoring regional emissions also makes a 
number of implicit statements, especially through the setting of a specific emissions 
reduction target. First, it connotes the region as a calculable space. This suggests that 
the region can be understood as a coherent assemblage of actors, the activities of which 
can be comprehensively monitored and measured. Second, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
targets and spatial emissions monitoring also work as a way of rendering a space more 
readily understandable within the prevailing mode of political logic; being both 
amenable to easy judgement of success or failure and as a clear signal of an actor’s 
ambition. Such was the case in Yorkshire and Humber: the emissions target was seen as 
a key method of signalling the statutory regional agencies’ intent and ability to act on 
carbon emissions. This was spelled out by one respondent:
I guess what targets can do is give the tone and intent of whether they want to go further, 
faster than national government or not. And certainly when I was at the RDA, that was what 
we were about: we were about saying, look the Government is on the verge of committing to, 
and while I was there did commit to 60% reductions by 2050, but even before that we had a 
go, well for this region ... we’re going to go for this target.
Former Regional Policy Director, Y&H
In this way, the target was also used to signal an autonomous and progressive regional 
governing coalition.
Spatial legitimacies were also assumed: the idea of a calculable region drew on a notion 
of Yorkshire and the Humber as a cohesive ‘place’ with shared priorities; as the same 
respondent explained, it was seen as part of a wider project of bringing together the 
region’s stakeholders to work on key issues as “Team Yorkshire” (Former Regional 
Policy Director, Y & H). This was to be achieved not only through ‘horizontal’ 
acceptance of the target as a rationale for action in regional-level agencies, but through 
‘vertical’ translation across scales to local actors within the region. As noted in Chapter 
8, respondents -  including those involved in the original target-setting process -  were 
keen to downplay the role that regional actors can play in reducing emissions. If this 
was the case, it therefore became crucially important that the target had vertical
185
influence in affecting the actions of local authorities. This was outlined by a regional 
policy executive:
With the target, the idea was to not just be Team Yorkshire at the top, at the regional level, 
but to filter through stakeholders, and especially local authorities, who after all have most of 
the on-the-ground powers. It was about setting a message for them to act as well.
Regional Policy Executive, Y & H
A final part of the logic behind the target was to successfully brand the region externally; 
that is, to develop an external image of Yorkshire and the Humber as a changing region 
at the forefront of addressing new political challenges and a good investment 
opportunity for those entering new markets based on low-carbon technology. A former 
regional policy director -  a key protagonist in setting the initial target -  noted this:
And, of course there was a thing about Yorkshire and Humber, industrial wasteland, coal, 
steel, mills and ports and a big thing that we want to promote is that yes that’s part of the 
heritage and it’s still there -  but as value added industries -  but that we are moving on as a 
region, we are ahead of the game on the environment, and we’re actually aspiring to 
something different.
Former Regional Policy Director, Y&H
This builds on the same kinds of issues of spatial and governing legitimacy, but is 
aimed at developing an outwards-facing regionalism. The statement also stands in 
contrast to the comment made by a respondent in the previous chapter regarding the 
‘pragmatic’ role of regional actors.
Connecting the carbon region: technological translations
In terms of measuring the success of the target, of greatest importance was translation 
from an abstract calculation to an impact on the governed entity at the ‘end’ of the 
governing chain: a reduction in carbon emissions, and in turn, stabilisation of the 
Earth’s climate. This required that the calculation of the region as a carbon space by a 
small number of actors then had the effect of connecting a range of other actors to act 
on the same rationality. In the case of the Yorkshire and Humber regional target the
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governing technology underwent various mutations en route as it was mediated by 
various actors at different points in space and time, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Translation routes
Specific actions
<
Rationality >  Discursive rationale
Target >• No translation Same target (co-option)
Technology Organisation-specific target (authority)
Different target (co-option)
These different translations may hint at the ‘strength’ of the target -  and of its 
implementation -  as a governing technology. While significant mutations could, in 
theory, also lead to positive consequences, such as hardening of the target into more 
tangible and specific technologies, the greater and more profound the divergence from 
the original target the less impact it may be said to have had, and at the same time, the 
less impact it is likely to have. In Yorkshire and the Humber, the regional target 
underwent four key forms of translation. In some situations, the technology remained 
the same in essence, but underwent a degree of change to some of its attributes: a 
change in the measurement methodology, for example. A second set of mutations across 
organisations and space was characterised by translation to a more targeted form that 
was specific to the organisation or space being governed. A third form of translation 
took place whereby the target did not translate into another target, but instead acted as a 
rationality for other forms of action. Finally, in some cases the target failed to translate 
at all as actors simply failed to recognise the target as a technology or rationale for 
action. These are discussed below in three sections: material translations, that is the 
effect on carbon emissions and in turn the climate; ‘horizontal’ translations, translations 
through the regional governing network; and ‘vertical’ translations, those that take place 
in moving from regional networks to governing networks operating within different 
scalar formations.
187
Material Translations
Measuring the success of a governing technology is not simply a case of measuring a 
simple outcome indicator but, since the primary aim of a quantitative target is ostensibly 
to achieve a quantitative outcome, some exploration of quantitative progress on the 
target is worthwhile. Within a year of the first iteration of the target it became clear that 
meeting it was becoming unlikely. Successive versions of the region’s annual progress 
report, Progress in the Region (PiR), included warnings regarding the likelihood of 
failing to meet the target every year from 2004 onwards, with increasing urgency over 
the years, from being seen as “very difficult to achieve” given planned regional and 
national interventions (PiR, 2004 p98) to there being a “strong likelihood that the region 
will fail to meet its targets” (PiR, 2007 p i25). According to DECC (previously Defra) 
statistics, C02e emissions in Yorkshire and the Humber fell by three per cent between 
2005 and 2007 (National Statistics, 2010). A 2007 report by Arup, commissioned by the 
Regional Assembly, used different production and consumption based methodologies to 
measure emissions. This showed a rise in carbon emissions since 2003 when measured 
either way, which they expected to continue for the foreseeable future.
This quantitative failure does not provide conclusive proof that the target entirely failed 
to impact on action within the region. It could, for example, merely show that the target 
was designed to fail, in that it was too ambitious to be realistically achieved. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, however, Yorkshire and the Humber had a fairly 
similar record in terms of progress on emissions compared to other regions, as measured 
by DECC. This leads to a basic understanding that the existence of a regional target did 
not directly result in emissions in Yorkshire and Humber changing at any greater speed 
than other regions. More fundamentally, it may bring about questions regarding the 
intrinsic feasibility of a regional emissions target.
All the same, this basic analysis does not take into account the specific role of the
regional target in bringing about behavioural change within the region beyond any other
measures put in place: its ‘added value’ as a governing technology. It is worth, then,
exploring the issue in some greater depth to determine the extent to which the target has
become successfully embedded as a rationale for action within the region. In doing so, it
is useful to look at two other forms of translation across space: ‘network’ -  across actors
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operating ‘regionally’ -  and ‘scalar’ translations; between regional and local or national 
governing actors.
Network Translations
In most instances the target did not translate at all across the core statutory governing 
network as measured through incorporation into corporate documents or regional 
strategies, and in other instances it was mentioned only in passing, rather than acting as 
a guiding rationale for action.54 Three instances where the target did succeed to some 
extent in translating to core organisations are worth noting, however.
First, the 2003 RES was initially led by Yorkshire Forward, giving an implicit 
understanding that they signed up to the regional target, while the Regional Assembly 
and Government Office Yorkshire and Humber (GOYH) were also signatories to the 
strategy. Following on from this, the target also translated across to different high-level 
regional strategies, although with varying degrees of mutation. For example, the 2003 
RES target was to reduce GHG emissions by at least 20 per cent by 2010, which was 
then firmed up in the 2004 RSS; this refers to the “the region’s target” (p76) specifically 
as a 20 per cent emission reduction by 2010 and 25 per cent by 2015. The 2006-15 RES 
(2005) also includes the target, but with another change from its original expression, 
moving from a production-based approach to a consumption-based methodology. More 
recently, the 2008 PiR uses both production and consumption related data to gauge 
regional progress on emissions, as do Arup, Stockholm Environment Institute and 
Cambridge Econometrics (2007) in reviewing the impact of the region’s core regional 
strategies on climate change.
Second, the regional target translated to an internal target for Yorkshire Forward. This 
aimed for a reduction in CCbe emissions by between 1.5 and 2.5 million tonnes per year 
for the years 2003 to 2006 (Yorkshire Forward Corporate Plan, 2003b).55 This target
34 This was the case, for instance, in the 2003-2005  R egional Sustainable D evelopm ent Fram ework, the 
2008  Integrated Regional Framework and the secondary level strategies for housing and w aste.
33This was based on a calculation o f  the em issions resulting from Yorkshire Forward projects i f  no carbon  
saving elem ents were im plem ented. A s such it is arguably a false indicator o f  actual carbon savings, as it 
allow s for a net increase in em issions per project, but a direct result o f  the regional target nonetheless.
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was not met in any of the three years of monitoring and as a result the target from 2006 
onwards was reduced to 0.5 million tonnes per year. In the 2006 Corporate Plan refresh, 
failure to ‘mainstream’ this and the regional target into RDA activities was noted as a 
particular issue: “this requires some serious work” (Yorkshire Forward Corporate Plan 
2006-2010, 2006). One outcome of this recognised failure was the introduction of a 
‘carbon calculator’ tool for use on Yorkshire Forward projects. This introduced another 
level of translation, as the target became a technology in the more commonly 
understood sense of the word; a piece of software that brought the target ‘to ground’.
By 2007, respondents did feel that the targets were beginning to have an impact. The 
role of the regional target as a co-optive technology was acknowledged by interviewees, 
for instance as “something we can all see” across the organisation; a “reminder of the 
need to act” (Regional Policy Manager, 2007) on emissions. In other words, the regional 
target acted as a meta-technology in building awareness of climate change as a ‘regional 
issue’, and set the strategic tone for action. Similarly, the adoption of emissions targets 
helped in the gradual removal of a ‘silo’ mentality surrounding climate change, and 
environmental issues more widely:
Probably, if you’d asked me two, three years ago, I’d’ve had to have said, that some 
departments would see the environment and climate change as just the job of the 
environment directorate, and wouldn’t really impact on what they are doing, and they’d be a 
bit sniffy if it did. But -  and I think this is where the targets have played a big part -  it’s now 
being recognised as part of what we all do, and it’s less of a problem getting people to 
understand that, you know, we are about economic growth, but we are about understanding 
environmental limits too.
Regional Policy Manager, Y & H
Maintaining a quantitative carbon target for actions in regional organisations was 
limited to those examples outlined above.
A third ‘immediate’ effect can be seen in the adoption of the target as a rationale for a 
series of specific actions. In this vein, the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Energy 
Infrastructure Strategy (REIS; YHA, 2007) takes the regional target as a core rationale 
for action, with a number of specific actions outlined to achieve this, including 
quantified potential contributions to the target. It is not surprising that the energy 
strategy should be more directly concerned with carbon emissions than other strategies,
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but the fact that other strategies do not have a dedicated section focusing on specific 
actions related to the target shows a failure to embed it as an active -  as opposed to 
rhetorical -  rationality.56 On this issue, Your Climate (2005) would appear the obvious 
vehicle for translating the target into action, but while the Action Plan includes 
reference to the target, it is not detailed as a key rationale for action and further analysis 
reveals that it only played a small part of the developing the Plan (see Chapter 10 for a 
more detailed discussion). The lack of reference to the regional target in regional 
strategies suggests it remained in the margins as a basis for regional action.
Nor did the target have the effect of drawing in other regional organisations or non- 
statutory agencies into climate action as part of ‘Team Yorkshire’. One respondent from 
the charity sector saw regional targets as crucially important to action, but felt that the 
existing target was not being properly embedded into regional action and that, at the 
same time, it was not the role of other regional stakeholders to deliver on this target:
Our job is to make sure that they are meeting their responsibilities, not the other way round. 
Team Yorkshire and all that, yeah that’s fine, but not if it’s about passing the buck to others.
Regional Environmental Campaigner, Yorkshire and the Humber
Similar views came from other non-statutory regional actors. In particular, the feeling 
was that, although setting a regional target was a positive step, which placed regional 
agencies -  especially Yorkshire Forward -  ‘ahead of the game’ in comparison to action 
in other regions, this also led to a degree of arrogance in their attitude towards other 
stakeholders, whilst materially little had changed.
Really they haven’t been brilliant at saying to us, you know, ‘help us out here’. I think 
Yorkshire Forward is keen to maintain an image that it’s established for itself as doing more 
about climate change mitigation than lots of other organisations, including some of the 
environmental ones. Which means that it starts to develop this attitude of ‘leave it to us guys, 
we know what we’re doing’, that sort of thing.
Regional Environment Stakeholder, Yorkshire and the Humber
As a result, an overall impression is formed of the target not being integrated into a 
strong regional approach on carbon management. The failure to develop a regional-level
56 Although this in itself signals the extent to which carbon managem ent as an issue more w idely  has 
m oved from a peripheral issue o f  energy demand to one which is understood as also fundam entally  
concerning energy supply.
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network of action on the target has been partially acknowledged by regional agencies: 
for instance the Yorkshire Forward Corporate Plan (2006, p34) notes the need to 
“secure significant interventions with the major regional generators and many other 
regional partners”.
This also highlights the fact that, although the REIS attempted to implement 
quantifiable projects, these interventions had been difficult to achieve. The role of 
energy companies in terms of this target was to some extent negated by changes to the 
target methodology57 (see below), but other key actors remained -  on the whole -  
distanced from the regional target. Perhaps equally importantly -  in terms of the 
legitimacy of the target -  carbon reduction actions that were being carried out were not 
being discursively linked to the target in planning or execution.
Scalar Translations
The development of the regional target was not only concerned with setting a rationale 
for action within the wider regional governing cabal. In order for it to be legitimately 
considered a success it was necessary that the target became part of a scalar practice 
between local and regional governing actors. There was little evidence of this happening. 
The regional target had not been replicated at the local level up to 2007 and where 
targets were later implemented these stemmed from other governing programmes and 
technologies (see Chapter 12). A review of local authority core planning, community, 
sustainable development, environment and climate change strategy documents in 
Yorkshire and Humber found only one citation of the regional target. This is 
strengthened through responses from local authority officers and executives: no 
respondents at local authority level mentioned the target as a catalyst for action when 
asked about external -  or specifically regional -  influences on their approach to carbon 
management and, when asked about the impact of a regional emissions target on local 
decision-making, were often not even aware of its existence: “I can’t say that I was
57 Although the introduction o f  renewable energy targets meant that reconfiguring the energy supply  
remained important for the regional energy partnership.
58 Calderdale Borough C ouncil’s draft core developm ent plan (2008) sets the context for their clim ate 
change plan by referring to the regional target as set out in the R SS. It docs not go as far as suggesting  
that Calderdale has a responsibility to help meet that target, however.
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really aware of it ... They’ve not involved us in it in any way at all” (Local Authority 
Sustainability Officer, Y&H).
Importantly, when regional actors did interact with local authority and LSP actors on 
climate issues, the regional target was not mentioned:
On our big projects, on the ones that have the supposed ‘regional impact’ we have to deal 
with the regional planners. And to be fair, they can and have occasionally pulled us up on the 
need for more renewables or the BREEAM stuff. But the target, no, that’s never been 
mentioned. They’ve certainly never said, you know, we need to meet this target, what’s this 
contributing?
Local Authority Planner, Y&H
Others -  generally those who were also involved in intra-regional networks -  were 
aware of the target, and believed it to be important in signalling a willingness to act on 
climate change regionally, but admitted that it had little impact on decision-making 
locally:
Yes, I think some people here are aware of it. There’s a difference between knowing about it 
and actually incorporating it into our systems, though. It’s not used as a barometer of our 
success by any means. Nobody, either in our team, other officers, or -  I very much doubt -  
[smiles] members [of the Council] discusses our contribution to the target, or where [the 
local authority area] fits in with the target. That might be a bit to do with the fact that we 
aren’t set up to do that but really it’s because what the region says on climate change isn’t 
really on the Council’s agenda.
Local Authority Climate Change Officer. Y&H
This quite clearly suggests a failure on the part of regional institutions to embed the 
target as rationality in local governing systems, but also suggests that this is not only a 
result of a lack of effort by regional actors: local authorities do not necessarily see 
regional actors as relevant and, where they do, some felt that they would be unable to 
constructively engage in a regional target without additional resources to calculate and 
monitor their own emissions. In other words, the region failed as a ‘scalar’ practice: by 
failing to link in other ‘local’ or ‘regional’ actors, the regional organisations remained 
distinctly localised actors themselves in this context. Similarly, as shown in the 
discussion of the RCCAP, below, and later in Chapter 12 on Local Area Agreements, 
local authorities referred to a different set of institutions and processes in their policy­
making on climate change.
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Translation across borders
Another measurement of the regional target’s success is through its influence outside its 
borders: for example, across other regions -  that is, as a part of a network of similar 
territories across the UK and internationally -  as well as its influence on national or 
supra-national governing bodies, and influence in spatially branding the region. As of 
2007, a regional emissions target had not been taken up by any of the other seven 
administrative regions in the UK, suggesting the target has not had a direct impact on 
other regions’ approaches to climate change policy.59 Policy professionals in the North 
East and South West were ambivalent towards adopting a regional target themselves, 
but did note that Yorkshire and the Humber had shown ambition in taking up theirs. 
This was tinged with cynicism for some, however:
They’ve got this target, and certain individuals are keen to play that up and it gives them a 
good rep as leading on climate change and in some sense you could say they did get in there 
before some regions in setting out their stall on climate change but are they actually leading 
the field? They can give the impression they are, for sure, but... What we’re doing in the 
South West; you could say we’ve got a much longer history on sustainability and the 
environment and it’s more embedded into our way of working if you like.
Regional Policy Manager, South West
What these responses do suggest, however, is that the target has had the effect of 
‘seducing’ actors outside the region into viewing Yorkshire and the Humber as a lead 
actor on climate change, regardless of material evidence. This may be said to have 
spread to the national scale; for example the National Audit Office’s Independent 
Performance Assessment o f Yorkshire Forward -  commissioned by what was then 
BERR -  referred to the target as an example of evidence of commitment to 
environmental action (National Audit Office, 2007). This compares to the reports 
prepared for ONE North East (2006a) and SWRDA (2006b), in which both agencies 
were charged with a lack of metrics to measure sustainability. Similarly, a respondent 
representing a central government department quickly identified Yorkshire and the 
Humber as a “not lagging” region; pointing to the target as evidence of their “ambition”. 
The same respondent also noted Yorkshire and the Humber -  alongside the North West
59 London has a proposal to meet a 20 per cent carbon reduction target in the G L A ’s 2004  Energy  
Strategy, but had a different administrative remit, and more resources available to it. It is a lso  a more 
obviously cohesive space as a functional city(-region) and so cannot be compared in the sam e 
geographical or governing sense to other English regions.
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-  as being responsible for “more interesting” approaches to the environment and climate 
change. And yet, as noted in the previous chapter, actual evidence of climate change 
action did not greatly differ across the three regions up to 2007.
At the same time, none of Yorkshire and the Humber’s statutory agencies were 
officially recognised as the leading regional exponent of governing carbon; the North 
West RDA was the lead agency for the Department of Energy and Climate Change’s 
(DECC) regional network, while Government Office South West was the lead 
organisation in the Government Office Network for Climate Change, suggesting that the 
region was not entirely successful in branding itself as a leading exponent of carbon 
management.
Barriers to regionalism, or anti-programmes
All things considered, Yorkshire and the Humber’s regional target did not successfully 
embed itself as a rationale for action at a regional level outwith Yorkshire Forward, and 
not comprehensively within it. Nor did it effectively work as a governing strategy 
across different scales and territories of governing. At the same time, it is important to 
bear in mind that this was a first attempt at calculating the region as a carbon space, in 
the UK at least. While its impact was not as great as may have been hoped -  and one 
can easily become cynical about the intentions behind the target -  the very fact that it 
was put in place at all represents a degree of foresight on the part of the actors involved.
Missing actions
Most importantly, the translations outlined above show that the target was never tied in
to a specific delivery framework, or indeed any form of strategy aimed at delivering
emissions reductions. Yorkshire Forward’s internal target and calculation tool was the
closest that any of the signatories to the 2003 RES came to developing a delivery
strategy. On the whole this meant that it stayed ‘free-floating’ from policy and had no
clear route towards making a difference ‘on the ground’. As shown in quotations below
relating to ‘missing actors’, the target was developed without regional actors having a
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firm grasp on what would need to be done in order to meet the target, what the region 
could realistically achieve, or what they would be prepared to do. The regional action 
plan provided an ideal opportunity to create a delivery plan for the target, but this was 
not taken on board. This is explored in further detail in Chapter 10.
The target was essentially a co-optive technology, aimed at seducing and potentially 
manipulating actors to reduce their emissions as part of a shared regional movement on 
climate change. It relied on the perceived legitimacy of the signatory organisations as 
representative governing entities and internal will from the signatory organisations to 
implement emissions reduction strategies within their own operations. A number of 
further factors militated against the target translating across actors and becoming 
legitimised rationale for action.
Missing actors, or no overall control
First, there was a case of ‘missing actors’ involved with the target: no person appeared 
to have specific responsibility for monitoring and aiding delivery on the target(s). There 
was no co-ordinator for target-related action across the region, and nobody to whom 
specific enquiries could be addressed. More widely, there was no clear ‘ownership’ of 
the target by regional organisations. For instance, although production of the RES was 
led by Yorkshire Forward and many of its proposed actions were carried out by the 
RDA, it claimed not to ‘own’ the regional target: “It is the region’s target, and as a 
stakeholder in the region we sign up to it, but it is not ‘our’ [gesticulates parentheses] 
target” (Regional Policy Manager, Y&H). This was contrary to the belief of most other 
‘stakeholders’, as amply demonstrated in the interview excerpts used in the above 
section on the target’s success. This includes apparent confusion by the Regional 
Assembly’s Scrutiny Panel (YHA, 2008b), who attempted to clear up the issue. They 
began by noting that:
Yorkshire Forward was the first RDA to commit to a greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
target in their RES ... Yorkshire Forward is applauded for being the leading RDA on 
voluntarily setting an output target of this nature.
p23
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But they then continue to m ake the fo llow in g  explanation:
The Scrutiny Board has however, identified some confusion over which organisation ‘owns’ 
the RES target, and individuals and organisations have mistakenly believed that it is owned 
by Yorkshire Forward. The Scrutiny Board is clear that the RES target is a regional target 
which any organisation can contribute to.
p23, emphasis added
Clearly, it was the aim of Yorkshire Forward to include other organisations in helping to 
achieve the target, but without any clear leadership the likelihood of it becoming 
embedded as a rationale for action was diminished.
The issue of leadership also links in with another concern, that of a sense that statutory 
regional actors engaged in a degree of distancing from the target. Policy makers felt that 
they must pay lip-service to the target, but did not necessarily believe it to be a useful 
indicator: the main rationale given for the target was that it was already there and that 
removing it would be difficult.
Researcher: Is it important that the region has a spatial emissions target?
Regional Policy Executive, Y&H: Well, we have one, so I suppose... And it would give a 
bad message to back down on it now... It does give off a message to the public that it’s 
important to us.
Asked more directly on whether there was an internal wish that the target had not been 
initially set, another respondent replied with the following:
Well... I suppose there may be an element of that. It’s, like I say it was agreed at a time 
when I don’t think we really knew what we needed to do ... we’re still learning as we go 
along really. I don’t think we knew what action was required really, when we initially set the 
target.
Regional Policy Executive, Y&H
This lends weight to the notion of an arbitrarily determined target that regional actors 
were only just beginning to understand the implications of: thus an air of being bound to 
something that they felt may not be achievable, or perhaps appropriate.
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Target Construction and Methodology
The way in which the target itself was constructed shows a second set of weaknesses of 
the target as a technology. It should at the outset be reiterated that it was apparent that 
the initial setting of the target had not been very thoroughly thought through -  “it was a 
stab in the dark” (Regional Stakeholder, Y&H) -  and it looks unlikely that the target 
will be met. Reaching such a conclusion is not such an entirely straightforward task, 
however, owing to a number of factors. One respondent offered their view of the 
principles behind setting a target:
The balance has got to be, you’ve got to produce something simple and tangible and targets 
are ideal: Yorkshire and Humber produces x million tonnes of C02 per year, and by 2020 we 
want to reduce to y million, then that’s easy and you can very quickly grasp that. But on the 
other hand, whatever’s behind that has to be robust. So however you’ve got to that figure 
needs to be auditable so that if you can’t meet that, or you exceed it there is a rationale 
behind it.
Regional Policy Manager, Y&H
This statement quite conveniently points to a number of the key faults underpinning 
Yorkshire and the Humber’s target. A degree of ambiguity and inconsistency over the 
level of the target and data available to measure it -  as well as the methodology used -  
has the effect of creating a confusing picture, while the measurement of carbon 
emissions also brings about questions regarding understandings of the region as a 
governed space. As one regional policy manager noted: “we do have different targets in 
different documents, which effectively sends out the wrong message”. As a result, Arup, 
Stockholm Environment Institute and Cambridge Econometrics (2007) went as far as to 
claim that “[i]n the Yorkshire and Humber region there is no definitive regional 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction target” (p3).
The difference between the production and consumption based methodologies used in
the different forms of the target had potentially important policy implications, in that
they focus more heavily on different sectors. For example, energy production is not
included in the consumption approach, so achieving emissions cuts may have required
promoting actions more towards individual consumers and businesses than by the
energy sector. In reality, though, this had little effect on policy making. It allowed
regional policy-makers to take a sector over which they felt they had little control out of
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the reckoning, but because of other commitments -  such as regional renewable energy 
targets -  the energy sector continues to play a large part in regional climate change 
policy.60
Notwithstanding the above, the shift in methodology should emphasise further the need 
for engagement with other stakeholders within the region, in particular local authorities, 
who had greater ‘on the ground’ resources and contact with individuals consumers and 
organisations. The target methodology also raises wider questions about regional 
understanding of the region as a space. The move to a more consumption-related 
approach removed some ‘supra-regional’ activities from the methodology, but did not 
make a distinction between ‘regional’ and ‘local’ activities. Nor was the target 
disaggregated to the sub- or city-regional level, where much of region-level activity was 
delivered. No spatial pattern of emissions was reported through regional monitoring at 
all. In this way the region was simply reduced to a series of regional ‘sectors’, with 
roles for local authorities remaining unclear.
The change in measurement methodology also added confusion over responsibility for 
the target, as shown here:
What I do know is, when you read the small print, it is basically only about Yorkshire 
Forward’s impact ... So there’s that side of it, and there’s confusion between consumption 
side targets and production side targets. So I don’t thing that there’s a particularly clear 
message coming out, as to what this all means.
Regional Stakeholder, Yorkshire and the Humber
Although it appears that the respondent had become confused between the regional 
target and Yorkshire Forward’s internal target, this respondent was not the only person 
to make similar claims, which points to the lack of clarity over the principles of the 
target and its communication to others.
A large part of the appeal of a quantitative target is that it simplifies an issue so that 
progress can easily be monitored. The degree of confusion over the target to some 
extent negated this advantage; even those regional stakeholders and local authority
60 Although it is im possible to com pletely avoid, energy policy is taken as som ething separate -  although  
linked -  to carbon management policy. I w ill d iscuss energy policy in the next chapter as having  
progressed differently from carbon management policy.
199
officers that were aware of the regional target were often not sure who it applied to, how 
it was measured, or even the level of emissions reductions aimed for. On the final issue 
in that list, nobody within regional agencies, never mind those outside, was able to point 
to a specific rationale behind the exact target chosen, nor to documents that explained 
them.61 In particular, there was a feeling that it was an arbitrary aspiration, linked 
vaguely to national targets, whilst not quite actually matching them.
Unless we can actually see how that’s planned out then the conclusion that we come to -  and 
you asked about the rationale of how it’s set -  is that it’s completely arbitrary. Which is 
generally how most targets are set [laughs]. And they wonder why... They set an arbitrary 
target and they’re not really implementing any policies to try an achieve it. Hmmm... 
[Laughs]
Regional Environment Stakeholder
Other actors cited the problems of measurement and monitoring discussed above as 
potentially creating problems with transparency and accountability as well as being an 
unproductive use of time:
There’s a danger it might confuse people and there’ll be a perception that people are being 
fooled and that people are using different targets at different times to say we’ve achieved or 
exceeded them when they haven’t. And to some extent people will always accuse, whether 
it’s the local council or the government, of doing that. Because they’re cynical, and perhaps 
rightly so.
Regional Climate Change Officer, Y&H
The point for some was not the size, or measurement of the target, however. It was not 
necessarily important what the target was, more that it conveyed a message of a need for 
action on carbon emissions. Spending time worrying about data may only serve to delay 
action, and use scarce resources that could more profitably be used elsewhere.
Whether the target for emissions reductions in Yorkshire in Humber is 40, 60, or 80%, it’s 
still a massive shift across the whole of the region ... Actually, the thing that regions need to 
respond to is, ‘oh my god it’s a large number, what can we do?’ ... let’s just accept it’s a big 
number [laughs] and start now working towards achieving a big number.
Former Regional Policy Director, Y&H
61 Various people within regional organisations thought that such docum ents did exist, but nobody was 
able to find these docum ents, including those identified by others as being responsible for them.
200
These initial concerns around data and the potential for a ‘politics of knowledge’ in 
target setting were not greatly significant in the case of the Yorkshire and Humber 
regional target: the lack of ownership and leadership, including the ‘missing actors’ 
outlined above are likely to have been a stronger determinant of the target’s success. 
However, the discussion of issues relating to the mechanics of setting a target begin to 
highlight how calculative programmes, if not well articulated or combined with a 
programme of practice, can easily result in the ‘black box’ remaining open indefinitely, 
which can lead to questioning of the very basis of the programme.
Governing from Above
The implementation of the target was not helped by a level of ambivalence from the UK 
government, including some attempt at authoritative intervention on the inclusion of 
targets in regional strategies, apparently on an ad hoc basis. In the Yorkshire and 
Humber draft RSS (YHA, 2006) reference was made to the regional and national GHG 
targets. These were subsequently removed from the text by the Secretary of State, with 
the following justification:
Draft PPS on Planning and Climate Change (Dec 2006) says that “aspirational targets relying 
on actions beyond the RSS’s ability to influence should normally be avoided as they are not 
helpful in measuring the operational performance of RSS”.
Secretary of State Suggested Changes, 2007 p7
In 2008, the finalised RSS included an aim to “help to meet the target set out in the RES 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the region in 2016 by 20-25% (compared to 1990 
levels)”: despite an initial attempt by central government to remove reference to targets 
eventually they were able to negotiate a phrasing that was deemed suitable. This does, 
however, show a reluctance of the Government to allow regions to push beyond their 
specific statutory powers, thereby constraining the ability of regional institutions in 
developing their own policy levers. As one respondent remarked:
It was a bit weird all that... on the one hand they wanted us to show a commitment to 
tackling climate change in the RSS, but they didn’t want to us to be so committed that we 
actually include our own regional target, which we already have anyway.
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Regional Policy Officer, Y&H
Furthermore, in contrast to Yorkshire and Humber’s experience, the submitted South 
West (2007) and North East (2008) RSSs both included reference to the region 
contributing to national targets set out in the draft Climate Change Bill, without the 
Secretary of State suggesting removal.
Discussion: does a regional target make sense?
This chapter outlined an example of early calculative practices within Yorkshire and the 
Humber to co-opt regional actors to a shared ‘regionalism’ based around carbon 
reductions. On the whole the regional emissions reduction target failed to draw in actors 
from outside of the core statutory organisations, although had some success in changing 
practices within the RDA, where it was linked to a more specific internal target and 
calculative tool. A number of issues worked against the technology as a programme to 
re-calculate the region, in the construction of the target itself, and the lack of leadership 
on delivering the target. A set of wider issues begin to come forth about the relationship 
between national, regional and local actors, which will be explored further in the 
following chapter and after that, an ensuing discussion ‘interlude’ (Chapter 11). It also 
raises a number of questions about the validity of a target for the region in itself, 
however.
The statement by a Regional Policy Executive in Yorkshire and the Humber that, “I 
don’t think we really knew what we needed to do” makes clear that the regional target 
was developed without regional actors being aware of exactly what actions would be 
required in order to meet the target. This issue also brings up the question of whether a 
target is a useful governing technology at all. Throughout the data collection process, 
respondents in Yorkshire and the Humber, as well as those in the North East and South 
West, expressed doubts about the value of a regional emissions target, ceteris paribus. 
These concerns largely emanated from the perceived lack of resources available to 
regional agencies to engender change -  “we just don’t have the leverage to make them 
do what we want” (regional policy maker, NE) -  but also relate to the region as an 
appropriate scale for action. The energy sector provides a useful illustration of this,
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particularly in Yorkshire and Humber. Energy production in the region accounted for a 
large proportion of production related emissions: 70 megatonnes of carbon per year, 
compared to total transport, domestic and industry emissions of 60 megatonnes (PiR, 
2008). The regional target in its original guise required significant reductions from 
regionally based energy producers, a sector over which it was also felt there was limited 
regional influence:
The question is what can regional governance do to influence national infrastructure and 
national power generation and fundamentally the answer comes back as very little actually. 
And that’s partly to do with the structure of the energy market, which is national rather than 
regional. It’s partly, I believe, to do with the infrastructure itself: a National Grid, as opposed 
to a series of regional grids.
Former Regional Policy Director, Y & H
This was acknowledged in an observed Regional Energy Forum meeting, where a 
representative from the energy sector questioned the rationale behind attempted regional 
energy interventions, and as a result, how energy suppliers were supposed to engage 
with a regional emissions target. Although the more recent iteration of the target avoids 
this by taking a consumption based approach, this gives an example of the problems 
faced by a tier of governing that did not become sufficiently ‘fixed’ so as to have 
become a point at which (economic, energy or other) assemblages are organised around 
them. One respondent made the following comment, which illustrates an underlying 
consensus on the utility of a regional target given current governing, and wider societal, 
arrangements: “You might argue, being cynical, that the others haven’t followed suit 
because they know that it’s a meaningless target” (Regional Environment Stakeholder, 
Y & H ) .
This issue was put to respondents in the North East and South West, who discussed 
their reasons for not adopting a target. Respondents in the North East were not against 
the idea of emissions targets in general, but there was resistance to an overarching 
spatial target:
There’s no point setting a regional target that is an overall reductions target... What does that 
mean? What are more important are targets in terms of transport, different sectors of industry, 
domestic, agriculture ... If it’s too generic, it’s not made use of. If it’s too detailed, but 
covers everything, it’s too much.
Regional Policy Manager, North East
203
There are number of points to make here. First, it suggests that essentially the region as 
a governed space is about inserting connective strands between national and local 
programmes, specific to different sectors, not as a ‘space’ in itself; a point of scalar 
relations, not a place. Again, a spatial emissions target for the region was seen as 
meaningless, the implicit reasoning being that a regional target did not bring -  the 
regional policy-maker’s favourite term -  ‘added value’. In other words, regional 
protagonists were suspicious of subtle co-optive technologies that were not linked to 
direct programmes of action. There is a sense that regional governing should not be 
based on ‘blue sky’ aspirations, which could only be met by engaging actors internal 
and -  crucially -  external to the regional tier in the process of societal restructuring 
(something that they felt unable to do). The South West RSS puts this quite bluntly:
While the region wishes to make its contribution to achieving the national targets for 
reducing emissions, it is clear that relatively high rates of growth of population and transport 
will make this very difficult. We have taken on board the Government’s targets to reduce 
C 02 emissions over the 20 years of this plan, but recognise that our efforts may well fall 
short as many of the factors which have an influence are beyond our control.
SW Draft RSS, 2007
Similarly, a policy manager in Yorkshire and the Humber made the following, more 
fundamental point:
So we’ve got a regional target. Great. But ... you have to ask, why have we got one, because 
if it’s there as a., as a figurehead, is it really the role of the regional bodies to be making 
political statements about what others should be doing?
Regional Policy Manager, Y&H
In other words, regional governing actors were seen as being there to provide pragmatic 
interventions, within a political framework set elsewhere: the region was not a 
sufficiently ‘legitimate’ actor to go beyond that position. In terms of where ‘elsewhere’ 
is, on the whole people working at the regional level tended to refer upwards to central 
government -  but not as far as the EU -  rather than to local interests. In discussing the 
merits of targets, one respondent did emphasise the difficulty of situating the region 
within supra-national, national, other regional and local policy frameworks. Again, this 
reflects a concern with the appropriateness of a regional target when set within a wider 
multi-level governing system:
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It’s a difficult time, because there is obviously targets in the proposed draft climate change 
bill, and there’s targets in the RSS and RES and I think they pretty much tie in together. But 
there’s also targets around renewables. And there’ll be targets in the Local Area Agreement, 
which will be bespoke per area. So I’m not sure whether or not targets are appropriate: I 
mean, the positive side is that it’s something tangible ... I suppose the danger is that you, not 
that you can’t meet the targets, but you get into a kind of confused area, where you think 
how do they all kind of all link together? ... It’s all gone a bit target crazy.
Regional Climate Change Manager, Y&H
As such, the logic behind a regional target is brought into question. This is not, however, 
necessarily owing to the region being any more fundamentally ill-suited to 
quantitatively monitoring and governing than any other governed space. It is more a 
question of the resources that were available to regional organisations; the willingness 
of key actors within these organisations to use their resources towards meeting climate 
goals; and potentially a wider lack of understanding of the ‘place’ of the region within 
different forms of political networks and imaginations.
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10 Co-optive action planning
A second group of first wave practices based around discourses of carbon regionalism were those relating to the development of regional climate change 
partnerships and action plans. By 2007, all of the English regions had some form of 
regional climate change partnership in operation. These arose largely from an initial 
Defra and the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) drive to promote climate 
change agendas, in particular climate change adaptation. This included some funding 
towards employing a climate change co-ordinator for the region. The regional 
partnerships in the three study regions had the role of providing a facilitative framework 
to bringing actors together within the region to act on climate change; and -  in the 
North East and Yorkshire and the Humber -  to produce a Regional Climate Change 
Action Plan (RCCAP). The South West provides a slightly different picture in that the 
partnership was adaptation focused, and the regional action plan was produced 
separately by an Assembly-based ‘Task and Finish’ group. Both the South West (2008) 
and North East (2008) were much later in producing their Action Plans than Yorkshire 
and the Humber (2005), and so the documents to some extent represent different 
political conditions, which will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter. The 
fact that the comparator regions were later in producing Action Plans highlights some 
underlying factors internal to the regions that played a part in their later, more muted 
regionalist approaches, so are worth some mention here.
The key differences between Yorkshire and the Humber and the other two study regions 
centre on engagement between actors within regional organisations, and between those 
actors and other organisations within the region. Comparatively strong links between 
the core regional organisations were borne out in a relatively cohesive group of regional 
actors working as the Regional Climate Change Executive Group (later Partnership) in 
Yorkshire and the Humber. This was also reflected in stronger regionalist sentiment in 
the region’s Climate Change Action Plan, Your Climate (2005). Regional actors in the
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North East and South West, by comparison, had less of a culture of engagement with 
one another. This, it would appear, was a key factor in determining a difference of 
approach between Yorkshire and the Humber and the other two regions.
Regional Climate Change Partnerships
As noted, each of the regions had a regional climate change partnership by 2007, 
although the role and make-up of these differed slightly from region to region. The 
Yorkshire and Humber Regional Climate Change Partnership (initially called the 
Regional Climate Change Executive Group) was formed in 2004 with the initial aim of 
producing a regional action plan. This group was formed by the Sustainable 
Development Board, which the Partnership ‘sat under’. Both of these groups were 
notionally independent from the three statutory regional organisations, although the 
Regional Assembly and GOR both provided some ‘secretariat’ resources and hosted a 
climate change co-ordinator to lead the Partnership’s work between 2004 and 2006.
In the North East the Partnership was more clearly linked to the Regional Assembly, 
with the climate change co-ordinator taking a lead role. This involved the development 
of an action plan, but also other activities, such as a schools education programme. The 
South West Climate Impacts Partnership was solely focused on climate adaptation 
activity. The regional action plan was instead developed by a Task and Finish group set 
up by the Regional Assembly and led by an officer from GOSW.
None of these groups can be said to have been placed at the core of regional policy. 
They were not ‘high level’ groups and, initially at least, were devised as relatively 
mechanistic technical bodies. The development of Action Plans in the North East (2008) 
and Yorkshire and the Humber (2005 and 2009) gave some purpose to the Partnerships, 
however, and revealed ambitions to develop as focal points of regional activity on 
climate change.
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Regional Climate Change Action Plans
Regional Climate Change Action Plans in Yorkshire and the Humber and the North East 
worked as a material - and textual - manifestation of regional partnerships. They 
attempted to strengthen the logic behind a dedicated regional forum for action; and 
promote a programme of practice to embed the region as a source of action. In other 
words they worked as both co-optive and enabling technologies through seduction, 
induction and facilitation (shown in Table 15, below).
Table 15: Regional action plans as governing technologies
Technology Rationality Mode(s) Governing
Agencies
Institutional
Relations
Regional Encourage action Seduction, (moral) RDA, RA, Heterarchy or
Action Plan on GHG emissions induction and GO network
reduction facilitation
In 2007, Yorkshire and the Humber was the only one of the three regions with a fully- 
fledged Climate Change Action Plan. Plans for the North East and South West were 
produced in April and September 2008 respectively. Yorkshire and the Humber 
published the second iteration of its climate change action plan in March 2009. The first 
Action Plan is of particular interest, however, as it demonstrates a central aim of 
pressing climate change as a specifically regional issue and is more clearly 
demonstrative of first wave climate change action.
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Table 16: Regional Climate Change Action Plans
Action Plan 1 Action Plan 2 Linked to Partnership?
East Midlands 2009 N/A Yes
East of England 2009 (draft) N/A Yes
London 2007 N/A No
North East 2008 N/A Yes
North West 2007 N/A Yes
South East N/A N/A N/A
South West 2008 N/A No
West Midlands 2007 N/A No
Yorkshire and the Humber 2005 2009 Yes
Table 16 shows the pattern across the English regions. As can be seen, Yorkshire and 
the Humber were two years ahead of other regions in producing their RCCAP.
Rationality
At the time of the first tranche of interviews each of the regions either had a plan in 
place -  as in the case of Yorkshire and the Humber -  or were in the process of
developing a plan, as in the case of the comparator regions. However, respondents were
not especially clear as to where the impetus for these developments originated. Actors 
were clear that resources from Defra had provided a stimulus for the Partnerships and 
Action Plans, but they had difficulty in outlining a rationale for developing these 
regional forums and plans. Almost every regional actor found themselves verbally 
stumbling around a little before providing three sets of virtually identical phrases:
“plugging gaps”; “added value”, “joining up” and being “ahead of the game”
competitively.
I think it’s just a recognition that there is a regional perspective that can add some value and 
so that’s why it’s happening. I think it’s that whole recognition of the regional tier really. 
And I suppose there’s some sort of competition in there somewhere; I mean every region 
wants to be the best!
Regional Climate Change Manager, Y&H
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In the case of Yorkshire and the Humber, the development of an Action Plan was 
identified in the 2003 Regional Sustainable Development Framework (RSDF) as a set 
action towards filling a regional lacuna in climate change action. Interestingly, neither 
the RSDF nor the final Action Plan make reference to the role of national government in 
pressing for this to happen, an issue which brings us neatly on to the first way in which 
the Action Plan has been used as a governing technology: as a text that attempts to 
engage actors within the region through a ‘programme’ of discursive seduction and 
induction based around the legitimacy discourses discussed in Chapter 2, and touched 
on in the previous chapter.
Technology (1): Discursive Seduction and Moral Induction
It is useful to begin first with the ‘outcome’ of the plan process -  the Plan itself -  and in 
particular the claims made about the region within the text. This helps to frame the 
discussion, as it very clearly draws attention to the regionalist sentiment behind the Plan. 
In Yorkshire and the Humber, Your Climate provided a focal point for the development 
of a carbon regionalism, through discursive approaches to legitimise regional climate 
change action through a textual ‘programme’ of seduction and moral induction. Part of 
this programme in fact works to blur the line between seductive approaches and moral, 
inductive arguments. Where a ‘morality of space’ is presented, this is then taken on to 
become a seductive point whereby regional organisations are the natural actors to 
foment action.
The Your Climate introduction points to a number of regional characteristics that 
seemingly mark Yorkshire and the Humber out as unique:
1.2 The Yorkshire and Humber region is characterised by its strong regional identity and 
great diversity of landscapes, businesses and communities. Despite massive economic 
change over the last 20 to 30 years, the major urban centres still form part of the 
industrial heartland of the UK. Outside these areas the region is predominantly rural and 
of high environmental quality ... Lowland valleys, such as the Vale of York, support 
highly productive agricultural activities.
p6
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Further analysis of Your Climate draws this out further. This begins with a seeming 
truism: “Our way of life in Yorkshire and Humber is based on the existence of a stable, 
temperate climate” (p2). This infers that Yorkshire and the Humber is distinct from 
other English regions; indeed it seemingly even has its own climate. In a similar way to 
the notion of the ‘region as a place’ the Plan also denotes a sense of collective 
responsibility and of a cohesive unit, or regional community. The text then develops 
from the claim that Yorkshire and Humber has a strong regional identity to use the term 
“our region”. We thus go from statements about “The Yorkshire and Humber region” 
(1.1 p6), to “our regional way of life” (1.2 p6). However, “our region” is taken a step 
further in being used to also mean the regional governing organisations and/or regional 
‘stakeholders’, resulting in a confusing conflation of the two: in the statement “Our 
region is determined to help avoid further damaging shifts in climate” (foreword, p i), it 
is not clear whether the document is trying to make claims about the attitudes of people 
who live in Yorkshire and Humber, or about the regional governing organisations.
The intended result is that Yorkshire Forward, Government Office and the Assembly 
become synonymous with the region as a space, as truly representative of ‘the people’. 
But it also aims to show that the Action Plan is not representative of any one individual 
or group of people or organisations within the region, rather that it is an objective 
overview of the region as a whole: further on there is reference to the fact that 
“organisations in the region commissioned two important studies” (1.7 p7), meaning 
Yorkshire Forward, the Regional Assembly and Government Office. Finally, “our 
region” also works as a euphemism, by removing the role of individual agency in 
negative statements: “Our region is also a contributor to climate change” (1.3 p6), as 
opposed to (for example) “in Yorkshire and the Humber, individuals, businesses and 
public sector organisations are contributors to climate change”.
A third theme that entwines with, and builds on ‘our unique region’ is that of an
autonomous and progressive tier of regional governance in Yorkshire and the Humber.
The regional target discussed in the previous chapter is used here as both evidence of
autonomous, progressive regional governing, and also the logical outcome of
autonomous, progressive governing, creating a tautologous argument: ‘we promote
strong governing because we promote strong governing’, or ‘we should have an
emissions target because we have an emissions target’. Regional agencies are portrayed
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as strong leaders on climate change, both in scalar terms and territorially when 
compared to other regions’ activities. Statements like, “The time for debating is over; 
we now need to take positive action” (p7) work to lay the grounds for this argument, 
while the foreword emphasises the fact that “we have the only Region Economic 
Strategy in England that publicly commits to reducing greenhouse gas emissions” (p2), 
and similarly that “We have a forward looking Regional Spatial Strategy with a 
comprehensive climate change policy” (ibid.). The regional targets are again used as 
evidence for this, which calls back to the role of the target as a method of seduction in 
itself, as discussed in Chapter 10. Furthermore, a repeated claim is that “Our region has 
already made great steps towards addressing climate change” (p2, p8).
Regionalist sentiment is also present in the South West Action Plan, The South West 
Climate Change Action Plan fo r  the South West [sic] 2008-2010 (SWRA, 2008), as 
evidenced in the following statement, where ‘we’ is used to bind actors together as a 
cohesive gestalt:
Here in the South West we cannot insulate ourselves from the direct and indirect impacts of 
a changing climate, so we must prepare for them. We must make the transition to a low 
carbon society as quickly as possible, and where we can, take real advantage of the economic 
opportunities that will also arise.
The South West Action Plan for the South West, 2008 p2
In the overall document, however, there is more obvious delineation between ‘we’ as 
‘regional partners’ and ‘we’ as inhabitants of the region, than in Your Climate; with 
very little regionalist rhetoric beyond the foreword. The North East Action Plan is an 
online document, devoid of regionalist rhetoric other than one mention of “our region” 
and a suggestion that the regional tier of governing can “add value” (Sustaine, 2008) to 
local and sub-regional action.
The extent of regionalist doctrine within Your Climate was also picked up by actors in 
other regions.62 One respondent in particular noted that:
It’s quite, you know, out there with the region stuff, isn’t it? There’s a fair bit of drum- 
beating going on. I can sympathise with that, but 1 think we’d be quite a bit more er... 
[laughs] shall I say, conservative small c in our claims
62 Respondents were asked to read, and then com m ent on, the foreword and introduction to Your C lim ate.
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Regional Policy Manager, NE
This was acknowledged by a number of actors involved in the Action Plan process: “it 
is very much an issue for this region” (Regional Policy Manager, Y&H), and:
We wanted to show that we were working at this agenda and we wanted it to be understood 
that climate change has a regional dimension to it, and yes, there was some of the wanting to 
get people on board with the fact that the working together as-a-region is well a positive 
thing!”
Former Regional Policy Manager, Y&H
This approach therefore seeks to establish a rationale for regional action on climate 
change. In question here, then, is the extent to which this text was (a) reflective of 
perceptions within the region and (b) successful in strengthening perceptions of the 
region as a legitimate spatial fix for governing carbon.
Technology (2): Facilitative co-option
A second way in which Action Plans aimed to galvanise regional action on climate 
change was to facilitate partnership between different individuals and organisations. By 
doing so, they also aimed to co-opt actors into a regional discourse on climate change:
It was about trying to get some sense of regional purpose, togetherness on climate change. 
It’s perhaps not quite achieved what we wanted, but the aim was really ... let’s have a point 
at which people, stakeholders can see some regional leadership, can be part of a collective 
movement, if you like.
Regional Policy Manager, Y&H
To achieve these aims, we see a combination of co-optive and enabling governing 
modes within the sphere of reference determined by the regional partnership. Under the 
terms of reference for the Plan, seven of the 13 key objectives identified engaging 
stakeholders, or developing partnerships, including the following aims to:
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-  Work closely with other fora, commissions or other regional bodies with a stake in 
climate change issues.
-  Improve engagement by key decision makers in climate change issues at regional and 
local levels.
-  Engage local authority decision makers and strategic planners to develop tools to 
facilitate the development of local action plans.
Terms of Reference, Your Climate, p51
Furthermore, a range of regional organisations, sub-regional organisations, and local 
organisations -  including local authorities and LSPs -  were outlined as having key 
institutional roles and responsibilities with regard to climate change. Each of the 
specific actions also involved a lead statutory agency working in partnership with other 
organisations: for instance, work on fuel poverty (Action 3.7) was set to involve 
Yorkshire Forward as the lead organisation, with Transco, Yorkshire and Humber 
Assembly and local authorities supporting implementation. Several actions were reliant 
on non-statutory regional organisations to lead the work, including on climate change 
and ecosystems -  English Nature -  and on evidence-building, which was to be led by 
Yorkshire Universities.
The other two regions’ RCCAPs have similar objectives. In the North East, a whole raft 
of ‘leadership’ aims were set out, including five specifically related to engaging 
different actors within the region, with a further three in the mitigation section that were 
aimed at engaging different public and private sector organisations within the region on 
carbon management activity. The South West Action Plan identifies nine out of 41 
actions to be carried out by non-statutory regional organisations, although this included 
two to be led by Defra.
Technological Translations
As in the case of the regional emissions target for Yorkshire and the Humber, the 
impact of the Action Plan as a meta-technology can be seen through the various 
translations that took place as it was mediated by other actors.
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Material Translations
The most obvious way to measure the success of the RCCAP -  and by proxy, the 
Partnership -  is to monitor delivery on its primary aims: the Actions within the Plan. A 
primary Action within the Plan was to ensure that it was continually monitored, 
including the production of a biannual progress report. Friends of the Earth (2009) 
contend that “there has been no analysis of the success or failure of the 2005 Action 
Plan”. This is not strictly true. In 2007, AEA Environment (2007b) carried out an 
independent review of one third of the Actions, but this was the first and only review 
that took place. This review focused on those Actions that aimed to address climate 
concerns in just three sectors: transport, housing and land management. As a result, only 
11 of the total 33 actions in the Plan were reviewed. Three of these related to adaptation 
(of which one was deemed to have been fully achieved), and the remaining eight to 
carbon management. Of the eight, AEA deemed that only one had been unambiguously 
achieved, which related to delivery of insulation measures to fuel poor communities. 
This was delivered through Community Energy Solutions, a DECC funded non-profit 
organisation, who carried out work in the North East and Yorkshire and the Humber. 
They were not highlighted as a lead or support organisation in the original Plan, which 
brings a suspicion that the Plan was not necessarily a driver in the action being achieved. 
More broadly, Friends of the Earth (2009) strengthen this suspicion in contending first 
that commitments to monitoring had not been kept and that:
The achievement since 2005 of what measures have actually been undertaken to secure 
climate change reduction ... have not taken place as a result of the Action Plan, but 
independently of it.
ibid. p5
This is followed by a damning assessment of the overall delivery of the plan: it “did not 
work to any extent at all in terms of measurable emissions reduction, and in comparison 
to the scale of the challenge it confronted” {ibid.). The second regional plan, published 
in 2009, contained very little reference to Your Climate and no reflection on its success, 
or lack of.
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As with the regional target, however, although the achievement of the specific actions is 
important the Plan may also be judged through other means, such as the achievement of 
some of the ‘softer’, associative actions: in other words, its success as a meta­
technology in drawing actors together, raising awareness on carbon management, and 
encouraging other actors to develop their own action plans.
Network Translations
The Yorkshire and Humber Climate Change Partnership was relatively successful at 
engaging with statutory actors at the regional level: it was chaired by a member of the 
Assembly, while employees of the three statutory bodies attended meetings and became 
involved in the Partnership’s tasks. LGYH did not regularly attend meetings up to 2007. 
The Environment Agency seconded a member of staff to the Assembly, who attended 
Partnership meetings, as did another Environment Agency representative. LGYH and 
the Environment Agency, however, were seen by respondents as being much less 
engaged in the Partnership; and climate change agendas more generally. In the case of 
the Environment Agency, its statutory role on climate change related to adaptation, 
which partly explains why they did not have such tight engagement on carbon 
management issues. LGYH, on the other hand, was not engaged as a ‘regional’ player in 
the same way that they did after the dissolution of Regional Assemblies: its lack of 
engagement up to 2007 was not seen as an issue by respondents. Nonetheless, 
attendance at Partnership meetings made it clear that the three statutory agencies were 
very much the lead entities in the Partnership, with other actors in place on a more 
consultative basis.
Even within the three core agencies, acceptance of the Climate Change Partnership and 
Plan was not universal. A number of those respondents not directly involved in the 
Partnership were dismissive, or ambivalent about its role:
Well, I think they are doing something useful. But they are a bit., peripheral, perhaps, to the 
core business on climate change. That’s not to say that what they are doing isn’t good or 
important work, but they’re not really, the Action Plan’s not really seen as the driver of 
change on low carbon policy.
Sustainable Development Policy Manager, Y&H 
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Furthermore, the absence of any authoritative measures from the action plan represented 
a lack of buy-in from the key partners in terms of the level of ‘clout’ they were willing 
to extend to the Partnership. Where authoritative measures were taken through funding 
or planning constraints, these were omitted from the Plan.
More formally, Action 1.1 in Your Climate aims to “ensure climate change is reflected 
in strategic decision-making progress to progressively advance climate risk 
management in key regional strategies” (p35): that is to ensure translation of the Plan’s 
core objectives across to other actors. All but one of the regional strategies published 
after 2005 do make reference to climate change. But this does not necessarily connote 
success for the Partnership: any number of other influences may have brought this on to 
strategic agendas. Specific reference to Your Climate in strategies would give a better 
indicator of its success. Also, while the Action within the Plan only refers to strategies, 
it is also useful to look at regional actors’ corporate plans. To begin with the latter, 
corporate strategies for core agencies made some, but limited, reference to the Action 
Plan as a means for delivering corporate goals. These instances reflected a case of a 
technology translating to become a weak rationale for ‘general’ action, rather than any 
firm programme of actions. Only the 2008-11 Regional Assembly Business Plan (YHA, 
2008d) included a set of specific aims relating to the delivery of the Action Plan.
Cross-regional core strategies -  RES (Yorkshire Forward, 2006), Integrated Regional 
Framework (IRF; Yorkshire Forward, 2007), and RSS (YHA, 2008c) -  all refer to the 
Action Plan to some extent, although the level of engagement varies: the IRF describes 
Your Climate as highlighting “where the important work lies” on climate change; while 
the RSS is less fulsome, in saying that it highlights just “some” (p43) of the actions 
required on climate change. Again, the Plan is recognised as a ‘legitimate’ document, 
but there is no real level of commitment to it as a strong rationale for action.
In terms of ‘second tier’ regional strategies, of five that were published after Your
Climate, three made some reference to the Plan. In two of these cases, there is some
direct translation of actions within the Plan to objectives within the strategies: the
Environment Enhancement Strategy and the Rural Framework both outline sets of
actions that could contribute to the Action Plan. The Regional Energy Infrastructure
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Strategy (REIS; YHA, 2007) refers to comments made in Your Climate relating to the 
“development of new technology and an increased role for biomass as the prime movers 
for reducing emissions” (2007, p i5), but does not link its objectives to specific actions, 
or objectives in the Plan.
The other two strategies did not refer to the Action Plan. The Science and Innovation 
Strategy made no reference to climate change or carbon management at all. This 
strategy would relate to a number of Actions within the Plan, but is perhaps more 
distanced from the Plan than other regional strategies. More surprisingly, the Regional 
Biodiversity Strategy did not refer to the Plan either, despite having core objectives 
relating to climate change and the fact that the Plan has two Actions specifically relating 
to biodiversity, whilst -  more generally -  climate change has clear implications for 
biodiversity. In all, translation of the Plan amongst statutory regional actors was mixed. 
While most statutory regional organisations and strategies paid increasing heed to 
carbon management, Your Climate and -  by extension -  the Partnership do not appear 
to have played a large part in this.
There is less to go on in terms of judging the level of engagement with other regional 
‘stakeholders’. Friends of the Earth engaged with Your Climate in producing their own 
review of the Plan, and provided “an important critical voice” (Regional Policy 
Manager, Y&H) to the Partnership. Other regional branches of national and 
international organises were represented to varying degrees. The Yorkshire and Humber 
branch of the World Wildlife Fund was regularly represented at Partnership meetings 
and the NHS was nominally involved in the Partnership “at a distance” (Regional Policy 
Manager, Y&H) since its inception. Yorkshire Universities -  an association 
representing the region’s 14 universities -  were not regularly represented at Partnership 
meetings, but did commit to lead on one action relating to indentifying new evidence, 
the ambiguity of which makes it difficult to measure. It is telling, however, that one 
respondent admitted that Yorkshire Universities had not been consulted in the 
development of the second iteration of the Action Plan, from which they -  and the HE 
sector as a whole -  were conspicuously absent.63
63 This is slightly different from involvem ent o f  people working within HE institutions. A sm all number 
o f  academ ics attended workshops and events held by the Partnership, but as interested outsiders or in a 
personal capacity rather than to lead action within the Partnership on behalf o f  their em ployer.
218
In relation to the private sector, Yorkshire Water was regularly represented at 
Partnership meetings and also signed up to support delivery on one action on land 
management. Several members of the Partnership did reveal frustration at a lack of 
engagement from regional business partnerships such as the Yorkshire and Humber 
Chamber of Commerce, and the Federation for Small Business. The latter had been 
approached on a number of occasions, according to one respondent, but would not 
engage with the Partnership “in any way”.
Outwith the region
It is hard to say precisely how successful the Action Plan was in influencing the 
decisions made by regional actors in other regions. There was no evidence that Your 
Climate had been directly influential in the development of climate policy in other 
regions: none of the other regions’ Action Plans make reference to Your Climate, and 
none of the respondents in the comparator regions felt that it had been influential in 
their decision-making.
On the other hand, by virtue of being the first published Plan it was understood as being 
“a good thing” (Regional Policy Manager, NE); but by dint of simply ‘being there’ 
rather than for its content. Plans across the regions detail relatively similar approaches 
on the whole in terms of actions; but seemingly through a lack of willingness to break 
from the regional policy ‘template’ as used in other policy domains, rather than 
specifically learning from the Yorkshire and Humber experience. Regional climate 
change co-ordinators met together periodically as a group, so there may have been some 
indirect influence through this mechanism, but interviewees in the North East and South 
West said that they were either unaware (SW) or not overly interested (NE) in the 
approach taken by Yorkshire and Humber: “our approach has to be specific to our 
region”.
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Scalar Translation
A number of actions in Your Climate also related to ‘vertical’ influence, both in terms 
of translating to local governing networks and to national governing networks. As with 
the regional target, influence on local networks was limited, while there was little 
evidence of impact on national governing networks.
Local Governing Networks
In addition to the overall aim of engaging local authorities and LSPs in the work of the 
partnership, Your Climate identifies six specific actions to encourage local action on 
climate change, two of which focus on incorporating the aims of the Plan into local 
decision-making. These are detailed in Table 17.
Table 17: Actions directed at local governing networks
Action Deliverables Timescale
4.1 ... Develop a common tool for 
local authority emission benchmarking 
and monitoring ... aiming to facilitate 
the development of local action plans 
to improve corporate and borough 
wide carbon management
Emissions benchmarking 
tool developed and in use 
by regional local 
authorities
Tool developed End 05 
Adopted by 50% LAs 
End 06
4.2 ... Assist LSPs to develop local 
climate change action plans or fully 
integrate climate adaptation and 
mitigation considerations with 
corporate business planning.
LSPs either develop 
specific plans to reduce 
... emissions or fully 
integrate within corporate 
business planning
Start Sept 06
Source: Your Climate (2005)
The region did not produce a tool for emissions monitoring (Action 4.1). This is partly 
because the Action was superseded by developments on Local Area Agreements and 
Defra emissions monitoring (see next chapter), although this would not have been the 
case if the tool had been implemented within the projected timescales. An ecological
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footprinting tool for local authorities was developed by URSUS Consultants (2008) on 
behalf of the region’s Sustainable Development Board, but this development was not 
something that the Climate Change Partnership was involved with. These actions also 
link back to the regional target, and the calculation of regional emissions more generally, 
and the failure of these to become embedded within local decision-making. A clear 
opportunity was missed here to link together the target with specific actions within the 
Action Plan, and then link these further into a regional network of local benchmarking 
and shared calculation agendas.
Nor was Action 4.2 successfully implemented. By the end of 2007 not one of the 
region’s local authorities or LSPs had published a climate change action plan. This 
compares to five local authorities with action plans by 2007 in both the North East (out 
of 12 councils) and South West (out of 15), without the ‘catalyst’ of a regional plan. In 
2009, only Leeds and Sheffield City Councils had fully functioning carbon reduction or 
climate change action plans, although a number of others were in the process of being 
developed.64 As with the regional target, Calderdale was the only local authority or LSP 
to refer to the regional climate change partnership in any core, sustainability, or climate 
change document. Interviews with local authority officers confirmed that there was a 
lack of engagement with the Regional Partnership. When asked the level of impact the 
RCCAP had on local decision-making, the stock response was, “None at all, to be quite 
honest with you” (local authority executive, Y&H).
National Governing Networks
Briefly, in addition to the above, Your Climate had no obvious effect on national 
governing networks. For instance, despite being the first region to publish a climate 
change action plan or strategy, this was not picked up by national reports on regional
64 Furthermore, Sheffie ld ’s ‘low  carbon plan’ (Sheffield  First, 2009) was developed as a direct response  
to adoption o f  a carbon reduction target through the 2008-11 Local Area Agreem ents and not related to 
the regional action plan, w hile L eeds’ clim ate change strategy (Leeds Initiative, 2009) states that it was 
developed as part o f  their agreement as a signatory to the Nottingham  Agreem ent, which m ost local 
authorities in England had signed up to. Kirklees -  w idely regarded by respondents as the reg ion ’s m ost 
forward thinking authority on clim ate change -  had a com prehensive clim ate change w ebsite, with details 
o f  a range o f  initiatives and future plans, but no formal action plan or strategy
221
action on climate change.65 Interviews with national government policy makers elicited 
very little interest in Yorkshire and the Humber’s Plan, with respondents emphatic in 
their opinion that it has had no influence on the Government’s regional policy on 
climate change: “No influence; not really. We know it’s there, and it’s good that it’s 
there -  although by now it is an expectation -  but that’s all” (Central Government 
Policy Executive).
Barriers to Regionalism
As with the regional target, a range of issues worked against the delivery of the Action 
Plan or its success as a discursive programme. In particular, a ‘lack of teeth’ or metrics 
to measure the carbon reduction potential of actions, insufficient prioritisation of 
enrolling other actors into the programme, and a lack of clarity of purpose were 
identified as key factors.
Missing Modes (Absent Authority)
A number of actions were highlighted as ‘missing’ from the Plan by respondents. It was 
particularly felt that the partnership could have worked more at the provision, and 
transfer, of knowledge: many local authority respondents and ‘stakeholders’ could see a 
useful role for regional partnerships as points through which access to knowledge, 
evidence and best practice relating to carbon management. Although Yorkshire Futures 
-  the Regional Observatory -  did make regional studies available through their website, 
it was felt that the Partnership should have taken a more proactive approach to ensuring 
that actors within the region were informed about work taking place in the region. This 
included updates on the work of the Partnership relating to actions within the RCCAP. 
This issue was also alluded to by a central government respondent -  responsible for 
DECC’s liaison with RDAs and Regional Assemblies -  who noted a lack of knowledge 
transfer activity between partnerships and other actors within the regions.
65 Exam ples over this period include Sustainable D evelopm ent C om m ission’s (2005) Independent review  
o f  su sta inable developm en t in the English regions (2005), the governm ent response, Securing the 
R egions' Future (2006), the National Audit O ffice sustainability appraisals o f  R D A s (2 006 -8 ), or the 
Environmental Audit Com m ittee regarding sub-national action on clim ate change (2008).
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Regional respondents were less sure about this issue, however. They agreed that 
knowledge transfer was important, or even “crucial” (regional policy manager, Y&H), 
in governing carbon reduction, but were unsure where the Partnership fitted in with this. 
Respondents pointed to the role of the Energy Savings Trust and the Carbon Trust in 
this area, as well as workshops held by the Regional Assembly and the Yorkshire 
Futures website as ways in which ‘the region’ as a whole, if not the Partnership itself, 
was working to share knowledge and evidence. A lack of finance to fund such activities 
was also highlighted. However, the fact that action was being carried out separate to the 
Partnership and that the Partnership could not afford to carry out the actions itself both 
emphasise the fact that it was not sufficiently recognised as the point of co-ordination 
for regional activity on climate change, and was not being backed by ‘high-level’ 
regional actors to carry out the kinds of actions that stakeholders felt they needed.
As noted, the Action Plan does not include any authoritative action to be taken by 
Yorkshire Forward, Government Office, or the Regional Assembly through regional 
planning or funding conditions, nor does it identify ways for Yorkshire Forward to use 
its funding streams to provide funds for carbon management schemes. Friends of the 
Earth (2009) were scathing on this issue, claiming that instead the Action Plan focused 
on “oblique and secondary” measures that did not directly deliver emissions reduction: 
“In other words the original design of the measures was quite unlikely to deliver the 
intended outcome”.
Similarly, a local authority executive made the point that a “lack of teeth” within the 
Plan made it less likely that local authorities would to engage with it: “the potential 
benefits seem to be minimal, there’s no programme or even lobbying action to get more 
funding for climate action, and the ‘sticks’ to make local authorities engage are 
nonexistent”. Regional actors were also engaged in debates about the role of the action 
plan. This included questioning which actors it should target, who should be involved in 
delivering actions and also the types of power they should aim to exercise. Only two 
respondents at the regional level outlined the use of authoritative power as a useful tool 
to bring about action, and these were qualified in their proposals:
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This was the first Action Plan, and was about trying to bring together the key regional 
players... it was important to concentrate on that, on what we can do working together, and 
not concentrate on what our individual statutory roles are. It was about getting a message out 
there too, that we’re about facilitating, about enabling. And this has been discussed recently, 
should the next Action Plan be about facilitating again? But the question comes back to, how 
much power do we have as a climate change partnership? I mean, is there a stick to beat 
them with? In terms of regional delivery, it’s difficult to be authoritative.
Regional Policy Manager, Y&H
Clearly, the experience of delivering the RCCAP made regional actors reassess their 
role as governing entities; but it also served to emphasise the lack of input from 
elsewhere. It may be that the Action Plan and Partnership should be specifically about 
‘acting in partnership’ through joint facilitation and ‘soft’ enabling measures. Such an 
approach, however, relies on strong associational ties and belief in the Partnership and 
region more widely as a legitimate point of shared action, which was seemingly limited 
in Yorkshire and the Humber in this case. So, whilst such an approach may have been 
laudable in principle, and perhaps unavoidable, the lack of ‘harder’ actions that either 
constrained or provided for action did have the effect of limiting the legitimacy, and 
therefore impact, of the Action Plan and Partnership.
Missing Actors
As with the regional target, there was a clear sense that the absence of various actors 
from the Partnership had been a contributing factor to the relative lack of success. This 
was exacerbated with a lack of effort to engage with other actors. Firstly, there was a 
feeling that the Partnership had not gone very far in attempting to include external 
viewpoints, and create a participative approach to regional action on climate change. As 
a member of the Partnership noted, membership consisted of “what I call the usual 
suspects” (regional policy officer, Y&H). Another respondent referred to this group as 
“a cosy coterie” (regional environmental stakeholder, Y&H). Rather than encouraging a 
more inclusive network of actors, an aspiring regional oligarchy was being developed; 
albeit one that was unable to exercise the power to act as such. This was viewed -  
somewhat wearily -  as being nothing out of the ordinary, however:
The way decisions are made, I suspect, is pretty much the same the world over ... It basically 
works the same way, which is that a few people do most of the decision-making and it goes 
through whatever process it has to go through to be authorised.
Former Regional Policy Director, Y&H
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Observation of Partnership board meetings also highlighted a (vague) power hierarchy 
between actors. Assembly and Government Office representatives carried out most of 
the work on Action Planning and Partnership administration, but at the same time 
deference was paid to Yorkshire Forward representatives: they appeared to be the ones 
with the clearest sense of what their organisational aims, ambitions and priorities were. 
At the other end of the scale, non-statutory stakeholders seemed to be fulfilling a role as 
critical observers, with contributions on specific issues, but not as fully fledged actors 
within the partnership.
The Partnership included two local authority representatives, the Chair -  a councillor 
and member of the Assembly -  and a local authority officer. There was no formal 
recruitment process, however. The Chair was responsible for inaugurating the Group 
through involvement in the regional Sustainable Development Board, and had a history 
of involvement with regional-level partnerships; similarly the local authority officer 
approached the Partnership owing to personal interest in climate change and regional 
governance. Interviews with local authority officers confirmed a sense that local 
authorities were not included in the decision-making of the regional partnership: 
“they’ve really been very weak on trying to involve [the local authority] in what’s going 
on regionally. W e’ve had nothing from them” (local authority executive, Y&H), and: 
“The climate change partnership is not much more than a partnership of the regional 
agencies. There’s definitely, I think, a lack of local engagement there” (Regional Local 
Government Representative, Y&H). Actors involved with the Partnership largely agreed 
that they had not made great strides towards including local authorities.
There was in fact a degree of ambivalence towards the importance of involving local 
authorities, despite their importance in achieving actions within the plan.66 At the same 
time however, respondents involved in the Partnership and Action Plan were keen to 
note their role in “providing a framework for local action” (Regional Stakeholder, Y&H) 
and for local authorities to “use our model to develop their own Plans” (Regional Policy 
Manager, Y&H). Respondents also acknowledged a gap in representation from the 
private sector, especially small businesses. To further emphasise these issues, AEA
66 Sim ilarly, ‘regional’ businesses were seen as important, yet 90% o f  businesses have few er than 10 
em ployees and operate very much ‘loca lly ’ (National Statistics and BERR, 2008)
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Environment (2008) gave an overview of some of the successes and challenges faced in 
the Plan’s implementation. In particular, they noted a lack of clarity over responsibility 
for actions and the need to strengthen co-ordination between organisations in the future.
A second case of ‘missing actors’ took place between 2006 and 2008, when there was a 
two year hiatus without a regional climate change co-ordinator. Without a full time 
‘champion’ of the regional partnership, it was felt by some respondents that activity had 
stalled and lost the focus of developing links with other actors: “there is a bit of a 
feeling that it’s just lost its way a bit, and that it’s maybe losing its relevancy as a result” 
(Regional Policy Executive, Y&H). This was even noted from outside the region:
If you look at the other regions which developed quite well and then fell away because they 
lost their co-ordinator, because they were the only person that it was their role to do stuff, 
action stalls. Development stalls. And it’s really important that that doesn’t happen, because 
I could be run over by a bus, I could be offered a better job, I could fall out with people so 
badly I leave. You know, you just don’t know do you?
Regional Policy Manager, NE
The issue of ‘buy-in’ recurs again here. Although regional actors from the different 
statutory organisations worked comparatively well with one another in Yorkshire and 
the Humber, there remained an issue relating to the amount of influence these actors had 
within their own organisations, and consequently a lack of high-level engagement from 
the statutory organisations. Individuals attending Partnership meetings tended to be 
policy managers with a specific remit on climate change or sustainable development and 
meetings were not attended by senior level executives from any of the statutory regional 
actors. The need to get more visible high-level commitment for the Partnership was 
acknowledged in interviews and in one of the Partnership meetings attended as part of 
the research process. This was also reflected in the difficulties found in securing finance 
to maintain the Partnership and employ a co-ordinator, which was seen as the “biggest 
challenge” (Local Councillor, Y&H) that they had faced since being incorporated in 
2004.
Various respondents also suggested that cultural problems -  both organisationally and 
between individuals -  were creating barriers to action. One respondent felt that the lack
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of engagement with the Partnership was in part owing to the ‘apolitical’, technocratic 
approach taken by the actors involved in leading the Partnership:
You see, with [policy officer A] and [policy officer B] in the regional partnership, they’re 
not involved properly with the bigger picture. They’re no good at engaging with people, like 
the important players at the local level. They’re not really interested in influencing people to 
the extent that they’re rethinking their way of doing things.
Local Authority Officer, Y&H
This was not a widely held view, although members of the Partnership often referred to 
themselves as being ‘action focused’ as compared to being concerned with political 
attempts to engage others: “I’m more [concerned] about action than sitting about 
chatting about the problem” (Partnership member, Y&H). Another respondent 
highlighted differences in working cultures between actors as a reason why the 
Environment Agency was less involved with the carbon management action, arguing 
that “people in senior positions in the Environment Agency, in the regions are generally 
not political operators”, as a result of their “technocratic” background (Former Regional 
Policy Director, Y&H). In relation to these cultural or personality differences, one 
respondent also reinforced the idea of the closed-shop, in emphasising the similarity of 
people involved with the Partnership: “ ...the sense I get from the exec is that we’re all 
similar kinds of people really, we tend to work in a very consensual way” (Regional 
Policy Manager, Y&H).
On the other hand, reference to the two comparator regions highlights that, although 
‘Team Yorkshire’ caused some problems in terms of promoting a ‘we know best’ 
attitude, in the other two regions there was less partnership working between the 
statutory agencies, which presented its own problems. In the South West, the RDA had 
been seen as the leading actor on carbon management, with “tokenistic” (Stakeholder, 
SW) involvement from the Assembly, while Government Office “isn’t in the loop 
terribly well ... they just get on with doling out Neighbourhood Renewal money” 
(National Policy Stakeholder). This was mirrored in a more fractured overall picture on 
climate change action, with the South West Climate Change Impacts Partnership solely 
focused on adaptation policy, while the regional Action Plan was developed through a 
separate ‘task and finish’ group, led by the regional Assembly and Government Office. 
This led to the involvement of even fewer external actors in the process of developing
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the Action Plan. In the North East, “things are much more politicised” (National Policy 
Stakeholder, UK):
...of course being the place where the referendum and no vote was has really weakened the 
Regional Assembly, and the RDA, where there are a bunch of very strong, very conventional 
economic development people in charge see no reason to engage with the Assembly ... And 
the Government Office director actually spent some time in the RDA and again is a 
conventional, a good, solid Whitehall manager. But, they are really three parallel streams, 
where the RDA are absolutely dominant. Rather than any attempt to integrate those.
ibid. Emphasis in speech inflections
As a result, the North East’s Regional Climate Change Partnership took a more 
outward-facing approach to its operations: “the aim is to develop something self- 
propagating, that engages the region, not just regional policy bods” (Regional Policy 
Manager, NE). In other words, there was a belief that the partnership needed to reach a 
‘critical mass’ through various practices of engagement with a range of regional 
stakeholders.
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Missing (Policy) Links
The lack of engagement with other actors is also reflected in a lack of links to external -  
local, regional, national and supra-national -  policy within the Plan. The Partnership 
and Action Plan in Yorkshire and the Humber were very much ‘stand alone’ entities. 
Although the Plan was set within the context of different policies in its introduction, 
Actions themselves contained few links to these policies, with little emphasis of how 
they could work to achieve the agendas of actors outside the Partnership.
The regional target is of particular relevance here, given the aim of the Plan to reduce 
emissions in the region. Linkage to the target could have worked to strengthen both the 
Plan and the target. For instance, Action 1.1 above -  on developing a local emissions 
accounting tool -  could have been tied to a regional monitoring approach to promote the 
notion of a regional climate agenda or the region as a carbon space, as well as foment 
action on emissions monitoring and reduction. Attempts to ‘roll-out’ Yorkshire 
Forward’s calculative tool for measuring emissions ‘savings’ across other organisations 
would also have been a useful way of encouraging emissions reductions whilst also 
strengthening engagement with the regional emissions target.
Critically, actions within the Plan gave no indication of the extent to they would 
contribute to regional -  or other -  emissions targets. As such, there was little 
understanding of the intended outcome of actions; what each action might contribute to 
emissions reductions; or what level of reductions the actions combined would 
potentially achieve. Friends of the Earth paid special attention to this issue:
The quantified regional emissions reduction target established in adopted RSS 2004 ... was 
not identified as the driver for its individual measures. This would have required the setting 
of allocated targets -  e.g. to policy or sector areas of emissions -  required to be achieved.
Friends of the Earth, 2009 p5
This provides a reverse side of the coin to the lack of success of the regional target as 
governing technology: in the case of the RCCAP a more robust linkage to the target, 
including specific contributions would have given the Plan greater clarity and 
legitimacy as a programme itself, with the result of also strengthening the role of the 
target in the region.
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Clarity of Purpose
The statements made by Friends of the Earth, above, point to the fact that was clear 
uncertainty regarding problem identification. As noted, regional actors seemed unsure 
of the rationale behind a regional partnership. There was a sense of ‘if there’s a regional 
tier of governing, then that needs to include climate change’. This argument is not 
without merit, but it shows an underlying lack of thought as to why carbon management 
specifically required a regional dimension, beyond integrating it into the activities of 
regional organisations. This lack of clarity was apparent in observed meetings and 
interviews when discussing Yorkshire and the Humber’s second RCCAP (RCCAP-2; 
YHA, 2009) as the need to carry out mapping exercises, regional inventories and data 
gathering continually arose -  having not been comprehensively carried out prior to 
development of the first Action Plan -  while at the same time actions were being drawn 
up quickly in order to “urgently press on” with developing a new Action Plan. This 
perhaps reflects climate change as a ‘wicked issue’ for policy makers, in the sense that 
data and information has not always been available within the same timescales as the 
perceived need to act require (see Chapter 12 for further discussion of this). Nonetheless, 
there were elements of this that were specific to the regional partnership, which fed 
through into understanding the purpose of the regional partnership and the related 
RCCAP. This was encapsulated in the following discussion of the process behind the 
second iteration of the Plan:
I get the impression that at the moment we’re trying to start with a blank sheet of paper and 
kind of think, what are we really about, what are we really trying to achieve and is there a 
point to us?
Regional Climate Change Manager, Y&H
There had been a degree of post hoc reflection regarding the Action Plan, but at the 
same time, this only served to highlight the uncertainty about the specific role of the 
region in governing carbon management. This issue was prevalent across both sets of 
first wave practices analysed here, and is explored further in the following discussion 
chapter; in particular this relates to the problem of attempting to build a new policy 
domain within a relatively ‘unfixed’ spatial settlement.
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Governing from ‘Above’
The initial drive towards regional partnerships and action planning came in part from 
central government. Defra and UKCIP’s initial funding of climate change co-ordinators 
for the regions provided some impetus towards developing cross-organisational action 
on climate change. Although these monies were particularly aimed at driving action on 
climate adaptation they were also used to develop work on carbon management across 
the regions. This funding was not, however, sufficient to allow a continuous co­
ordinator post in Yorkshire and the Humber without match-funding from elsewhere and 
the two year gap between co-ordinators was clearly deleterious to the Partnership’s 
progress. This gap also meant that the Partnership was less tied in to regional networks 
across England. UKCIP facilitated a climate change co-ordinator network, which was 
primarily focused on adaptation, but which nonetheless played an important role in 
allowing co-ordinators to share knowledge on mitigation agendas:
... of course we end up talking about the whole gamut of things we’re involved in and what 
the region’s up to, and the majority of that still is on the mitigation side, so that inevitably 
becomes part of the discussions.
Climate Change Co-ordinator, North East
The barriers faced by the Partnership should also be set within the context of a wider 
governing malaise. It was clear that there was a distinct lack of formal support from 
central governmental actors, despite their initial priming of the co-ordinator role. While 
UKCIP continued to provide support on adaptation issues, there was little involvement 
from central government on carbon management activity through the Partnership, 
although the provision of some funds was relatively important in keeping the 
Partnership and the Plan going:
At the regional level to date, minimal... We have had some bits of funding but it’s you know, 
little bits here and there. But, in terms of advising policy, minimal. And this time round, 
we’ve not specifically consulted them ... I mean obviously we’re aware of the national 
picture as a reason for the Action Plan: because so much has happened nationally since the 
last one was published. But no specific advice as such.
Regional Policy M anager, Y&H
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This was not limited to Yorkshire and the Humber: respondents in the North East noted
f\1a similar lack of engagement with Defra and CLG. Similarly, as with the regional 
target, EU actors were absent from the Plan process. That is not to say that the EU is not 
a powerful actor on climate change, and that its work did not impact on the regions -  in 
fact, it has been crucial to their very existence as governed spaces -  but that EU actors 
were not involved in specific regional activities, such as Plan-development. Their role 
here would perhaps be described by Bob Jessop as metagovemance ‘in the shadow of 
hierarchy’. More specifically -  and as noted in the previous chapter -  the types of 
practices that the EU engage in to govern action on climate change at the regional level 
tend to be very much ‘at a distance’ through specific authoritative interventions, 
directives or funding regimes; many of which filter through the mediating force of the 
UK government before arriving in the offices of regional policy makers. On the other 
hand, the EU does work to develop transnational regional networks on certain policy 
agendas such as ESPON or networks relating to the EU cohesion agenda or Structural 
Funds: regional actors tended not to be aware of or involved in similar activities with 
regard to carbon management.
Conclusion: does the region operate as a scaled network?
This chapter explored the development of a regional climate change partnership and 
associated action plan for Yorkshire and the Humber, with some reference to the North 
East and South West by way of context. These developments worked as two sets of 
governing technologies: one of which was based around a seductive regionalist 
programme in an attempt to re-imagine the region as a carbon space and a ‘natural’ 
point of governing carbon management. Despite the strong sentiment behind this, the 
allied technologies based on facilitation and enabling largely failed, with a number of 
factors for this discussed above. More widely, these factors touch on questions about the 
extent to which the region failed to become a ‘scaled network’ for activity on carbon 
management, in much the same way that it failed to develop a scalar relationship in 
developing an emissions target for the region. In other words, the relative failure of the 
action plan and partnership highlighted the fact that the region did not act as a point of 
interaction on climate change: networks within the region were not, and did not become,
67 DECC was not created until October 2008
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scaled in this way. This may also reflect on the intrinsic nature of climate change as a 
policy agenda and highlights the limitations of contiguous spaces that can be ‘made the 
same’ as objects of government for certain types of ‘fluid’ phenomenon. A brief look at 
the different ‘types’ of local authorities within Yorkshire and the Humber would help to 
further unpack these issues.
In terms of local authorities, there seemed to be two broad categories: larger authorities 
that were not ‘bound’ by the region; and smaller authorities that were not ‘plugged in’ 
to the region. The ‘unbound’ authorities tended instead to be members of wider 
networks; in particular, the UK Core Cities Climate Change Group, through which each 
of the UK’s core cities has signed up to the Core Cities Climate Declaration, but also 
international networks, such as that framed around the Aalborg Agreement or the Cities 
for Climate Protection network (see Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). They had not only 
‘jumped scales’, but also had been actively involved in the creation of new ‘networked 
scales’:
Firstly, I think, here in [the local authority area], as I’ve said, we’ve not had much 
engagement from anyone regionally really, but also I think as a city, we look to the other 
core cities rather than to the region. Another thing is around timescales: it’s not as though it’s 
co-ordinated in any way to match up with when we were coming out with our Action Plan at 
all; not that it necessarily needs to be, but the timing just didn’t match up... And... well, I just 
don’t think we as a unit were massively aware of the regional agenda... We didn’t, or don’t, 
necessarily see its relevance to us.
Local Authority Executive, Y&H
This also highlights a second issue: not only were these larger authorities not interacting 
as part of or with a regional network, they also saw regional governing actors as being 
somewhat ‘behind’ in terms of their efforts on climate change. This was emphasised by 
another respondent -  this time not at a ‘core city’ authority -  who claimed that “it’s 
local authorities like us that are leading the way on climate change, not the region” 
(local authority officer, Y&H).
‘Unplugged’ authorities, on the other hand, were those that were not being reached by 
the regional Partnership, and/or were not attempting to engage themselves. For these 
authorities, climate change was either not fully on the local agenda, or the Partnership 
was not offering them the benefits that would be of most use to them:
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You could say that it’s taking a while for certain [council] Members to come round to the 
seriousness of climate change. And that stops things moving. But, I have to say, I don’t think 
really the regional group have really tried to engage with us greatly. It’s something I 
personally would see the benefit in, linking up with others to learn from each other, get some 
economies of scale from pooling resources and getting extra resources from elsewhere 
maybe, but I haven’t really had the sense that they’re [the regional partnership] pushing that 
agenda to be honest.
Local Authority Officer, Y&H
Instead, those authorities that did want support on climate change issues reported that 
they tended to look to national advice bodies, such as the Carbon and Energy Savings 
Trusts, for specific help on carbon management.
The issue of ‘unbound’ and ‘unplugged’ authorities is developed further in Chapter 12, 
while the following chapter turns to drawing out some of the wider issues relating to the 
development and implementation of first wave practices.
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11 Disconnection, non-engagement and muddle
Taking the analysis of the technologies in Chapters 9 and 10 together, a number of broader themes clearly emerge. Despite some small successes in developing a 
carbon regionalism through broad-based approaches based on associative power, first 
wave efforts largely failed to impact on action in the region. Regional actors did not 
develop a basis for regional action that was either sufficiently cohesive or compelling to 
engage non-statutory actors in the process. This can be reduced to the fact that regional 
actors lacked governing or spatial legitimacy in the eyes of others both internal and 
external to the regions. Regional actors failed to embed a regionalist discourse to 
foreground action on carbon management: to return to an earlier quotation, “what the 
region says on climate change isn’t really on the ... agenda” (local authority officer, 
Y&H).
These are played out through a number of factors that came through both the wider 
analysis of modes of governing and the specific studies of the two meta-technologies in 
Yorkshire and the Humber and can loosely be filed under governing and spatial 
legitimacies. In terms of governing, the previous two chapters described the limited 
success of attempts to draw in actors from different policy domains, types of 
organisations or scales of activity. This leads to a sense of isolated networks within 
regional organisations; vertical disconnection between actors operating at different 
scales; and a linked ‘politics of non-engagement’. Spatially, there was a clear notion of 
carbon regionalism as a ‘regional agenda’, rather than an ‘agenda of the region’ (as 
noted in Chapter 10): that is, led by a small number of ‘regional’ actors, rather than 
something that a wide range of actors within the region engaged with. Crossing the two 
sets of issues was a sense of institutional muddle, as highlighted by other studies of 
sustainability policy (see Batchelor and Patterson, 2007; Gore and Wells, 2009), but that 
-  crucially -  this was mired in a deeper existential muddle. Reflecting back on the 
previous two chapters, this meant a lack of clarity of purpose, difficulty in identifying
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problems and solutions, including identification of which actors to engage through what
means.
Governing Legitimacy
It was clear that regional actors lacked governing legitimacy in terms of carbon 
management. There was some limited expression of regional actors as being seen as 
progressive in Yorkshire and the Humber, with a belief from some that regional actors 
were doing more on carbon management than in other regions. This still amounted to 
little, however: “it’s at the local level where innovation is taking place; where some of 
us are pushing climate change as an issue and really taking it seriously” (local authority 
executive, Y&H). This is a contentious claim and certainly not all, or even many local 
authorities could be said to have been demonstrating such a commitment. But, by dint 
of the operations they perform, local authorities are intrinsically more closely linked to 
the space that they govern and they also have some de facto  representative legitimacy 
through the elected chamber of councillors. As a result of this, in some ways local 
authorities had greater autonomy than regional actors to develop their own agendas, 
even if centralisation and regionalisation over the period 1979-2007 did limit the ability 
to act upon them.
Sentiment regarding the region as a progressive force was also noticeably absent in the 
South West and North East: “They’re attempting F all, excuse the language, nothing 
beyond a few words here and there, the odd flagship development...” (Local authority 
officer, NE). Regional actors were also seen as reactive to development elsewhere:
They, well, let’s take each of the three. The RDA, Yorkshire Forward, they’re... well, they 
did start off with some good rhetoric, the targets, what have you, but... They’re not really 
pushing on climate change are they? They’re kind of... You get the sense of them putting 
their heads above the parapet now and again and thinking, ‘something’s going to happen on 
this soon’ ... Government Office, well, they’re whatever the Government says ... and the 
Assembly, I get the sense that the intentions are there, but they can’t do a lot unless other 
people agree to it, agree to fund it.
Regional Stakeholder, Y&H
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Understanding these issues may be helped in part through reference to Jessop’s (2003) 
notion of inevitable ‘governing failure’ and the lack of a cohesive programme of 
practices or specific technologies, including little variation in the form of these practices. 
For instance, the regional target was left largely hanging alone in documents, expected 
to work as seductive technology in itself. There was no comprehensive programme to 
engage other regional actors in the target. The RCCAP could be seen as in part reacting 
to this issue, although influence from Defra and UKCIP provided greater impetus 
towards developing the Plan. Similarly, the Plan did contain a wide number of 
deliverable actions, but these were not linked to any delivery framework. Some of the 
actions may have had frameworks set in place ‘behind the scenes’, but many clearly did 
not. In particular, actions that were aimed at encouraging action amongst -  for example 
-  LSPs and local authorities had no particular governing strategy behind them, other 
than a broad notion of ‘engagement’. A typical example of this was the aim for all local 
authorities to develop their own climate change action plans: it appeared that the 
existence of the RCCAP was expected to act as a seductive or inductive technology in 
itself, as if local authorities were supposed to see the Plan and say ‘the region’s got one, 
so we’d better follow suit’. This relies on local authorities already being tied into the 
notion of the region as a legitimate governing and spatial entity, however. This 
highlights a form of Catch-22 situation, propagated by a lack of attempts by regional 
actors to change the way in which they approach practices of governing.
Drawing from these thoughts, two particular problems of governing legitimacy present 
themselves as indicative of wider patterns of carbon management policy at the regional 
level. These relate to linked notions of autonomy and representation and were noted 
within the studies of the two technologies in Chapters 9 and 10, but also more broadly 
across each of the three regions.
Vertical disconnection (not autonomy)
The regionalist programmes studied here did not succeed in travelling across scales of
governing. Their targeted governed entities did not engage with the rhetoric of
governing and spatial legitimacy for a carbon regionalism, in part because of a lack of a
comprehensive programme of practice to engage them; and also -  perhaps crucially -
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because central government did not engage in a co-ordinated manner with regional 
approaches to climate change. This may have been in part because climate change still 
lacked real ‘thematic legitimacy’ at the national level and it was not yet at the point 
where national climate policy was taken sufficiently seriously to disaggregate 
responsibilities to sub-national governing actors. From interviews with central 
government civil servants at Defra it seemed that there was a degree of general 
ambivalence about the role of regional actors in acting on carbon management, partly 
because they were not yet clear what they felt the role of regions should be within 
national policy.
This highlights a wider issue of ‘vertical disconnection’ between national, regional and 
local governing actors on climate change. Actors did not act autonomously -  their 
actions were heavily shaped by other, principally central government actors -  but at the 
same time, they did not engage with actors at different scales in their decision-making: 
“we just don’t have the leverage to make them do what we want” (regional policy 
maker, NE).
The issue of governmental constraint is not a simple case of statutory responsibilities 
and governmental intervention: more subtle forms of power, through various governing 
technologies, were more in evidence in constraining action at the regional tier. This is 
particularly an issue for climate change policy, as an emerging and potentially complex 
policy domain. This has resulted in uncertainty at the regional level, a lack of 
engagement at the local level and a seeming sense of “bemusement” at the national level 
as to the actions of regional organisations (Central Government Policy Manager). 
Regional respondents were relatively open in saying that they were not clear of what is 
expected of them by central government. They received little guidance over the 
development of carbon reduction policy and often received contradictory messages from 
different government departments:
I have to be honest, and say, I don’t think we, I don’t think any of us, really know what’s 
expected of us from central government. There really hasn’t been a great deal of ‘steering’ if 
you like, so we’re just trying to work it all out, not all on our own, but there is an element of 
that.
Regional Assem bly Policy M anager, Y&H
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In 2007 there were no set guidelines of expectation from central government to the 
regions, and many respondents at the regional level mentioned a lack of formal or 
informal governmental steering and ‘enabling’ on carbon management in general. This 
was not confined to Yorkshire and the Humber; respondents in the South West and 
North East were agreed on this and the UK Government tacitly acknowledged this issue 
in response to criticism from the Environmental Audit Committee: “Regional co­
ordination is important and the Government must ensure that the different players 
are all clear about their respective roles” (Government Response to Environment Audit 
Committee, 2008, Paragraph 66).
The EU has been cited by others (for instance, Fairbrass and Jordan, 2004) as key to the 
development of progressive national and sub-national policies on environmental 
sustainability. At the regional level this was largely an invisible process in terms of 
climate change action; either through policy that filtered first through national 
government, or through conditions attached to associated funding regimes. There was 
also a distinct lack of direct engagement with the EU. For example:
We’ve had some contact with [the EU] on specific issues -  especially on CCS [Carbon 
Capture and Storage] -  but not a great deal in general; and nothing on the Action Plans. Of 
course there are specific points in funding programmes, although they can be interpreted in 
different ways.
Regional Policy Manager, Y&H
None of the respondents could point to much involvement with the European 
Commission or Directorates General, although this was beginning to improve. It is 
important to bear in mind the limit to European Commission resources -  particularly in 
terms of personnel -  here: they have to prioritise how and where they focus attention, 
but clearly -  outwith specific regional programmes -  regional carbon management 
policy had not been afforded major focus at this point.
Representation: politics o f non-engagement
Linked to evidence of vertical disconnection was a politics of non-engagement between 
different actors across governing levels, and outside core governing networks at the
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regional level. In the South West, for example, there was a complaint that GOSW had 
played a role in this lack of engagement in not functioning as a conduit between 
government and other statutory regional organisations:
It’s been very, very poor. We have engaged extensively with regional representatives of 
national agencies, such as the Highways Agency, but if you’re saying “have you had good 
links with government departments or ministers” ... then no. We’ve approached Government 
Office -  we saw it partly as their job to link us up with Whitehall -  and they have said that 
Whitehall are too busy with the Climate Change Bill, Energy Bill and so on. Which I thought 
was a bit weak; and a bit crap to be honest with you ... And Government Office didn’t really 
help, by acting as both gatekeeper and lock keeper.
Regional Assembly Policy Manager, South West
This also had further consequences on relations between other governing organisations. 
For example, in one particular case a lack of engagement between EU advisors and the 
regional development agency led to an exacerbation of tensions between local and 
regional actors. In this instance, a local authority was approached by the regional 
European Office to build on an existing programme relating to renewable energy 
production. They did not, however, engage with the RDA -  who held the necessary 
funds -  in this process, and as a result the application for funding failed: the RDA had 
already committed its money elsewhere. This in turn created some ill-feeling between 
the local authority and the RDA.
A more general perspective from respondents working within the regions was the lack 
of accountability of regional actors, linked to them also appearing unrepresentative of 
‘the region’ more broadly conceived:
The region looks, from the outside, like a completely self-serving, self-apppointed sort of 
coterie of a few people making all the decisions. Which isn’t entirely fair, but you can see 
why it might look that way. And I can quite clearly remember sitting in a bar, at a conference 
[laughs], after far too many drinks one night, and I can remember talking to somebody about 
-  this is five years ago -  and him saying that there’s going to be a backlash against 
regionalism because of exactly this; because people just., the case for it hasn’t been made 
properly. And there’s no clear line of accountability for it. And it’s kind of set up to fail.
Former Regional Policy Director, NE EA
Another respondent noted similar issues, pointing to an inherent weakness within the 
regional governing system, essentially arguing that the region’s main strength has also 
acted as its ‘Achilles heel’:
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One of the slightly appealing things about a regional tier of government [is that] the region is 
small enough to be responsive to local circumstances, but big enough to be able to make and 
arguably impose some of the more awkward areas of decision-making ... where no local 
government wants to be responsible for that decision and responsible to their local electorate 
for. I think where that falls down is that ordinary people have got wise to that approach and 
they’re very suspicious of unaccountability at all levels.
Former Regional Policy Director, Y&H
This view of regional actors as unrepresentative thus made others less likely to engage 
with them; which in turn works to fulfil this premise.
Governing muddle
A ‘Jessopian’ understanding of these issues may lead to a discussion of processes of 
strategic selectivity as performed by national and regional policy actors. This is 
followed here to a degree. Clearly national government, and EU bodies, shaped regional 
action through on the one hand ‘letting them get on with it’ while also communicating 
an expectation of a degree of action to take place, but at the same time not setting a 
strategic tone through their own actions or providing regions with the necessary 
resources to push the agenda comprehensively themselves. On the other hand, the extent 
to which all of these processes are intentional is questionable; central government itself 
was still only beginning to grapple with the issue of climate change and the level of 
change required to achieve large-scale emissions reductions. In this case it would not be 
fair to call all of these events ‘strategic’. In the same vein, Gerry Stoker’s (2002) notion 
of ‘purposeful muddle’ is partially discounted. Early carbon regionalisms partly failed 
because of a lack of commitment -  and national government was perhaps happy to see 
what experiments emerged from regional thinking -  but largely because “nobody knew 
what they were doing” (regional stakeholder, NE) nationally, as well as regionally.
In a wider sense, the UK government’s ambivalence towards effective action on carbon 
emissions did shape a number of the actions taken by regional actors, and also the 
response of local authorities -  and other actors -  to the actions taken by them. The 
forms of power exerted tended to be shaped by a lack of concern for climate change as 
compared to other issues; that is, they were generally limited to exercising ‘soft’
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associative power. Similarly, actions were often shaped by ‘indirect’ power: an 
assumption of national governmental interference if certain actions were, or were not, 
taken. This was built on ‘messages’ received from central government, or on the basis 
of previous interventions.
These problems were not limited to actors external to the core regional network. There 
was also a lack of strategic commitment within regional governing organisations, as 
demonstrated in the discussions of carbon regionalisms above:
...there is a leadership vacuum on climate change which needs to be rectified, so that climate 
change action can be more effectively delivered and monitored.
Regional Scrutiny Panel, Y&H, 2008 p20
As a result of this external and internal ‘muddle’, regional policy makers and officers 
struggled to outline what the role of their agencies on climate change should be. This 
uncertainty and disconnection between central and regional departments made regional 
agencies also less likely to go beyond quite pragmatic, timid proposals towards 
governing carbon management; including a lack of willingness to contribute significant 
levels of resources towards a policy area that was not being pushed as a regional issue 
by central government.
As a result there was a genuine feeling amongst regional policy professionals and 
stakeholders that the lack of engagement between tiers of governing, and a general 
sense of governing muddle was constraining action:
You feel that you’ve., you’ve put a lot of effort in to kind of build a regional consensus 
around these areas and we just don’t have the instruments, we don’t have the power to do 
much about it, you know. I think that genuinely effective initiatives in climate change 
mitigation are going to come from the ground up, from the local scale... And government is 
still too scared to take that sort of leap ... It feels as though it is waiting until voters are in 
favour of climate change mitigation before it will do anything. So, all of the people who 
have specific jobs, remits within their jobs about climate change mitigation don’t really have 
any... teeth, any instruments with which to do their job.
Former Regional Executive, NE
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Similarly, from a local authority perspective:
The lack of input legitimacy, of democratic mandate, and the disconnect between the region 
and local authorities, means that it’s not getting into the local authority system; it’s not., 
trickling through.
Regional Local Government Representative, Y&H
In addition, the 2007 ‘Sub-national Review’ may be said to have set the wider role of 
statutory regional bodies in governing the environment into greater question. I will 
return to this in the next chapter.
Spatial legitimacy
Disconnection between governing networks -  and the problems that this can cause -  
was an important theme of regional action on climate change. This can be discussed 
through the lens of governing legitimacy; but there is also a range of linked spatial 
issues that mediated the governing process. These relate to scalar practices, place-based 
discourses and a wider sense of ‘existential muddle’ as to how the regions should be 
understood by policy actors.
A regional agenda, not an agenda of the region.
First and foremost, linked to -  and perhaps partially explaining -  the notion of vertical 
disconnection, carbon regionalisms were specifically regional agendas, in the sense that 
they were developed by actors within core regional governing networks, rather than 
being an agenda o f the region, an ‘organic’ manifestation of a shared carbon 
management agenda amongst people across the region.68
This was owing in part to the weakness of the ‘region as place’ discourse: local 
authorities, for instance, saw themselves as residing within a region, but did not really 
identify with the region as a core point of concern. For respondents that represented
68 I mean core here in the sense o f  being people within the statutory agencies, rather than the ‘core’ 
decision-m aking actors on mainstream policy dom ains such as econom ic policy
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local authorities, the region was not a ‘place’ of shared beliefs and agendas. It was 
instead seen as a network of people operating at a different spatial scale of activity, with 
whom they may interact, but who were not a natural first point of call beyond those 
areas where there was a statutory relationship in place: for instance through planning 
guidance.
Similarly, the region did not -  on the whole -  act as a ‘scaled network’ for many larger 
authorities, who instead looked to other cities across the UK, Europe and the rest of the 
world to share ideas and best practice on climate change. For example, respondents in 
larger authorities often talked of being part of networks such as the Core Cities network, 
or the international Cities for Climate Protection network. Smaller authorities with less 
capacity could benefit most from regional enabling activities, but they were not being 
comprehensively reached. There were, for example, local authority actors who were 
keen to be involved but felt disengaged from regional activity: some respondents from 
these authorities complained that the region was less interested in the ‘smaller’ 
problems that they faced; others felt that they just were not being offered the “right sort” 
(local authority officer, Y&H) of engagement by the region. Some smaller authorities 
felt more of an affinity towards sub-regional activities (see the example of the Tees 
Valley in Chapter 12), and yet others had a more parochial ‘keep ourselves to ourselves’ 
attitude and were not involved in any climate networks. In all three regions, one or two 
local authorities were recognised as leading on climate change agendas, but the feeling 
was that they were not being effectively utilised to push the agenda at a regional level.
Existential muddle
Within regional networks there was also a very strong sense that regional actors were
unsure as to how ‘the region’ should be understood, especially when this came to
understanding the ‘carbon region’. This moves beyond confusion over the role of
different actors, or ‘governing muddle’, to a deeper sense of ‘existential muddle’. This
stretches back to the construction of the regions as spaces of governing, as discussed in
Chapter 3, but attempting to re-imagine an already chaotically understood concept has
highlighted these issues further. One respondent was particularly open in revealing the
uncertainty about what constitutes ‘the region’:
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You start to get into questions like why the region? What is the region? And if you’re like 
me, you think ‘bloody hell! This isn’t quite what I was signing up for when I came here!’ 
And in truth I don’t think we could really, not properly, answer those questions.
Regional Policy Manager, Y&H
This issue is portrayed in both case studies above. For instance, the construction of the 
regional target may be seen as a search for order and an attempt to give a clear signal of 
the region as a legitimate space. Instead, however, it succeeded in showing a degree of 
uncertainty about what counted as ‘regional’ emissions, with prevarication around 
‘regional influence’ over particular sectors, but also a lack of spatial delineation 
between -  for example -  regional and local. In fact, no spatial pattern of emissions was 
being reported through regional monitoring at all. Also, as a result of not being clear in 
their understanding of the region, regional actors did not seem to know exactly who 
their target audience was, especially in the Action Plan and Partnership. Although the 
Action Plan focused on particular sectors, different respondents said different things: 
some were keen to get more ‘regional players’ on board; some felt that local authorities 
were a target audience, while others did not; some wanted to be involved with engaging 
individuals with climate change, while yet others felt strongly that this was not the 
region’s role. One respondent felt that regional actors involved with the Yorkshire and 
Humber Climate Change Partnership had not been reflexive or reflective enough in 
approaching climate change as a regional issue:
So climate change is interesting because it’s... I don’t know how it would work with 
something else., but it seems to be that we’re, you know, we’re dealing with the issue in the 
way that we deal with every other issue, and perhaps climate change is a bit., bit different, 
and perhaps we should be dealing with it a bit differently. I think there’s an automatic 
assumption that we’re doing something useful when perhaps it’s all already happening out 
there and we don’t need someone to drive it or add value to it. I think we do, but... I think 
we need to not just assume that.
Regional Policy Manager, Y&H
When well understood lines of authority are in place, these issues can be put to one side 
somewhat: an organisation’s role is simply to act on orders. Where this is not the case -  
as for first wave climate action -  it seems to be of fundamental importance that spatial 
governing actors are clear about what their potential role could be, but also about what 
and who they are trying to influence.
245
The next chapter turns to second wave practices, which brought a number of 
continuities from previous challenges, although these issues were re-cast within a move 
towards the development of instrumental governing programmes and greater central 
government co-ordination. This has the effect of making some differences appear more 
stark -  for instance problems relating to ‘unbound’ and ‘unplugged’ local authorities, 
while issues relating to regional legitimacy became somewhat circumvented by shifts in 
scalar and sectoral organisation of carbon management policy.
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12 Second wave action: instrumental rationalities 
and fractured regionalisms
The publication of the ‘Sub-National Review’ (SNR), the Climate Change Act and the national roll out of Local Area Agreements (LAAs) in 2007 and 2008 had 
significant impacts on the English regions as political spaces and for climate change as 
a political issue. These governmental programmes brought changes to the involvement 
of different actors within the governing process: for instance, LAAs brought about a 
greater emphasis on the direct involvement of Government Offices, while the SNR 
resulted in the abolition of Regional Assemblies and an enhanced role for regional local 
government associations.
There was also a shift in the form and extent of governing meta-technologies for carbon 
management. First wave meta-technologies featured regional actors as instigators of 
spatial governing programmes, which were bound to sets of regionalist discourses. The 
introduction of local carbon emissions monitoring and targets marked a second wave of 
action, with a move towards regional actors becoming more bound as mediators of 
authority. This took place alongside an array of enabling and co-optive arrangements to 
work with actors within the regions: indeed many of these arrangements were developed 
as a response to growing statutory pressures on public and private sector bodies to 
reduce their emissions. For instance, the growth of local authority climate ‘regionalisms’ 
through Regional Improvement and Efficiency Partnerships may be seen as a direct 
response to the inclusion of area-wide carbon reduction targets in LAAs.
Specifically, these changes might be said to have signalled a move from governing 
through ‘muddled co-option’ at the regional level towards the development of specific 
instrumental rationalities, whilst -  at the same time -  more fractured regionalisms based 
on specific sectoral or instrumental goals began to emerge. If first wave technologies 
were defined by vertical disconnection and a politics of non-engagement, second wave
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approaches moved towards more formalised vertical hierarchies and a politics of 
variegated connection manifested through access to and manipulation of knowledge or 
evidence. This fits in with a wider ‘politics of mediation’ that began to emerge through 
the development of centralised carbon reduction programmes.
Having focused more specifically on two sets of practices in Yorkshire and the Humber 
in Chapter 9 and 10, I will widen the focus once more in this chapter to take in 
developments across the three regions. LAAs, as a national programme rolled out at the 
same time across the country, allow for a more comparative angle to be taken, which 
also helps to gain a broader understanding of the direction of travel in the regions at the 
end of the research period.
Governing from above: four key developments
Before delving into the specifics of the issues outlined above, it is worth a brief 
reminder of the key national policy developments that took place in 2007, and some 
discussion of the implications -  broadly speaking -  that they had for regional carbon 
management actors.
The Sub-National Review
As noted above (and in Chapter 3), The Review o f Sub-national Economic Development 
and Regeneration (HM Treasury, 2007) -  or ‘Sub-National Review’ (SNR) -  had far- 
reaching implications for the regions, most notably through the abolition of Regional 
Assemblies. At the same time, the SNR proposed the strengthening of sub- or city- 
regional governing arrangements in terms of greater delivery of regional programmes 
through sub-regional partnerships and -  where there was demand -  the introduction of 
Multi-Area Agreements for groups of local authorities. As a result, regional actors were 
to be left with a more ‘strategic’ governing role. These changes had a number of 
repercussions, with statutory planning and transport responsibilities being transferred to 
RDAs, and the ‘democratic’ mandate being taken up by newly empowered regional
Local Government Associations: Local Government Yorkshire and Humber (LGYH),
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South West Councils, and Association of North East Councils (ANEC) in the three 
regions of concern here. For some respondents, especially representatives of local 
authorities, this represented a positive step and was seen to lead the way towards a more 
streamlined and directly representative system of governing. This, they felt, could 
potentially work towards removing the issues of non-engagement and vertical 
disconnection outlined in the previous chapter:
That’s actually, to me got some positive aspects to it. Part of it is about trying to rebuild the 
relationships between different levels of government and trying to get a proper 
accountability structure there. And in terms of the regions, it’s about looking at it all and 
thinking ‘what can be done at the regional level that adds value by us all working together, 
by collaborating’ ... and I’m particularly interested in what might come through more 
collaboration at the sub-regional level.
Regional Local Government Representative, Y&H
Similarly, in the North East it was seen as an opportunity to clear up tensions between 
different policy actors, and bring about greater engagement between RDAs and local 
government:
I don’t think it will change regional policy as such, but it will change the way it’s developed, 
because one organisation won’t be around ... ANEC and the Assembly used to be one body, 
and they split and there’s political tensions around ‘who’s the boss’. But they will have to be 
stepping up to the mark. And they have to sign up to the IRS and each of the Local 
Authorities, too ... Previously, I don’t think the RDA have had much to do with local 
authorities. That has to change, they have to be on board with them.
Regional Policy Manager, NE
This also had immediate ramifications for the day-to-day workings of regional 
governing networks, as Assemblies wound down and new settlements were agreed. 
RDAs were able to exercise greater power over the decisions made in partnerships - as 
outlined by more than one respondent in each of the regions - while Regional Local 
Government Associations began to push for more resources and be more vocal in their 
views. At the same time, this did not necessarily always result in ‘power struggles’ and 
in Yorkshire and the Humber the key issues appeared to be more about pragmatic 
discussions around ‘moving forward’:
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I guess there probably is a difference. It’s very difficult to get away from a sense that we 
know the Assembly’s not going to be there in two years time, so there’s a kind of sense that 
as we get closer to that their importance will diminish. And particularly for the Action 
Plan ... it’s probably going to be a two or three year action plan, so its lifetime is going to be 
longer than that of the Assembly when it’s launched, so we have to have a think about how 
that works.
Regional Policy Manager, Y&H
In terms of climate change, the SNR -  particularly in the consultation draft -  was 
decidedly quiet. Climate change was mentioned rarely, and with no reference to the 
regions’ role in tackling carbon emissions in the whole of the original document. 
Furthermore, the consultation draft proposed the removal of all statutory targets from 
RDAs -  including those related to sustainable development -  and replacing them with a 
single indicator based on regional GVA. This provoked a degree of concern from policy 
professionals and stakeholders around the country, including the vast majority of those 
interviewed for this research: “it’s a very clear concern, if you listen to the response 
from people in this region, and others” (Regional Policy Manager, North East). In 
reality, however, other political developments ensured that carbon has remained on the 
agenda for all governing actors, although in part as a means to increase GVA.
The Climate Change Act
On 13th March 2007, the draft Climate Change Bill was published, setting out a
framework for reducing carbon emissions in the UK. It received royal assent as an Act
of Parliament in November 2008. Despite being a major piece of legislation, the
immediate ramifications for the regions were not clear. Nonetheless, the Act did not
include any specific requirements for regional emissions budgeting. It certainly framed
policy debates at a regional level, however, and led to some reflection on the role of the
regions in governing carbon management: “it [the Act] does beg some fundamental
questions, particularly with the SNR happening and changing relationships” (Regional
Climate Change Manager, Y&H). Effectively, this worked to bring climate change
higher up the regional agenda, both through adding to the national discourse regarding
climate change, and through the exercise of indirect power: although regional actors
were not directly affected by the Act, they could foresee an increase in expectation for
regional action on climate change. This also coincided with a House of Commons
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Environmental Audit Committee enquiry investigating -  amongst other things -  the 
possibility of mandatory disaggregated targets for the regions (discussed in more detail 
below).
Planning Policy Statement: Planning and Climate Change
First published as a consultation document in December 2006, Planning Policy 
Statement: Planning and Climate Change aimed to set out “how planning should 
contribute to reducing emissions and stabilising climate change (mitigation) and take 
into account the unavoidable consequences (adaptation)” (p2). This included guidance 
for regional planning bodies, particularly on the development of Regional Spatial 
Strategies. Alongside broader delivery principles and a reiteration of the need for 
renewable energy targets, the document also “encouraged” (p5) regional planning 
authorities to include carbon trajectories for new developments, but - slightly 
contradictorily - not use these trajectories in making decisions on planning applications. 
Although not directly related to the following discussion, this is worth bearing in mind 
as part of a move towards more central coordination of local and regional climate 
change policy.
Local Area Agreements
The nationwide roll-out of Local Area Agreements in 2008 -  whereby local authorities, 
with their Local Strategic Partnerships, agreed up to 35 targets based on the National 
Indicator set -  was championed as a means of devolving decision-making away from 
central government. Here, Government Offices (GORs) took the role of the 
decentralised ‘administrative state’ (Dryzek, 1992) as a conduit for central government. 
They were responsible for negotiating Local Area Agreements (LAAs) with local 
authorities and Local Strategic Partnerships. No indicators were mandatory in Local 
Area Agreements, but GORs did have to agree to those that were chosen and could 
potentially veto decisions made by local authorities and LSPs, while the Secretary of 
State for Communities and Local Government was ultimately responsible for signing
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off LAAs. All local authorities were monitored through Comprehensive Area 
Assessment (CAA) regardless of their inclusion in LAAs.
The third round of LAAs, published in June 2008, and the linked CAA included for the 
first time a range of climate change related indicators. The new National Indicator (NI) 
set included performance monitoring of local authority contributions to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation: NI 185 referred to local authority ‘in-house’ carbon 
emissions; NI 186 to local authority-wide emissions, NI 187 to fuel poverty, and NI 188 
to climate change adaptation. NI 186 was the first example of mandatory spatial 
emissions reporting in the UK. This indicator was the top priority within Defra for 
inclusion in LAAs (Government Office Yorkshire and Humber, 2008), and as such 
GOR officers were expected to push for their adoption by all local authorities and LSPs.
Instrumental Ties: Calculation and Mediation of Emissions
The most significant developments in spatially governing regional carbon management 
came through the increased monitoring of emissions, as well as a new role as mediator 
for Government Offices in the monitoring of local authority emissions through the CAA 
and local authority emissions targets associated with LAAs. In terms of emissions 
monitoring, there was a centralisation of methodologies through the annual publishing 
of Defra/DECC local and regional emissions data, alongside continuing uncertainty 
regarding the extent of accountability (in both calculative and political senses of the 
term) of the regions. LAAs and CAAs also brought about a range of questions regarding 
the future role of regional actors in governing carbon management, potentially 
suggesting a move towards, or back, to the ‘managerial’ region -  described as 
‘pragmatic’ regionalism in Chapter 3 -  for this policy area, which chimes with an 
emphasis on the ‘strategic’ role of regional actors in the SNR.
Governing from above: emissions monitoring
Carbon management policy at the regional level slowly began to shift towards being
bound by more formal ties to central government. Two sets of issues arose during the
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research period that related to ‘direct’ governing from above, one of which was a fairly 
subtle process of aligning emissions methodologies and one which may have logically 
followed on from this -  the development of disaggregated targets for the regions -  but 
which did not. These two sets of issues are of minor importance within the wider 
understanding of changing carbon management policy: they did not coerce actors into 
action; nor did they include stringent mechanisms of reward and punishment. But they 
do point towards a gradual development of more specific scalar roles -  vaguely akin to 
a form of environmental fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972; 2002) -  including a developing 
hierarchy of authority in climate policy.
Defra/DECC emissions monitoring
As evidence of a fairly ‘covert’ process of goveming-by-authority, although statutory 
regional bodies were not formally monitored with regard to their action on climate 
management, Defra did publish annual regional emissions levels, based on AEA 
Environment (2005; 2006; 2007a) monitoring data. From 2008 onwards, this data was 
given National Statistics status (see National Statistics, 2010). As a result this tended to 
form the basis of emissions monitoring for regional agencies (see Table 18). Both the 
North East and South West used Defra/AEA monitoring data to assess their regional 
emissions, again because this was more “politically expedient” rather than being the 
most robust or ambitious route:
We’ve taken a quite pragmatic approach; it’s much easier to focus on the carbon emissions 
approach that Defra use. There are more subtle methods on the horizon, but it’s a political 
issue; to get it through we had to be pragmatic and look at what was politically expedient.
Regional Policy Officer, South West
Similarly, Yorkshire and the Humber’s Progress in the Region 2007 reported on 
production-based GHGs measured through Cambridge Econometrics’ REEIO (Regional 
Economy Environment Input Output) model, but also shows Defra ‘point-source’ CO2C 
statistics. But by 2008, all reporting referred to Defra statistics. The use of a set 
methodology for LAAs (see discussion below) also meant that if regions tried to be 
consistent, they were bound to the Defra/AEA model.
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Table 18: Methodologies used in measuring GHG emissions
Data Source Target Methodology
Production
National - Kyoto Defra UNFCCC reporting 12.5% (2008-12) based
National - Labour Unclear 20% (2010) Unclear
National - CC Act Defra Environmental Accounts 80% (2050) Point source
Regional - National Defra Environmental Accounts N/A Point source
monitoring
NI 186 Defra Environmental Accounts Varies Point source
Yorks and Humber Defra, SEI, Cambridge 20-25% (2015) Differs across
Econometrics documents
This also introduces a second, potentially more fundamental issue. While Yorkshire and 
the Humber’s aspirational target made no distinction between local and regional 
emissions by monitoring all emissions as ‘regional’; the Defra approach did the 
opposite. Here, the region was simply an aggregation of local authority emissions. This 
points to a notion of the region as purely an intermediary, at most a constrained 
mediator, between supra-national or national government and local authorities. It gave 
no sense of where the much-vaunted ‘added value’ was in having a regional dimension 
to carbon monitoring and management. It is also worth noting at this point that guidance 
on local emissions targets in LAAs (AEA/Defra, 2007) lists a range of ‘local’ and 
‘national’ actions as important in reducing local emissions, but no ‘regional’ actions. 
Again, the regional tier of governing was considered incapable of change in its own 
right, something that the network of RDAs recognised, and contended with:
It is important that innovative action by regional bodies be accounted for ... Regional 
activity is generating additional carbon savings and without this recognition, there will not 
be clarity on how the UK’s overall carbon reduction targets are being met.
Memorandum submitted by the RDAs to the Environmental Audit Committee, 2008
This is drawn out further below in discussing the process of calculating and negotiating 
NI 186 in LAAs. Before doing so, however, the discussion moves to a ‘non-event’: the 
proposal and rejection of mandatory targets for the regions. This deepens the sense of 
uncertainty about where the region should sit within emerging carbon management 
regimes.
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Disaggregated targets
Following the submission of the Climate Change Bill and the reorganisation of regional 
structures, there was some speculation about the possibility of mandatory disaggregated 
targets being introduced for the regions. In initial interviews with regional policy actors 
in the three regions there was a belief that mandatory spatial carbon reduction targets 
were likely to be part of the final post-SNR regional settlement, alongside targets for 
GVA and housing. Around the same time, the cross-party House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) launched an inquiry entitled Climate change 
and local, regional and devolved government. A core element of this was to determine 
“to what extent should there be disaggregated targets for different levels of government?” 
This included discussion of mandatory regional spatial targets. The responses to this 
inquiry revealed a deep level of uncertainty amongst regional actors across England, 
despite a degree of support for mandatory disaggregated targets. The East of England 
Development Agency’s submission was typical in this respect:
There is still no clarity as to whether the Government intends to cascade national targets to 
regional and local level or whether it expects regions and local authorities to establish their 
own targets which will be amalgamated into the national target. There is also uncertainty as 
to whether regional/local targets as set by central government will be legally binding and 
how the Government will ensure fit with the targets which have already been set by regions 
or whether the expectation is that the existing regional/local targets will be abandoned in 
favour of the Government’s targets ... The Government needs to make a clear, urgent 
decision on how it intends to handle regional and local carbon reduction targets ... There 
needs to be a robust and consistent process for cascading targets from the national level 
through the regions to local authorities.
EEDA Submission to EAC, 2008
Respondents in the three regions had also engaged in “a fair amount of discussion” 
(policy co-ordinator, NE) with Defra with regard to the Climate Change Bill and the 
disaggregation of targets. In the final EAC report, however, the Government submitted 
their view that they were “not in favour of disaggregated targets” (ibid., p7).
On the surface, then, this is a bit of a ‘non-issue’. But this does link to the problems 
caused by governmental ‘non-decision making’ discussed in the analysis of first wave 
action. Regional actors were clear only in their lack of clarity about government
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intentions; and in the event the government introduced spatial accountability measures 
through targets at national and local levels, but left an ambiguous gap for the regional 
tier. So, if the regions were not to be held directly accountable for their own action, 
what was their role to be within the emerging calculus of carbon spaces? To this we 
now turn.
Regional actors as mediators of governmental programmes
The introduction of LAAs, and specifically NIs 185 and 186, brought about some 
changes to the role of regional organisations in governing carbon management. These 
changes included strengthening of the role of some policy actors as well as introducing 
a more formal mediating role for the regions, through the activities of GORs as a 
conduit for central-local relations. This took place both through enabling actions to help 
governed entities meet national/supra-national policy requirements and also by 
potentially strengthening processes of goveming-by-authority from national government; 
that is, acting on behalf of government as a localised expression of power (see Allen, 
2003). NI 186 is of particular interest here, as it marked the introduction of spatial 
carbon monitoring and targets at the local level, and opened up a range of issues 
regarding the spatial and scalar politics of carbon management. This included not only 
developments regarding the governing role of regions, but also understandings of the 
region as a space.
NI 186 -  and the optional LAA indicators more generally -  pose a slightly tricky
problem in terms of attempting to define it as a governing mode. It may, for example, be
seen as a form of authority, induction, or enabling mode. In terms of governing by
authority, LAAs were compulsory and every higher-tier authority in England agreed one.
National Indicator 186 was also automatically monitored through CAA, but there was
no statutory compulsion to achieve any set level of emissions reductions unless LSPs,
led by Local Authorities, took up NI 186 as a basis for a target in their LAA. However,
Defra did have NI 186 as their top priority for environmental indicators. As such, GOR
officers were expected to ‘push’ for its inclusion using more ambiguous exertions of
power. Whilst LSPs and local authorities were committed to meeting the agreed targets,
the consequences for failure were unclear (see ‘monitoring’, below). There was,
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however, a small element of induction or provision -  depending on the way the process 
is viewed -  involved in the LAA process: LAAs come with a small pot of money tied to 
achievement of goals.
Table 19: N1186 in LAAs as Governing Technology
Technology Rationality Mode(s) GoverningAgencies
Institutional
Relations
NI 186 Target 
(national govt)
Encourage action 
on GHG emissions 
reduction
Authority, enabling 
(provision)
Defra (DECC 
after Nov 2008)
Hierarchy
NI 186 Target 
(GoRs)
Encourage local 
authorities to take 
up a NI 186 target
Indirect authority,
co-option
(seduction and
manipulation),
enabling
(provision)
Government 
Offices for the 
Regions
Hierarchy
Mediation through Negotiation: Authority, Seduction, Manipulation
The role of GORs, as the regional body charged with negotiating LAAs, demonstrates 
an emerging ‘politics of mediation’ in governing climate change mitigation, firstly as an 
arm of the administrative state; a localised ‘enforcer’ of national policy. Local 
authorities with their LSPs (henceforth referred to jointly as local authorities69) 
potentially engaged in several rounds of formal and informal negotiations with GORs 
and across each stage of agreeing their LAA. In this process, Government Offices were 
seen as the “eyes, ears and mouth” (National Policy Manager) of central government in 
developing the finalised LAAs. As noted above, Defra guidance on LAAs set out NI 
186 as the priority environmental indicator for Government Offices to ‘push’ for in 
negotiations, a process described by a Government Office representative in Yorkshire 
and the Humber:
69 Although L A A s arc supposed to be LSP-led frameworks, in the case o f  NI 186 negotiation was led by 
local authorities.
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We negotiated the LAAs on behalf of central government, with the local authorities, LSPs.. 
So, obviously working for Defra in promoting the hierarchical pyramid that they have, with 
186 at the top, and their expectation that all local authorities have at least one mitigation 
indicator. And our role was about publicising climate change, what support is available, new 
developments on guidance for each indicator, one to one meetings in negotiating each 
indicator ... we were encouraging and challenging them to include 186 and... then agreeing 
the specific targets later on.
Regional Policy Manager, Y&H 
This description was echoed in the South West and North East:
Initial proposals come from local authority, the LSP, and then we’ll get to see those, we’ll 
comment so we have the opportunity to push particular indicators with particular authorities. 
In this round of LAAs we were very clearly given the message that they wanted to see 186 in 
every LAA. Now I don’t see the point of LAAs if the government’s going to say, ‘we want 
that in every LAA’. They’re supposed to be agreements based on local priorities ... We did 
push 186 with all authorities but we didn’t insist on it.
Regional Policy Manager, NE
The above descriptions of the LAA process were also alike in emphasising that GORs 
did not attempt to enforce NI 186, although they did “push” for it. In both instances the 
actual methods of co-optive ‘persuasion’ are unclear, and this is something that was 
difficult to uncover in discussions with respondents. It appears, however, that these 
negotiations focused -  on the whole -  on softer forms of seduction, both through 
emphasising the benefits of including NI 186 -  “we tried to remind them how good it 
would look politically to include it” (Policy Manager, Y&H) -  and through pointing to 
support for the indicator, as described in the above quote from the Regional Climate 
Change Officer. They represented, in other words “the friendly face of authority” 
(Policy Manager, SW). Nonetheless, there was an underlying suggestion that local 
authorities were ‘challenged’ by GORs to take up NI 186 by implying the use of 
threatened authority. In the end, the Secretary of State could veto LAAs, and this 
underlay negotiations:
They didn’t say, ‘you must include this indicator’, but they did stress that they wanted it seen 
there, and when that’s backed up by the power of the State -  even if they’re not saying 
they’ll use that power -  you have to at least pay some regard to that. Because you know that 
they could use that power if they wanted to.
Local Authority Executive, Y&H
258
As with first wave developments, ‘indirect’ authority came to the fore; albeit this time 
more overtly stressed.
Defra was satisfied with the role that GORs played in negotiations, particularly in 
‘selling’ NI 186 to local authorities, as evidenced in interviews and official statements, 
including the following:
Government Offices in partnership with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra) have proved highly successful in achieving the Government’s aim of 
ensuring that addressing climate change features prominently in LAAs.
Environmental Audit Committee, Govt Response 2008 p4
GOR officers in the Yorkshire and the Humber, South West and North East were also 
pleased with their own role in negotiating LAAs, with respondents unanimously keen to 
emphasise their success in achieving take-up of NI 186 and climate change indicators 
more generally. But the role of GORs flowed in both directions; they also were 
important in communicating local authorities’ perspectives to central government. 
Again, respondents working in central government praised the role of GORs in this 
respect:
...this is important: they communicated well with us, and other government departments, 
really well to put across local authority needs.
Policy Executive, Defra
In this sense GORs governed from below as ‘enablers’ of central government operations 
through provision of information, as well as for local authorities through operating as a 
channel to facilitate dialogue with central government. While central government was 
satisfied with the role played by GORs, analysis of NI 186-related guidance and 
discussions with local governing actors tells a slightly more nuanced story. This 
narrative draws out several political issues relating to the process of mediation, in 
particular around access to and manipulation of data, knowledge, evidence and 
monitoring procedures.
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Mediating targets: uneven co-option
Of 150 LAAs agreed in 2008, 87 per cent (130) included at least one carbon reduction 
target, a seemingly encouraging statistic. 100 included NI 186, and of those that did not, 
a further 30 included NI 185 (local authority ‘in-house’ emissions). Of the remaining 20 
LAAs, 13 included NI 188 (climate change adaptation measures). This left just seven 
LAAs with no climate change measures. However, this also shows that a third of local 
authorities did not take up an emissions target that involved instigating action outwith 
their own operations; seemingly a very high non-adoption rate for Defra’s highest 
priority indicator (for further discussion, see Eadson, 2008). Table 20, below, shows the 
key descriptive statistics for the targets agreed.
Table 20: N1186 Targets for C02e Reductions in ‘Take-Up’ LAAs
Carbon reduction target 2008-11
Standard
Year Mean Median Max Min Deviation
2008-11 (n = 95) 10.5% 11.0% 15.0% 1.0% 2.2%
2008-9 (n = 87) 3.7% 3.4% 11.8% 0.0% 2.0%
2009-10 (n = 86) 3.2% 3.3% 7.0% 0.0% 1.2%
2010-11 (n = 86) 3.7% 3.7% 11.0% 0.6% 1.5%
Nb. Targets based on baseline year of 2005
In all, local authorities pledged to cut emissions by 26.4 mega-tonnes, equal to a 5.7 per 
cent reduction of total UK carbon emissions as measured through the indicator, or a 4.7 
per cent reduction in the UK’s total ‘Kyoto’ carbon emissions in 2005. This would have 
provided quite a boost to the UK’s carbon accounts and to achieve such a reduction 
through implementation of NI 186 would appear to be quite an achievement.
A look at the level of take-up of the indicator in each of the case study regions may say 
something about the levels of authority, or the success of their co-optive efforts, being 
exercised by GORs.
260
Table 21: LAA take-up of N1186 in Case Study Regions
LAAs with NJ 
186
Per cent of 
LAAs
Mean reduction 
target 2008-20JJ
North East (n = 12) 1 58% 11.73%
Yorkshire and Humber (n = 15) 10 66% 11.95%
South West (n = 16) 12 75% 8.50%
Table 21, above, shows take-up of NI 186 in the three case study regions. As can be 
seen, there is a mixed picture; only half of North East LAAs included the indicator, 
while 81% of LAAs in the South West did. The North East also had the highest 
incidence of LAAs that include no carbon reduction indicators. This would initially 
suggest that local authorities in the South West were either (a) more politically tuned in 
to climate change mitigation issues or (b) had greater capacity to effect CCL reductions. 
70 But it may also suggest that GOR Officers in the North East were less effective, or 
less willing to fulfil their governmental role in pushing for inclusion of NI 186. 
However, by taking a glance at the agreed targets within those that included the 
indicator, it becomes clear that the South W est’s LAAs agreed to significantly lower 
emissions reductions over the three years of the Agreement than in either the North East 
or Yorkshire and Humber. Perhaps, therefore, GOR Officers in the South West were 
simply more willing to negotiate targets in order to encourage the inclusion of NI 186. 
There was some sense of this in interviews, but nothing conclusive. There may also 
have been some degree of uneven application of intra-regional emphasis on the levels of 
reductions required within NI 186: for example, Bristol in the South West was 
permitted to commit to just a one per cent emissions reduction over the three years of 
the LAA. The case of Bristol is discussed in further detail below.
70 Within each region there is no obvious geographic or political pattern to take up o f  the indicator - with 
the exception o f  the Humber sub-region in Yorkshire and the Humber, w hose LSPs universally opted out 
o f  NI 186: as respondents noted, there was more pressing concern for adaptation issues fo llow in g  the 
floods o f  2007 - so this appears to rule out many o f  the more obvious context dependent issues.
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Mediating data: constrained enabling
In April 2008, AEA Environment produced a report for Defra offering guidance on a 
‘community climate change indicator’, alongside tables suggesting potential emissions 
reductions by local authorities over the period 2004-10. This report and updated data 
was then used in determining suggested targets for local authorities that adopted NI 186. 
Local authorities were supplied with figures via GORs, but these were pre-determined 
by Defra via AEA. While GORs were charged with delivery, they have little power to 
alter the framework for action in any way. This point was made in interviews by local 
and regional respondents: “AEA have projected 11 to 13 per cent for most authorities, 
and we just had a small band that we had flexibility to negotiate in if the local authority 
could provide justification for that”. Their ability to engage in ‘enabling’ activities was 
thus limited and they seemed only able to act, at best, as the ‘kindly face’ of authority.
Not only were the figures prescribed by Defra, but so were specific actions that should 
be taken to achieve the agreed cuts, through recommendations in the supporting AEA 
report. This report lists a total of 49 actions to reduce local emissions, split into national 
programmes, national programmes with local influence, and locally-led programmes. 
Somewhat oddly for a ‘local’ indicator, only seven actions -  marginal actions on local 
transport such as ensuring residents’ tyres are at the optimum pressure to decrease petrol 
consumption -  out of the total are locally-led. As noted above, there is no mention of 
regional actions within this, and again, there is no leeway given for GORs to suggest 
alternative actions or to allow local authorities to suggest different approaches. In all, 
there was “a lack of scope really for Government Office to have much say in how 
targets are met and what target should be set” (Regional Local Government Executive, 
Yorkshire and Humber).
Mediating knowledge: limited provision, unequal capacities
One area in which GOR representatives did have the capacity to enable local authorities
was through the provision of knowledge, data and evidence. This emerged as a key
issue in interviews with respondents and in the LAA negotiation process it was clear
that some local authorities -  many of which came under the banner of those ‘unbound’
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to the region -  were more ‘carbon savvy’ than others. These authorities were able to 
manipulate figures and make a case for a target different to that prescribed by central 
government. As noted, Bristol in the South West was able to make a case for just a one 
per cent CO2 reduction over the three years of the LAA: government figures (AEA, 
2008) suggested they should be able to achieve a 13.1 per cent reduction (see Eadson, 
2008 for further analysis of this issue). This shows one way in which GORs, Regional 
Assemblies and regional local government associations failed to achieve a level playing 
field in the negotiation of emissions targets. The rationale behind emissions reduction 
scenarios, produced by AEA Environment on behalf of Defra, is in itself something that 
in excess of one-third of local authority respondents were unaware of. As such, they 
were automatically disadvantaged in terms of agreeing to a target: they did not know 
what the target referred to. In many local authorities they “were just really thinking, 
well that sounds about right, that’s similar to the national target, okay” (local authority 
officer, Y&H). Similarly, many of the smaller ( ‘unplugged’) ‘carbon naive’ authorities 
did not possess the resources to effectively negotiate on targets: again showing a failure 
by regional organisations to provide adequate support.
The position for authorities that did not adopt NI 186 was similar. Some opted out of the 
target because they had recognised some of the inherent faults with the methodology, 
and instead took up NI 185 or a ‘185 +’ indicator, which expanded the influence of local 
authorities to include schools, hospitals and emergency services. Others had opted out 
because carbon management was not yet on the agenda for the authority: most 
commonly this was described by respondents as being a result of unwillingness from 
elected members’ to take this on. It was not clear exactly how they had resisted pressure 
from GORs to take up NI 186. One possibility was that some authorities were simply 
more truculent, and perhaps more detached from regional and national policy actors 
than others. In other words, maybe the ‘pushing’ from GORs could only be effective 
from those who recognised their authority, and who already had some level of 
engagement with the policy actors involved.
One respondent particularly emphasised the fact that data has not been readily made 
available to local authorities, either through Defra or the GOR flagging up where data 
might be found, suggesting that GORs -  as in the experience of some respondents
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during first wave practices -  again acted as ‘gate-keepers and lock-keepers’ of 
information:
I mean I had to do a lot of digging: Defra haven’t published a lot of this data. There’s an 
extra layer of data that they didn’t put on the website that I had to get from AEA. But an 
extremely important layer of data. There’s only one colleague in the North East who’s 
recognised that lack of data and has requested to know how I did it. Which leads me to 
believe, or guess, that there’s no other authorities in the North East that have really nailed 
down what this indicator means. Because you can’t from the level of data on the website.
Local Authority Officer, North East
The East of England Development Agency (EEDA), in a submission to the 
Environmental Audit Committee also argued that “central government needs to provide 
robust and back-calculated databases, disaggregated to the regional/local level, to 
support this process” (2008). This was something acknowledged as a problem by 
national respondents, including a suggestion that the RDAs needed to play a greater 
enabling role post-SNR, but also that Regional Innovation and Efficiency Partnerships 
(RIEPs) would have a key role in relation to LAAs and climate change (discussed in 
more detail in ‘fractured regionalisms’ below):
There is certainly scope for a lot more knowledge exchange between organisations at all 
levels and there is, I suppose, an issue around different departments and agencies making 
more effort to share their knowledge with each other.
Policy Executive, Defra (now DECC)
Carbon savvy authorities also engaged in a more subtle process of manipulation. 
Availability of local emissions data meant that there was a two to three year time lag in 
data being published: targets refer to a 2005 baseline, and 2008 data was not expected to 
be available until the final year of the current agreements. A number of local authorities 
took this opportunity to manipulate the process by ‘front-loading’ their target so that the 
2008-9 year has the highest projected carbon reduction; including, as it does, any 
reductions made in the years 2005-8. The LAAs with higher reductions in their first 
year were then able to commit to much smaller commitments over the final two years of 
the programme; the mean target for these LAAs was only 0.5 per cent higher than for 
the other ‘non-savvy’ Agreements (see Table 22, below).
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Table 22: ‘Carbon Savvy’ LAAs compared to whole population
Mean Target 
Whole Population ‘Carbon Savvy’
2008-11 10.5% 11.0%
2008-9 3.7% 6.2%
2009-10 3.2% 2.4%
2010-11 3.7% 2.5%
Silent intermediary: monitoring
A third issue relates to the role of GORs in monitoring the targets, which continues to 
highlight the highly top-down nature of NI 186. On this issue GOR representatives were 
no more than silent intermediaries for central government. All monitoring was to be 
carried out by AEA and Defra/DECC: “that’s a job for us; it’s centrally done, and really 
that’s the only way it’s possible to do it at the moment” (Central Government Policy 
Executive). This was partly pragmatic, but also shows the lack of control that regional 
and local actors had over the process. No easily utilisable tool was available to local 
authorities or regional actors to monitor changes to their own emissions, which made it 
difficult to challenge the monitoring data, particularly for low capacity ‘carbon naive’ 
authorities.
Finally, respondents were not clear as to how they would be rewarded or censured for 
their progress on meeting targets. There was an overall financial reward offered for 
achievement of goals across the LAA as a whole, but not for individual targets. This 
meant there was a lack of incentive for local authorities to meet their specific goals, as 
long as most priorities were met. As such, respondents felt that this would mean that NI 
186 could drop towards the bottom of priorities as local authorities focused on more 
politically achievable goals that met dominant economic and social policy lines. GOR 
officers recognised this, but argued that their role as ‘authoritative seducers’ came to the 
fore here in making sure that local authorities remained “on the ball” (GOR officer, SW) 
with NI 186.
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Multi-level fluidities of (quasi) authority and manipulation
The top-down developments in spatial carbon calculation started to map out a more 
clear route of disaggregated responsibility for certain regional actors -  especially GORs 
-  which points to a move towards ‘Type I’ multi-level governing of sub-national carbon 
management, with designated chains of hierarchy. These hierarchies also included 
differential governing modes, with national government adopting a more ‘traditional’ 
authoritarian mode once LAAs were agreed, and GORs taking on a more enabling role. 
It is in the negotiation process itself that power fluidities and ambiguities were more 
clearly asserted, however. Here, for example, (indirect) authority, seduction and 
manipulation overlapped as GORs attempted to persuade local authorities to take on NI 
186, and then to agree to specific targets. At the same time, the absence of provision 
proved to act as a constraining mode of governing in itself by denying access to 
information to some local authorities, while other authorities were able to use their own 
resources to manipulate the process of target setting. For some local authorities, then, 
the role of GORs in constraining options gave the NI 186 process a more authoritative 
air, while ‘carbon savvy’ actors were able to turn the process into one of genuine 
negotiation based around various modes of co-option.
Associative Ties: Fractured Regionalisms
Alongside regulatory moves towards forms of instrumental ‘carbon control’, and 
attendant scalar politics, there were concurrent moves towards a second wave of 
associative regional partnership building. These were built in part on the back of the 
new regulatory arrangements, in part as a rejection -  or lack of -  co-ordinated efforts to 
develop inclusive regional partnerships on climate change, and in part as a result of 
continuing RDA attempts to engage with business communities to attract inward 
investment and modernise their ‘indigenous’ economies. The move towards the 
mainstream of political thinking, including economic development policy, brought some 
additional ‘legitimacy’ to carbon regionalisms as they became more closely tied to 
either central governmental instrumental programmes or used monetary induction and 
were more squarely focused on particular audiences. As a result, there was a fracturing
of agendas along sectoral lines as regional climate change partnerships continued to
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develop alongside the introduction and development of a range of other partnerships, as 
well as some scalar fracturing as sub- and city-regions began to develop their own 
regional climate change ‘identities’.
Sectoral Fracturing
By 2009 each of the three regions had their own first wave Climate Change Action 
Plans, as did the other five ‘non-case study’ regions. Yorkshire and the Humber 
produced a second iteration of their plan -  Your Climate, Our Future -  in 2009, which 
struck a slightly more discursively pragmatic tone than the previous document: it 
focused less on seduction and moral induction and more on sets of issues based around 
10 ‘priority areas’. This perhaps reflected the lack of success in the previous strategy, 
but also that acting as an ‘umbrella’ for regional activity was increasingly difficult, as a 
number of other ‘regionalisms’ began to develop. While the plan was more focused -  
for instance attention on specific housing schemes in Kirklees and Rotherham -  the 
actions themselves tended to be equally vague, being focused on ‘supporting’, 
‘encouraging’ and ‘engaging’ in much the same manner as the first Plan. Stakeholder 
respondents expressed concern at the continuing lack of delivery framework or metric 
behind the plan, which prompted the inclusion of the following statement:
The plan does not list lots of detailed actions. It is not specifically linked to C 02 targets and 
cannot provide a breakdown of how they will be achieved.
Your Climate, Out Future, 2009 plO
This statement reflects a level of pragmatism about the extent to which the Action Plan 
could be expected to achieve large carbon savings, but also perhaps questions the point 
of going to the trouble of creating one in the first place, particularly given that other 
Partnerships were being created to grapple with specific issues of carbon management.
The most notable new partnership was the introduction of Regional Improvement and 
Efficiency Partnerships (RIEPs), led by regional local government associations. These 
were introduced across the regions in 2008, and part of their ambit was to support local 
authorities in delivery on climate change agendas through the CLG and Defra funded
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Climate Change Best Practice Programme. Central government actors had indentified 
an issue relating to the piecemeal nature of support offered to local, and regional, 
governing bodies:
Coordination of support for local and regional government on climate change mitigation and 
adaptation is recognised by the Government as essential. This has been reflected in the 
approach taken to developing the Climate Change Best Practice Programme and the wider 
RIEP programme
EAC Report Government Response, 2008 p5
This funding -  between £200,000 and £500,000 for each region per year -  was designed 
especially to support Local Authorities to deliver improvements in their National 
Indicators related to climate change: NTs 185, 186, and 188. This included facilitating a 
network of local authority climate change practitioners to share best practice and 
knowledge in both the North East and Yorkshire and the Humber, while in the South 
West Nl-specific networks were set up. For one respondent, these networks would be 
helpful in overcoming the knowledge gaps outlined in the discussion of the NI 186 
target-setting process, above:
I would say that the RIEP climate change board could be more involved in the LAAs in 
future, and help to set targets that are really more likely to fit local capabilities.
Regional Local Government Representative, NE.
RIEPs role in delivering the Climate Change Programme also created a strange situation 
with regard to the work of regional climate change partnerships and related action plans, 
as the two streams of work overlapped somewhat. In Yorkshire and the Humber it was 
mooted that the Regional Climate Change Partnership take leadership of the climate 
change element of the RIEP, but the Climate Change Partnership decided against doing 
so; ostensibly because they felt it would distract from the work they were already doing:
I went to the climate change partnership and said ‘do you want to act as leaders on this 
strand’. It seemed to make sense. But they said no! I came back to them ‘but you could get 
£1 million a year to do it’. Their argument was though that it would distract them from their 
purpose. I thought, ‘why on Earth would they not want to work on this’. And I think a big 
part of it is that they didn’t want us taking over, us dictating to them ... But a big chunk of 
the action plan involves RIEP, so...
Regional Local Government Representative, Y&H
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This issue fits with a wider criticism made by a number of local authority actors that the 
Regional Climate Change Partnership in Yorkshire and the Humber:
...continues on but seems to have been overtaken by events. There’s so much other stuff 
going on and they just seem to be stagnating there. I’m not really sure where they sit 
amongst all the other stuff that’s going on, even just at the regional tier.
Local Government Executive, Y&H
This is further compounded by the growth in associative regionalisms aimed at non­
policy actors. As an example of this, a developing carbon ‘new regionalism’ began to 
take shape between 2007 and 2009, particularly in Yorkshire and the Humber, but also 
across the other regions. This developed further the notion of carbon management 
offering economic gains to those that acted fastest to develop new technologies and 
adapt their businesses to be more carbon-efficient and link with earlier ideas around the 
competitive region. Such ideas were clearly prevalent in the initiation of ‘flagship’ 
renewable energy projects in the three regions, but now they were beginning to develop 
specific project streams based around carbon reduction as a regional issue. The launch 
of Carbon Action Yorkshire (CAY) was particularly notable in terms of developing a 
business-focused carbon regionalism. CAY was incorporated in 2007, with the aim of 
signing-up the 100 ‘top companies’ in the region -  including the largest public bodies -  
to commit to reduce their carbon emissions. This apparently met with some success, and 
by March 2008 60 of the target companies had signed up to the partnership “with 
another 39 expressing an interest” (Y&H Sustainable Development Board, March 2008, 
p6). In November 2009 this was then subsumed under the banner of COzSense 
Yorkshire, which drew together CAY with Future Energy Yorkshire and Recycling 
Action Yorkshire. The launch of these initiatives may also be seen as being implicit 
recognition that first wave action had made little or no difference to ‘on the ground 
activity’ and that more direct engagement with actors and organisations within the 
region was necessary.
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Scalar Fracturing
There was also a degree of scalar fracturing of climate regionalisms, as a number of 
sub- or city-regional arrangements began to form. These took place partially as a result 
of the SNR’s emphasis on multi-area partnerships at the city-regional level but also 
through a bottom-up push for supra-local action on climate change. Following the SNR 
the role of city-regions as an additional level of governing came to the fore, with the 
initial introduction of multi-area agreements (MAAs) in ten city-regions. Four of these 
lay within the case study regions: Tees Valley, Tyne and Wear, South Yorkshire and 
Leeds City-Region. Tyne and Wear took up NI 186 as a target, while Tees Valley had 
already developed a climate change action plan (Tees Valley Unlimited, 2007) as means 
of promoting action locally and regionally on carbon management.
The Tees Valley example represents an early rejection of the administrative region as a 
legitimate source of climate action. Led by Middlesbrough Council -  now a Climate 
Change ‘Beacon’ Council -  the five Tees Valley local authorities, alongside other ‘key 
partners’ including Scottish Power and the Environment Agency, developed a sub­
regional climate change action plan, beginning in 2007 ( ib id .) .71 This included funding 
a full-time co-ordinator for three years and was developed from a recognition of (a) a 
lack of action and (b) a gap between local and national action on climate change. In 
making these points there was an implicit rejection of the North East region as having 
provided insufficient leadership on these issues: as noted in the previous chapter, first 
wave action in the North East was relatively slow in taking place, which left a gap for 
other actors to fill.
Unlike regional efforts, this plan and the related partnership contained no ‘regionalist’ 
sentiment, but was instead built around a coalition of local authorities, in particular 
aiming to build on good practice identified in Middlesbrough. Significantly, no regional 
agencies were involved, while local authorities and LSPs were the main delivery 
organisations for 17 of the 30 actions. ONE North East was identified for support on 
one action -  “work towards the integration of renewable energy into the major new 
developments in the Tees Valley” -  but was otherwise absent.
71 T ees V alley consists o f  the areas covered by Darlington, Hartlepool, M iddlesbrough, Rcdcar and 
Cleveland and Stockton Borough Councils.
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The Tees Valley Climate Change Action Plan also set a 8.75 per cent (minimum) and 
14% (aspirational) target for reducing carbon emissions between 2000 and 2006-2012, 
as well as a 27 per cent minimum reduction 2012-2030, developed from 2000 baseline 
data for each LA in the partnership and introduced the Tees Valley Emissions 
Monitoring Protocol for measuring and reporting on emissions. A crude calculation 
taking LAA figures alongside the 2000 baseline minus major industry emissions 
suggests a 10.3 per cent reduction by 2006, suggesting that the sub-region had been 
relatively successful in meeting its goals. The Plan also sets out an objective to develop 
local authority action plans in each of the local authority partners, with the exception of 
Middlesbrough, which already had one. Unlike the regional partnership in Yorkshire 
and the Humber, this was successful in translating to local action: Darlington published 
its Plan in 2006; Stockton in 2007, with a refresh published in 2009; and Hartlepool’s 
was published in 2007. Only Redcar and Cleveland did not have an Action Plan in place 
by 2009.
Fractured legitimacies
The profusion of associative regionalisms, sub-regionalisms and city-regionalisms 
developing between 2007 and 2009 led national policy respondents to report co­
ordination of regional activities as “a nightmare”, with the attendant claim that “it’s a 
real case of too many cooks in the kitchen” (National policy co-ordinator). Seemingly, 
in the absence of strong institutional legitimacy -  spatial or governing -  for regional 
actors as a cohesive entity, they instead worked around specific areas where some 
shreds of legitimacy could be found. The rise of sub- or city-regional approaches post- 
SNR also raised questions about meso-level action on climate change. While the regions 
were seen as either too large, insufficiently active or not fully recognised by central 
government, local authorities still felt the need for some co-ordination between areas 
given both a lack of resources and the uncontainable nature of carbon emissions as a 
‘local’ issue.
RDA-led (new) regionalisms were developed around business efficiency, facilitating
funding sources and developing new technology ‘clusters’; and GOR-led instrumental
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regionalisms were developed around central governmental programmes. The Tees 
Valley also offered an example of bottom-up regionalism to fill a supra-local void in 
terms of climate change action, with legitimacy residing in the five partner local 
authorities ‘buy-in’. In Yorkshire and the Humber the development of these 
partnerships and programmes prompted further questioning of the regional partnership’s 
continuing role in governing climate action in the region. One local authority 
respondent, for example, offered the viewpoint that “they just seem to have outlived 
their purpose, but don’t seem to know it themselves yet”. Feelings were less strident in 
the North East and South West, but the carbon regionalist agenda had always seemed 
more muted in these two regions anyway, and the partnerships had operated alongside 
that general feeling with more restrained rhetoric.
Implications and conclusions
Was a shift taking place in the sub-national governing of climate change? Were we
seeing a move in the direction of more instrumental ‘carbon control’ regimes? At the
end of the research period this was not entirely apparent, not least because the
institutional framework of the regions remained fluid. A strong emphasis on the
facilitative and enabling roles of regional agencies remained, particularly in looking at
different initiatives towards developing ‘carbon regionalisms’. However, these
regionalisms had in some ways shifted focus to reflect, for example, the development of
new regulatory systems governing carbon emissions and renewable energy. At the same
time, these new regulatory systems were difficult to place as necessarily reflecting a
new era of ‘carbon control’, although it is clear that they differed from past regimes in
the sense that they were emplacing direct top-down, quantitative, governing
mechanisms that were largely absent previously. Yet, here, the role of regional agencies
was somewhat muddled: for instance, GORs acted as a conduit for national government
priorities, but it is difficult to tell exactly what their influence had been on the
regulatory system and the continuing uncertainty about regions roles as ‘accountable’
carbon spaces -  both in terms of calculation and democracy -  which also made it
difficult to analyse the emergent role of regional governing actors. These ambiguities
appeared to have affected the development of policies in at least one of the study
regions: the development of new regional partnerships and ‘regionalisms’ appeared to
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reflect a continuing, and growing role for regions as supporting governmental 
programmes through strengthening government messages, providing communication of 
these messages, and facilitating partnership working to achieve governmental goals.
This was not an apolitical process, however. In particular an emerging multi-level 
politics of knowledge was starting to take shape across scales and networks. The LAA 
negotiation process highlighted this particularly, with GORs and other bodies 
apparently unsuccessful in ensuring that local authorities had equal access to knowledge 
and evidence. There is no evidence that this was a deliberate strategy, more a ‘missed 
trick’. More directly, through planning interventions and regional funding strategies, 
there was scope for further political conflict, which as yet has been relatively muted: 
this was, however, dependent on national government and the EU giving stronger and 
more co-ordinated messages -  through different modes -  on the need for regional 
agencies to intervene.
As regional action became more fractured across different agendas and spatial levels, 
developing a cohesive strategy at a regional level became more difficult. Against a 
background of more strategic focus for regional bodies, and carbon management 
entering the radars of actors working across a range of policy domains, this was perhaps 
inevitable. But, nor was this fracturing necessarily negative. Potentially, the 
development of smaller, policy-specific approaches could also have provided space for 
the construction of ‘proper’ experimental regionalisms: given clearer ‘shaping’ from 
national government, regions were able to build new coalitions around these and 
experiment with new approaches. By binding themselves to more specific rationales and 
technologies, these regionalisms were more able to legitimise their existence than the 
broadly-defined ‘holistic’ regionalisms represented by regional climate change 
partnerships and action plans. In doing so, these developments also led to questioning of 
the future of region-wide climate change partnerships. The future success of these 
partnerships appeared to lie in their ability to recognise opportunities to work with other 
developing regional approaches -  as the Yorkshire and Humber CCAP failed to do in 
the case of the RIEP -  but also in their own positioning within regional governing 
networks: the development of separate regionalisms that were not placed under the 
umbrella of the regional partnerships in part serves to show the lack of buy-in from 
high-level regional actors.
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As I will briefly discuss in the following, concluding chapter, the election of the 
Coalition government in May 2010 marked a new era for the regions, which brought 
about plans to abolish RDAs and GORs, with some resources returning to the centre and 
Local Economic Partnerships -  most of which are likely to be based around city- 
regional or sub-regional partnerships -  taking on a narrower economic development role 
than the regional structures that preceded them. In July 2010, Communities and Local 
Government also announced that CAAs would be abolished in the spirit of ‘new 
localism’ (CLG, 2010), and it is likely that LAAs will go the same way. It is not yet 
clear what this means for sub-national carbon management arrangements, but a possible 
scenario would be that this narrower agenda sees a further centralisation of climate 
governance, with local authorities either ‘set free’ of specific targets, or -  potentially -  
tied even more directly into governmental programmes such as the mooted local carbon 
budgets (FoE, 2010).
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13 Conclusion
This research account has attempted to uncover the ways in which the governing of carbon management was unfolding in the English regions, with particular 
emphasis on spatial ‘meta-technologies’ aimed at re-imagining, calculating and 
connecting regions as ‘carbon spaces’. In doing so, the thesis has explored how these 
practices developed and changed over time, with two distinct waves of action identified. 
To draw this account to a close, reflection on the research aims, findings and 
implications helps to set the analysis within a wider political and theoretical context, 
whilst also looking to future avenues for research.
Research Aims
In the introduction to the thesis I set out four basic research questions as follows:
-  How is carbon management being governed in the English regions?
-  Specifically, how are practices of governing being used to re-imagine regions as 
‘carbon spaces’?
-  What are the specific spatial practices involved in doing so?
-  How have these practices changed over time?
In essence this was an exploratory piece of research that aimed to bring empirical light
to the role of sub-national governing organisations in carbon management amid
suggestions that ‘carbon control’ was usurping sustainable development as the leitmotif
of eco-state restructuring. I investigated the extent to which this shift might be viewed
within a study of climate policy by first exploring early region-led attempts to engage
with climate agendas -  ‘pre-carbon control’ action -  against practices formulated within
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the context of rising governmental and popular interest in climate change as a policy 
agenda.
In particular, following the glut of policy and academic focus on the ‘new regionalism’ 
and region-led economic growth I was interested in the ways in which regional actors 
were attempting to develop spatial practices that tried to ‘re-draw’ the region as a 
carbon space through either discursive techniques to re-imagine the region, or re­
calculation of the region through monitoring carbon emissions. These were also cast 
within the notion of re-connecting the region through enrolling actors to a shared 
approach to carbon management: a ‘carbon regionalism’.
Yorkshire and the Humber offered a useful study in that regional actors were relatively 
early in adopting carbon management initiatives, especially in terms of outward-facing 
regionalisms. This was seen most clearly through the adoption of an aspirational 
emissions target for the region and then also developing the first regional climate 
change action plan in England. While not central to the study, views from the North 
East and South West were imperative in providing context to the decisions made within 
Yorkshire and the Humber as well as material that helped to build on understanding of 
some of the wider issues and trends in the regions.
Research Findings
The empirical studies drew out a gamut of matters for discussion, from the discursive 
framing of ‘regional’ issues through to the varying success of actors in connecting with 
those operating with different network or scalar relationships. At the forefront of this 
was an overarching understanding, particularly within first wave events, that while 
some level of activity on governing carbon management was taking place, there was 
very little direct action to reduce carbon emissions. Because of the temporal proximity 
of the research to second wave events, these too were only at the stage of being 
constructed, with the impact of these yet to become clear. The implementation of the 
two types of meta-technology in this thesis summed this up well, with the development 
of targets and action plans being treated almost as an end in themselves by policy­
makers. Impact on actions that would reduce carbon emissions was minimal and the
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further that investigation moved along potential routes of implementation of 
technologies, the more slender the connection between the technology and the actions of 
governed entities became. The target in Yorkshire and the Humber may be seen as an 
attempt to ‘mainstream’ carbon management, but this had limited success because of 
insufficient action to include it in decision-making processes. Where attempts were 
made within Yorkshire Forward to implement an internal target this also failed to have 
significant impact on governing practices. The Action Plan gave an opportunity to 
remedy this situation, but it failed to deliver any meaningful actions with ‘on the ground’ 
impact or link these to any sense of quantitative achievement of the regional target.
The reasons for these initial failures were manifold. They include the thematic 
legitimacy of climate change as a serious policy item, as well as the fact that policy 
makers at all levels were only just beginning to think about how to integrate the issue to 
existing policy structures. A range of different questions was also presented by the 
changing role of regional actors within multi-level governing processes, and also by the 
way in which policy actors understood and considered the geographic space that they 
were attempting to govern. Four core themes may be drawn out from these sets of issues. 
Two of these are quite specific and relate respectively to changing practices of 
governing and changing institutions. The second two consider more broadly ‘the search 
for order’ in constructing formations and some reflections on how policy actors 
approach the issues of imagining and re-imagining the region.
Changing practices
Changing practices may be described, in short, as follows. First wave sub-national 
action on carbon emissions was piecemeal, poorly resourced, and involved too few 
people. Sub-national carbon politics were largely characterised by disconnection and 
disengagement. Regional governing practices were essentially aimed to effect change 
indirectly through co-optive meta-technologies. This reflected an understanding by 
regional actors that their role was purely to ‘set the strategic tone’ or carry out some 
broad enabling and facilitative actions. This in part suggests that regional actors lacked 
the resources, or perceived autonomy, to be bolder in their actions, both because of
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external -  central government -  and internal -  regional policy networks -  ambivalence 
towards carbon management as a legitimate policy agenda.
Around 2007, central government became more involved, including the introduction of 
a more coherent system of calculation. This resulted in a shift in roles, and a fracturing 
of agendas for regional actors. The emerging politics of governing carbon management 
stemming from these changes centred not around disconnection or disengagement, but 
on the variegated nature of connection and engagement: that is, the forms of resources 
made available (or not) and the forms -  and focus -  of power being exercised.
Second wave action saw a clear move towards the use of more instrumental 
technologies, tied to particular governing programmes, but these are not as simple to 
categorise as to say they were ‘authoritarian’, or ‘coercive’. They operated along the 
fuzzier boundaries between power modalities, and used more subtle means to 
manipulate and induce action. For example, while LAA targets and CAA monitoring 
were not examples of ‘classic’ governing by authority, they did begin a process of 
shaping the ways in which local authorities consider the space that they govern. Equally, 
the agreed targets were to be monitored on a ‘light touch’ basis and were agreed through 
negotiation rather than imposition. Nonetheless, the imbalance of resources between the 
parties involved meant that central government (Defra) and GORs were able to 
manipulate the process through the selective provision of knowledge and evidence to 
local authority officers.
Referring back to While, Jonas and Gibbs’ ideas regarding eco-state restructuring and
carbon control (2010, see also below), sub-national sustainable development agendas in
the 1990s and 2000s placed emphasis on the role of governing actors in developing
partnerships and fostering associative practices to effect behavioural change. Early
moves towards delivering specific climate policy goals relied on similar means.
However, these did not disappear with the emergence of more instrumental practices of
carbon control. Instead they became more focused around specific goals and rationales
which often related to the instrumental programmes. Here the path-shaping activities of
the state become clear. National government’s ambiguity towards climate change as an
issue in the early stages of regional action propagated a sense of existential muddle with
relation to both the region as a political entity and as a ‘carbon space’. As they became
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more involved in sub-national activity, however, this led to a clear shaping of regional 
actions: they became more focused on specific areas of economic or central 
governmental concern.
Changing institutions
The research period also covered a number of institutional changes, which had a bearing 
on the way in which carbon management practices were developed. The 2007 Sub- 
National Review resulted in greater resources -  in terms of statutory responsibilities -  
being given to RDAs, while the tone of the Review focused very much on ‘strategic’ 
economic development. As such, there were fears that environmental issues might 
become even more muted in regional policy. Instead there was a relative ‘explosion’ 
and fracturing of carbon management activity around a range of agendas, as noted 
above. In light of what was to follow in the 2010 general election this might be viewed 
as the beginning of the end of ‘standardised’ regionalism with the start of a new process 
of re-scaling and retrenchment of the state through the institution of more narrowly 
configured city-regions. Some of these city regions chose to focus on climate issues, but 
the majority did not; at least in their formal Multi-area Agreements.
The arrival of the Coalition government in May 2010 was marked by a number of
announcements regarding the future of many of the institutions and programmes
discussed in previous chapters. In the Coalition’s programme fo r  government (2010) it
was announced that RSSs would be “rapidly” abolished. In June 2010 it was announced
that the RDAs would also be abolished (CLG, 2010), with GORs hearing that they
would meet the same fate in the October Comprehensive Spending Review  (HM
Treasury, 2010). CAAs were also removed, with LAAs likely to follow suit. Some of
the resources and responsibilities were to be returned to central government, some
planning freedoms given to local authorities and some economic development
responsibilities reserved for voluntary Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). This may
be seen as a continuation of narrowing of sub-national agendas and potentially
signalling an even more squeezed space for ‘inclusive’ carbon regionalisms, although
low-carbon agendas as a focus of economic growth priorities were relatively well
represented in the 56 proposals submitted by prospective LEPs. Instead, both parties in
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the Coalition have committed to implementing local carbon budgets (FoE, 2010), which 
may signal a further centralisation of resources and power, with a concomitant 
localisation of responsibility for carbon management.
Much of this thesis is dedicated to the relative failure of regions as institutional spaces, 
both as legitimate spaces of governing and more specifically in implementing climate 
policy. This requires some further unpacking, especially in light of the abolition of 
statutory regional bodies. First, the arguments do not propose that regions per se are 
intrinsically doomed to fail as political constructs. Nor do I propose that the English 
administrative regions could not have become ‘legitimate’ political constructs given the 
right conditions and resources. Rather, there were problems with the framing of what 
legitimacy they did possess and then a seeming over-extension of what could be 
achieved when compared to what actors were able -  within the scope of national and 
international regimes -  or willing -  within the scope of individual organisations -  to do. 
The problem with this ‘centralised regionalism’ was that (a) it was difficult for regions 
to frame policies around non-mainstream policy lines as they did not have sufficient 
freedom to determine how to utilise resources, (b) the institutional set-up of regions was 
such that it reflected central concerns and as such was not designed to deal with non­
mainstream policy, and finally (c) when the centre became unsure as to how best to 
proceed, or did not give sufficient freedoms for regions to proceed themselves, there 
was insufficient bottom-up support for them to continue.
The search for order
Both first and second wave spatial practices may be framed as being part of a ‘search
for order’, in terms of defining and delineating what climate change meant for
governing actors and also in terms of what the region meant within that. In terms of
region-led approaches, the calculation, monitoring and targeting of regional emissions
in Yorkshire and the Humber was a particularly clear signal of attempts to reconfigure
the region as a carbon space. This largely failed to carry weight with other actors within
the region, however, and may be partially put down to the fact that this ‘search for order’
was highly disordered in both its construction and implementation. Clear bureaucratic
lines were not implemented (a la Wiebe, 1967), but nor were these programmes linked
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to a cohesive programme of associative seduction or facilitation. When regional actors 
developed broad-based regionalist approaches, these were not directly linked to targets 
and suffered from a lack of legitimacy in the sense that they did not give any real 
indication of the value of their actions. Partnerships and Action Plans -  especially in 
Yorkshire and the Humber -  also failed to filter through to other levels of governing and, 
again, seemed to suffer from a malaise of being unsure how to order activities on carbon 
management. The failure of these programmes to operate across scales may be said to 
have left these ‘regional’ actors as only regional in title: they were operating very much 
as localised actors with connections limited to a small number of other people in offices 
in Leeds (Yorkshire Forward and GOYH) and Wakefield (YHA and LGYH).
Second wave instrumental programmes carried a much clearer organising logic, 
however. Regions were more clearly tied into a national monitoring framework, with 
area-wide carbon targets for local authorities linked to specific roles for regional actors. 
These gave regions a source of legitimacy as part of a central governmental programme, 
which overrode some of the ongoing problems of spatial legitimacy that acted as an 
explanans and also consequence of the failure of first wave actions.
On the other hand, second wave associative programmes, built on a tighter instrumental 
logic, in some ways created an even more disordered sub-national space of carbon 
management. This disorder had some negative effects: for example, in creating 
difficulties for those attempting to co-ordinate -  or order -  carbon management, and in 
developing overlaps between programmes (see the discussion on the relationship 
between the REIP and the RCCAP in Chapter 12). At the same time, however, a clearer 
process of metagovemance from ‘above’ helped to create a space for the beginnings of 
genuine engagement with carbon management issues across different sectors based 
around specific goals. In a sense one might therefore argue that the beginnings of 
clearer spatial regulation of carbon management may have worked to start off a process 
of proper experimental carbon regionalism had the regional tier not been so abruptly 
curtailed in 2010. This perhaps also reflects the wider tensions between ‘creative 
destruction’ and ordered regulation in capitalist economies.
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Re-imagining the region
Building on the above, some wider conclusions can be drawn about the way in which 
policy actors imagined and then attempted to re-imagine sub-national space. The ability 
to re-imagine the region as a carbon space was hampered from the start by the fact that 
initial imaginings had not reached any settled understandings in the first place, and had 
undergone ongoing uncertainty. Creation of a new policy domain on top of existentially 
muddled infrastructure that already sat upon unsteady and shifting sands simply added a 
new level of uncertainty for policy-makers. What the ‘carbon region’ might look like, or 
whether such an object could in fact be constructed was not explicitly considered. 
Similarly, regional policy-makers did not spend a great deal of time considering their 
role in relation to the space they aimed to govern: for instance, what resources they had 
at their disposal and which different power modalities they could exercise. Instead, they 
chose to follow well-trodden policy routes used in other domains. This was problematic, 
in part because of a lack of ‘thematic legitimacy’ for climate change as a policy area, 
which also impacted on the level and types of resources available. As a result, the co- 
optive action plans and targets had few levers to encourage others to get ‘on board’.
Spatial carbon policy was calculated in both first and second waves through an 
understanding that it could be tackled through the deployment of policy across existing 
spatial containers. This may reflect the way in which many ‘new’ policy areas are 
developed. Tony Gore (2005, p i) suggests that this may reflect “a neoliberal concern to 
obtain control over complex or ‘wicked’ issues by attempting to insert connective 
strands into an institutional structure that remains fundamentally unchanged”. Literature 
on spatial calculation and the sociology of accounting (see Miller, 1994) also highlights 
the post-enlightenment tendency towards ‘making things the same’ through calculative 
practices so that they can be easily compared and combined. The use of existing 
geographical boundaries therefore makes carbon ‘the same’ as other spatially calculated 
properties such as GVA per capita.
Simplifying responsibilities and boundaries through use of existing scales and territories
may be beneficial in terms of inserting ‘connecting strands’ with other policy
infrastructures and then co-ordinating action across different policy areas. The
prevailing approach therefore views different spatial formations essentially as
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containers, and as contiguous. But this desire to homogenise quite different spatial 
properties is potentially problematic. In particular, the calculation of carbon to date 
throws up three sets of dilemmas. First, there are issues as to how sub-national carbon 
calculations have viewed these spatial containers. For instance, certain aspects of sub­
national space were excluded as national, or international concerns, while whole other 
sectors were left unconsidered in terms of suggested actions to deliver carbon reductions. 
Similarly, there were different views of how these containers were ‘put together’. First 
wave regional targets measured the region as a ‘flat’ unit of space, without reflection of 
difference across that space, while centralised DECC monitoring saw regions as no 
more than an agglomeration of local authorities. On top of this was a seeming 
misunderstanding of the notion of scale: regional actors understood the region as 
operating ‘above’ local authorities, and as such were ambivalent about engaging with 
them. They instead attempted to by-pass them to interact with other ‘regional’ actors: 
‘regional’ businesses, or regional public sector institutions such as the NHS. This left 
targets, action plans and partnerships somewhat divorced from ‘real’ scalar relations 
with, for example, local authorities.
Second, the region as a carbon container immediately frames the way in which it is 
measured and calculated, which gives rise to a more fundamental limitation to this 
approach to policy spaces. One aspect of this is that it means that only action that took 
place directly within the region counted towards regional emissions. For example 
DECC’s point-source approach to emissions monitoring takes simply those emissions 
generated in local authorities ‘at source’. This meant that the linkages between actors 
within the region and elsewhere were downplayed. That is, the ‘embedded’ emissions in 
consuming goods and services produced elsewhere are given little attention. Later 
iterations of the Yorkshire and Humber regional target referred to consumption-based 
methodologies. This included embedded emissions from various activities, but because 
the sources of these were outside of the contained region, and the region lacked the 
capacity and/or willingness to productively engage with the points of production, this 
meant that potential policy was limited to reducing demand for products.
Finally, the rise of national and international ‘scaled networks’, such as the international
Cities for Climate Protection network, suggest that some actors are beginning to
imagine carbon spaces as ‘like-spaces’ made up of urban areas with similar political
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concerns or other properties. This is quite different from the notion of the nation state 
consisting of a number of ‘russian doll’ discrete and spatially contiguous containers, 
which poses questions about how national policy might engage with such imaginings 
within more traditional ‘top-down’ policy domains. For instance, policy actors could 
approach carbon management as an issue for different types of space -  for instance, 
specific sets of policies for core cities, small towns, rural areas and so on -  which may 
not sit together within a region, or perhaps even nation. It may even allow for groups of 
local authorities to develop their own shared ‘spaces’ as policy units, which again may 
not sit neatly together in a traditional spatial sense. This has yet to come out in policy 
considerations. Such an approach might mean a different understanding of the region. 
For instance, ‘unbound’ cities may form one type of policy network, scaled nationally 
or internationally, while in this scenario ‘unplugged’ spaces could become the focus of 
regional enabling measures: in many ways quite different from the cities-as-growth- 
poles approach taken by RDAs.
Theoretical Implications
This account drew on three core sets of ideas: exploring the construction of governed 
spaces through the notion of spatial and governing legitimisation; understanding the 
plural nature of spatial and power relations (within limits); and the need to develop a 
framework that could capture both the how and where of these relations, including the 
mediations and translations that might take place ‘in-between’. Contributions have been 
made to the literature on each of these issues. More specifically the aim was to 
contribute to debates on eco-state restructuring and carbon control, with hints towards 
the implications of an emergent multi-scalar politics of calculation. This involved 
exploration of a way of capturing the multi-level exercise and mediation of power 
through re-working Harriet Bulkeley and colleagues’ Modes of Governing framework.
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Found in translation?
As first discussed in the introduction through Italo Calvino’s I f  on a winter's night a 
traveler, this research account has particularly highlighted the importance of studying 
the role of mediators and intermediaries in governing programmes, and of the 
translations that can occur in power modalities and the technologies themselves as they 
are mediated through chains of actors. In relation to the practices analysed in the 
previous chapters, this politics of mediation draws attention to how -  for example -  
knowledge and evidence were manipulated by different actors in processes of 
calculation and the effects this manipulation might have on eventual policy outcomes.
Multi-level Governance theories can help to model these processes to some extent, and 
place emphasis on the connective strands between different actors, but this approach 
also fails quite significantly to either encapsulate (a) power relations between actors or 
(b) the multi-directional nature of power. In relation to the latter it might be that re­
framing MLG as ‘multi-site governing’ helps to overcome this issue, although this 
thesis has been more concerned with exploration of (a), which is a more fundamental 
problem.
The Modes of Governing framework opens up these issues somewhat, by helping to 
focus on the specific ways in which new policies and strategies are developed and 
implemented; and how governing institutions may attempt to draw others into their own 
set of logics and practices. Re-framing the approach through more explicit attention to 
John Allen’s thesis on the ‘lost geographies of power’ helps to further open up the 
subtleties of power, to give a potentially richer understanding of governing processes; 
especially when combined with a more flexible approach that takes into account the 
multi-site and multi-directional exertion of power. Re-working this approach has 
allowed for understanding of the fluid nature of power, the full constellation of 
processes and relations that comprise a governing practice and -  of particular 
importance -  the ways in which these are mediated by different actors across space.
In particular, attending greater focus to the translation of discourses, interests and 
governing programmes makes it possible to clearly trace the way in which such matters
are mediated by others. This helps to find clear points of success or failure within
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governing processes but also brings added depth to the understanding of implementation. 
The process of deploying a governing technology is illuminated beyond the initial 
actors and the eventual governed entity and instead clear fault lines are exposed. This 
also brings a more nuanced dimension to understanding multi-level processes: different 
rationales and power modalities are highlighted as they are added and removed from 
programmes as they pass through different sets of actors.
Carbon calculation and control
In Chapter 4, carbon control was understood as a continuance of ‘narrowing’ trends of 
ecological modernisation in practice. Analysis of first and second wave action on 
carbon reduction in the regions would seem to bear this out. For example, rhetoric 
within policy documents focused on the idea of ‘decoupling economic growth from 
growth in emissions’, through technological fixes, rather than understanding the 
problem as intrinsically linked to capitalist economic systems. Calculating and 
economising nature -  in the guise of carbon -  also grew as a theme, for instance in 
Yorkshire Forward’s use of a carbon calculator tool, and then the integration of 
emissions targets into LAAs. More broadly this is encapsulated by the focus in the Stern 
report (and subsequent ‘mini-Sterns’ for Liverpool and Manchester) on the cost of 
carbon, shadow pricing in governmental departments and continued development of 
different emissions trading regimes across Europe and North America. Similarly, 
carbon was seen as something that could be ‘made the same’ as other policy domains 
and implemented as a ‘connecting strand’ within a fundamentally unchanged governing 
infrastructure. Changes that did take place to sub-national institutions were not made 
out of any consideration for climate policy. The focus of second wave associative 
practices also showed a narrowing as well as fracturing of agendas as different 
institutions sought to build coalitions of engagement around energy supply and 
associated technologies, organisational efficiency and waste reduction. These all centre 
on changes to organisational behaviour and technological fixes, rather than fundamental 
societal transformation. Social justice elements do not feature strongly within these 
themes, nor do processes of democratic deliberation.
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Clearly there were some quite important changes to the way in which carbon was 
spatially governed over the study period, and these changes do in part follow those of 
the ‘carbon control’ thesis. The introduction of Local Area Agreements, with regional 
actors as mediators in both authoritarian and enabling practices showed a clear scaling 
of carbon reduction policy, with delineated responsibilities. This moved towards a view 
of regions not as carbon spaces in themselves but as merely collections of more 
‘legitimate’ or manageable spaces in the form of local authority areas. In first wave 
practices the relative importance of local authorities to regional actions was not always 
clear to regional actors, whereas in second wave actions they became a clear focus. 
Although the exact form of these instrumental programmes will change over the coming 
period, there are hints that spatial calculation will continue and potentially harden 
through the introduction of mandatory local carbon budgets.
The identification of two waves of carbon management policy within the research 
period is also important to note in that it sets emerging trends of ‘carbon control’ within 
the evolution of climate policy, rather than moving from an analysis of sustainable 
development to climate change as the central concern of eco-state restructuring. This 
allows an understanding not just of how concern for climate change increased in recent 
years, but what this means for different actors as carbon management moves from an 
associative goal to one of increasingly constraining instrumentalism on the one hand 
and selective enabling on the other.
The changing role and space of ‘in-between’ governing organisations takes this 
somewhat further, in showing a trend of ‘stripping out’ meso-level policy concerns. 
This saw a move from broad-based regions to a simplified structure of economic 
governance, to city-regions and now LEPs. LEPs potentially mark a final reduction of 
(city-) regional policy to a small range of specific economic interventions. The role of 
wider environmental policy within these is almost entirely lost, while carbon reduction 
is relevant only where it contributes to economic rationales. Indeed, the Coalition 
government has been short on definitive action on carbon reduction so far, while 
international progress on a post-Kyoto framework has also stalled following the 
identified ‘second wave’ of climate policy, or first phase of carbon control. There does, 
however, appear to be an incremental move towards carbon as a more mainstream
‘currency’ of calculation within governing at all levels.
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The calculation of space is highlighted as an important research agenda within emerging 
literature on carbon control (While, 2010). This thesis developed this in further 
conceptualising the role of calculation in governing practices, the ways in which 
different forms of calculating carbon can frame policy decisions and the politics of 
knowledge and evidence that surround these calculations. A linked area of thought here 
relates to the moral tensions relating to targets and related calculations in themselves. 
The literature outlined in Chapter 4 on emerging academic debates on emissions targets 
and related programmes -  including the carbon control thesis -  focuses mainly on the 
potentially regressive nature of such types of calculations. This represents only one side 
of the moral issues relating to targets. On the one hand the methods by which 
calculations are constructed and deployed may, by the very nature of homogenising 
complex issues into a single number, result in the loss of important nuances and in turn 
become environmentally and socially problematic in their consequences. On the other 
hand, emissions targets and monitoring allow others to see a clear and concise 
indication of where an organisation, city or country currently is, and where they are 
aiming to get. Being able to say -  as many have -  that targets are not ambitious enough 
or that progress towards meeting them is too slow, shows that such calculations can also 
open up organisations to a degree of accountability and in many ways invites interested 
parties to explore the black box of policy formation. This, one might argue, is 
fundamentally a good thing. Rather it is the power relations involved in their 
deployment -  for instance imposition by national government on local authorities -  that 
determine the regressive or otherwise nature of calculations. It is therefore important to 
untangle whether targets and related calculations are in fact morally neutral devices in 
themselves, something which may become lost in focusing on the politics of their 
construction and implementation.
Analysing the development of carbon control from within carbon management policy
formations rather than in contrast to sustainable development logics highlights some
additional facets of the ‘rise of carbon control’ to those initially outlined by While,
Jonas and Gibbs (2010). In particular, it highlights the messy nature of environmental
policy formation, which is not always easily cast simply as state ‘strategic selectivity’.
Similarly, the role of different interest groups and policy actors in developing new
associative technologies around state programmes at urban and regional scales has
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perhaps been underplayed by While, Jonas and Gibbs: while instrumental policies were 
certainly seen to be on the rise, the responses to these policies continued to tend towards 
softer enabling measures -  and some increasing financial provision in specific sectors -  
rather than passing authoritative measures further down the chain of governing actors. 
That is not to say that this may change over time, particularly as carbon reduction and 
oil dependence imperatives become more keenly felt.
Limitations and future research agendas
While it is felt that this research account has something to offer in terms of empirical, 
conceptual and theoretical debates, various avenues remained unexplored, and others 
that were not explored in as great detail as may have been the intention at the outset. 
This is due in part to the nature of the research. This was an exploratory piece of 
research and as such took a deliberately broad view of governing carbon management in 
the regions. This meant confinement to within carbon management policy and some 
discussion of the inclusion of carbon management agendas within spatial rationales 
broadly speaking. As a result some of the debates take a broader view of events, rather 
than specific attention paid to -  for example -  the impact of policies on economic 
decision-making. This was in part enforced by lack of access to people working within 
RDAs, which shaped the research agenda somewhat. I would have especially liked to 
have spent more time exploring the impact of the Yorkshire Forward carbon calculator 
on decision-making within the organisation, which would have potentially provided a 
fruitful avenue for discussion within the framework of ‘re-calculating’ the region.
As noted in the discussion of research methods in Chapter 7, it was initially hoped to 
carry out some embedded research within an RDA or Regional Assembly, but this 
turned out not to be possible. Such an opportunity would have perhaps allowed for 
deeper saturation within the day-to-day deliberations of policy actors. This would have 
acted as an ‘added bonus’ to the material that I was able to generate through other 
measures, but was certainly not critical to uncovering the issues under consideration in 
this account. More likely it would have led to a different type of account, answering 
different sets of questions.
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I reflected in the introduction on the issues posed by the demise of the regions in terms 
of the continuing validity of this thesis. It is worth reiterating here the belief that the 
research has generated findings that are sufficiently applicable beyond a specific set of 
institutional arrangements in a specific place at a specific time. Beyond this, however, 
some difficulties were caused by the level of uncertainty with regard to the future of 
regional institutions throughout the research period. For instance, respondents often 
found it quite difficult to respond within any degree of certainty to even the simplest 
questions regarding future plans. Similarly, the changing role of regional organisations 
muddied the waters somewhat in terms of climate change policy, in trying to untangle 
which changes resulted from regional upheaval, and which were as a result of debates 
relating more specifically to carbon management. This is inevitably reflected in the 
research account, as it has meant that a wide range of different debates about the role of 
meso-level governing as well as of environmental policy have had to be marshalled, 
synthesised and then also untangled in order to describe and explain the events covered. 
This is generally seen as a positive aspect of the research in that it allows for some 
relatively wide-ranging discussion about some fundamental issues regarding the politics 
of spatial formations, but it did also preclude a more ‘compact’ analysis of a very 
specific set of issues or events.
The theoretical focus was chosen deliberately to avoid taking an overtly ‘regulation’, 
political-economy or -ecology approach to the study. The aim was to be slightly more 
inductive in terms of uncovering the politics of carbon management and approach the 
emerging policy domain as a serious political issue. This involved more discussion of 
basic principles regarding uncovering the exercise of power or construction of spatial 
formations rather than taking an approach that tied itself to particular sets of political a 
priori assumptions. That said, the aim of the study was not uncritical in the sense of 
exposing political disjunctures, inequalities and underlying state selectivities (or lack of). 
So, while the ‘multi-level power modalities’ approach did not in itself begin with 
specific transformational goals, its utilisation allowed for the researcher to begin 
uncovering where such goals might be developed.
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Further research: spatial calculus and sub-national decision-making
This thesis fits in with a wider programme of analysing the political implications of the 
state ‘taking climate change seriously’. The second wave fracturing of associative 
carbon agendas across different ‘strategically selected’ policy areas -  in particular 
energy, economic ‘new regionalism’ and specific local ‘efficiency’ agendas -  is 
interesting in itself; in particular to view how these different agendas are variously 
framed and shaped. But perhaps of more importance -  or at least interest to me -  is 
further examination of the role of emerging calculative practices in the framing of 
political decision-making.
This could first be expanded through further comparative research into the multi-level 
politics of calculation in other national contexts, as well as further development of how 
these practices enrol certain spaces and actors while excluding others: both areas of 
political contention, such as air travel or those that are deemed less important, such as 
particular groups of disenfranchised actors or places. While this thesis focused on the 
original construction and translation of spatial carbon accounting, which provided a 
necessary understanding of how these practices have unfolded within carbon reduction 
policy, it would now be illuminating to turn to how this ‘carbon calculus’ (While, 2010) 
is being played out in the wider politics of governing. This would include emphasis on 
the way in which carbon calculation, including technologies such as shadow pricing, are 
beginning to impact on economic policy rationales, as well as the way in which such 
calculations pass along different policy ‘chains’. This might include some emphasis on 
the wider behavioural effects of such technologies on organisations and individuals. 
Such discussion would benefit from deeper consideration in relation to the evolution of 
other policy domains, and in particular the evolution of calculation and the wider 
‘search for order’ within -  for example -  the welfare-state, economic policy or even 
other environmental agendas (see for example, Hopwood, 1983; Miller, 1994; Kalthoff, 
2005; Vollmer, Mennicken and Preda, 2008 on). It would also be useful to pay greater 
attention to the developing science of climate change to develop more nuanced 
frameworks regarding the calculative agendas of political actors. As yet political 
accounts -  this one included -  have only skimmed the surface of the political 
implications of carbon accounts and much could be learned from greater
interdisciplinary engagement between social and climate scientists.
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Second, and related, this research account pointed to issues relating to ‘unplugged’ and 
‘unbound’, or ‘carbon savvy’ and ‘carbon naive’ local authorities. While emphasis on 
emerging -  or experimental -  practices within unbound or carbon savvy authorities is 
important -  and is the subject of growing attention -  there are equally important 
questions that relate to those that struggle to keep up with changing agendas. For 
instance, what becomes of the urban hinterlands in city-regions within calculative 
regimes? While (2008) explored ideas of future non-economic growth agendas based 
around low-carbon competition and trading, but there are a range of concerns that are 
already beginning to play out regarding\ the level to which non-core cities and towns are 
acting on a level-playing field in relation to existing carbon management agendas and 
the extent to which they are able to effectively engage with what may become a second 
era of post-industrial economic restructuring in the West.
Finally, the modes of governing approach has been fleshed out in this thesis towards an 
approach that is more conceptually consistent with ideas of multi-level (or multi-site) 
governance; mediations, translations and mutations through networks; and multiple 
power modalities. This has helped to develop a more fully fledged ‘theory of change’. 
In order to develop this further, the approach outlined in this thesis requires further 
work in terms of testing in different policy domains, to answer different types of 
questions and in different spatial contexts.
Final reflections: non-human space in policy
Much of the analysis in this thesis pointed to the failure of governing actors to 
implement technologies that either act as strategic ‘steering’ measures for organisations, 
or make a difference to ‘on the ground’ delivery of carbon reductions. Most 
disappointing in the creation of new policy domains on carbon management has been 
the failure by mainstream policy actors to take the chance to ‘do governing differently’. 
As noted, plans across the regions -  but also nationally and locally -  detailed relatively 
similar approaches in terms of actions, seemingly through a lack of willingness to break 
from the regional policy ‘template’ as used in other policy domains. The creation of a
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new policy domain, particularly one with such far-reaching and complex consequences 
for human life as climate change, provides an opportunity to consider alternative 
methods of governing, or to engage with new groups of human and non-human entities. 
For instance, the calculative practices outlined in the empirical chapters could have been 
utilised to radically re-envisage the region as a genuine ecological space of ‘carbon 
flows’, rather than focusing on areas that were less politically contentious. Even within 
standard policy restraints, carbon regionalisms could have been built on genuine 
participation with local authorities, LSPs and individuals, rather than -  in a misguided 
search for ‘added value’ -  being based on acting around the margins of policy and 
spaces.
Reflecting more broadly, progress on carbon emissions reduction remains slow and 
subject to periods of time where seemingly little happens, as well as spaces of inaction. 
This is shown in this thesis through the microcosm of regional policy. But it is also a 
reflection of wider trends, epitomised in the failure of the Copenhagen summit in 2009 
to deliver progress on ‘Kyoto II’ and the continuing reluctance of economically 
developed nations to act on their moral duty in taking a lead on emissions reduction and 
providing sufficient aid to those unable to escape the consequences of climate change. 
The responses that have been taken are narrow, limited and over time potentially 
socially and environmentally regressive. The Coalition government in the UK promised 
that they would be “the greenest government ever” (Cameron, in The Guardian, 2010), 
but had failed to live up to this billing at the time of writing. Large cuts to the budgets 
of DECC and Defra announced in the 2010 Spending Review, and the abolition of the 
Sustainable Development Commission as part of the government’s ‘bonfire of the 
quangos’ are particularly worrying portents for the wider consideration of 
environmental agendas in government.
It could be argued that policy-making as a whole is an attempt to grapple with the 
contingency and impermanence of existence. Nonetheless current ecological crises 
make recognition of the relativity, impermanence and plurality of space all the more 
critical for policy actors. There is some evidence that policy actors are beginning to 
acknowledge at least a small proportion of the challenges relating to the specific crisis
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of climate change, but there remains a fundamental reluctance to grapple with the notion 
of non-human space and recognise that it is ‘real’.
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Annex 2 Research participants
Table 24: Respondents by job category
Yorkshire and 
the Humber North East South West Total
National Policy Actor N/A N/A N/A 3
Regional Policy Director 4 0 1 5
Regional Policy Manager 6 4 2 12
Regional Policy Officer 2 2 0 4
Regional Stakeholder 3 2 2 7
Local Authority Executive 1 1 0 2
Local Authority Manager 7 5 3 15
Local Authority Officer 6 3 2 11
Local Councillor 2 0 1 3
Total 31 17 11 62
Table 25: Respondents by type of organisation
Yorkshire and 
the Humber North East South West Total
Central Government Department N/A N/A N/A 2
National Policy Commission N/A N/A N/A 1
Regional Development Agency 3 1 1 5
Regional Assembly 2 3 1 6
Government Office 2 1 1 4
Regional local government 
association 2 1 0 3
Stakeholder organisation 3 2 2 7
Local Authority / Council 15 9 6 30
Other 4 0 0 4
Total 31 17 11 62
A2
Table 26: Interviews by Stage of Research
Yorkshire and 
the Humber North East South West Total
Stage 1 16 7 4 27
Stage 2 22 11 8 41
Total 38 18 12 68
A3
Annex 3 Meetings and events attended
Workshops and consultation events
Regional Strategies and Climate Change workshop, Yorkshire and Humber Assembly, 
July 2007.
Regional Climate Change Action Plan review workshop, Yorkshire and Humber 
Assembly, July 2008.
Regional Climate Change Action Plan consultation workshop, Leeds City Council, 
March 2009.
Meetings
Yorkshire and Humber Regional Climate Change Executive Group meeting, September 
2007.
Yorkshire and Humber Regional Energy Forum board meeting, December 2007. 
Sheffield First Low Carbon Group meeting, January 2009.
Focus groups
Yorkshire and Humber Regional Assembly Sustainable Development team, June 2007. 
Sheffield City Council Sustainable Development team, March 2009.
